[1]Congress Should Oversee America's Wars, Not Just Authorize Them:
Nearly 17 years after the 9/11 attacks, a bipartisan coalition of
senators has put forward legislation that promises to overhaul the
legal framework for America's worldwide campaign against terrorism.
Proponents of this measure argue the existing authorization for
military force-an AUMF in wonk-speak-passed back in September 2001
has become woefully outdated. The failure to modernize it,
supporters say, represents a dereliction of duty by Congress.
They have a point. The text of the 2001 AUMF no longer bears much
resemblance to the wars we are fighting and that we will continue to
fight for the foreseeable future. As a matter of both constitutional
good practice and common sense, the case for an updated statute is
clear.
The problem is that, while a new authorization is legally desirable,
its real-world impact is likely to be minimal-doing little more than
sanctioning military operations the executive branch is already
prosecuting. Lawmakers who portray passage of an AUMF as the
ultimate fulfillment of their war-powers responsibilities therefore
risk elevating constitutional form over national security
substance-while neglecting the far more powerful but less formal
tools Congress possesses to influence America's post-9/11 wars for
the better.
That is unfortunate because the need for thoughtful, energetic
congressional activism has never been greater. From Afghanistan to
Syria to the Sahel, multiple complex U.S. military operations are
unfolding . Members of Congress are uniquely positioned to
scrutinize these efforts and the strategy underlying them, identify
any flaws and failures in policy, and inject innovative or
disruptive new ideas into the public debate that will make success
more likely.
In the mid-2000s, for instance, it was Members of Congress from both
parties who were pivotal in challenging-and eventually
overhauling-the Bush administration's strategy in Iraq.
During those years, senators like John McCain and Joseph Lieberman
(for whom we worked at the time) regularly traveled to the Middle
East, meeting with military commanders and frontline forces, while
back in Washington, they engaged not only the administration
officials responsible for Iraq, but also think tank scholars,
reporters, and visiting foreign leaders.
These interactions both convinced them that White House claims about
the war's progress were mistaken and brought them into contact with
dissidents, inside and outside government, who were arguing for an
alternative strategy-a population-centric counterinsurgency
campaign, backed by more forces. McCain, Lieberman and a few others
then used the congressional bully pulpit to advocate for this
approach, which the Bush Administration eventually embraced. The
result was the 2007 "surge" that stabilized Iraq.
Of course not all ideas emanating from Capitol Hill are good ones,
to put it mildly. Nor is it the appropriate role of Congress to
micromanage the day-to-day conduct of a war through binding
legislation.
Rather, the mission of Congress should be to provide smart,
determined oversight-asking tough, well-informed questions,
illuminating and demanding accountability for failures, and
encouraging fresh thinking. To that end, members must be willing to
invest the considerable time and effort to develop deep expertise in
national security, especially around the conflicts we are fighting.
Congress is also unique in its authority to peer through the cloud
of secrecy that otherwise necessarily cloaks much of the conduct of
war. This is all the more critical given the natural tendency of the
executive branch under every administration-like any bureaucracy-to
convince itself that whatever it is doing is working and that
patience will ultimately vindicate the existing approach.
Advocates of a new authorization for use of military force sometimes
argue that the authorization process itself-including some sort of
periodic renewal mechanism-is the best guarantor for this kind of
congressional overwatch. Unfortunately, this is mistaken.
On the contrary, past AUMF debates are striking for their failure to
have anticipated the problems that arose in the conflicts they
authorized. Current congressional deliberations around a new statute
also don't inspire much confidence in this respect: Those debates
have focused thus far on procedural questions while neglecting the
substantive issues about the wars the resolution would endorse.
Nor should intensive congressional scrutiny take place only every
few years. Rather, it is a continuous responsibility for Congress
that should be pursued independent from any AUMF mechanism. Members
should be traveling and investigating, talking to experts, fleshing
out alternative ideas, and working with executive branch officials
and military leaders to improve the conduct of operations critical
to our national security.
Too little of this seems to be happening now; late last year, after
the combat deaths of four servicemembers in Niger, many legislators
admitted they did not know U.S. troops were deployed there.
None of this is to diminish the constitutional case for passing a
new authorization for the use of military force. But lawmakers owe
our warfighters and our citizens more than an updated AUMF. It is
knowledgeable, constructive oversight of today's wars that is the
most impactful contribution that Congress can make to our national
security-and failure to provide it, an even more problematic
abdication of responsibility.
(Via [2]Lawfare - Hard National Security Choices)
I tried to cut this down for citation. I failed. Read it all.
__________________________________________________________________
My original entry is here: [3]Congress Should Oversee America's Wars,
Not Just Authorize Them. It posted Thu, 07 Jun 2018 20:22:26 +0000.
Filed under: personal,
References
1.
https://www.lawfareblog.com/congress-should-oversee-americas-wars-not-just-authorize-them
2.
https://www.lawfareblog.com/recent
3.
https://www.prjorgensen.com/?p=1199
