# taz.de -- Migration policy in Germany: Nervous activity | |
> No idea seems to far fetched for discussion. Internment in Africa, | |
> termination of rescue operations at sea – everything just for the sake of | |
> keeping refugees away. | |
Bild: German policy aims at keeping refugees from even reaching neighbouring co… | |
It’s winter 2016 and Germany is impatient. For more than a year, the EU has | |
been piling the pressure on African states to get them to fall in line and | |
as far as the German government is concerned, things aren’t moving fast | |
enough. In an internal memo issued on 30 November, the German foreign | |
office (Auswärtige Amt) insists that the EU finally begin migration | |
partnership negotiations with Egypt. The FO adds that the issue of | |
“expulsion“ be “stressed“ as a political aim, urging the Council of the | |
European Union to decide on the matter at its next meeting. | |
Never before has Germany put so much energy into influencing such policies. | |
Unlike Spain or Italy, for many years the Federal Republic had only shown a | |
minor interest in shaping external migration control. After all, back then | |
the country was used to just a small number of refugees crossing its | |
borders. Asylum figures peaked in the early 1990s, but in 1993 a set of | |
laws widely seen as a compromise between the parties on asylum policy (and | |
which also included a constitutional amendment) suddenly saw a tightening | |
of conditions for admission. A clause concerning third states did much to | |
decrease the number of applications. Shortly afterwards, these new laws | |
were followed by the EU’s Dublin III Regulation, which ensured that the | |
majority of refugees remained on the union’s outer borders in states such | |
as Greece and Italy. The number of asylum applications received by Germany | |
thus decreased in the years up to 2007, when it reached a record low of | |
19,164. Since then, figures have shot up – and so Germany has once again | |
taken an increased interest in asylum policy. | |
One example can be seen along Africa’s borders, where in recent years | |
Germany’s government authorities have spared no expense in bolstering | |
security. In 2016 Germany's Federal Ministry of Defence, together with the | |
foreign office, provided several million euros to help partner countries | |
'get into shape’. Tunisia received €20 million from this fund, some of | |
which was earmarked for improving electronic surveillance along its Libyan | |
border and for border police training. In 2017 the country is set to | |
receive a further €40 million. Germany’s federal police officers are | |
training Tunisian border guards and its armed forces are sending speedboats | |
and armoured trucks. | |
Next year the country also plans to provide mobile monitoring systems | |
featuring ground surveillance. Tunisia has already received five night | |
surveillance systems, 25 thermal imaging cameras, 25 optical sensors and | |
five radar systems: the North African state is practically being gifted a | |
high-tech border. Back in March 2012, the German police force sent a | |
“border police liaison officer“ to the country’s capital, Tunis, whose job | |
was to collect information on the current situation concerning illegal | |
migration (for more information, see the report on Tunisia). | |
## Human rights take a back seat | |
Germany also sent a police officer to Egypt to work as a liaison officer. | |
In April 2016 during a visit to Cairo, Germany’s Minister for Economic | |
Affairs and Energy, Social Democrat Sigmar Gabriel, not only discussed the | |
planned sale of two submarines, he also offered assistance to tighten | |
security along the Libyan-Egyptian border and improve security measures on | |
the Sinai Peninsula. In June 2016, following two years of talks, Germany’s | |
interior minister Thomas de Maizière and his Egyptian counterpart Magdy | |
Abdel Ghaffar signed a security pact outlining the fight against organised | |
crime and terrorism as well as disaster prevention. | |
German federal police began training Egyptian border officers as early as | |
2015, while Germany’s Criminal Police Office trained two of the country's | |
secret services (the GIS and the NSS). In 2016 German police carried out a | |
total of five training sessions with Egyptian officials, covering areas | |
such as border security, a controversial issue given the human rights | |
situation in the Middle Eastern country. This is because Egypt has an | |
anti-terrorism act that classes a terror organisation as anything that in | |
any way threatens public safety and order or the interests of the people. | |
However, in response to a question tabled by the Green Party, the German | |
government stated early in the year that given the current high levels of | |
migration, the German police force was set to provide even higher levels of | |
