# taz.de -- Migration policy in Tunisia: Fortress Europe in North Africa | |
> To ward off terrorism, the EU is building border facilities for Tunisia. | |
> But the country is reluctant to become a detention centre for transit | |
> migrants. | |
Bild: 2011: A refugee from Ghana at the border between Libya and Tunisia | |
Of course the border with Libya is open. Or at least porous. This was | |
repeatedly asserted during investigations in Tunisia in early 2015, by the | |
political side as well by civil society groups. At the official border | |
crossing points, there were controls; however, according to these claims, | |
for those who knew the ropes or had the necessary money on hand, it was | |
relatively easy to cross the national border that extends, in large part, | |
all the way across the desert. | |
Among the North African neighbour states, the “open door“ policy was viewed | |
as one accomplishment of the “Arab Spring“. No-one could, or would want to, | |
halt the daily border traffic in southern Tunisia. That would deprive the | |
already impoverished local population of its livelihood. | |
According to the statements of workers from international organisations, at | |
the controlled border crossings, about 100 dollars would be demanded on the | |
quiet in order to continue travelling into Libya. Syrians used this route | |
through the South of Tunisia when fleeing to Europe. The route that passed | |
through Turkey, from there by airplane to Algeria, across the border to | |
Tunisia and then on to Libya, in search of a boat that would carry them | |
across the Mediterranean Sea, was viewed in early 2015 as a less costly and | |
lower-risk alternative to the so-called Balkan route through Eastern | |
Europe. | |
After the attack on the Bardo Museum in the Tunisian capital in late March | |
2015, the atmosphere in the country changed overnight. After the revolution | |
of 2011, representatives of the various Tunisian transitional governments | |
had appeared noticeably reserved with regards to European ambitions to | |
involve Tunisia more deeply in the expansion of its border and migration | |
controls. As Tunisian civil society grew stronger, the hope for a | |
democratic, human rights-based policy on migration and refugees was | |
palpable. In early 2015, practically from one day to the next, these | |
efforts were once again subordinated to the interests of national security. | |
The border to Libya was closed out of fear of further terrorist invasions. | |
The attack on tourists on the beach at Sousse in the following summer | |
further reinforced the abrupt return to a repressive configuration of | |
Tunisian border and migration policy. | |
## The dictator as border protector | |
The EU and its member states energetically support Tunisia's | |
security-oriented comeback: Representing a last remaining hope for | |
democracy, the country is supposed to be preserved against the chaos | |
threatening its neighbour states and supported in its aspirations toward | |
democracy and a free market economy patterned on a Western role model. As a | |
secure transit land along the central Mediterranean route, it is also | |
intended to play a key part in re-stabilising the European border regime. | |
A retrospective: In the 1990s, as European states began jointly securing | |
their external borders, co-operation with Tunisia played only a minor role. | |
Italy already maintained good relations with the then-dictator Ben Ali and | |
thereby effectively tied Tunisia through a bilateral co-operation agreement | |
into the expanding European compartmentalisation regime. Under pressure | |
from Europe, the authoritarian regime prohibited and criminalised | |
“irregular migration“ by law, starting in 2004, controlled its sea borders | |
and thereby effectively lay the groundwork for pre-planned migration | |
control based on the European model. | |
It was only after the fall of President Ben Ali that Tunisia consequently | |
become a “problem“ for Europe in terms of border and migration policy. A | |
brief historical moment of reduced and disorganised border surveillance | |
during the uprising in early 2011 was enough to allow 25,000 migrants to | |
cross the sea to Italy. As war broke out in Libya and thousands fled from | |
violence and instability, first into neighbouring Tunisia and then further | |
on to Europe, the arrivals in Italy nearly doubled. Added to this came the | |
great movement of refugees along the Balkan route. In reaction to these | |
events, which Europe called a “refugee crisis“, Italy imposed a state of | |
