| # taz.de -- Schäuble’s role in Brussels: Merkel’s bogeyman | |
| > Chancellor Angela Merkel’s manner over the Greek conflict has been mostly | |
| > obliging, while her finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble played the role of | |
| > bad guy. | |
| Bild: „No“ to Schäuble. | |
| BERLIN taz | A historic moment? As if! When the German Chancellor stepped | |
| up to the microphone on Monday morning in Brussels, she was back in low-key | |
| Merkel mode. Appearing unruffled, she presented the results of the crisis | |
| summit: Greece would receive a new multi-billion bailout if it carried out | |
| the toughest of financial cutbacks: „All in all, the advantages outweigh | |
| the disadvantages.“ She said that she could advise the Bundestag to approve | |
| the plan „with complete conviction“. And no, she was not considering | |
| linking the ballot to a motion of confidence in her leadership. | |
| The initial climax to this drama could hardly have been put in more sober | |
| terms than those chosen by the Chancellor. The unity of the eurozone hung | |
| in the balance. The leaders of the 19 EU states had debated for 17 hours. | |
| They had argued and tussled, revoked traditional alliances then patched | |
| them up again. But Merkel did not breathe a word about the fact that she | |
| and her finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble had won all down the line. The | |
| draconian austerity agreement signed by the Greek government could hardly | |
| be called a compromise. | |
| For Merkel, this was crucial. She knows that many MPs in the CDU and CSU | |
| are at odds with a third bailout agreement. She desperately needed success | |
| in Brussels in order to scrape together a majority at the Bundestag’s | |
| special session on Friday. | |
| In Berlin, Merkel’s speaker Steffen Seibert explained the agreement. A | |
| Greek journalist asked whether the conditions would be a humiliation for | |
| Athens. This „good agreement“, retorted Seibert, was one involving all | |
| states. The Greek Syriza government had signed it, France had played a | |
| major role, and so had Germany. Merkel’s speaker sold the whole deal along | |
| the lines of an old political principle: victors must appear modest in | |
| their hour of triumph. | |
| In reality, Merkel smartly divided up the roles between herself and her | |
| finance minister. While she always appeared obliging, Wolfgang Schäuble | |
| flashed the torture instruments at the left-wing Syriza government. And in | |
| the end, it agreed to unprecedented austerity measures. | |
| ## Harsh cutbacks | |
| Schäuble’s manoeuvring began on Saturday afternoon when the finance | |
| ministers of the Eurogroup met to prepare Sunday’s meeting with the heads | |
| of state. He asked his state secretary to circulate a paper, which – | |
| allegedly – reflected the German government’s position. On it, Schäuble’s | |
| ministry sketched out two options for the Greek government to choose from | |
| in addition to harsh cutbacks. | |
| The first proposal was an external trust fund, into which Greece was meant | |
| to transfer €50bn of assets – such as airport, ports or property. These | |
| could then be privatised without the Greek parliament having the power to | |
| prevent it. | |
| The second proposal was even more controversial because it depicted a | |
| horror scenario that the German government had avoided up to this point: in | |
| the event that Greece could not get on top of its debts, a provisional exit | |
| from the eurozone would be possible, a „temporary Grexit“. | |
| ## The Grexit bluff | |
| Schäuble might as well have lobbed a burning torch into a gasoline depot | |
| with his paper. Italy’s head of government Matteo Renzi railed against the | |
| Germans’ obsession with economising (“Enough is enough“) and French | |
| president François Hollande brusquely rejected the idea. | |
| But the Grexit option was a mere bluff, and it did not figure much in the | |
| rest of the summit meeting. Instead the government heads concentrated on | |
| keeping Greece in the euro. However, the proposal had served its purpose. | |
| By cracking the whip at the Greeks, Schäuble drove them further towards the | |
| German position. This is supported by the fact that an almost identical | |
| formulation was laid out in the closing statement of Schäuble’s trust fund | |
| proposal, even though it amounted to a vote of no confidence in the Syriza | |
| government. | |
| On Monday morning, many European newspapers depicted Schäuble as Europe’s | |
| bogeyman, a disciplinarian who had imposed a diktat on Greece. But this | |
| view of things neglects Merkel’s role. At a federal press conference, | |
| government speaker Seibert confirmed that both options in the paper were | |
| coordinated with the Chancellor. A Grexit, however, was not the | |
| government’s priority. „That was a possible Plan B“, said Seibert, in the | |
| event that no agreement was reached, and if the Syriza government approved. | |
| So Schäuble is not only Europe’s bogeyman: he’s also Merkel’s protective | |
| shield. | |
| Translation: Lucy Renner Jones | |
| 15 Jul 2015 | |
| ## AUTOREN | |
| Ulrich Schulte | |
| ## TAGS | |
| taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
| taz international | |
| taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
| taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
| taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
| taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
| ## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA | |
| Democracy and the Greek crisis: Breaking Europe’s Stunned Silence | |
| No longer does anybody in Brussels dare to resist orders from Berlin. Do we | |
| want a Europe run by decree? It’s time for debate. | |
| After the Euro Summit in Brussels: Thus fails Europe | |
| Thanks to a loathsome alliance, Merkel and Schäuble have been able to | |
| impose all of Germany’s demands on Greece. The result is a regime of | |
| sanctions and coercion. | |
| Economist about the ECB and Greece: Like setting off a nuclear bomb | |
| The ECB denying Greece emergency loans would be blackmail, writes the | |
| economist Martin Hellwig. A crisis like 1931 could be created. | |
| Germany, Greece and the EU: Europe isn’t that German | |
| What kind of a Europe do we want? Surely one that values solidarity. The | |
| German course of austerity therapy has failed. It is time to correct the | |
| mistakes. |