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# 2025-08-01 - IBM and the Holocaust by Edwin Black | |
Tea Time With Thomas J. Watson and Adolf Hitler | |
Some time ago i saw this book referenced on Mastodon. I checked it | |
out from the local library. Of course it was serious, heavy reading | |
chock full of data and references. | |
From this book i learned about the sheer quantity of hard, historical | |
data concerning the Holocaust. In my opinion, Holocaust deniers must | |
be practicing willful ignorance on an epic scale. | |
Evidence And Documentation For The Holocaust | |
Reading this book raised questions. I wonder what it must feel like | |
to know about this amoral indifference and yet work in an IBM | |
subsidiary such as RedHat, or to found a company that does large | |
scale business with IBM, such as Intel. | |
> By the time I was twenty, I had lived through a Hungarian Fascist | |
> dictatorship, German military occupation, the Nazis' | |
> "Final Solution," the siege of Budapest by the Soviet Red Army, a | |
> period of chaotic democracy in the years immediately after the war, | |
> a variety of repressive Communist regimes, and a popular uprising | |
> that was put down at gunpoint... [where] many young people were | |
> killed; countless others were interned. Some two hundred thousand | |
> Hungarians escaped to the West. I was one of them. | |
> | |
> --Andy Grove, Intel | |
Andrew Grove | |
On the other hand i see plenty of online rhetoric about punching | |
Nazis or kicking Nazi sympathizers out of bars. Some people seem to | |
have a sloppy definition of what counts as a Nazi. On top of that, | |
the whole attitude has a distinctly American posture of denying the | |
systematic nature of problems and reducing them to hopeless matters | |
of individual choice and responsibility. This "small picture" line | |
of thought is what permitted IBM to be so amoral in the first place, | |
while smaller scapegoat companies received public punishment. | |
Below are notes from the book. | |
# Introduction | |
Solipsistic and dazzled by its own swirling universe of technical | |
possibilities, IBM was self-gripped by a special amoral corporate | |
mantra: if it /can/ be done, it /should/ be done. To the blind | |
technocrat, the /means/ were more important than the /ends/. The | |
destruction of the Jewish people became even less important because | |
the invigorating nature of IBM's technical achievement was only | |
heightened by the fantastical profits to be made at a time when | |
bread lines stretched across the world. | |
IBM NY (USA) always understood--from the outset of 1933--that it | |
was courting and doing business with the upper echelon of the Nazi | |
Party. | |
Punch cards could only be designed, printed, and purchased from | |
one source: IBM. The machines were not sold, they were leased, and | |
regularly maintained and upgraded by only one source: IBM. | |
IBM was founded in 1896 by German inventor Herman Hollerith as a | |
census tabulating company. Census was its business. But when IBM | |
Germany formed its philosophical and technical alliance with Nazi | |
Germany, census and registration took on a new mission. IBM Germany | |
invented the racial census--listing not just religious affiliation, | |
but bloodline going back generations. This was the Nazi data lust. | |
Not just to count the Jews--but to /identify/ them. | |
People and asset registration was only one of the many uses Nazi | |
Germany found for its high-speed data sorters. Food allocation was | |
organized around databases, allowing Germany to starve the Jews. | |
Slave labor was identified, tracked, and managed largely through | |
punch cards. Punch cards even made the trains run on time and | |
cataloged their human cargo. German railway, the /Reichsbahn/, | |
Dehomag's (IBM Germany's) biggest customer, dealt directly with | |
senior management in Berlin. Dehomag maintained punch card | |
installations at train depots across Germany, and eventually across | |
all Europe. | |
How much did IBM know? Some of it IBM knew on a daily basis | |
throughout the twelve year Reich. The worst of it IBM preferred | |
not to know--"don't ask, don't tell" was the order of the day. Yet | |
IBM NY officials and frequently Watson's personal representatives, | |
Harrison Chauncey and Werner Lier, were almost constantly in Berlin | |
or Geneva, monitoring activities, ensuring that the parent company | |
in New York was not cut out of any of the profits or business | |
opportunities Nazism presented. When United States law made such | |
direct contact illegal, IBM's Swiss office became the nexus, | |
providing the New York office continuous information and credible | |
deniability. | |
... I understood that IBM does not merely wait for governmental | |
customers to call. IBM has attracted its fortune and reputation | |
precisely because it generally anticipates governmental and | |
corporate needs even before they develop, and then offers, designs, | |
and delivers customized solutions--even if it must execute those | |
technologic solutions with its own staff and equipment. | |
How many solutions did IBM provide to Nazi Germany? I knew about the | |
initial solution: the census. Just how far did the solutions go? | |
In my pursuit, I received extraordinary cooperation from every | |
private, public, and governmental source in every country. Sadly, | |
the only refusal came from IBM itself, which rebuffed my requests | |
for access to documents and interviews. I was not alone. Since | |
World War II, the company has steadfastly refused to cooperate with | |
outside authors. | |
# Chapter 2: The IBM-Hitler Intersection | |
"The physician examines the body and determines whether all organs | |
