# taz.de -- Migration policy in Mali: Corruption and control | |
> Much has been done to bolster security along Mali’s once porous border. | |
> Local police forces are only all too happy to implement the new border | |
> regime as demanded by the EU, with border crossings often requiring | |
> payment of a 'fee’. | |
Bild: French President Hollande (L) greets Mali's President Ibrahim Boubacar Ke… | |
European nations have long been trying to seal a readmission deal with | |
Mali. But until recently, Mali had very little interest in actively | |
participating in the expulsion of its own citizens. Between 2007 and 2009, | |
France attempted to sign a readmission agreement with the West African | |
country whilst simultaneously pursuing guidelines based on the principle of | |
‚selective migration’. Sarkozy’s advances were perceived by many Malians … | |
a provocation. Deportee associations and the Malian trade union | |
confederation CSTM organised protests in front of the French embassy and | |
were against offering Sarkozy a state visit. In the end, the readmission | |
agreement went unsigned. | |
Although Mali participated in the Rabat Process, which began in 2006, as | |
well as in a dialogue between the EU and the ACP (a loose alliance of | |
African, Caribbean and Pacific states) on ‘migration and development’, it | |
has only signed one migration agreement to date: with Spain in 2009. It did | |
so on the condition that Spain would offer opportunities to Malians to | |
legally participate in the Spanish job market in exchange for Mali’s | |
co-operation concerning deportations. This promise quickly vanished from | |
the table when Spain became swept up in the financial crisis, which did | |
little to strengthen the appeal of signing readmission agreements in the | |
eyes of Mali’s government. | |
On 11 December 2016 Mali signed a Joint Communiqué with the EU in which it | |
affirmed its intention to combat “irregular“ migration as well as to | |
actively engage in the deportation of Malian citizens. | |
However, the Valletta Summit gave the EU renewed vigour to push for Mali to | |
agree to readmission deals. In February 2016 the EU Commission spoke of a | |
“package of incentives“ for Mali that included the following: | |
- political support (specifically in security policy) | |
- support for the Malian peace process as well as with efforts to combat | |
terrorism and with the fight against radicalisation and violent extremism | |
- support in the areas of “border management“ and border control as well as | |
for the modernisation of civil registries | |
- provision of financial aid from the EU Trust Fund not only for projects | |
that combat the root causes of migration but also for “improved migration | |
management“ and efforts to tackle “criminal networks“ | |
- development aid financed by the EU and its member states to be used as an | |
incentive to encourage the Malian state to engage in dialogue. | |
At several points, the EU’s document openly stresses Mali’s dependency on | |
development funding from the union as well as military engagement from EU | |
states, e.g. with the presence of European task forces as part of | |
‚Operation Barkhane’ and the MINUSMA mission. Ultimately, this document | |
clearly suggests that the EU would take advantage of Mali’s military, | |
political and economic dependency to force through readmission agreements. | |
## Growing pressure from Brussels | |
On 21 October 2016 the EU Heads of State and Government decided that a | |
‘Mobility Partnership’ deal should be signed with Mali as soon as possible. | |
This was the purpose of Angela Merkel's visit on 9 October 2016. One month | |
later, the EU Commissioner for Migration and the Italian foreign minister | |
followed in her footsteps by paying a visit to Bamako. | |
The Malian government found itself in a quandary: pressure from the EU was | |
growing – but there was also pressure from the population at home, and | |
Malian leaders were only too aware of the need for remittances paid by | |
migrants. This predicament is perfectly articulated in the increasingly | |
contradictory role of the Ministry for Malians Abroad, which was founded to | |
represent the interests of the Malian diaspora but now finds itself playing | |
an active role in identifying migrants prior to deportation, together with | |
the relevant embassies. | |
On 22 November 2016 a group of Malian migrants and refugees living in | |
Germany were paraded (some of them in handcuffs) in front of embassy staff | |
in Halle (Saale) as part of a collective identity parade/hearing. | |
Afterwards some were taken directly to a detention centre in Büren. The | |
Malian officials who carried out the hearing were given instructions not | |
just from Mali’s foreign ministry and the ministry of the interior but also | |
from the Ministry for Malians Abroad. | |
A similar process is in place for dealing with the EU’s new laissez-passer | |