emergency and France and Denmark suspended the Schengen Agreement and | |
closed their national borders. | |
## Money for expulsion | |
The European states were in agreement that unregulated migration to Europe | |
on this scale was to be averted in the future at all costs. Despite | |
multiple manifest displays of humanitarian concern and commendation for the | |
democratic turnaround, the EU offered no appreciable new responses to the | |
migration policy challenges of the “Arab Spring“. In essence, it pushed the | |
Tunisian transitional government to re-establish the co-operations | |
involving matters of return and border security that had existed before the | |
revolution, in order to stabilise the fragile, momentary border regime in | |
the Mediterranean. | |
To do this, at first the EU mainly offered Tunisia money. The EU indicates | |
that since 2011, payments to Tunisia thereby doubled overall. Up until | |
2016, they add up to €3.5 billion in total. The numerous bi- and | |
multilateral agreements, “partnerships“ and “dialogues“ that were made … | |
Tunisia in this period focus primarily on so-called positive incentives. | |
More European funds for development and democracy promotion were meant to | |
prompt Tunisia to take back more “irregular migrants“ from Europe and deter | |
them from crossing the Mediterranean in the future. | |
In the form of civil-military co-operation the EU was fulfilling Italy's | |
wish, as well as its own, to strengthen border protection in the central | |
Mediterranean. In the context of the operation “Hermes“, starting in 2011, | |
the European border protection agency Frontex attempted to detect and | |
impede irregular border crossings. In 2015, its mandate was extended within | |
the framework of Operation FrontexPlus. To this day, there exists no | |
official agreement between Frontex and the Tunisian state to formalise the | |
operative teamwork and legitimate their “rescue“ of migrants by returning | |
them to Tunisia; in practice, Frontex nonetheless carries out direct | |
expulsions continually by handing over refugees on the sea to the Tunisian | |
military. | |
If Germany had its way, this practice, which has thus far been informal, | |
would prospectively become an official procedure within European border | |
management in the Mediterranean. German involvement in the area of Tunisian | |
security extends back to 2004. In the name of “combatting terror“, it was | |
reinforced in 2015 with training support, technical equipment, a liaison | |
office of the German police in Tunis and €100 million, and focused on | |
securing the land border with Libya. This was followed in 2016 by further | |
training missions, deliveries of speedboats, a document testing laboratory | |
and, in part, military equipment and devices for border security, mostly | |
produced by Airbus. From Germany's perspective, apparently not only | |
terrorists but also refugees and migrants should be stopped by these | |
sponsored border protection measures. | |
## Reluctant implementation | |
The EU has also been expanding its involvement for further border security | |
in North Africa since 2015, in the name of “combatting international | |
terror“. With the support of the International Organisation for Migration | |
(IOM), as well as the UN refugee agency UNHCR and the International Centre | |
for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), it is attempting to shift the | |
failed mission to bolster Libyan border protection (EUBAM Libya) over to | |
Tunisia. Under EUBAM Tunisia, €23 million are earmarked over the next three | |
years for the reform of the Tunisian security sector. Over half of the | |
money is designated to expand border protection, including, for example, | |
three so-called situation centres at the borders to Algeria and Libya. | |
Tunisia may gratefully accept European money, but so far, it remains | |
hesitant to implement its co-operation promises in the area of migration | |
control. After the revolution in 2011, the representatives of the various | |
transitional governments were no longer willing to play “doorkeeper“ to | |
Europe. It proved especially reluctant to implement the security-oriented | |
approach being forced upon it by the EU, against the will of an | |
increasingly self-confident and organised civil society. Even until today, | |
Tunisia has refused to become the official main receiving country for | |
migrants “rescued“ from the Mediterranean Sea by EU border protection | |
agency Frontex and European member states. Even the number of migrants who | |
