# taz.de -- Migration policy in Somalia: Returning home by choice and force | |
> Almost half of Somalia's population fled the country during 25 years of | |
> civil war. Now, the transitional government is trying to bring its | |
> citizens back home – with help from the EU. | |
Bild: A boy with a toy gun in Mogadishu | |
An estimated one-half of the population of Somalia, according to the World | |
Bank, has left its homeland during the past 25 years of civil war: over | |
four million Somali. This makes Somalia one of the key countries of origin | |
of refugees on the continent. | |
Most of them sought refuge in neighbouring countries: Almost half a million | |
Somali refugees were living across the border in the north-eastern desert | |
regions of Kenya during peak periods of flight and drought in Somalia in | |
2011 and 2012. About a million still live in Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, | |
Djibouti and Yemen today. Over a million displaced persons are seeking | |
refuge within the country, mostly in the secure regions of Puntland and | |
Somaliland – both virtually independent states that have not been | |
internationally recognised. | |
In Somalian language and culture, a word has lately come to be used for the | |
dangerous journey to Europe: “wuu tahribay“ is said among families, in | |
telling the news that a son has set off to try his luck in Europe. In | |
Arabic, the term is used in connection with smugglers and human | |
traffickers; in the Somali language, particularly in Puntland and | |
Somaliland, it refers to migration to Europe. A favoured destination is | |
Sweden. | |
The routes are hazardous and diverse: The eastern route crosses the Gulf of | |
Aden, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Syria, on the way into Turkey and | |
finally to the Balkans. The sea route leads across the Red Sea and the | |
Sinai Peninsula, then over the Mediterranean to the Aegean Region; the | |
western route passes via Ethiopia through Sudan and Libya. The number of | |
applicants for asylum in the EU has been rising for years. In 2015, there | |
were around 21,000 Somali applications, of which 5,500 were approved and | |
over 3,000 rejected. Since August 2016, Somalia has been listed at the | |
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) as one of the countries of | |
origin with good chances to remain in Germany. Until then, the list had | |
included only Eritrea, Iraq, Iran and Syria. | |
In large parts of Somalia, brutal civil war has prevailed for the last 25 | |
years. The Islamist militia Al-Shabaab has had intermittent control of | |
significant parts of the country. However, not all Somali living abroad are | |
war refugees, but also young men and women from the relatively peaceful | |
areas of Somaliland and Puntland. A study by the Rift Valley Institute | |
indicates that the ratio of young Somali from these regions who leave the | |
country after finishing school is almost exactly as high as the ratio of | |
those from the conflict zones. Most of them are looking for work that | |
corresponds to their education level, since there are no jobs to be found | |
in their homeland, says the study. “Migration is a path to success in the | |
Somali culture“, states Bram Frouws, a migration specialist at the think | |
tank RMMS, which researches migration movements on the Horn of Africa. Many | |
Somali now holding major positions in the country's current government and | |
economy have returned from a period of exile in Europe or the USA. | |
## Measures to stabilise Somalia | |
The international community has undertaken costly endeavours in recent | |
decades to stabilise the country during the civil war. Since 2007, the | |
African Union (AU) has maintained a stabilising mission in Somalia | |
(AMISOM), which is substantially funded by the EU: More than €1 billion | |
have been spent since 2007 on the payroll of Ugandan, Kenyan and Burundi AU | |
soldiers and police officers. Yet in early 2016, in the course of setting | |
up the EU's military mission in Mali, Nigeria and the Central African | |
Republic, the EU reduced its share of the AMISOM budget by 20 percent. In | |
the first half of 2016, Kenya and Uganda then complained of outstanding | |
payments to its soldiers in Somalia. Both countries threatened to pull out | |
of the mission. In September 2016, the EU approved a further $178 million. | |
In 2010, the European Union (EU) had already established a training mission | |
for the practically non-existent army. Soldiers, especially officers, were | |
trained by European military officers, though not within Somalia's borders. | |
Owing to the state of security, the Somali troops were flown to Uganda and | |
then drilled by European trainers for months at a time. In 2015, the | |
mission (EUTM) was moved to Mogadishu. At the present time (as of the end | |
of 2016), nearly 200 European soldiers are still stationed there in order | |
