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# taz.de -- Migration policy in Tunisia: Fortress Europe in North Africa
> To ward off terrorism, the EU is building border facilities for Tunisia.
> But the country is reluctant to become a detention centre for transit
> migrants.
Bild: 2011: A refugee from Ghana at the border between Libya and Tunisia
Of course the border with Libya is open. Or at least porous. This was
repeatedly asserted during investigations in Tunisia in early 2015, by the
political side as well by civil society groups. At the official border
crossing points, there were controls; however, according to these claims,
for those who knew the ropes or had the necessary money on hand, it was
relatively easy to cross the national border that extends, in large part,
all the way across the desert.
Among the North African neighbour states, the “open door“ policy was viewed
as one accomplishment of the “Arab Spring“. No-one could, or would want to,
halt the daily border traffic in southern Tunisia. That would deprive the
already impoverished local population of its livelihood.
According to the statements of workers from international organisations, at
the controlled border crossings, about 100 dollars would be demanded on the
quiet in order to continue travelling into Libya. Syrians used this route
through the South of Tunisia when fleeing to Europe. The route that passed
through Turkey, from there by airplane to Algeria, across the border to
Tunisia and then on to Libya, in search of a boat that would carry them
across the Mediterranean Sea, was viewed in early 2015 as a less costly and
lower-risk alternative to the so-called Balkan route through Eastern
Europe.
After the attack on the Bardo Museum in the Tunisian capital in late March
2015, the atmosphere in the country changed overnight. After the revolution
of 2011, representatives of the various Tunisian transitional governments
had appeared noticeably reserved with regards to European ambitions to
involve Tunisia more deeply in the expansion of its border and migration
controls. As Tunisian civil society grew stronger, the hope for a
democratic, human rights-based policy on migration and refugees was
palpable. In early 2015, practically from one day to the next, these
efforts were once again subordinated to the interests of national security.
The border to Libya was closed out of fear of further terrorist invasions.
The attack on tourists on the beach at Sousse in the following summer
further reinforced the abrupt return to a repressive configuration of
Tunisian border and migration policy.
## The dictator as border protector
The EU and its member states energetically support Tunisia's
security-oriented comeback: Representing a last remaining hope for
democracy, the country is supposed to be preserved against the chaos
threatening its neighbour states and supported in its aspirations toward
democracy and a free market economy patterned on a Western role model. As a
secure transit land along the central Mediterranean route, it is also
intended to play a key part in re-stabilising the European border regime.
A retrospective: In the 1990s, as European states began jointly securing
their external borders, co-operation with Tunisia played only a minor role.
Italy already maintained good relations with the then-dictator Ben Ali and
thereby effectively tied Tunisia through a bilateral co-operation agreement
into the expanding European compartmentalisation regime. Under pressure
from Europe, the authoritarian regime prohibited and criminalised
“irregular migration“ by law, starting in 2004, controlled its sea borders
and thereby effectively lay the groundwork for pre-planned migration
control based on the European model.
It was only after the fall of President Ben Ali that Tunisia consequently
become a “problem“ for Europe in terms of border and migration policy. A
brief historical moment of reduced and disorganised border surveillance
during the uprising in early 2011 was enough to allow 25,000 migrants to
cross the sea to Italy. As war broke out in Libya and thousands fled from
violence and instability, first into neighbouring Tunisia and then further
on to Europe, the arrivals in Italy nearly doubled. Added to this came the
great movement of refugees along the Balkan route. In reaction to these
events, which Europe called a “refugee crisis“, Italy imposed a state of
emergency and France and Denmark suspended the Schengen Agreement and
closed their national borders.
## Money for expulsion
The European states were in agreement that unregulated migration to Europe
on this scale was to be averted in the future at all costs. Despite
multiple manifest displays of humanitarian concern and commendation for the
democratic turnaround, the EU offered no appreciable new responses to the
migration policy challenges of the “Arab Spring“. In essence, it pushed the
Tunisian transitional government to re-establish the co-operations
involving matters of return and border security that had existed before the
revolution, in order to stabilise the fragile, momentary border regime in
the Mediterranean.
To do this, at first the EU mainly offered Tunisia money. The EU indicates
that since 2011, payments to Tunisia thereby doubled overall. Up until
2016, they add up to €3.5 billion in total. The numerous bi- and
multilateral agreements, “partnerships“ and “dialogues“ that were made …
Tunisia in this period focus primarily on so-called positive incentives.
More European funds for development and democracy promotion were meant to
prompt Tunisia to take back more “irregular migrants“ from Europe and deter
them from crossing the Mediterranean in the future.
