# taz.de -- Schäuble’s role in Brussels: Merkel’s bogeyman | |
> Chancellor Angela Merkel’s manner over the Greek conflict has been mostly | |
> obliging, while her finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble played the role of | |
> bad guy. | |
Bild: „No“ to Schäuble. | |
BERLIN taz | A historic moment? As if! When the German Chancellor stepped | |
up to the microphone on Monday morning in Brussels, she was back in low-key | |
Merkel mode. Appearing unruffled, she presented the results of the crisis | |
summit: Greece would receive a new multi-billion bailout if it carried out | |
the toughest of financial cutbacks: „All in all, the advantages outweigh | |
the disadvantages.“ She said that she could advise the Bundestag to approve | |
the plan „with complete conviction“. And no, she was not considering | |
linking the ballot to a motion of confidence in her leadership. | |
The initial climax to this drama could hardly have been put in more sober | |
terms than those chosen by the Chancellor. The unity of the eurozone hung | |
in the balance. The leaders of the 19 EU states had debated for 17 hours. | |
They had argued and tussled, revoked traditional alliances then patched | |
them up again. But Merkel did not breathe a word about the fact that she | |
and her finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble had won all down the line. The | |
draconian austerity agreement signed by the Greek government could hardly | |
be called a compromise. | |
For Merkel, this was crucial. She knows that many MPs in the CDU and CSU | |
are at odds with a third bailout agreement. She desperately needed success | |
in Brussels in order to scrape together a majority at the Bundestag’s | |
special session on Friday. | |
In Berlin, Merkel’s speaker Steffen Seibert explained the agreement. A | |
Greek journalist asked whether the conditions would be a humiliation for | |
Athens. This „good agreement“, retorted Seibert, was one involving all | |
states. The Greek Syriza government had signed it, France had played a | |
major role, and so had Germany. Merkel’s speaker sold the whole deal along | |
the lines of an old political principle: victors must appear modest in | |
their hour of triumph. | |
In reality, Merkel smartly divided up the roles between herself and her | |
finance minister. While she always appeared obliging, Wolfgang Schäuble | |
flashed the torture instruments at the left-wing Syriza government. And in | |
the end, it agreed to unprecedented austerity measures. | |
## Harsh cutbacks | |
Schäuble’s manoeuvring began on Saturday afternoon when the finance | |
ministers of the Eurogroup met to prepare Sunday’s meeting with the heads | |
of state. He asked his state secretary to circulate a paper, which – | |
allegedly – reflected the German government’s position. On it, Schäuble’s | |
ministry sketched out two options for the Greek government to choose from | |
in addition to harsh cutbacks. | |
The first proposal was an external trust fund, into which Greece was meant | |
to transfer €50bn of assets – such as airport, ports or property. These | |
could then be privatised without the Greek parliament having the power to | |
prevent it. | |
The second proposal was even more controversial because it depicted a | |
horror scenario that the German government had avoided up to this point: in | |
the event that Greece could not get on top of its debts, a provisional exit | |
from the eurozone would be possible, a „temporary Grexit“. | |
## The Grexit bluff | |
Schäuble might as well have lobbed a burning torch into a gasoline depot | |
with his paper. Italy’s head of government Matteo Renzi railed against the | |
Germans’ obsession with economising (“Enough is enough“) and French | |
president François Hollande brusquely rejected the idea. | |
But the Grexit option was a mere bluff, and it did not figure much in the | |
rest of the summit meeting. Instead the government heads concentrated on | |
keeping Greece in the euro. However, the proposal had served its purpose. | |
By cracking the whip at the Greeks, Schäuble drove them further towards the | |
German position. This is supported by the fact that an almost identical | |
formulation was laid out in the closing statement of Schäuble’s trust fund | |
proposal, even though it amounted to a vote of no confidence in the Syriza | |
government. | |
On Monday morning, many European newspapers depicted Schäuble as Europe’s | |
bogeyman, a disciplinarian who had imposed a diktat on Greece. But this | |
view of things neglects Merkel’s role. At a federal press conference, | |
government speaker Seibert confirmed that both options in the paper were | |
coordinated with the Chancellor. A Grexit, however, was not the | |
government’s priority. „That was a possible Plan B“, said Seibert, in the | |
event that no agreement was reached, and if the Syriza government approved. | |
So Schäuble is not only Europe’s bogeyman: he’s also Merkel’s protective | |
shield. | |
Translation: Lucy Renner Jones | |
15 Jul 2015 | |
## AUTOREN | |
Ulrich Schulte | |
## TAGS | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz international | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA | |
Democracy and the Greek crisis: Breaking Europe’s Stunned Silence | |
No longer does anybody in Brussels dare to resist orders from Berlin. Do we | |
want a Europe run by decree? It’s time for debate. | |
After the Euro Summit in Brussels: Thus fails Europe | |
Thanks to a loathsome alliance, Merkel and Schäuble have been able to | |
impose all of Germany’s demands on Greece. The result is a regime of | |
sanctions and coercion. | |
Economist about the ECB and Greece: Like setting off a nuclear bomb | |
The ECB denying Greece emergency loans would be blackmail, writes the | |
economist Martin Hellwig. A crisis like 1931 could be created. | |
Germany, Greece and the EU: Europe isn’t that German | |
What kind of a Europe do we want? Surely one that values solidarity. The | |
German course of austerity therapy has failed. It is time to correct the | |
mistakes. |