– a replacement travel document issued by EU states that allows migrants to | |
be deported even if their relevant embassy refuses to co-operate. At a | |
conference of the Malian Association of Deported Migrants on 6 November | |
2016, Broulaye Keita, a representative of the Ministry for Malians Abroad | |
claimed that Mali would not recognise a replacement travel document issued | |
by EU member states. In spite of this, since August a number of individuals | |
have been deported to Mali from France and Sweden using the EU’s | |
laissez-passer. | |
## Undermining freedom of movement | |
Some of Mali’s neighbouring states – Algeria, Mauritania and Niger – have | |
been on the receiving end of European efforts to create a repressive | |
migration regime, and appear receptive to their demands. Even prior to | |
2012, the Algerian state was notorious for mercilessly forcing migrants and | |
refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa out into the desert, even regularly | |
carrying out push-backs over the Malian border during the process. When war | |
broke out in northern Mali in 2012, Algeria temporarily closed its southern | |
border. In any case, most migrants were already deterred by what had become | |
an extremely dangerous journey across a war zone. | |
For its part, Algeria suspended direct push-backs into Mali, instead | |
choosing to send migrants to Niger. In 2001 Mauritania left ECOWAS, the | |
community of West African states, thus also relinquishing its obligation, | |
as laid out in a 1979 protocol, to ensure freedom of movement. The country | |
has considerably tightened its immigration laws, particularly through the | |
introduction of a new mandatory residence card ('Carte de Séjour’) and has | |
started ruthlessly deporting migrants to Sub-Saharan Africa. At the Gogui | |
border crossing, for instance, push-backs to Mali have been taking place | |
for years. It is also becoming more difficult to travel through Niger as EU | |
states are putting the nation under ever-increasing pressure to clamp down | |
on “irregular“ migration. All of this has a direct impact on Mali, as many | |
travellers cross into neighbouring countries from the Republic as they | |
journey northwards. | |
## Closing borders in transit zones | |
One place where the consequences of this restrictive border policy can be | |
particularly seen and felt is the Gao region, which is located in Mali’s | |
north-east on the border to Niger and home to what are currently the most | |
frequently used trans-Saharan migration routes | |
“Alongside Agadez in Niger, Gao is one of the central hubs for people | |
travelling from one of many West African countries towards the north,“ says | |
Éric Alain Kamden, who has been working on the ground for NGO Caritas since | |
2009. It was already a key migratory transit point before the war began; | |
today around 150 travellers pass through Gao every day according to | |
statistics provided by the IOM. It is where many begin their journey to | |
Niger. | |
Officially, freedom of movement exists between Mali and Niger as they are | |
both ECOWAS members. However, this freedom is increasingly being undermined | |
by a system of controls. At the Yassan border crossing there are mounting | |
reports of travellers being refused entry by the 'Service de Migration’, a | |
department of the Nigerien police, and sent back to Mali. This affects not | |
only Malian citizens but also, and to a much greater extent, individuals | |
from other West African countries. In order to enter Niger, Malian | |
travellers must be in possession of a form of ID that is valid for at least | |
another three months and need to state a contact, preferably in the capital | |
Niamey. This person is then telephoned immediately and must contact the | |
border post from a police station in order to confirm that the individual | |
waiting at the border is indeed entering the country to visit said contact. | |
## Entry refused despite valid passports | |
Travellers from the south of Mali who only hold one form of identification | |
may only be granted entry if they can provide a contact in Niger, | |
irrespective of when their ID is set to expire. According to an inspector | |
at the Yassan border post, officials have been ordered not to grant entry | |
to individuals from other West African states, e.g. Ghana, Sierra Leone, | |
Ivory Coast, the Gambia, Senegal and Guinea, who are assumed to be | |
migrants. | |
In 2016 there were documented cases of excessive control, such as | |
Senegalese travellers being refused entry even though they held a valid | |
CEDEAO passport, an ID card and an immunisation card (i.e. all of the | |
necessary documents). In July 2016, for example, four young people from | |
Mali, Togo, Senegal and Burkina Faso, who wanted to cross the border to | |
install Orange mobile telephone masts for their Nigerien employer, were | |