assistance to Egypt in the shape of training and equipment to improve | |
border security (more detail is given in the Egypt report). | |
Since 2012, GiZ, a German development agency, has been running a police | |
reform programme in Mauritania, Niger, Chad and Nigeria commissioned by the | |
foreign office. Between 2016 and 2018, the German government will provide | |
€26 million for the project. The aim is for border police in rural areas to | |
learn how to “effectively carry out the relevant procedures when processing | |
border crossings“. In Mauritania, a transit country, GiZ is carrying out | |
measures such as constructing three border posts at a cost of €210,000, | |
providing nine passport and fingerprint scanners, training 102 border | |
police and building up a pool of trainers specialised in border security. | |
In Niger nine police stations were built on the Nigerian border (costing | |
€1.35 million), its border police received nine pick-ups (costing €270,000) | |
and 12 motorcycles at €10,000 each, as well as training units for its | |
border police. In Chad a new post was constructed on the border with | |
Cameroon. As part of the third phase of this initiative, further assistance | |
will be given to police forces in Mauritania, the Ivory Coast, Niger, the | |
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, Nigeria and South Sudan by | |
2018. Interpol’s 'Adwenpa II’ operation, which will provide training for | |
border guards in 14 West-African states between 2016 and 2018, is also | |
receiving funding from the German government. | |
## Restraint in Sudan | |
In 2015 roughly a quarter of a million euros was given to Morocco, | |
Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania to combat human trafficking and people | |
smuggling. In 2016, 18 African states received a total of around €1.8 | |
million from Berlin for related projects. In December 2016 the German | |
Cabinet decided to participate in the EUCAP Sahel Niger civilian mission | |
launched to combat drug, arms and people trafficking in Niger. There are | |
plans to send 20 federal and state police officers to the nation, which is | |
the largest transit country for African refugees en route to Europe. | |
One of the key projects in this area is the GiZ’s 'Better Migration | |
Management’ initiative, to which the EU contributes €40 million; Germany | |
gives an additional €6 million. The objective, according to the GiZ, is “to | |
improve migration management around the Horn of Africa“ and “curb people | |
smuggling and human trafficking“. Democracies such as Djibouti, Kenya and | |
Somalia are involved, as are dictatorships, such as Ethiopia, Sudan and | |
Eritrea. The GiZ insists that it rejected the Sudanese regime’s demands for | |
equipment (for more information, see report on Sudan). | |
The 2015 refugee crisis was also accompanied by a sharp rise in the number | |
of deportations. According to a list from November 2016, from 2010 to 2014 | |
Germany deported between 4,800 and 5,400 people a year. In 2015 this figure | |
rose to 16,337 and during the following year, 17,137 had been deported by | |
October. These figures do not include deportations within the European | |
Union. Over the years, Germany has signed formal readmission agreements | |
with Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Georgia, | |
Hong Kong, Macau, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Pakistan, the Russia | |
Federation, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Ukraine. This allows Germany to | |
deport nationals of other states or stateless persons to these countries if | |
they have been granted right of residence there – or if they have | |
“illegally and directly“ entered Germany via these countries. Since 2010 | |
Germany has removed between 200 and 500 individuals every year and sent | |
them to countries outside of the European Union that were not their country | |
of origin. Serbia, Kosovo and Albania were the most frequently named | |
destination countries. | |
## Kurds deported to Syria | |
A low-point in Germany’s efforts to secure expulsion agreements was the | |
deal made between former Federal Minister of the Interior, Christian | |
Democrat Wolfgang Schäuble, and his former Syrian counterpart Bassam Abdel | |
Majeed in 2008. When Germany’s foreigner registration office began applying | |
the new ruling, it resulted in Kurds and Yazidis being deported to Damascus | |
where they were immediately arrested. The Syrian regime accused them of | |
“damaging Syria’s reputation abroad“, most likely due to the arguments | |
stated by refugees in their rejected asylum claims. After civil war broke | |
out in 2011, the agreement was suspended but not annulled. | |
An expulsion agreement with Morocco has been in place since 1998 and in | |
2006 Germany signed a similar pact with Algeria. However, Germany’s | |
government is not happy about the way these deals have been implemented. | |
