# taz.de -- Germany, Greece and the EU: Europe isn’t that German | |
> What kind of a Europe do we want? Surely one that values solidarity. The | |
> German course of austerity therapy has failed. It is time to correct the | |
> mistakes. | |
Bild: The majority wants a Europe of solidarity, one that bands together for th… | |
BERLIN taz | „Politics begins with the contemplation of reality.“ Since the | |
Greek 'no’ there have been so many lies flying around the German political | |
landscape that one wants remind the top-ranking German politicians and | |
leading spin doctors of that famous quote by Social Democrat Kurt | |
Schumacher. Ah yes, reality. It is currently being negated by many, and | |
unscrupulously reinterpreted by others. So much so that the prejudice | |
within the German discourse could gain the upper hand. That, however, must | |
not be allowed. | |
The result of the Greek referendum is not, as the Bild-Zeitung imagines it, | |
a simple rejection of the euro. With his policies, Prime Minister Alexis | |
Tsipras has not „burnt the last bridges“ towards compromise as SPD leader | |
Sigmar Gabriel maintains, nor has Tsipras’ government lit a wildfire in | |
Europe, as CSU General Secretary Andreas Scheuer claimed, before he went on | |
to rail against „leftist wrong-way drivers“, „blackmailers“ and „dece… | |
of the people“. | |
Reality? You must be joking. This is what propaganda looks like – | |
instrumentalising reality to one’s own ends. That kind of incitement has | |
nothing to do with rationality, let alone respect for other cultures or | |
democratic conventions. | |
The question on the ballot papers was precisely formulated; it referred to | |
the most recent austerity measures offered by the EU institutions – and | |
nothing more. At the same time, surveys showed that a large majority of | |
Greeks want to stay in the eurozone. In real terms: around 60 percent of | |
all Greeks, in particular many young people, are calling for a stop to the | |
brutal austerity measures. Some 40 percent of all citizens would even be | |
prepared to accept further hardships, despite rampant poverty. | |
The debt-ridden country is therefore not as torn as it would appear. The | |
Greek 'no’ is in fact a committed ‚yes’. The majority want a Europe of | |
solidarity, one that joins forces for the weak and leaves nobody behind. A | |
Europe that does not cowtow to the euro, the stock exchange and the market, | |
but one that champions the primacy of politics, fellowship and integration. | |
To ask the careful question: don’t we all want that? Moreover, isn’t such a | |
vision of a bountiful alliance worth a couple of billion euros? | |
## In essence apolitical | |
Those who interpret this complex, conflicted situation as a vote for | |
leaving the euro are acting irresponsibly – and in essence apolitically. | |
One has grown accustomed to the CSU top dogs’ dulled reactions to anything | |
happening beyond the Bavarian border, as if they had poured five Weißbier | |
down their gullets at breakfast time. | |
However, it is apalling to see the SPD chairman stoop to courting prejudice | |
in order to clutch at percentage points. In the matter of the Greek | |
question, the German Social Democrats have denied their very essence which, | |
despite Agenda 2010, should have something to do with social warmth and | |
international solidarity. Whether Sigmar Gabriel’s right-leaning approach | |
can still win points with fearful voters remains to be seen. | |
That the damage done to the party image will remain is clear. However, | |
given the drama of the process, one could almost begin to no longer care | |
about the SPD again. What kind of strange understanding of democracy is | |
this anyway – to label a referendum on harsh austerity measures a trick, or | |
an attempt to blackmail the EU? Chancellor Angela Merkel, Gabriel and the | |
CSU leaders are otherwise constantly lauding the idea that the people must | |
be allowed to speak their voice strongly. It is precisely in such European | |
questions that more participation is drastically needed. | |
## Rituals laid bare | |
Many harbour the prejudice that Brussels is a bureaucracy-obsessed Moloch, | |
wholly detached from everyday life. When the government of an EU state | |
allows its citizens to vote though, the same parties act as if it were a | |
coup against the European idea. To actually implement direct democracy – | |
what are these cheeky devils thinking?! | |
The charming thing about the at times aimlessly wandering Syriza government | |
is that it lays well-practiced rituals bare. With the referendum, Tsipras | |
broke with prevailing EU logic. The troika had always negotiated on | |
restrictions with only a few of those involved in the governments – at the | |
exclusion of the parliament, not in sought-after backroom deals, and with | |
criteria that almost nobody understood. | |
The pressure that they exerted, the lack of reality in some of their | |
austerity plans and the leverage enacted on parliamentary rights only came | |
to broad public knowledge with the Greek crisis. One must be grateful to | |
Tsipras’ left-wing government for this act of transparency. | |
Behind the plumes of the smoke grenades being thrown by all those involved, | |
what is being missed is that two policy approaches are colliding. The EU | |
institutions, the German government and the other EU member states are | |
adhering to the dictum that in order for an economy to grow, its markets | |
need only be set up liberally enough. Tsipras and Co. are pushing for a | |