stopped. Although they were carrying the necessary equipment and despite it | |
being clear that they were there in a professional capacity, they were | |
initially refused entry at the border and were only able to continue their | |
journey when Caritas employee Kamden offered to vouch for them. Kamden was | |
even threatened with losing his own Nigerien residency permit if the four | |
individuals concerned were caught in Agadez trying to travel on to the | |
north. | |
Kamden is no stranger to such incidents: every day in his job he encounters | |
travellers who are stuck in Gao after having been refused entry at the | |
border or who have returned from the desert. He is convinced that the | |
repressive expulsion practices along the Malian-Nigerien border are a | |
direct consequence of the Valletta process, especially as the intensity of | |
the clampdown by Nigerien border guards has increased only recently. | |
## The IOM as border guards | |
Kamden says that until recently it was completely normal for people to | |
cross the border between Mali and Niger even without valid papers. Anyone | |
wanting to travel to Niger who was unable to produce a form of | |
identification during border checks merely had to pay a fine of CFA 1,500 | |
before being given an entry permit, which they could then use for a period | |
of 24 hours to enter Niger. This would be impossible today. The | |
implementation of a migration regime tailored to suit the EU is being used | |
to turn West Africa’s free movement zone, which has existed even longer | |
than the EU’s Schengen Area, from a right to a privilege. | |
One of the actors involved in this is the International Organization for | |
Migration (IOM). At present, a new border post is being set up just two | |
kilometres away from the current border point in Yassan. It will be built | |
and run with the participation of the IOM. The IOM also operates | |
checkpoints on the access road to the city of Gao as well as in Kidal in | |
northern Mali. Here any traveller who is suspected of being a migrant is | |
registered. | |
The new policy is even becoming noticeable in Gao itself. Here countless | |
individuals are being left stranded and penniless after having to abandon | |
their journey to the north due to encountering difficulties (e.g. falling | |
victim to robbery). They enter the city from the north on the back of | |
trucks driven by Arab grocers. When they try to find a place to sleep, they | |
are often captured by soldiers and taken to the nearest police station. | |
English speakers, in particular, are often suspected of being spies for | |
terrorist organisations, such as Boko Haram or Mujao. If these suspicions | |
cannot be substantiated, they are accused of the crime of ‚loitering in a | |
public place at night’. Kamden claims that previously there were no charges | |
or prison sentences for such crimes in Gao. He suggests these practices are | |
the direct result of increased pressure from partners in Europe. | |
## ‘Small-scale police corruption’ vs. freedom of movement | |
Even Malian police forces have started implementing tighter security | |
controls for travellers, with the line between security duties and | |
‚small-scale police corruption’ becoming increasingly blurred. Now buses | |
travelling towards the north are frequently stopped and passengers’ | |
documents checked. Travellers have always been asked to pay ‘fines’. But in | |
the Gao region, says Kamden, security forces are especially targeting | |
anyone who appears to be a “likely candidate for migration“. He explains | |
that someone from the south of Mali who is suspected of wanting to cross | |
the border in order to head northwards would have to pay at least CFA | |
5,000. A similar practice has been witnessed along the route between Bamako | |
and Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso. Local residents from Heremakono have | |
reported that even large groups of travellers are regularly being prevented | |
from travelling onwards and left stranded at the border if their papers are | |
deemed invalid or if they do not pay the desired sum. | |
It is difficult to assess how much of this police harassment of travellers | |
is directly linked to the objective of trying to manage migration. However, | |
compared to just a few years ago, it has become noticeably more difficult | |
to travel without (valid) travel documents, and in this part of the world, | |
owning a passport is not self-evident for everyone. Restrictive control | |
practices have increased since the Valletta Summit. A de facto alliance of | |
interests exists between police officers, who top up their wages by | |
requesting certain ‚fees’, and the migration regime itself, whose aim is to | |
restrict movement towards the north. | |
In April 2016, a new biometric passport featuring a ‘tamper-proof’ chip was | |