to instruct Somali officers. | |
Within the civil EU mission EUCAP Nestor (Regional Maritime Capacity | |
Building Mission in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean), | |
European instructors have been training the Somali coast guard in its | |
struggle against piracy since 2012. | |
## Operation Homecoming | |
At of the end of 2016, elections were planned in which the clan chiefs were | |
to vote for a new government – a further criterion to stabilise the | |
country. Refugees were to play an important part in the elections. Their | |
return would supposedly contribute toward democratisation and the | |
legitimisation of a new transitional government, and thereby to the | |
country's stabilisation. It might even have been considered possible that | |
the entire population would participate in the election, as a government | |
spokesman implied: “Keep in mind that your return is a sign of the revival | |
of peace in Somalia and that if you return, you might make a difference to | |
your country“, he appealed to over 270,000 Somali refugees then remaining | |
at the Kenyan centre Dadaab. | |
In 2013, the Kenya and Somalian governments reached a trilateral agreement | |
with the UNHCR on closing the refugee centres in Kenya. At that point, the | |
deadline for voluntary return was set for the end of November 2016. Somalia | |
and Kenya wanted to hold to this date, and correspondingly raised the | |
pressure on the refugees. UNHCR, on the other hand, holds firm to the | |
international principle of freedom of choice to return, and anticipates | |
that repatriation might be concluded by the year 2032. | |
In June 2016, Hassan Sheikh Mohammud became the first Somali president to | |
visit Dadaab in Kenya. He promised his compatriots: “We don't want you to | |
be forced to return without available housing, education and health care | |
services“. He remained silent as to who should finance these offers. In | |
2016, UN refugee agency UNHCR received not even a third of the $150 million | |
assessed to be necessary for the provision of Somali refugee aid. To | |
assimilate so many returning refugees in such a short time would be a | |
Herculean task for a country that has been almost completely destroyed by | |
over 20 years of war, stated Somali government spokesperson Daud Awais. | |
## Dependent on aid money | |
The EU ranks as the largest financial donor to Somalia's stabilisation. For | |
a long time, “combating the causes of flight“ was the catchphrase for the | |
EU strategy toward Somalia, but in recent times, the focus is predominantly | |
on supporting those who return. Since Kenya announced the closure of its | |
refugee centres, 17,000 Somali have packed their belongings and been flown | |
out on UN aircraft. Currently, 275,000 Somali are still living in Dadaab | |
alone. Within Somalia, four “safe zones“ have been determined for returns, | |
including the capital Mogadishu and the coastal city of Kismayo. Voluntary | |
returnees are given a supply of food for 6 months and $150 per person from | |
UNHCR. This does not correspond to the definition of “voluntariness“ and is | |
thus infringing upon international rights, declares Victor Nyamori of | |
Amnesty International in Kenya. There are apparently more “push factors“, | |
foremost including the fear of violent deportation, than “pull factors“, | |
such as a better life back in the homeland. | |
Money for Somalia has been authorised by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for | |
Africa as well: the EU is paying €50 million to the UNHCR and the | |
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to handle the re-entry and | |
reintegration of returning refugees. Most of those returning find their | |
homes destroyed or occupied and must take shelter in the centres for | |
displaced persons now being erected by international NGOs. The EU is | |
investing a further €10 million in drought-ridden North Somalia, in order | |
to combat root causes of flight. | |
Within the framework of the National Indicative Programme (NIP), Somalia | |
has benefited from €286 million from the EU Development Trust Fund. Further | |
funds were distributed to Somalia within the scope of the regional Khartoum | |
Process, and also as part of support measures from the regional | |
organisation IGAD and the African Union. | |
The return of Somalian refugees has a further relevance for Europe. As soon | |
as great numbers of refugees from Kenya come back to the country, European | |
authorities will be able rank Somalia as a safe country after all. | |
12 Dec 2016 | |
## AUTOREN | |
Simone Schlindwein | |
## TAGS | |
migControl | |
Jemen | |
## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA | |
Vor Jemens Küste: Schlepper stoßen Flüchtlinge ins Meer | |
Mindestens 29 Menschen seien dabei ums Leben gekommen, meldet eine | |
UN-Behörde. Sie nennt den Vorfall vor der jemenitischen Küste | |
„schockierend“. |