# taz.de -- Democracy and the Greek crisis: Breaking Europe’s Stunned Silence | |
> No longer does anybody in Brussels dare to resist orders from Berlin. Do | |
> we want a Europe run by decree? It’s time for debate. | |
Bild: The bosses discuss how to go ahead. | |
Some events are so severe one cannot bear them out for long. The Euro | |
Summit of July 12 and 13 was such an event. In one oppressive and feverish | |
overnight meeting, Chancellor Angela Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang | |
Schäuble left their mark not only on Greece, but on the whole euro zone. | |
Threatening to „temporarily“ exclude Athens from the euro, they imposed the | |
toughest conditions in the history of the euro crisis; a history already | |
laden with pressuring and dictates. | |
Since then, changes in Greece have been alarming – from a proud country | |
that dared a defiant „ochi“, to a mindless colony of the resurrected | |
troika. It’s not only Greece; the whole of Europe seems to have been left | |
paralysed. The 19 euro countries have agreed to a deal in which they | |
themselves do not believe. The International Monetary Fund has become | |
involved in a „rescue“ which is already known to be doomed, but which | |
nobody dares to refuse. Europe is in shock, a leaden mortis has enveloped | |
the euro zone. | |
No more clearly can this be seen than in the European Commission and its | |
president Jean-Claude Juncker. Having stepped up to bring the EU onto a | |
socially acceptable course for recovery, Juncker today no longer even dares | |
to present an impact analysis for new austerity measures for Greece. The | |
man who wanted to conduct a „political commission“, and in June presented | |
himself as a confident mediator is today begging Berlin for approval of the | |
new memorandum. | |
The Euro Group has transformed, too. Called into existence by France in | |
order to lay the foundations for a growth-oriented „economic government“, | |
today no political debate with this informal conglomerate is possible. | |
Greece’s former Minister of Finance Yanis Varoufakis tried, and failed | |
resoundingly. Under Schäuble’s uncanny direction, the Euro Group is merely | |
a club of small shopkeepers attending to it that German „stability“ rules | |
are complied with. | |
National economic findings play as negligible a role as democratic | |
practices. On the contrary; in the Euro Group of 2015 it is good form to | |
disregard the results of elections and referendums, and to prepare | |
decisions based on secret „non-papers“, unavailable for public debate. With | |
his submission prior to the Euro Summit of the „time out“ for Greece, | |
Schäuble honed this approach to perfidious perfection. | |
Against this background, it is no wonder that many get the feeling that | |
this is no longer their Europe. The southern Europeans in particular are | |
losing faith in democracy, as no less than the employer-focused „Institut | |
der deutschen Wirtschaft“ discovered. However, discontent is also on the | |
rise within Germany. Even as Merkel and Schäuble celebrate record approval | |
ratings, 56 percent of Germans think the Greek crisis has been mismanaged. | |
While the Euro Summit may have averted the largest immediate danger of a | |
Grexit and its chaotic consequences, the most important asset up until this | |
point – European political consensus – was broken with, for citizens as | |
well as politicians. For the first time in EU history, Merkel and Schäuble | |
overtly threatened a member country with expulsion. In another first, they | |
openly defied France’s interest in keeping Greece in the euro, and refused | |
to debate on a „Grexit“. This will bear consequences. | |
One need not go as far as Shahin Vallee, previous advisor to the former | |
Council President Herman Van Rompuy. The Frenchman warned that the Greek | |
deal could destroy the euro by undermining the trust between Germany and | |
France. One also need not see things as bleakly as Greece’s Varoufakis, who | |
insinuated that Schäuble’s true goal was to discipline France. It is | |
nevertheless clear that the Euro Summit marked a rupture in Franco-German | |
relations. | |
The European Commission will now need to dress for the cold. Schäuble will | |
not be satisfied with simply reining Juncker in and deterring any | |
„interference“ in the affairs of the creditors. Next, he wants to even | |
curtail the responsibilities of Brussels’ authorities to monitor EU | |
treaties and competition law through, for instance, the creation of an | |
independent competition regulation authority. He appears to want to seize | |
this opportunity to break up power in Brussels. | |
So seen, the German walkover in Greece could be simply the prelude to a | |
much larger battle. If Berlin were to succeed in pressing Paris to the | |
margins and weakening Brussels, then „German Europe“ will have triumphed. | |
Nobody could then oppose Germany’s future wishes – with the exception | |
perhaps of British Prime Minister David Cameron, whom Merkel and Schäuble | |
still require for their power games. „Plan the Grexit, prevent the Brexit“ | |
is the name of Schäuble’s game. | |
Only the next two years will tell whether that strategy pays off – the | |
leadup to the referendum in the UK, and the presidential elections in | |
France. Germany, too, will hold elections in 2017. The EU is therefore | |
about to see the most important months of its history. During them, the | |
union will decide whether it disintegrates, whether it pulls itself back | |
together or, with seemingly no alternative, whether it will submit to the | |
outcomes of German leadership. It is high time for debate in Europe – | |
particularly in Germany, where the strings are being pulled. | |
That debate is simply not getting into gear. Following the debacle of the | |
July Euro Summit a state of post-traumatic shock has set in not only in | |
Brussels, but also in Berlin. A state which has stunned all reasoning into | |
a stupor. That is too dangerous – it endows Schäuble and the apologists of | |
German Europe a power that they do not deserve. | |
Translation: Hans Kellet | |
17 Aug 2015 | |
## AUTOREN | |
Eric Bonse | |
## TAGS | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
Schwerpunkt Brexit | |
Lesestück Recherche und Reportage | |
EU | |
Schwerpunkt Flucht | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA | |
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After the Euro Summit in Brussels: Thus fails Europe | |
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