Keynesian investment policy, and debt relief. | |
## Misguided austerity dictum | |
Many hard facts now suggest that Germany’s approach to Greece is not | |
working. In recent years, Greece has cut its budgets by more than 30 | |
percent. Its economy has shrunk by almost a third, unemployment has shot up | |
to 27 percent. With a deep recession and excessive debt occuring side by | |
side, the German chancellor must have long since realised that her | |
austerity dictum is misguided. | |
The consideration of reality, however, has certainly not begun within the | |
SPD – its chairman preferring to grumble that German workers’ incomes would | |
be jeopardised by a permanently subsidised Greece. That's true, but it is | |
too simple. Gabriel neglects to mention that an exit from the euro – the | |
notorious Grexit – would be even more expensive. Germany would have to | |
immediately write off sums in the high-double-digit billions, and Europe | |
would create a poorhouse on its doorstep. | |
The worst, though, would be the disintegration that that would signal. | |
Europe would no longer be a strong economy, upholding fundamental common | |
values, but rather a power team geared for a competition in which | |
underachievers are mercilessly left behind. Granted, it is understandable | |
that Europe's political elites are vexed by the behavior of the newcomers | |
from Athens. Tsipras and his finance minister have used every opportunity | |
to discredit themselves. | |
It is simply not very helpful when the negotiating parties make accusations | |
of criminality and terrorism. Similarly, it is incomprehensible why a | |
leftist government would resist cuts to their inflated military budget for | |
so long. The nationalistic connotations in the pathos which Tsipras confers | |
upon his own work are also pretty hard to bear. | |
But anger, resentment and frustration are simply not political categories. | |
They lead nowhere. Good politics are characterised by the fact that they do | |
not yield to emotional temptations. The German federal government would be | |
well advised to seek out the rational core and reevaluate, again and again. | |
Particularly as the Germans are very powerful players in this poker game, | |
and the Greeks very weak ones. Those in positions of power who kick those | |
below them always come across as vile. Gabriel and Scheuer ought not to | |
forget that. | |
By contrast, the rationality of Tsipras‘ actions has been downright | |
impressive. By replacing his finance minister he removed the most | |
provocative player from the game. The other EU ministers would no longer | |
have even sat at the same table as Yanis Varoufakis, with his successor | |
they will have to. With simple matters of staff, Tsipras demonstrates his | |
bargaining skills, placing the EU institutions in a tight position – and | |
the European Union? | |
## Europe isn't that German | |
In the face of this situation the other EU countries, Germany in | |
particular, cannot permit themselves to persist with their face-saving | |
posturing. Taking democracy seriously means offering Greece new | |
negotiations. The German chancellor is reputedly able to learn quickly. | |
That was always her greatest strength when it came to nuclear power, the | |
minimum wage or family policy. | |
So far Angela Merkel has attempted to solve the European crisis in a very | |
German manner. She has set everything on the peculiar and, for the vast | |
majority of peoples, entirely incomprehensible ideology that tough | |
austerity is a national economic panacea. She favours infinitesimally small | |
steps and dogged negotiating, as in the case between employers and | |
industrial union IG Metall. She is also confident that the weakest will | |
emerge from such struggles in the lead. Europe isn't that German. | |
As ironic as it sounds, with their ‚no‘ to austerity the Greeks have given | |
Merkel the chance to correct her mistakes. Helmut Kohl, who still stood for | |
the true idea of Europe, would have most likely signed off on Greek debt | |
relief years ago. | |
Translation: Hans Kellett | |
7 Jul 2015 | |
## AUTOREN | |
Ulrich Schulte | |
## TAGS | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz international | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
Schwerpunkt Angela Merkel | |
## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA | |
Democracy and the Greek crisis: Breaking Europe’s Stunned Silence | |
No longer does anybody in Brussels dare to resist orders from Berlin. Do we | |
want a Europe run by decree? It’s time for debate. | |
Schäuble’s role in Brussels: Merkel’s bogeyman | |
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s manner over the Greek conflict has been mostly | |
obliging, while her finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble played the role of | |
bad guy. | |
After the Euro Summit in Brussels: Thus fails Europe | |
Thanks to a loathsome alliance, Merkel and Schäuble have been able to | |
impose all of Germany’s demands on Greece. The result is a regime of | |
sanctions and coercion. | |
Economist about the ECB and Greece: Like setting off a nuclear bomb | |
The ECB denying Greece emergency loans would be blackmail, writes the | |
economist Martin Hellwig. A crisis like 1931 could be created. | |
Frist für Griechenland: Schlussstrich am Sonntag? | |
Noch bis Sonntag bekommt Griechenland Zeit, die Voraussetzungen für neue | |
Finanzhilfen zu schaffen. Sonst drohe ein „Grexit“, so die EU-Kommission. |