are working to the benefit of the entire organism." asserted | |
Heidinger to a crowd of Nazi officials. "We [Dehomag AKA IBM | |
Germany] are very much like the physician, in that we dissect, | |
cell by cell, the German cultural body. We report every individual | |
characteristic... on a little card. These are not dead cards, quite | |
the contrary, they prove later on that they come to life when the | |
cards are sorted at a rate of 25,000 per hour according to certain | |
characteristics. These characteristics are grouped like the organs | |
of our cultural body, and they will be calculated and determined | |
with the help of our tabulating machine. | |
"We are proud that we may assist in such task, a task that provides | |
our nation's Physician [Adolf Hitler] with the material he needs | |
for his examinations. Our Physician can then determine whether the | |
calculated values are in harmony with the health of our people. It | |
also means that if such is not the case, our Physician can take | |
corrective procedures to correct the sick circumstances... Our | |
characteristics are deeply rooted in our race. Therefore, we cherish | |
them like a holy shrine which we will--and must--keep pure..." | |
Heidinger's speech, along with a list of the invited Nazi Party | |
officials was rushed to Manhattan and immediately translated | |
for Watson. The IBM Leader cabled Heidinger a prompt note of | |
congratulations for a job well done and sentiments well expressed. | |
# Chapter 3: Identifying The Jews | |
IBM did not invent Germany's anti-Semitism but when it volunteered | |
solutions, the company virtually braided with Nazism. Like any | |
technologic evolution, each new solution powered a new level of | |
sinister expectations and cruel capability. | |
When Germany wanted to identify Jews by name, IBM showed them how. | |
When Germany wanted to use that information to launch programs of | |
social exclusion and expropriation, IBM provided the technologic | |
wherewithal. When the trains needed to run on time, from city to | |
city or between concentration camps, IBM offered that solution as | |
well. Ultimately, there was no solution IBM would not devise for | |
a Reich willing to pay for services rendered. One solution led to | |
another. No solution was out of the question. | |
# Chapter 5: Medal For Watson | |
Thomas Watson was more than just a businessman selling boxes to the | |
Third Reich. For his Promethean gift of punch card technology that | |
enabled the Reich to achieve undreamed of efficiencies both in its | |
rearmament program and its war against the Jews, for his refusal to | |
join the chorus of strident anti-Nazi boycotters and isolators and | |
instead open a commercial corridor the Reich could still navigate, | |
for his willingness to bring the world's commercial summit to | |
Berlin, for his value as a Roosevelt crony, for his glitter and | |
legend, Hitler would bestow upon Thomas Watson a medal--the highest | |
it would confer on any non-German. | |
The Merit Cross of the German Eagle with Star was created for Thomas | |
Watson to "honor foreign nationals who made themselves deserving of | |
the German Reich." It ranked second in prestige only to Hitler's | |
German Grand Cross. | |
Watson was honored. At the next ICC Congress, he would not only be | |
installed as president of the ICC, he would be decorated by | |
/der Führer/. | |
On June 28, 1937, over a peaceful cup of tea served in dainty | |
china cups atop elegant saucers, in a quiet corner of the Reich | |
Chancellery, huddling over a small serving table and seated on | |
cushy, floral armchairs, Watson and Hitler would finally talk. | |
Sitting with them was a Hitler cohort and two other prominent Hitler | |
supporters from the ICC convention. No one knows exactly what Hitler | |
told Watson during the exchange. | |
* * * | |
... And then Adolf Hitler suddenly walked in. Dressed in his | |
familiar brown party uniform, he made his way directly to the royal | |
box festooned with a swastika flag. As he did, the familiar command | |
crackled through the air: "Sieg!" | |
The assemblage of distinctive businessmen, including dozens from the | |
United States of America, in the year 1937, gripped by the moment, | |
awed by the occasion, imbued with the spirit, under the leadership | |
of Thomas J. Watson, jumped to their feet amid roars, cheers, and | |
wild applause, reached for the sky in a loyal salute, and chanted | |
back "Heil!" Watson lifted his right arm halfway up before he caught | |
himself. Later a colleague denied to a reporter for the New York | |
Herald that Watson's gesture was a genuine salute. [Maybe it was | |
merely a Roman salute. Sarcasm.] | |
Hitler's medal was bestowed by Schacht as the newsreel cameras | |
whirred and government functionaries snapped to stiff attention. | |
The eight-pointed gold-framed cross of white enamel embedded with | |
German eagles and Nazi emblems dangled about the neck from a broad | |
red, black, and white ribbon in tandem with a second six-pointed | |
star worn over the left breast. To Watson, it was magnificent. When | |
wearing it, he was draped by two swastikas, one on the right and one | |
to the left. | |
# Chapter 8: With Blitzkrieg Efficiency | |
In spring 1940, J.W. Schotte, IBM's general manager for Europe, | |
dispatched a confidential report from his German office to senior | |
IBM executives in America. | |
Schotte's enthusiastic memo was titled | |
"Our Dealings With War Ministries in Europe"... | |
IBM had finally succeeded in gaining the necessary insider access | |
to sensitive military projects, Schotte reported, so that company | |
engineers could properly design punch card applications for war use. | |
