# taz.de -- History of european migration policy: From carrots to sticks | |
> To fight migratory movements the EU is using african states – thereby | |
> ignoring international treaties and european values. | |
Bild: Internally displaced persons in Maiduguri, Nigeria | |
The EU has finally lost patience with a decade-long approach based on | |
dialogue with countries in Africa calling for the return and readmission of | |
refugees. Under plans adopted by the European Commission on 7 June 2106 the | |
EU is now explicitly seeking to exploit Member States’ historical | |
neo-colonial links to try to contain the movement of migrants and refugees: | |
“The special relationships that Member States may have with third | |
countries, reflecting political, historic and cultural ties fostered | |
through decades of contacts, should also be exploited to the full for the | |
benefit of the EU. At present, the opposite is often the case. Trust needs | |
to be built up.“ | |
This might be better phrased as asking EU Member States to use their | |
histories of imperialism and exploitation to ask African states to sort out | |
an EU problem. | |
## The future foretold – from Trevi to GAMM | |
EU attempts to try to stop the arrival of refugee and migrants dates back | |
to the pre-Maastricht times. The Trevi Group, the intergovernmental fora | |
set up in1976, made immigration one of its priorities – the Dublin | |
Convention (first country of entry) was agreed on 15 June 1990, the same | |
year as the Schengen agreement entered into force and the gradual | |
construction of 'Fortress Europe’ began. | |
In December 2005, an Informal Summit at Hampton Court palace saw the | |
adoption of a “Global approach to migration: Priority actions focussing on | |
Africa and the Mediterranean“. This ‘Global Approach to Migration and | |
Mobility’ (GAMM) saw migration as a prominent effect of globalisation and | |
called for dialogue, cooperation and tackling the “root causes of | |
migration“, for example, by the “eradication of poverty in regions of | |
origin.“ | |
A plethora of regional processes followed: the Africa-EU Migration and | |
Mobility Dialogue, bilateral dialogues with Turkey, Southern Mediterranean | |
countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon) and African | |
countries (Cape Verde, Nigeria, Senegal, Ethiopia, South Africa). Ten years | |
later these noble aims were running into reality. | |
## On the EU doorstep | |
By the time of the “Khartoum Process“, involving African states from the | |
Horn of Africa, on 28 November 2014 the writing was already on the wall | |
with 270,000 refugees arriving in the EU through the Med – nearly double | |
the previous record of 141,000 registered refugees in 2011. The main | |
countries of entry were Greece and Italy where most refugees simply passed | |
through and moved north – back then there was little attempt by both | |
countries to record those arriving under the Dublin “first country of entry | |
rule“. | |
On 11-12 November 2015 there was another belated attempt to get African | |
states onside at the Valetta Conference in Malta. On the eve of the Valetta | |
Summit African reservations came into the open: | |
“Still wary of Europe's colonial past, some Africans believe the EU is | |
desperately trying to outsource its refugee challenges rather than accept | |
that people will still try to come to the continent.“ | |
The EU’s fundamental concern was to stop refugees or migrants from moving | |
up the continent of Africa until they reach the shores of the Mediterranean | |
– where they become the EU’s problem. | |
It was not until autumn 2015 that plans were put in place to create | |
“hotspots“ (closed detention centres, registration, “security screening“ | |
and the fingerprinting of refugees). These “hotspots“ did not start | |
functioning until February 2016 when patience inside the EU had already | |
run-out. | |
By the end of 2015 1,000,573 people had reached Europe across the | |
Mediterranean, mainly to Greece and Italy. In effect refugees simply | |
relocated themselves throughout the EU | |
The “Visegard“ countries(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) in | |
eastern Europe had started to set their own rules building walls/fences at | |
their borders and using tear gas and rubber bullets to turn back refugees. | |
And other countries – Austria, Croatia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Norway and | |
Sweden – closed their doors too. Germany, having boldly welcomed over one | |
million asylum seekers in 2015, tightened the rules to make life harder and | |
deportation easier. | |
In these and other EU countries racist and sometimes fascists groups | |
intervened and played to a populist tune. The EU power elite became openly | |
worried about their power-bases and were openly falling out with each | |
other. | |
## Time for the first “dodgy deal“ | |
With all the doors out of Italy and Greece closed the EU reached the first | |
