| # taz.de -- After the Greek referendum: History in the Making | |
| > The outcome of the referendum is clear. Now more than ever it’s up to the | |
| > ECB, alongside the Greek government, to come up with solutions. | |
| Bild: Merkel says no – at least in this street painting in Frankfurt/Main. | |
| This „no“ from the Greeks is sensational. It will write history, although | |
| what will come next remains unclear. What is already clear is that this | |
| „no“ will be received as a provocation by european leaders. It can now only | |
| be hoped that they won’t react hastily and mount a Grexit. | |
| The message from Greek premier Alexis Tsipras was unambiguous – he did not | |
| push for a 'no’ because he wanted to leave the eurozone, but rather because | |
| he hoped that he might thereby force the troika into concession-making. | |
| After all, up until now the „Institutions“ haven’t budged. They submitted | |
| to Tsipras the same austerity targets that they submitted to his | |
| predecessor, Samaras. | |
| It’s been obvious for some time that the troika’s rigid austerity measures | |
| aren’t working, but are instead dragging the country deeper into the | |
| crisis. There clearly is plenty of room for the eurozone to make | |
| concessions without immediately abandoning the course of the reforms, | |
| though. | |
| The eurozone would therefore be well advised to finally show the Greeks | |
| some good will. It wouldn't even be difficult to save face while doing so. | |
| The present austerity targets, amounting to some eight billion euros over | |
| the next two years, could be formally insisted upon, but counterbalanced | |
| with a guarantee of investments of the same sum. | |
| There would be enough worthwhile projects; it is for instance inexplicable | |
| that Greece still imports oil and doesn’t draw on sunlight and wind – both | |
| of which are in bountiful supply – for energy. However, the risk is | |
| enormous that dogmatism will win over rational thinking, and that the | |
| European leaders will have no interest in affording Tsipras some kind of | |
| triumph – preferring instead to orchestrate a Grexit. | |
| From a technical standpoint this would be easy; the European Central Bank | |
| need only further freeze its emergency credit to the Greek banks, or even | |
| demand immediate repayment. Without enough euros to conduct normal | |
| financial transactions, Greece would have to switch promptly to a parallel | |
| currency. | |
| Over time, European leaders consistently insisted that a Grexit would pose | |
| no danger. That was a bald lie. The risks are impossible to predict, and it | |
| would be highly probable that, when the next crisis comes, the next Euro | |
| country would be on the block – simply because the financial markets would | |
| bet on it. That is how world history looks. | |
| Translation: Hans Kellett | |
| 6 Jul 2015 | |
| ## AUTOREN | |
| Ulrike Herrmann | |
| ## TAGS | |
| taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
| taz international | |
| taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
| taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
| taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
| taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
| taz-Texte zur Euro-Krise auf Englisch | |
| ## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA | |
| After the Euro Summit in Brussels: Thus fails Europe | |
| Thanks to a loathsome alliance, Merkel and Schäuble have been able to | |
| impose all of Germany’s demands on Greece. The result is a regime of | |
| sanctions and coercion. | |
| Economist about the ECB and Greece: Like setting off a nuclear bomb | |
| The ECB denying Greece emergency loans would be blackmail, writes the | |
| economist Martin Hellwig. A crisis like 1931 could be created. | |
| Grexit and the Eurozone: Destroyed confidence | |
| The monetary system is based on confidence, and that confidence has been | |
| shattered. The end of the monetary union is dawning – even if Greece | |
| remains in the euro. | |
| Angela Merkel and the Greek crisis: Is the Chancellor invulnerable? | |
| Angela Merkel is prepared to push through a third aid package for Athens. | |
| The opposition accuses her of wanting to help the Greek banks, not its | |
| citizens. | |
| Crisis in Greece: Europe’s helpless leftists | |
| Syriza’s politics was a proposal for the system to show good will. This was | |
| both naïve and impassioned. |