have actually been returned from Europe on the basis of bilateral | |
agreements is negligible. | |
As to the implementation of a functional system for asylum, which was to | |
have been developed with support from UNHCR starting in 2012, skepticism | |
and disagreement prevail. Many fear that this could encourage the EU in the | |
future to not only return refugees and migrants back to Tunisia, but to | |
also generally contain them there. | |
In Europe, recommendations come up time and again for so-called reception | |
centres, where refugees in North Africa would apply for asylum and, if | |
necessary, also wait for their relocation to Europe. The most prominent | |
recommendation dates back to a German-British initiative from 2004. In the | |
years that followed, the so-called Blair-Schily Plan was repeatedly taken | |
out of the drawer and considered, yet due to concerns about human rights | |
and asylum policy, it never gained a majority in the EU. Just how much such | |
concerns have changed within the EU can be seen in the conclusion of the | |
Turkey Agreement in March 2016, in which Turkey is to be compensated with | |
€6 billion and the prospective facilitation of visas for its own citizens | |
in exchange for taking back, and “providing temporary protection to“, | |
Syrian refugees. | |
## Expulsion to the desert | |
It hasn't gone this far in Tunisia yet. As long as there is no functional | |
system for asylum in Tunisia, people who have been “rescued“ while fleeing | |
and are sent there have almost no chance to validate their right to asylum | |
and gain adequate protection. According to a report by the UN Special Envoy | |
in 2013, irregular border crossings and sojourns in Tunisia can still be | |
punished by imprisonment. After the revolution, this practice was at first | |
suspended, but the corresponding law from 2004 was never abolished. | |
With regards to migrants who are rescued or returned to Tunisia, the law is | |
still being repeatedly applied in a deliberate way today. Those caught | |
under it are incarcerated in one of the so-called reception centres. Many | |
migrants coming from sub-Saharan Africa who were apprehended in Tunisia | |
without valid papers are also imprisoned there. However, the Tunisian state | |
lacks the money to deport them. Instead, it charges a fine for the period | |
of the irregular stay in the country. This must be paid, along with the | |
cost of their own plane ticket, by the migrants themselves in order to | |
effectively “bail themselves out“ of jail and “deport themselves“. If t… | |
migrants or their families cannot pay the fast-growing sums, they may be | |
deported without warning to the desert – formerly to Libya, now | |
increasingly to Algeria. | |
The Tunisian state makes money from the irregular and precarious presence | |
of migrants in the country and seems to be in no hurry to change the legal | |
foundation of these arbitrary, opaque practices. During a stay in Tunisia | |
in early 2015, it was possible to observe how “irregular“ migrants were | |
being driven out of the large cities in the North through arrests, | |
incarcerations and deportations, away from the proximity to the coast and | |
out of the focus of international publicity. “Tunisia keeps its coastal | |
borders sealed, there's no problem with migration here“ was the message | |
directed at Europe. In the South, by contrast, the Tunisian state left its | |
borders porous and allowed migrants stay as mobile as they liked, for the | |
most part. Knowing that the migrants' only chance is the route across Libya | |
and the Mediterranean to Europe, one might have hoped, through this tactic, | |
to be rid of the “problem“ at some point. For this, there would be no need | |
to implement EU-sponsored measures, only to selectively look the other way. | |
## Tunisia becomes a secure third state | |
However, Tunisian interest in controlling migration and borders changed | |
fundamentally in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2015. As it became | |
known that the assassinators came from Libya, or were trained there, | |
Tunisia immediately closed its border to the neighbouring country. With | |
financial support from Germany and the USA, in late 2015 the Tunisian | |
government even started construction on a “separation barrier“, 168 | |
kilometres long and 2 metres high, along the Libyan border. Whether this | |
will be implemented in the future additionally as a defence against | |
refugees and migrants on the way to Europe, as expected by Germany and the | |
EU, remains to be seen. | |
