# taz.de -- Economist about the ECB and Greece: Like setting off a nuclear bomb | |
> The ECB denying Greece emergency loans would be blackmail, writes the | |
> economist Martin Hellwig. A crisis like 1931 could be created. | |
Bild: No money: Pensioners wait for their money in front of the Greek central b… | |
After the „no“ vote in the Greek referendum, everyone is waiting to see | |
what happens next. Perhaps not much will happen at all. The Greek | |
government won’t receive new funding – but then it won’t need much because | |
the lion’s share of any new „aid“ would serve to pay back old „aid“. … | |
it’s not paid, then what should be common knowledge since the Latin | |
American debt crisis in the 1980s will become clear – that without a | |
bailiff, debt collection is difficult. | |
The crucial question is how the European Central Bank (ECB) will react. The | |
president of the German central bank, Jens Weidmann, and the head of Ifo, | |
Hans-Werner Sinn, have long demanded an outright halt to emergency loans to | |
Greece. But in fact, even freezing these loans is questionable. According | |
to the Treaty on European Union, the ECB’s task is „to promote the smooth | |
operation of payment systems,“ and to do this for all member states | |
including Greece. | |
Freezing emergency loans to Greece would cause its banks to close and lead | |
to massive restrictions on payment transactions. This is not in accordance | |
with the ECB’s contractual duties. | |
„But the Greeks aren’t sticking to the treaty either!“ This is an | |
inadmissible collective accusation. Instead of talking about „the Greeks,“ | |
we have to make a distinction between the Greek government, Greek | |
commercial banks and the Greek central bank. It’s true that the Greek | |
government is not willing to stick to the agreements it has drawn up – | |
credit agreements. But is this sufficient reason to hold all Greek banks to | |
ransom? The European Banking Union has been in place since 2014 whereby | |
banks are no longer subject to national supervision, but to the supervision | |
of the ECB. | |
„But the ECB’s money is being passed from the banks to the government, and | |
is supporting this breach of contract!“ This statement is untrue. The money | |
does not come from the ECB, but from the Greek central bank, which is | |
liable for any losses. And the money is not used to finance the Greek | |
state, but to compensate the huge drops in customer deposits. Apart from | |
this, as a supervisory committee, the ECB has prohibited Greek banks from | |
increasing its public sector loans – as just one example of how the Banking | |
Union breaks the ties between states and banks. | |
## Images that bring to mind the 1931 crisis | |
Issuing emergency loans in the event of a run on the banks belongs to the | |
core duties of a central bank. Banks finance themselves in the short term | |
through customer deposits and by granting mid- to long-term loans. If | |
depositors panic and withdraw their money, banks are defenceless. Then | |
either the central banks steps in, or a crisis occurs that causes | |
repercussions for the economy as a whole. | |
The photos emerging from Greece bring to mind images of Germany in 1931. On | |
9 July 1931, the Reichsbank stopped any further aid to German banks. | |
Following this was a run on the banks by customers. On 13 July, the | |
Danatbank was forced to close. On 14 and 15 July, there was a state-imposed | |
„Bank Holiday“ for all banks, followed by a three-week restriction on | |
payment transactions. As a consequence, economic activity plummeted by | |
another 20 per cent to 60 per cent of its pre-1929 level, while employment | |
fell by a further two million. | |
These experiences in the 1930s were one reason for the massive state aid in | |
2008. And it makes the ECB’s failure to support the Greek banks any further | |
all the more disconcerting. The effect this has on a country’s economy is | |
akin to setting off a nuclear bomb. The damage is incalculable. Its threat | |
alone has huge blackmail potential. This could possibly be aimed at Germany | |
too. For our country and our democracy, it would be much more dangerous | |
than the potential losses that the ECB’s critics are getting worked up over | |
now. | |
„But the Greek banks are insolvent!“ When Sinn raised this objection in | |
February for the first time, his facts were not correct. The Greek banks | |
had acquired a large amount of own capital in 2013 and performed well in | |
the ECB audit. But soon Sinn’s statement is likely to come true. If the | |
payment system collapses, companies whose customers are broke will not be | |
able to service their debts, which in turn will make the banks go bust. | |
## The costs of the crisis | |
According to ECB regulations, only solvent banks are allowed to receive | |
loans from the central bank. This protects it from losses. But in 1931, | |
would it not have been better to continue giving loans to commercial banks, | |
even the clearly insolvent Danatbank? The costs of the crisis for Germany | |
were so high that the answer to this question should be simple. But back | |
then, the Reichsbank had to cut off its support because it ran out of the | |
gold exchange and foreign currency holdings necessary to cover currency. | |
The rule only to lend money to solvent banks dates back to a time when | |
central banks had to be ready to convert their banknotes into gold or | |
foreign currency at any given moment. Concern about their gold and foreign | |
currency holdings, and the fear of a run on the banks, caused them to be | |
especially careful. This caution prevented a suitable monetary policy being | |
devised during the global economic crisis. | |
In the meantime, a pure banknote currency now exists with no conversion | |
obligation whatsoever. Central banks can support the monetary and banking | |
system without concern for their own ability to act. Shouldn’t the | |
responsibility for the operability of payment systems set out in the | |
European Treaty take priority over an internal ECB rule that dates back to | |
the era of the gold standard, and which the treaty doesn’t cover? | |
Translation: Lucy Renner Jones | |
9 Jul 2015 | |
## AUTOREN | |
Martin Hellwig | |
## TAGS | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz international | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA | |
Democracy and the Greek crisis: Breaking Europe’s Stunned Silence | |
No longer does anybody in Brussels dare to resist orders from Berlin. Do we | |
want a Europe run by decree? It’s time for debate. | |
Schäuble’s role in Brussels: Merkel’s bogeyman | |
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s manner over the Greek conflict has been mostly | |
obliging, while her finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble played the role of | |
bad guy. | |
After the Euro Summit in Brussels: Thus fails Europe | |
Thanks to a loathsome alliance, Merkel and Schäuble have been able to | |
impose all of Germany’s demands on Greece. The result is a regime of | |
sanctions and coercion. | |
Germany, Greece and the EU: Europe isn’t that German | |
What kind of a Europe do we want? Surely one that values solidarity. The | |
German course of austerity therapy has failed. It is time to correct the | |
mistakes. | |
After the Greek referendum: History in the Making | |
The outcome of the referendum is clear. Now more than ever it’s up to the | |
ECB, alongside the Greek government, to come up with solutions. | |
Grexit and the Eurozone: Destroyed confidence | |
The monetary system is based on confidence, and that confidence has been | |
shattered. The end of the monetary union is dawning – even if Greece | |
remains in the euro. |