# taz.de -- Migration policy in France: Colonial legacy and wall building | |
> Although France has a long history of immigration, the country is | |
> increasingly looking to curb the number of people crossing its borders. | |
> Actively negotiating with migrants’ home nations is its strategy. | |
Bild: The „Jungle“ in Calais being forcefully evacuated | |
Compared to its European neighbours, France has a long tradition of being a | |
land of inward migration. Eighteen million French citizens (almost one | |
third of the population) are purported to have at least one grandparent who | |
originates from another country. | |
Since the 1980s and the early 1990s, a series of conservative, | |
economic-liberal right-wing governments have embraced a 'zero immigration’ | |
policy. In theory, the aim was to restrict any form of new immigration that | |
would add to existing numbers. However, in practice this approach quickly | |
turned out to be untenable as certain minimum legal safeguards – family | |
reunification, the right of spouses married to French nationals to enter | |
the country – needed to be guaranteed and national as well as international | |
obligations upheld. | |
Whilst left-wing parties and some sections of civil society protested | |
against the official policy, claiming it went against political and social | |
principles, many ruling governments also came under fire from members of | |
the right: the right-wing Front National wasted no time criticising the | |
country’s leaders for their broken promises and calling out their lack of | |
consistency. | |
When a new social democrat government was elected in June 1997, its key | |
figures and experts tried to relieve some of the internal political | |
pressure and to reach what they saw as a “sensible compromise“ with | |
sections of the conservative camp. On 31 July 1997, university professor | |
Patrick Weil presented an expert report, which was frequently cited at the | |
time, to President Lionel Jospin’s government, putting forward a policy | |
designed on a utilitarian basis, i.e. focusing on the benefits to society. | |
## Explicit demands | |
Despite a considerably restrictive discourse on the issue of immigration, | |
the next incoming president, Nicolas Sarkozy, retained the core of this | |
utilitarian idea despite being a right-wing politician. The fundamental | |
change that came about under his presidency was in France’s economic | |
relations to its former colonies and to third countries: it was decided | |
that these partnerships would now be explicitly and unashamedly linked to | |
the willingness of these countries’ governments to assist in controlling | |
migration. | |
During this time a series of readmission agreements concerning unwanted | |
migrants from a whole host of countries were negotiated. Between 2008 and | |
2009, these agreements were at the core of a new generation of bilateral | |
deals concerning migration that comprised more comprehensive formal | |
documents. | |
Prior to this, France had signed a series of agreements that concerned only | |
readmission for foreign nationals who were undesired or who had committed a | |
criminal offence. These were mainly with other European states, such as the | |
Benelux countries (16 May 1964), Croatia (27 January 1995) and Bulgaria (29 | |
May 1996) as well as Switzerland and Liechtenstein (28 October 1998). Deals | |
were also signed with Latin American countries, e.g. Argentina (1 February | |
1995), Brazil (28 May 1996) and Venezuela (25 January 1999). However, | |
agreements up until this point still did not include countries on the | |
African continent, nor did they factor in other principal countries of | |
origin for migrants. | |
From the mid-2000s, some new readmission agreements were issued, which | |
affected those countries who had high numbers of citizens migrating to | |
France (agreements were signed with the former Union of Serbia and | |
Montenegro on 25 April 2006 and with Kosovo on 2 December 2009). The island | |
of Mauritius became the first African country to sign an agreement with | |
France, which it did on 15 November 2007. | |
## Bilateral agreements with African states | |
During the same period, however, negotiations were taking place on a new | |
generation of general migration agreements containing regulations on the | |
“concerted management of migration flows“. These agreements were usually | |
based on the premise that countries of origin – in exchange for visas for | |
students and some qualified professionals – would commit to better regulate | |
outward flows of their nationals and, crucially, to readmit citizens who | |
had been removed from France. The latter obligation also applied to | |
third-country nationals who had demonstrably entered France via the | |
territory in question. Similar agreements were signed with certain African | |
states: Senegal (23 September 2006), Gabon (5 July 2007), Republic of the | |
Congo (25 October 2007), Benin (28 November 2007), Tunisia (28 April 2008), | |
the Cape Verde islands (24 November 2008) as well as Burkina Faso (10 | |
January 2009) and Cameroon (21 May 2009). | |
Subsequent governments did not challenge these institutional frameworks but | |
chose to keep existing bilateral agreements. The incumbent social democrat | |
administration (as of the end of 2016) is trying to call as little | |
attention to the issue of immigration as possible in an attempt to avoid | |
domestic controversy and conflict. Instead, the aim has been to maintain | |
some form of technocratic consensus between the parties of the centre right | |
and centre left. | |
On 7 March 2016, what was to be the final reform of France’s immigration | |
law came into force. Despite being met with criticism from civil society | |
groups and anti-racism NGOs, the legislation was barely mentioned in public | |