In reaction to the EU's so-called refugee crisis of 2015, its member states | |
have agreed upon new initiatives intended to help them to expand migration | |
and border control continually further across the African continent. In | |
order to reinforce co-operation with so-called third states, it seems that | |
not only “positive incentives“ are to be provided from now on, but | |
additionally, “negative sanctions“ will be used if a country does not | |
co-operate. | |
As it appears in the “Partnership Framework for co-operation with third | |
countries“, in the first place, the EU is pursuing the goal of creating | |
conditions to “enable migrants and refugees to stay close to home and avoid | |
people taking dangerous journeys“. With the “Protection and Development | |
Programme for North Africa“, it has already created a new financial | |
instrument for this. It is set to equip the IOM with €10 million to build | |
up capacities in North Africa in the area of asylum and to provide better | |
protection for migrants there in the future. Thus the goal of current EU | |
policy toward Tunisia is nothing less than to make the country into a | |
“secure“ location where migrants on the way to Europe can be held and | |
expelled. | |
## Negative incentives | |
Secondly, by conducting swift, smooth expulsions the EU wants to deter | |
migrants from crossing to Europe. For this purpose, as well, it is courting | |
Tunisia vigorously. In October it sent the surprising news that it wished | |
to resume negotiations on a mobility partnership that had proceeded rather | |
haltingly since 2011. In essence, the agreement signed by Tunisia in 2014 | |
promises visa facilitation, particularly for its highly qualified national | |
citizens, if in return, the country takes back migrants who have entered | |
the EU via Tunisia. In practical terms, this has not yet been implemented. | |
The EU is trying to move implementation along with a “flexible approach“ | |
and to negotiate both central aspects of re-admittance and visa | |
facilitation in a “parallel“ yet “separate“ manner. The emphasis on two | |
separate agreements obscures the otherwise unmistakable similarity to the | |
Turkey Agreement. | |
If Tunisia continues to resist co-operation in taking back and providing | |
protection for migrants from the EU, it may lead to negative consequences | |
for European support in the country. Tunisia is one of 24 focus countries | |
in which the EU wants to make its support in all fields of policy dependent | |
upon the country's co-operation in “combatting irregular migration“ | |
Re-admitting its own citizens and transit migrants is also a central | |
element of this. In concrete terms, the EU is demanding the acceptance of | |
its own issued return papers and the introduction of biometric data | |
processing within border management. After Jordan and Lebanon, Tunisia is | |
the next country with which the EU is striving for investigation probes in | |
this context. From this, it may be presumed that the deal with Turkey will | |
soon be followed by a deal with Tunisia. | |
There is much to indicate that, in the future, Tunisia is intended to play | |
a key role in European policy on migration prevention and expulsions along | |
the central Mediterranean route. Thus far, in any case, Tunisia resists | |
becoming North Africa's largest “outdoor prison“ for Europe's unwelcome | |
migrants. Signs of protest from within civil society can already be heard. | |
12 Dec 2016 | |
## AUTOREN | |
Inken Bartels | |
## TAGS | |
migControl | |
Tunesien | |
Terrorismusbekämpfung | |
Schwerpunkt Flucht | |
Schwerpunkt Anschlag auf Berliner Weihnachtsmarkt | |
migControl | |
sichere Herkunftsländer | |
Schwerpunkt Flucht | |
## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA | |
Berlin nach dem Terroranschlag: Offen bleiben, aus Trotz | |
Er sei heute besonders freundlich, sagt der tunesische Busfahrer. Wie die | |
Hauptstadt auf die Gewalt reagiert. | |
EU-Gelder für afrikanische Staaten: Flüchtlinge aufhalten, um jeden Preis | |
Milliarden fließen nach Afrika, wenn dafür keine Menschen nach Europa | |
kommen. Aber wie viel bezahlt die EU für den Grenzschutz-Service? | |
Diskussion um sichere Herkunftsländer: Gefahr im Maghreb | |
Die Bundesregierung bezeichnet Tunesien, Algerien und Marokko als „sicher“. | |
Experten des Bundesamtes für Migration sehen das anders. | |
EU-Gipfel zu Flüchtlingspolitik: Keine Flucht aus Afrika | |
Auf ihrem Gipfel peilt die EU die komplette Schließung der | |
„Mittelmeerroute“ aus Afrika an. Bis Dezember sollen „konkrete und messba… | |
Ergebnisse“ vorliegen. |