> In military literature and in newspapers, the importance and | |
> necessity of having in all phases of life, behind the front, an | |
> organization, which would remain intact and would function with | |
> "Blitzkrieg" efficiency... was brought out. What we have been | |
> preaching in vain for years all at once began to be realized. | |
Revenue from IBM's dominant customer, the Third Reich, was growing | |
so rapidly, Schotte said he didn't yet possess the sales numbers. | |
IBM had almost single-handedly brought modern warfare into the | |
information age. Simply put, IBM organized the organizers of Hitler's | |
war. | |
Although deniability was constructed with enough care to last for | |
decades, the undeniable fact was that either IBM NY or its European | |
headquarters in Geneva or its individual subsidiaries, depending on | |
the year and locale, maintained intimate knowledge of each and every | |
application wielded by Nazis. This knowledge was inherently revealed | |
by an omnipresent paper trail; the cards themselves. IBM--and only | |
IBM--printed all the cards. Billions of them. | |
IBM printed billions of its electronically sensitive cards each year | |
for its European customers. But every order was different. Each set | |
was meticulously designed not only for the singular client, but for | |
the client's specific assignments. The design work was not a rote | |
process, but an intense collaboration. | |
# Chapter 12: IBM And The War | |
Carter saw IBM not as a great American company, but as a global | |
monster. In Carter's view, Watson was no capitalist luminary but | |
an opportunist to be classed with the Nazis themselves. | |
Throughout 1942, a number of American companies were grandly exposed | |
for extensive dealings with Nazi Germany. | |
Ironically, none of IBM's subsidiaries were on the Proclaimed | |
List because they fell into a double-edged corporate identity as | |
"American-owned property." The same applied to all American-owned | |
subsidiaries in Axis-controlled lands. So even though corporate | |
parents, such as IBM, were not permitted to communicate with | |
their own subsidiaries because they were in Axis territory, these | |
companies were deemed American property to be protected. In fact, | |
since IBM only leased the machines, every Dehomag machine, whether | |
deployed at the Waffen-SS office in Dachau or an insurance office | |
in Rome, was considered American property to be protected. | |
Hence, Dehomag could simultaneously exist as a United States interest | |
and a tool of the Nazis doing business with the same Farben and | |
Siemens entities that brought other American companies utter | |
denunciation and often prosecution. | |
* * * | |
One special defense project involved an experimental system required | |
by the Army Air Corps. It needed a device that could read holes in | |
the telegraphic paper and translate the results to punch cards. | |
[I had already thought of this idea before i read this book.] | |
* * * | |
IBM and its technology were in fact involved in the Allies most top | |
secret operations. The Enigma code crackers at Bletchley Park in | |
England used Hollerith machines supplied by IBM's British licensee, | |
the British Tabulating Machine Company. | |
It was an irony of the war that IBM equipment was used to encode and | |
decode for both sides of the conflict. | |
The maps displaying Japanese population density were marked with | |
dots, one for each ten persons. American and Dutch census bureaus | |
simultaneously used Hollerith systems in 1943 to create racial "dot | |
maps" as a means of organizing transfers to concentration camps. | |
IBM was in some ways bigger than the war. Both sides could not | |
afford to proceed without the company's all-important technology. | |
Hitler needed IBM. So did the Allies. | |
For the Allies, IBM assistance came at a crucial point. But for the | |
Jews of Europe it was too late. | |
# Chapter 14: The Spoils of Genocide | |
IBM's business was never about Nazism. It was never about | |
anti-Semitism. It was always about the money. Before even one Jew | |
was encased in a hard-coded Hollerith identity, it was only the | |
money that mattered. And the money did accrue. | |
# Chapter 15: The Spoils of Genocide, Part 2 | |
In the years that followed, IBM's worldwide stature became even | |
more of a beacon to the cause of progress. It adopted a corporate | |
motto: "The Solutions Company." Whatever the impossible task, IBM | |
technology could find a solution. ... Their exploits during the Nazi | |
era were lionized with amazing specificity in a promotional book | |
entitled /The History of Computing in Europe/ published in 1967 by | |
IBM itself. However, an internal ISM review decided to immediately | |
withdraw the book from the market. It is no longer available in any | |
publicly accessible library anywhere in the world. | |
How did the Nazis get the names? They always had the names. | |
What seemingly magical scheduling process could have allowed | |
millions of Nazi victims to step onto train platforms in Germany or | |
nineteen other Nazi-occupied countries, travel for two or three days | |
by rail, and then step onto a ramp at Auschwitz or Treblinka--and | |
within an hour be marched into gas chambers. Hour after hour. Day | |
after day. Timetable after timetable. Like clockwork, and always | |
with /blitzkrieg/ efficiency. | |
The question was barely raised. | |
author: Black, Edwin | |
detail: gopher://gopherpedia.com/0/IBM_and_the_Holocaust | |
LOC: HD9696.2.U64 I253 | |
tags: book,history,holocaust,non-fiction | |
title: IBM and the Holocaust | |
See also: | |
How Not To Build The Torment Nexus | |
# Tags | |
book | |
history | |
holocaust | |
non-fiction |