“dodgy deal“ deal with Turkey on 18 March 2016 and declared that Turkey was | |
a “safe country“ to send refugees back to. This agreement came in the form | |
of two Letters and a “Statement“. The EU cast aside the rule of law and EU | |
and international treaty obligations – in the view of many NGOs the EU was | |
tearing up its legal obligations and relying on “messaging“ (in its own | |
words) stating that all who arrived after this date would be sent back to | |
Turkey. | |
This was the start of a complete turnaround in EU policy: enough was | |
enough, the “carrot and stick“ approach of the GAMM experiment was to | |
become one simply of the “stick“ – agree now to returns and readmission, | |
with or without a formal agreement or suffer the “consequences“ by losing | |
aid and trade. | |
## A new era of neo-colonialism | |
On 7 June 2016 the Commission issued a new, quite different, strategy | |
called “Partnership Frameworks“ with the emphasis explicitly on return and | |
readmission and a direct threat that states that djid not cooperate would | |
suffer the “consequences“ through the loss of aid and trade. The Commission | |
said it was:“Standing ready to provide greater support to those partner | |
countries which make the greatest efforts, but without shying away from | |
negative incentives.“ | |
The Commission argued: | |
“To make change happen, the full range of policies and EU external | |
relations instruments have to be brought to bear. This means a change in | |
approach and fresh thinking with a mix of positive and negative incentives | |
and the use of all leverages and tools…“ | |
Feeding into “High Level Dialogues“ there are “country packages“for 16 | |
“priority countries: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, | |
Somalia, Sudan, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan, | |
Bangladesh and Pakistan. | |
EU development policy would be abused by prioritising returns: | |
“Increasing coherence between migration and development policy is important | |
to ensure that development assistance helps partner countries manage | |
migration more effectively, and also incentivises them to effectively | |
cooperate on readmission of irregular migrants. Positive and negative | |
incentives should be integrated in the EU's development policy.“, rewarding | |
those countries that fulfil their international obligation to readmit their | |
own nationals, and those that cooperate in managing the flows of irregular | |
migrants from third countries, as well as those taking action to adequately | |
host persons fleeing conflict and persecution. Equally, there must be | |
consequences for those who do not cooperate on readmission and return.…“ | |
No policy areas were to be exempt from this approach: | |
“All EU policies including education, research, climate change, energy, | |
environment, agriculture, should in principle be part of a package, | |
bringing maximum leverage to the discussion.“ | |
The plans also require: | |
“The facilitation of the identification of irregular migrants in view of | |
their readmission by strengthening third countries' capacity to ensure | |
functioning civil registries and fingerprint or biometrics digitalisation.. | |
Many of the targeted African states do not even have a record of births – | |
now whole populations have to be placed on a national biometric database to | |
meet EU demands. | |
As Patrick Kingsley observed in The Guardian: | |
“EU migration policy suggests Europe prefers strongmen over reality… The | |
EU’s new migration policy is laced with the progressive language of | |
“migration management“, of accepting that migration flows cannot be | |
stopped, only better managed. | |
But the policy’s content suggests that Europe still has not accepted this | |
reality. Once we get past the cuddly but vague nods towards resettlement | |
and development, the main takeaway is that palling up to dictators and | |
strongmen remains Europe’s preferred method for dealing with migration. | |
Even though they are usually the main causes of migration in the first | |
place.“ | |
## Another “dodgy deal“ with Afghanistan | |
On 30 September 2016 another deal was agreed with Afghanistan to start | |
immediate refugee „return“ flights. It planned the quick return of 80,000 | |
refugees – „effectively implement readmission commitments“ and by-passing | |
EU parliamentary scrutiny. Yet again the question is asked: Is Afghanistan | |
a „safe country“? | |
## The endgame | |
We are seeing the construction of a neo-colonial project through the | |
externalisation of Europe's asylum responsibilitiesby whatever means. | |
Long-standing commitments to help those living in poverty is to be | |
subverted by the EU’s own crisis – a failure to live to live up to its | |
fundamental values when confronted by a populism based on racism that in | |
turn threatens the EU elites’ hold on power. | |
15 Dec 2016 | |
## AUTOREN | |
Tony Bunyan | |
## TAGS | |
migControl | |
## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA |