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# taz.de -- New Year’s Eve 2016 in Cologne: “It is a poisoned debate“
> Fantasies of the right seemed to have come true. Sociologist explains why
> that very night leaves more of an impression than the terror attacks.
Bild: A blick from the Dom to the Main Station: how will be New Year's Eve this…
Mr. Nassehi, it has been one year since the Cologne new year's eve with its
incidents. Since then there have been terrorist attacks in Würzburg,
Ansbach and, most recently, Berlin. Does Cologne still stand out?
Armin Nassehi: Yes. The terrorist attacks were carried out by individuals
who were different from the refugee crowd after all. Cologne on the other
hand looked like a mass phenomenon.
What do you mean by that?
An image, almost a cliché, had come to life. Strangers you’d usually meet
around town suddenly become a collective thread. The perpetrators of
Cologne often were described as an amorphous crowd of people that was all
equally wild, equally dangerous. Even if you hadn’t seen it, you could
vividly imagine it.
Like a figment of the imagination of Pegida?
Yes. By now we know that about half of these people were refugees. The
other half were people of an migration background who have been in Germany
for longer and come from partly problematic, ethnically segregated areas
and hid behind a large number of refugees. These had been deviously hiding
behind a large number of refugees. For the attacked women and, even more in
the public debate, it looked like a homogeneous group.
Was there a connection between these men?
As a scientist I teach my students that talking about other cultures and
large groups creates more identity than there actually is. Groups we
identify from the outside as such are very heterogeneous themselves. During
that New Year’s Eve, on the other hand, there had also been a culture
clash. There were men who had experienced a more authoritarian upbringing
than most people know in Germany. Men who come from societies where
traditional domination plays an important role, especially in the home
countries of most of the perpetrators.
I can see that you feel uncomfortable when saying this.
It is a dilemma: do I use a generalising and culturalising argument? Or do
I, as a scientist, express adequately that it is no coincidence that these
men originate from certain family structures where the concept of honour,
the family bond, religion as a source of identity and orientation towards
patriarchal peer groups play an important role? This dilemma already begins
with the identification of such cultural obstinacy, because this does not
serve as an explanation for everything, regardless of the fact that the
social structure in gangs committing right-wing violence is very similar.
In the end, the entire communication about these issues is poisoned because
every exaggerated term describing a collective is as inadequate as the
denial of the negative effects of migration and fleeing a country. In
Cologne this dilemma reached a visible climax, even if it only affected a
small part of the migrant population.
By now some of the perpetrators were sentenced for theft and two for sexual
harassment. Is an adequate appraisal of the events possible?
Hardly. The night of Cologne almost has something mythical about it by now.
People say “Cologne“ or “Domplatte“ (the local name for the cathedral) …
everyone knowswhat is meant by that. At the same time we still don’t know
what has really happened. It was difficult to gather evidence, the police
could not handle the situation. The state can not give closure to the
victims. It can only punish what can be proved. This is actually proof that
the state functions according to the rule of law. But this must sound
cynical to many of the affected women.
The right immediately found a language to express themselves after this
event. A lot of leftists found that difficult. Why?
When communicating, there is an excessive fear of being racist by pointing
out any differences at all. This is actually a sign of a certain dishonesty
in the leftists’ argumentation that pays too much attention to origin and
cultural affiliation. Now this slightly neurotic sensitivity clashes with
the allegation of being sexist. Which issue is more serious? Some tried to
escape this by putting it into perspective. Such things would happen at
Oktoberfest as well. This has been perceived as a mockery of the victims.
Why is it mocking to say: this kind of behaviour seems familiar –from
festivities in Germany?
It was perceived as mockery because the behaviour in Cologne was unique in
its dynamic and its extent. The reaction seemed to prove that leftist and
feminist groups are completely insensitive to negative effects of fleeing a
country and migration, even if a mere fraction of the migrants are
concerned. This is why that night could turn into a symbol of the failed
multicultural society. Each statement relativising the events sounds like a
wish to distort them, because you wish them to be different. It also shows
that we in Germany have no experience of debating the negative effects of
migration controversially.
Aren’t we constantly discussing this?
But we avoid uncomfortable questions. Look how it is often uncomfortable
for leftists to talk about the origin of the men in Cologne. But one of the
principles of leftist thinking is that specific circumstances define us.
This includes cultural backgrounds. You simply have to take into acccount
that some standards and experiences with public and private institutions of
many countries of origin are not compatible with those in Europe. This is
not an argument in favour of culturalization. To turn a blind eye to it
plays down the dimension of some of the events. And it is not helpful that
incompatible groups like this, for example potentially violent far-right
peer groups, exist in Europe as well. The number of attacks on refugees
from the far-right speaks for itself. At the same time, from the
sociological point of view it must be made clear that terms such as “the
North Africans“, “the blacks“, and “the women“ are not defensable in
empirical terms, because there are big differences within these groups.
Nevertheless, there are cultural differences, and cultural conflicts. Even
if it is uncomfortable, those who mean well in particular have to seriously
consider these issues. We cannot leave the debate to those who say: we have
always known it.
After the Berlin attack the perpetrator’s possible country of origin was
quickly mentioned. Has the debate been more measured than the one after
Cologne?
You can identify two stages. During the first one everyone, including me,
hoped that it wouldn’t be a refugee. I was afraid that after that a
reasonable debate about the effects of migration and escape from danger
wouldn’t be possible anymore. Others were hoping that it would be a
refugee, because they can use it to underline their politics. During the
second stage the perpetrator was discussed in a more differentiated way, as
was the strategy of the 'Islamic State’.
Do you think it matters for many Germans whether the perpetrator was a
refugee or a migrant?
For many it probably doesn’t. But the tone of the debate was moderate. The
AfD (Alternative for Germany) and the Identitarian movement couldn’t
mobilise a lot of people for their demonstrations after the attacks. But we
could see many Muslims on the street protesting against violence and
showing their grief. It was impressive.
Is this the beginning of a new “Us“ that stands against the fear strategy
of AfD and IS?
Some would like it to be. But I don’t believe so, especially as such
beliefs in an “Us“ are rather trite. There is something beguiling about the
atmosphere after an attack: everyone stands together, encourages each
other, demonstrates that life goes on. It resembles mourning rituals we
know from religions. But this beguilement doesn’t last long. Also this
beguiling 'Us’ isn’t maintainable. It satisfies the need for strong
statements and moral support, but it is politically insignificant.
Do you fear that this “Us“could be exploited by politicians?
That might then be called “Leitkultur“ (leading culture). In modern,
liberal societies there should simply be as little “Us“ as possible, since
integration – of all population groups – is not a problem of commitment but
a question of practice. Integration means putting up with each other and
having the decency not to pester each other. The question is under which
circumstances this is possible. Strongly segregated, patriarchal migrant
communities conflict with that just as much as the petit bourgeois general
suspicion against everything that is different.
Currently, public discourse seems obscene. Leftists celebrate in social
networks because the man who kicked a woman down the stairs in Berlin is a
Christian Bulgarian and not a Syrian. The teenagers who tried to set a
homeless man on fire in Berlin are refugees, which makes rightists cheer.
Many people feel that these times are confusing, both leftists and
rightists. Something like a fundamental law of perception applies here: If
things get complicated, we hold on to visible things. Nothing generates
more attention and order than: origin, skin-colour, religion, language. Of
course, these features mean something, but just not everything. What all
these differences have in common is that it’s about strongly male-dominated
peer groups, where the violation of rules is not considered deviant
behaviour but the consistent condition for belonging to the group.
A left-wing club in Leipzig has recently written in an open letter that
there have been problems with sexual assaults by guests who were refugees.
I am a learned pedagogue and one of the experiences one acquires in this
job is that the people you support can indeed be arseholes. Those people in
Leipzig were smart enough not to steal away nor to simply change sides, but
to admit that they are caught in a dilemma.
Some leftists thought that it would have been better to sort that out
internally.
Luckily they haven’t done that. We should be happy about everyone who can
admit that they are caught in a dilemma. Our political discourse suffers
from the fact that only few people have the courage to do that. That does
not only apply to leftists.
To speak out on dilemmas is unattractive. Saying that the world is
complicated doesn’t make politicians seem particularly strong.
That’s true, currently, elections are rather won with simplifications. But
where credible decisions are concerned, simplification quickly reaches a
dead end. If Merkel’s “We can do it“ had at least hinted at the related
dilemmas, the hateful campaigns against refugee politics might have had
more difficulties.
Someone who admits a dilemma must expect to be applauded by the wrong side…
…otherwise it wouldn’t be a dilemma. This fear of reaction is
characteristic of the tribal culture we live in. We feel that we belong to
our own tribe and, if possible, should not do anything which could appeal
to other tribes. In a speech, I once praised the CSU’s operative
integration policy. If you ignore mainstream nonsense and populist semantic
excesses, this policy in Bavaria really is going in the right direction.
For saying that, I have had to take harsh criticism. And for writing that
young, underemployed men can produce problems in public space, six weeks
before Cologne.
Why? Crime statistics show that young men are a dangerous group. I grew up
in East Germany and had to learn to avoid such groups.
Many well-meaning persons would have no problem with saying that about
extreme right-wing male peer groups who are prone to violence in East
Germany, but when it comes to refugees, they fear being considered racist.
That’s how simple semantic cultures are sometimes. Good and bad, black and
white, instead of empirically looking more closely.
Much surround the refugee debates is reminiscent of discussions in
countries where war is raging. In Ukraine, for example, people with a
different opinion are often accused of helping the enemy.
There is a similarity. What we have been experiencing for several years now
is an increasingly fierce culture war for who has the narrative authority
to decide what can be said and what is deemed “normal“. It is not a
coincidence that issues such as family politics, gender roles, sexual
orientation and the migration question are the decisive triggers of this
culture war.
Are they the marginalised and left-behind who are talked about so much?
Without a doubt, there is a problem with the increasing economic
precariousness of some population groups, but this does not explain the
success of right-wing populist, xenophobic and reactionary thinking. This
purely economic thesis sometimes sounds like the left-wing equivalent to
the oversimplified AfD-story of overwhelming immigration as an explanation
for almost everything. There is precarity in the well-to-do classes. They
are the losers of modernisation in the sense that they have lost the
authority to consistently say what is the right way of life.
But this has been developing for a while.
Indeed. For three decades, sociologists have been continuously diagnosing
new complexities – and thereby underestimate the force of inertia of
well-established institutions and forms of life. Therefore, a culture war
arises between winners and losers in the fight for the power of definition
and over what can be said. A previously excluded third party is now
entering this battlefield: refugees. One party can show solidarity with
them, the other can’t. For those who feel dependant on their power to
define, the refugees are proof that everything here is going wrong.
A lot of this sounds like what the CDU used to say in the past.
At least until the 1970s, yes. The change is most visible in the CDU/CSU.
How fundamental is the change of power among the people who have a say in
deciding what is considered as normal? As fundamental as the change from
nobility to the bourgeoisie as the leading class?
I would not call it a real change of era. Quite the contrary: it is almost
as if what had always been promised by the Enlightenment is now coming to
pass. It is always about establishing new speakers: the lower classes,
people who have a different denomination, women, people who are culturally
and ethnically different, homosexuals. There are increasingly fewer groups
who can clearly assert themselves over others. Until recently, that was a
privilege for well-educated, native, heterosexual men with careers…
…that is, for old, white men.
This is what they are disrespectfully called – it’s culturally symbolic,
standing for these new rights. At some points, there have certainly been
semantic exaggerations, in academic environments, for example. But all of
that is just a symbol for the fact that the issue of the power of
definition of what is valid, has become more confusing. In any case, these
rights don’t make the world simpler, instead they reorganise power options.
Right-wing populism all over Europe has, at any rate, shifted the focus
from questions of distribution to questions of cultural definitions.
What is the AfD’s utopia?
The 1950s. That’s why they jump at everything that was different back then.
Why are people interested in gender roles today? Why are they interested in
sexuality? Why do people talk about migration? Because it was the time of
the self-sufficient, homogeneous nation-state, where the foreigner really
was a stranger. Back then, even the Frenchman was a stranger. But today,
not even the AfD could say that without sounding ridiculous. The utopia is
a less complex society.
And what is the alternative utopia, more complexity? That doesn’t sound
very appealing.
The question is how we can become more resistant to deviations in a
volatile world, how we can better tolerate what is different. Since this is
difficult at the moment, many people are content with very simple
explanations. This applies to the whole arsenal of right-wing cultural
criticism, to the left-wing illusion that everything is just a problem of
distribution. Maybe we need a completely new understanding of what makes up
modern conditions of life, which we possibly still envisage far too much in
terms of the categories of the classical industrial society’s institutions.
Original in German/auf Deutsch: [1][„Die Diskussion ist vergiftet“]
8 Feb 2018
## LINKS
[1] /Soziologe-ueber-Silvester-vor-einem-Jahr/!5369637
## AUTOREN
Daniel Schulz
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