introduced in Mali. It was a more advanced version of Mali’s previous | |
passport design, which also included biometric information. In addition, | |
Mali has recently rolled out a new (and also biometric) CEDEAO identity | |
card. | |
The country is now a pioneer in passport system biometricisation in the | |
West African region. This step is much lauded by the authorities and the | |
government, not just in Mali itself but internationally, as a key measure | |
to tackling “irregular migration“ and to improving the country’s security. | |
For years, a high number of Malian passports and ID cards were secretly | |
being traded along the route between the Sahel states and the Maghreb | |
region. One reason was the fact that Malian citizens could officially enter | |
Algeria without a visa and move freely within the country. For migrants who | |
were trying to find a way to earn money in Algeria, or who were passing | |
through on their way to another Maghreb state or Europe, this offered a | |
considerable degree of security. | |
By introducing a biometric passport system, the Malian government hopes to | |
put a stop to this practice whilst helping meet Europe’s aims in terms of | |
migratory policy. And among the Malian population, nationalist rhetoric is | |
being adopted by both sides to argue that people from other nations who are | |
travelling with Malian passports could potentially pose a threat to | |
“national security“. The passport debate is sometimes heavily confounded | |
with an issue which is unrelated to migration but which does pose a very | |
real threat to the safety of Mali's population: the presence of criminal | |
and armed groups. Moreover, the new passports and ID cards are being | |
promoted as a way to facilitate travel and held up as a signature project | |
to demonstrate Mali’s modern political system. | |
However, many Malians complain that they have encountered severe | |
complications and difficulties when applying for these new documents. For | |
example, the fee required to acquire one of these new and supposedly highly | |
secure passports must be paid to Ecobanc, a private company. But this can | |
only be done by presenting a 'carte NINA’, which was originally designed as | |
a voter registration card. | |
In practice, this complicated process has, until now, effectively made it | |
impossible for many Malians, including those living abroad, to get hold of | |
a new passport. The increasingly strict passport and ID checks along both | |
external borders and inland routes, compared to previous years when border | |
guards were happy to just take a passing glance, means that anyone who is | |
not in possession of the most up-to-date travel documents, for whatever | |
reason, is now experiencing a de facto restriction on their freedom of | |
movement. This hurdle not only affects people who are emigrating; it can | |
also more generally impact members of specific demographic groups whose | |
lives are heavily dependent on being able to travel between different | |
places and across borders, potentially threatening their livelihood. | |
For instance, this can affect travelling merchants and migrant workers, as | |
well as nomadic or semi-nomadic livestock breeders, such as the Tuareg | |
people who live in Mali’s northern border region. For years, they have been | |
accustomed to being able to move freely between various territories without | |
having to show a passport. Finally, the creation of a biometric passport | |
system takes on a new dimension when one considers the EU’s desire to gain | |
access to the Malian government’s biometric databases in order to use this | |
information to identify and deport Malian citizens (see above). | |
## Airports: the new frontiers | |
It is now standard practice at Bamako Airport for all travellers to have | |
their hand and fingerprints scanned when they arrive and depart. Combined | |
with passport biometricisation, it is now much more difficult for someone | |
to travel on another person’s passport. For prospective emigrants who stand | |
no chance of being granted a visa (which are only given under extremely | |
restrictive conditions), this was once one of the few loopholes they could | |
use to reach Europe without risking their lives in the desert or at sea. | |
In addition to standard police passport checks at Bamako Airport, an | |
initial security control measure is now also being carried out by | |
Securicom, a private security company. According to Ousmane Diarra from AME | |
(the Malian Association of Deported Migrants), this company has the power | |
to stop a passenger from boarding, even if they have a valid visa, based on | |
opaque criteria. Diarra claims that at African airports, Securicom serves | |
as an extension of FRONTEX, the EU's border agency. | |
12 Dec 2016 | |
## AUTOREN | |
Hans-Georg Eberl | |
Moussa Ouédraogo | |
## TAGS | |
migControl | |
## ARTIKEL ZUM THEMA |