In the form of civil-military co-operation the EU was fulfilling Italy's
wish, as well as its own, to strengthen border protection in the central
Mediterranean. In the context of the operation “Hermes“, starting in 2011,
the European border protection agency Frontex attempted to detect and
impede irregular border crossings. In 2015, its mandate was extended within
the framework of Operation FrontexPlus. To this day, there exists no
official agreement between Frontex and the Tunisian state to formalise the
operative teamwork and legitimate their “rescue“ of migrants by returning
them to Tunisia; in practice, Frontex nonetheless carries out direct
expulsions continually by handing over refugees on the sea to the Tunisian
military.
If Germany had its way, this practice, which has thus far been informal,
would prospectively become an official procedure within European border
management in the Mediterranean. German involvement in the area of Tunisian
security extends back to 2004. In the name of “combatting terror“, it was
reinforced in 2015 with training support, technical equipment, a liaison
office of the German police in Tunis and €100 million, and focused on
securing the land border with Libya. This was followed in 2016 by further
training missions, deliveries of speedboats, a document testing laboratory
and, in part, military equipment and devices for border security, mostly
produced by Airbus. From Germany's perspective, apparently not only
terrorists but also refugees and migrants should be stopped by these
sponsored border protection measures.
## Reluctant implementation
The EU has also been expanding its involvement for further border security
in North Africa since 2015, in the name of “combatting international
terror“. With the support of the International Organisation for Migration
(IOM), as well as the UN refugee agency UNHCR and the International Centre
for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), it is attempting to shift the
failed mission to bolster Libyan border protection (EUBAM Libya) over to
Tunisia. Under EUBAM Tunisia, €23 million are earmarked over the next three
years for the reform of the Tunisian security sector. Over half of the
money is designated to expand border protection, including, for example,
three so-called situation centres at the borders to Algeria and Libya.
Tunisia may gratefully accept European money, but so far, it remains
hesitant to implement its co-operation promises in the area of migration
control. After the revolution in 2011, the representatives of the various
transitional governments were no longer willing to play “doorkeeper“ to
Europe. It proved especially reluctant to implement the security-oriented
approach being forced upon it by the EU, against the will of an
increasingly self-confident and organised civil society. Even until today,
Tunisia has refused to become the official main receiving country for
migrants “rescued“ from the Mediterranean Sea by EU border protection
agency Frontex and European member states. Even the number of migrants who
have actually been returned from Europe on the basis of bilateral
agreements is negligible.
As to the implementation of a functional system for asylum, which was to
have been developed with support from UNHCR starting in 2012, skepticism
and disagreement prevail. Many fear that this could encourage the EU in the
future to not only return refugees and migrants back to Tunisia, but to
also generally contain them there.
In Europe, recommendations come up time and again for so-called reception
centres, where refugees in North Africa would apply for asylum and, if
necessary, also wait for their relocation to Europe. The most prominent
recommendation dates back to a German-British initiative from 2004. In the
years that followed, the so-called Blair-Schily Plan was repeatedly taken
out of the drawer and considered, yet due to concerns about human rights
and asylum policy, it never gained a majority in the EU. Just how much such
concerns have changed within the EU can be seen in the conclusion of the
Turkey Agreement in March 2016, in which Turkey is to be compensated with
€6 billion and the prospective facilitation of visas for its own citizens
in exchange for taking back, and “providing temporary protection to“,
Syrian refugees.
## Expulsion to the desert
It hasn't gone this far in Tunisia yet. As long as there is no functional
system for asylum in Tunisia, people who have been “rescued“ while fleeing
and are sent there have almost no chance to validate their right to asylum
and gain adequate protection. According to a report by the UN Special Envoy
in 2013, irregular border crossings and sojourns in Tunisia can still be
punished by imprisonment. After the revolution, this practice was at first
suspended, but the corresponding law from 2004 was never abolished.
With regards to migrants who are rescued or returned to Tunisia, the law is
still being repeatedly applied in a deliberate way today. Those caught
under it are incarcerated in one of the so-called reception centres. Many
migrants coming from sub-Saharan Africa who were apprehended in Tunisia
without valid papers are also imprisoned there. However, the Tunisian state
lacks the money to deport them. Instead, it charges a fine for the period
of the irregular stay in the country. This must be paid, along with the
cost of their own plane ticket, by the migrants themselves in order to
effectively “bail themselves out“ of jail and “deport themselves“. If t…
migrants or their families cannot pay the fast-growing sums, they may be
deported without warning to the desert – formerly to Libya, now
increasingly to Algeria.