“These countries need to understand that their co-operation in dealing with | |
matters of migration and expulsion is, in our view, a key element of our | |
bilateral partnership. It influences our willingness to contribute in other | |
areas,“ said Minister of the Interior Thomas de Maizière in January 2016. | |
Shortly afterwards, de Maizière travelled to North Africa and Tunisia | |
agreed to a particular pilot project: deportation flights on specifically | |
allocated charter planes containing up to 25 Tunisians. In future, | |
employees at the Tunisian embassy would also be called upon to identify | |
their compatriots whilst they were still housed in centres for asylum | |
seekers in Germany. Upon a visit to the headquarters of the National Border | |
Guard, de Maizière presented a range of equipment, including 27 off-road | |
vehicles, flak jackets and night-vision devices. The Moroccan government | |
agreed to carry out biometric data checks: now if the German government | |
supplies them with fingerprints to help identify a refugee under a | |
deportation order, Rabat must give a response within 45 days. | |
## Welcome to the Federal Printing Office | |
It is surely no coincidence that at the beginning of 2016, Veridos, a joint | |
venture between Germany’s federal printing office and German IT company | |
Giesecke & Devrient, announced that it had been contracted by the Moroccan | |
government to “develop and implement a national border control system“. | |
They would supply a range of equipment including biometric scanners, | |
passport reading equipment, security checkpoints and servers for 1,600 | |
security posts. In addition, the printing office confirmed that it was | |
currently tasked with printing passport booklets for Libya’s transitional | |
government. A delegation from Sudan’s immigration office also recently paid | |
the FPO a visit. | |
In 2016 Chancellor Angela Merkel embarked on a tour of Africa in search of | |
better deportation options for Germany. Merkel held out the prospect of | |
“comprehensive assistance“ to Niger. Following a meeting with the country�… | |
president Mahamadou Issoufou in the capital Niamey, she said the German | |
government would support the Nigerien army with trucks and communication | |
equipment. There was also a plan to create jobs for those who were | |
“currently making a living from people smuggling“. | |
Not wanting to pass up a good opportunity, President Mahamadou Issoufou | |
swiftly demanded a higher monetary sum, claiming a mere share of the EU’s | |
€1.8-billion trust fund was insufficient: “We need substantial support for | |
our country.“ He suggested a billion would be more appropriate. Merkel | |
agreed to €10 million for the army and €17 million to encourage job growth | |
around the city of Agadez. Without development, it would be impossible to | |
expect people to “help combat illegal migration“, she said. | |
## The Chancellery’s revolving door | |
In Ethiopia, a country that has been in a state of emergency for six months | |
and is ruled by a prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, who has shown | |
extreme brutality towards his opponents, Merkel proposed a partnership with | |
Germany’s Ministry of the Interior to train the Ethiopian police force “to | |
ensure that responses were proportionate and fewer lives would be lost | |
during clashes“. Desalegn informed her that Ethiopia’s democracy was “not | |
yet fully fledged“. | |
Immediately upon her return, her first visitor was president of Chad, | |
Idriss Déby Itno. He was promised €8.9 million “in addition to the | |
commitments we have already made“, explained Merkel, “to help resolve water | |
and food issues“. After all, Chad had “accepted more than 700,000 refugees | |
from other countries“. | |
Itno hadn’t even made it home when Nigeria’s president Muhammadu Buhari | |
landed. He even missed the start of the African Union summit in the | |
Togolese capital Lomé in order to pay the Chancellor a visit. In the first | |
nine months of the year, 10,200 Nigerians had applied for asylum, more than | |
twice the number that had applied over the same period in 2015. The | |
approval rate stood at eight percent, which, Merkel explained, “proves that | |
most Nigerians are coming to Germany for economic reasons“. Nigeria was | |
also on Merkel’s list of recipients, but something was expected in return: | |
the EU was to begin negotiations on a migration agreement with Nigeria. “We | |
will also be discussing an expulsion agreement.“ | |
## Germany and Frontex | |
German officials have long held leading positions within the EU’s border | |
protection agency, Frontex. Key decisions about the functions of Frontex | |
are also made by the agency’s management board, on which representatives of | |
all participating member states sit. It is chaired by Ralf Göbel, a former | |