debate. The reform introduced multiannual residence cards – ranging from | |
the previously used (limited) 'one-year card’ and the (essentially | |
unlimited) ‚ten-year card’ – for qualified professionals who fall under | |
certain categories. This applies to researchers and scientists, for | |
example, as well as artists and those employed in the cultural sector. | |
However, the legislation now allows the state to withdraw a residency | |
permit even if it is still valid. The state is also able to declare a | |
permit invalid if the authorities judge that the prerequisites for the | |
granting of the permit are no longer met. This had previously only been | |
relevant when applying for an extension. | |
## Approval rate rising | |
The failures of the French asylum system have often been highlighted in | |
recent years, one of the most obvious examples being the substantial | |
shortfalls of housing schemes for individuals awaiting the outcome of their | |
asylum claim. This is in spite of the fact that the number of asylum | |
seekers in the country is significantly lower than those applying for | |
refugee status in Germany. In 2014, a total of 68,811 applications for | |
asylum were submitted in France. The success rate for applications | |
processed by the two main national bodies (the French Office for the | |
Protection of Refugees and Stateless People, OFPRA, and the National Court | |
of Asylum, CNDA) across the year stood at 28 percent; in 2014 it was 24.5 | |
percent. | |
In 2015, a total of 80,075 applications for asylum were submitted in | |
France. In this year the percentage of applications accepted rose to 33.7 | |
percent, but this increase is almost exclusively due to the growing numbers | |
of asylum applications from Syrian nationals, who are, in most cases, | |
granted asylum status automatically. Leading members of the French | |
government have criticised Angela Merkel’s decision to open Europe’s | |
borders to refugees in the summer of 2015. Perhaps the loudest and most | |
notable critic has been former Prime Minister Manuel Valls, a member on the | |
right wing of the Socialist Party (see interview in the Süddeutschen | |
Zeitung from 25 November 2015). | |
In 2015/16, France took on a leading role as the EU drew up plans for the | |
‘distribution’ of migrants, who had entered EU territory in Greece and | |
Italy, across the union’s 28 member states. The task was to initially find | |
places for 120,000 refugees within two years. This was then changed to | |
66,000 by the end of 2017. Due to strong opposition from a number of | |
central eastern European states – Slovakia was strongly opposed to the | |
plan, and the Polish government started a campaign against it – most parts | |
of the agreement were blocked. In August 2016, a mere 2,845 migrants had | |
been moved from Greece and resettled in another EU state. In the months | |
that followed, the French government took a back seat when it came to | |
political initiatives at EU level; at home, the issue all but vanished from | |
the agenda. | |
For a brief period in the autumn of 2016, the clearance of the so-called | |
'jungle’, an informal makeshift camp that had been built on the outskirts | |
of Calais, became a major domestic issue. The Treaty of Le Touquet (signed | |
in 2003) meant France had made a pledge to the United Kingdom to keep | |
migrants on the French side of the Channel and to prevent immigrants | |
crossing illegally to the British Isles. However, the camp, which had | |
swelled to around 10,000 people, was rapidly becoming a highly contentious | |
issue at home with various commentators often referring to it as an | |
“eyesore“. Between 24 and 26 October 2016 the camp was cleared and | |
destroyed, but some of the previous occupants managed to evade the | |
authorities. | |
Around 5,500 adults and 1,900 unaccompanied minors were taken by bus to one | |
of 450 temporary accommodation sites in other parts of the country. Once | |
there, they were only guaranteed refuge for three months. Furthermore, and | |
contrary to what was originally promised, deportations to other EU | |
countries (Italy in particular) immediately resumed under the Dublin III | |
Regulation. | |
Essentially, the aim was to simply move the perceived problem elsewhere. At | |
the beginning of 2017, many of those affected who weren’t able to | |
successfully claim asylum in France once again found themselves with | |
nothing. In many cases, they also wound up back on the road. | |
In addition, large parts of the port of Calais are now off limits to | |
migrants, who might be looking to use the site as a transit point. As of 1 | |
December 2016, a law currently used to enforce the state of emergency | |
(which is set to be in place at least until 15 July 2017) was applied to | |
declare the RN 216 access road a specific hazard zone for pedestrians. | |
Trespassers (in de facto terms, migrants) can be punished with up to six | |
months’ imprisonment. | |
In addition to the barriers and fences already in place around the port of | |
Calais, on 20 September 2016 work began on the construction of a | |
four-metre-high and one-kilometre-long wall. This will be fitted with CCTV | |
cameras and searchlights. The aim is to prevent trespassers setting foot on | |
the road that leads to the port area, a spot where migrants have repeatedly | |
attempted to smuggle themselves on board lorries and ferries. The bill for | |
construction (€2.7 million) is being footed by the British government. | |
Construction on the wall was officially completed on 12 December 2016. | |
12 Dec 2016 | |
## AUTOREN | |
Bernard Schmid | |
## TAGS | |
migControl | |
EU-Afrika-Gipfel | |
## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA | |
Strategien gegen Migration: Die Wiederentdeckung Afrikas | |
Mehrere Gipfeltreffen wollen Afrikas Märkte öffnen und Grenzen schließen. | |
Der Kontinent soll unseren Wünschen gehorchen. |