The Tunisian state makes money from the irregular and precarious presence
of migrants in the country and seems to be in no hurry to change the legal
foundation of these arbitrary, opaque practices. During a stay in Tunisia
in early 2015, it was possible to observe how “irregular“ migrants were
being driven out of the large cities in the North through arrests,
incarcerations and deportations, away from the proximity to the coast and
out of the focus of international publicity. “Tunisia keeps its coastal
borders sealed, there's no problem with migration here“ was the message
directed at Europe. In the South, by contrast, the Tunisian state left its
borders porous and allowed migrants stay as mobile as they liked, for the
most part. Knowing that the migrants' only chance is the route across Libya
and the Mediterranean to Europe, one might have hoped, through this tactic,
to be rid of the “problem“ at some point. For this, there would be no need
to implement EU-sponsored measures, only to selectively look the other way.
## Tunisia becomes a secure third state
However, Tunisian interest in controlling migration and borders changed
fundamentally in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2015. As it became
known that the assassinators came from Libya, or were trained there,
Tunisia immediately closed its border to the neighbouring country. With
financial support from Germany and the USA, in late 2015 the Tunisian
government even started construction on a “separation barrier“, 168
kilometres long and 2 metres high, along the Libyan border. Whether this
will be implemented in the future additionally as a defence against
refugees and migrants on the way to Europe, as expected by Germany and the
EU, remains to be seen.
In reaction to the EU's so-called refugee crisis of 2015, its member states
have agreed upon new initiatives intended to help them to expand migration
and border control continually further across the African continent. In
order to reinforce co-operation with so-called third states, it seems that
not only “positive incentives“ are to be provided from now on, but
additionally, “negative sanctions“ will be used if a country does not
co-operate.
As it appears in the “Partnership Framework for co-operation with third
countries“, in the first place, the EU is pursuing the goal of creating
conditions to “enable migrants and refugees to stay close to home and avoid
people taking dangerous journeys“. With the “Protection and Development
Programme for North Africa“, it has already created a new financial
instrument for this. It is set to equip the IOM with €10 million to build
up capacities in North Africa in the area of asylum and to provide better
protection for migrants there in the future. Thus the goal of current EU
policy toward Tunisia is nothing less than to make the country into a
“secure“ location where migrants on the way to Europe can be held and
expelled.
## Negative incentives
Secondly, by conducting swift, smooth expulsions the EU wants to deter
migrants from crossing to Europe. For this purpose, as well, it is courting
Tunisia vigorously. In October it sent the surprising news that it wished
to resume negotiations on a mobility partnership that had proceeded rather
haltingly since 2011. In essence, the agreement signed by Tunisia in 2014
promises visa facilitation, particularly for its highly qualified national
citizens, if in return, the country takes back migrants who have entered
the EU via Tunisia. In practical terms, this has not yet been implemented.
The EU is trying to move implementation along with a “flexible approach“
and to negotiate both central aspects of re-admittance and visa
facilitation in a “parallel“ yet “separate“ manner. The emphasis on two
separate agreements obscures the otherwise unmistakable similarity to the
Turkey Agreement.
If Tunisia continues to resist co-operation in taking back and providing
protection for migrants from the EU, it may lead to negative consequences
for European support in the country. Tunisia is one of 24 focus countries
in which the EU wants to make its support in all fields of policy dependent
upon the country's co-operation in “combatting irregular migration“
Re-admitting its own citizens and transit migrants is also a central
element of this. In concrete terms, the EU is demanding the acceptance of
its own issued return papers and the introduction of biometric data
processing within border management. After Jordan and Lebanon, Tunisia is
the next country with which the EU is striving for investigation probes in
this context. From this, it may be presumed that the deal with Turkey will
soon be followed by a deal with Tunisia.
There is much to indicate that, in the future, Tunisia is intended to play
a key role in European policy on migration prevention and expulsions along
the central Mediterranean route. Thus far, in any case, Tunisia resists
becoming North Africa's largest “outdoor prison“ for Europe's unwelcome
migrants. Signs of protest from within civil society can already be heard.
12 Dec 2016
## AUTOREN
Inken Bartels
## TAGS
migControl
Schwerpunkt Flucht
Terrorabwehr
Tunesien
Schwerpunkt Anschlag auf Berliner Weihnachtsmarkt
migControl
sichere Herkunftsländer
Afrika
## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA
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EU-Gipfel zu Flüchtlingspolitik: Keine Flucht aus Afrika
Auf ihrem Gipfel peilt die EU die komplette Schließung der
„Mittelmeerroute“ aus Afrika an. Bis Dezember sollen „konkrete und messba…
Ergebnisse“ vorliegen.
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