deputy director general of federal police matters who is now a high-ranking | |
official within the German Ministry of the Interior. The head of the | |
Frontex operations division, Klaus Rösler, is also German. Rösler has | |
repeatedly commented on political decision-making and spoken out against | |
rescue operations for migrants off the Libyan coast. | |
In December 2014 he wrote a letter to the head of the Italian immigration | |
authorities and border police at the Ministry of the Interior, Giovanni | |
Pinto. He ordered police to stop responding to emergency calls outside of | |
their designated 30-mile radius as this did not comply “with the operative | |
plan“. During this time, the number of refugees drowning in the | |
Mediterranean rose sharply and the high death toll has continued to this | |
very day. Nonetheless, in June 2016 at a meeting of the Konrad Adenauer | |
Foundation in Brussels, Rösler argued that the high number of migrants | |
attempting the crossing was in part due to the EU’s high-intensity sea | |
monitoring and rescue missions. He claimed this was leading to smugglers | |
taking ever greater risks and sending refugees in boats that were not | |
seaworthy driven by migrants who hoped to be rescued by the EU. “It’s | |
causing people to leave,“ said Rösler. | |
Until 2013, Germany had steadfastly followed the Dublin system. The German | |
government repeatedly claimed the regulation had proved “effective“. One | |
year later, that was suddenly no longer the case. “We need to agree to | |
admission quotas, perhaps according to population,“ de Maizière said at an | |
EU meeting of justice and home affairs ministers on 9 October 2014 in | |
Luxembourg. It was exactly what the countries of southern Europe had been | |
demanding for years. Each time the request had been met with opposition, | |
mainly from Berlin. In 2009 around 11 percent of asylum applications were | |
submitted to Germany – far less than it would have to process if a quota | |
system were in place. However, since then this share has been rising as | |
southern European states are no longer able to keep refugees within their | |
borders: in 2011 it was one fifth, 2012 a quarter, and between mid-2013 to | |
mid-2014 one in three asylum applications made within the EU were submitted | |
to Germany. For many years, the country benefited from the Dublin | |
Regulation. Just as that began to change, Germany suddenly woke up to the | |
downsides of the supposedly “effective“ Dublin system. | |
## Camps in regions of origin | |
Although Germany was by no means shouldering the burden of Europe’s | |
refugees at that time, in 2004 its government stepped forward with an | |
initiative which, despite showing no signs of success, is still very much | |
in place. No one should be given the impression that attempting to cross | |
the Mediterranean was one way to enter Europe, said then Social Democrat | |
minister of the interior Otto Schily in 2004. He said it was important to | |
check whether the asylum applications of migrants pulled from the sea could | |
be processed in “facilities“ in North Africa. “Africa’s problems need t… | |
resolved in Africa with the help of Europe,“ Schily said. | |
One year prior, shortly before the beginning of the Iraq war in March 2003, | |
British Prime Minister Tony Blair unveiled his ‘New Vision for Refugees’. | |
He was also keen to outsource as much of Europe’s refugee protection | |
measures as possible to the regions from which refugees originated. | |
Refugees who managed to reach Europe were to be returned to their regions | |
of origin where they would be placed in special “protective zones“. The EU | |
wanted to create a global network of as many of these refugee camps as | |
possible, claiming that, once there, the UNHCR could ascertain individuals’ | |
need for protection. | |
One year later, Schily explained that he envisioned camps being set up in | |
North Africa as an experiment. A “European coast guard“ could patrol the | |
Mediterranean and take those rescued back to the country from which they | |
departed. There, EU state officials would check asylum applications | |
alongside a core team of officials from the EU’s own refugee agency, said | |
Schily. He explained that if there were no cause for asylum to be granted, | |
rescued refugees had to be returned to their countries of origin. “A | |
judicial review doesn’t necessarily have to take place,“ said Schily. After | |
all, North Africa was “outside the EU’s jurisdiction“. Even if a reason f… | |
flight had been established, individuals should primarily be moved to a | |
region close to their country of origin. | |
It looks as though the German government has decided to turn Schily’s idea | |
into the politician’s lasting political legacy. | |
15 Dec 2016 | |
## AUTOREN | |
Christian Jakob | |
## TAGS | |
migControl | |
## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA |