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= Noumenon =
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Introduction
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In metaphysics, the noumenon (, ; from Greek: νο�μενον) is a posited
object or event that exists independently of human sense and/or
perception. The term 'noumenon' is generally used when contrasted
with, or in relation to, the term 'phenomenon', which refers to
anything that can be apprehended by or is an object of the senses.
Modern philosophy has generally been skeptical of the possibility of
knowledge independent of the senses, and Immanuel Kant gave this point
of view its canonical expression: that the noumenal world may exist,
but it is completely unknowable through human sensation. In Kantian
philosophy, the unknowable noumenon is often linked to the unknowable
"thing-in-itself" (in Kant's German, 'Ding an sich'), although how to
characterize the nature of the relationship is a question still open
to some controversy.
Etymology
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The Greek word 'nooúmenon' (plural 'nooúmena') is the neuter
middle-passive present participle of 'noeîn' "to think, to mean",
which in turn originates from the word 'noûs', an Attic contracted
form of ν�ο� 'nóos' "perception, understanding, mind." A rough
equivalent in English would be "something that is thought", or "the
object of an act of thought".
Concept in pre-Kantian philosophy
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The Oxford Companion to Philosophy writes "Platonic Ideas and Forms
are noumenon, and phenomena are things displaying
themselves to the senses. [...] that noumena and the noumenal world
are objects of the highest knowledge, truths, and values is Plato's
principal legacy to philosophy." However, that noumena and the
noumenal world were objects of the highest knowledge, truths, and
values, was disputed from the start, beginning with Democritus, his
follower Pyrrho, founder of Pyrrhonism, and even in the Academy
starting with Arcesilaus and the introduction of Academic Skepticism.
In these traditions of philosophical skepticism, noumena are suspected
of being delusions. Plato's allegory of the cave may be interpreted
as an illustration of the noumenal/phenomenal distinction.
Overview
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As expressed in Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,' human understanding
is structured by "concepts of the understanding", or pure categories
of understanding found prior to experience in the mind, and which make
outer experiences possible as counterpart to the rational faculties of
the mind.
By Kant's account, when one employs a concept to describe or
categorize 'noumena' (the objects of inquiry, investigation or
analysis of the workings of the world), one is employing a way of
describing or categorizing 'phenomena' (the observable manifestations
of those objects of inquiry, investigation or analysis). Kant posited
methods by which human understanding makes sense of and thus intuits
phenomena that appear to the mind: the concepts of the 'transcendental
aesthetic', as well as that of the 'transcendental analytic',
'transcendental logic' and 'transcendental deduction'. Taken
together, Kant's "categories of understanding" are the principles of
the human mind which necessarily are brought to bear in attempting to
understand the world in which we exist (that is, to understand, or
attempt to understand, "things in themselves"). In each instance the
word "transcendental" refers to the process that the human mind must
exercise to understand or grasp the form of, and order among,
phenomena. Kant asserts that to "transcend" a direct observation or
experience is to use reason and classifications to strive to correlate
with the phenomena that are observed. Humans can make sense out of
phenomena in these various ways, but in doing so can never know the
"things-in-themselves", the actual objects and dynamics of the natural
world in their noumenal dimension - this being the negative correlate
to phenomena and that which escapes the limits of human understanding.
By Kant's Critique, our minds may attempt to correlate in useful ways,
perhaps even closely accurate ways, with the structure and order of
the various aspects of the universe, but cannot know these
"things-in-themselves" (noumena) directly. Rather, we must infer the
extent to which the human rational faculties can reach the object of
"things-in-themselves" by our observations of the manifestations of
those things that can be perceived via the physical senses, that is,
of phenomena, and by ordering these perceptions in the mind infer the
validity of our perceptions to the rational categories used to
understand them in a rational system, this rational system
('transcendental analytic'), being the categories of the understanding
as free from empirical contingency.
According to Kant, objects of which we are cognizant via the physical
senses are merely representations of 'unknown somethings'�what Kant
refers to as the 'transcendental object'�as interpreted through the 'a
priori' or 'categories of the understanding'. These 'unknown
somethings' are manifested within the noumenon�although we can never
know how or why as our perceptions of these 'unknown somethings' via
our physical senses are bound by the limitations of the 'categories of
the understanding' and we are therefore never able to fully know the
"thing-in-itself".
Noumenon and the thing-in-itself
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Many accounts of Kant's philosophy treat "noumenon" and
"thing-in-itself" as synonymous, and there is textual evidence for
this relationship. However, Stephen Palmquist holds that "noumenon"
and "thing-in-itself" are only 'loosely' synonymous, inasmuch as they
represent the same concept viewed from two different perspectives, and
other scholars also argue that they are not identical. Schopenhauer
criticised Kant for changing the meaning of "noumenon". However, this
opinion is far from unanimous. Kant's writings show points of
difference between noumena and things-in-themselves. For instance, he
regards things-in-themselves as existing:
..though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we
must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in
themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion
that there can be appearance without anything that appears.
He is much more doubtful about noumena:
But in that case a noumenon is not for our understanding a special
[kind of] object, namely, an intelligible object; the [sort of]
understanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we
cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an
understanding which should know its object, not discursively through
categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition.
A crucial difference between the noumenon and the thing-in-itself is
that to call something a noumenon is to claim a kind of knowledge,
whereas Kant insisted that the thing-in-itself is unknowable.
Interpreters have debated whether the latter claim makes sense: it
seems to imply that we know at least one thing about the
thing-in-itself (i.e., that it is unknowable). But Stephen Palmquist
explains that this is part of Kant's definition of the term, to the
extent that anyone who claims to have found a way of making the
thing-in-itself knowable must be adopting a non-Kantian position.
Positive and negative noumena
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Kant also makes a distinction between 'positive' and 'negative'
noumena:
If by 'noumenon' we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of our
sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of intuiting it,
this is a noumenon in the 'negative' sense of the term.
But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensible intuition, we
thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition, namely, the
intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we
cannot comprehend even the possibility. This would be 'noumenon' in
the 'positive' sense of the term.
The positive noumena, if they existed, would be immaterial entities
that can only be apprehended by a special, non-sensory faculty:
"intellectual intuition" ('nicht sinnliche Anschauung'). Kant doubts
that we have such a faculty, because for him intellectual intuition
would mean that thinking of an entity, and its being represented,
would be the same. He argues that humans have no way to apprehend
positive noumena:
Since, however, such a type of intuition, intellectual intuition,
forms no part whatsoever of our faculty of knowledge, it follows that
the employment of the categories can never extend further than to the
objects of experience. Doubtless, indeed, there are intelligible
entities corresponding to the sensible entities; there may also be
intelligible entities to which our sensible faculty of intuition has
no relation whatsoever; but our concepts of understanding, being mere
forms of thought for our sensible intuition, could not in the least
apply to them. That, therefore, which we entitle 'noumenon' must be
understood as being such only in a negative sense.
The noumenon as a limiting concept
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Even if noumena are unknowable, they are still needed as a 'limiting
concept', Kant tells us. Without them, there would be only phenomena,
and since potentially we have complete knowledge of our phenomena, we
would in a sense know everything. In his own words:
Further, the concept of a noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible
intuition from being extended to things in themselves, and thus to
limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge.
What our understanding acquires through this concept of a noumenon, is
a negative extension; that is to say, understanding is not limited
through sensibility; on the contrary, it itself limits sensibility by
applying the term noumena to things in themselves (things not regarded
as appearances). But in so doing it at the same time sets limits to
itself, recognising that it cannot know these noumena through any of
the categories, and that it must therefore think them only under the
title of an unknown something.
Furthermore, for Kant, the existence of a noumenal world limits reason
to what he perceives to be its proper bounds, making many questions of
traditional metaphysics, such as the existence of God, the soul, and
free will unanswerable by reason. Kant derives this from his
definition of knowledge as "the determination of given representations
to an object". As there are no appearances of these entities in the
phenomenal, Kant is able to make the claim that they cannot be known
to a mind that works upon "such knowledge that has to do only with
appearances". These questions are ultimately the "proper object of
faith, but not of reason".
The dual-object and dual-aspect interpretations
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Kantian scholars have long debated two contrasting interpretations of
the thing-in-itself. One is the 'dual object' view, according to which
the thing-in-itself is an entity distinct from the phenomena to which
it gives rise. The other is the 'dual aspect' view, according to which
the thing-in-itself and the thing-as-it-appears are two "sides" of the
same thing. This view is supported by the textual fact that "Most
occurrences of the phrase 'things-in-themselves' are shorthand for the
phrase, 'things considered in themselves' (Dinge an sich selbst
betrachten)."
Although we cannot 'see' things apart from the way we do in fact
perceive them via the physical senses, we can 'think' them apart from
our mode of sensibility (physical perception); thus making the
thing-in-itself a kind of noumenon or object of thought.
Pre-Kantian critique
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Though the term 'noumenon' did not come into common usage until Kant,
the idea that undergirds it, that matter has an absolute existence
which causes it to emanate certain phenomena, had historically been
subjected to criticism. George Berkeley, who pre-dated Kant, asserted
that matter, independent of an observant mind, is metaphysically
impossible. Qualities associated with matter, such as shape, color,
smell, texture, weight, temperature, and sound are all dependent on
minds, which allow only for relative perception, not absolute
perception. The complete absence of such minds (and more importantly
an omnipotent mind) would render those same qualities unobservable and
even unimaginable. Berkeley called this philosophy immaterialism.
Essentially there could be no such thing as matter without a mind.
Schopenhauer's critique
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Schopenhauer claimed that Kant used the word 'noumenon' incorrectly.
He explained in his "Critique of the Kantian philosophy", which first
appeared as an appendix to 'The World as Will and Representation':
The difference between abstract and intuitive cognition, which Kant
entirely overlooks, was the very one that ancient philosophers
indicated as �αινομ�να ['phainomena'] and νοο�μενα ['nooumena']; t
he
opposition and incommensurability between these terms proved very
productive in the philosophemes of the Eleatics, in Plato's doctrine
of Ideas, in the dialectic of the Megarics, and later in the
scholastics, in the conflict between nominalism and realism. This
latter conflict was the late development of a seed already present in
the opposed tendencies of Plato and Aristotle. But Kant, who
completely and irresponsibly neglected the issue for which the terms
�αινομ�να and νοο�μενα were already in use, then took possession o
f
the terms as if they were stray and ownerless, and used them as
designations of things in themselves and their appearances.
The noumenon's original meaning of "that which is thought" is not
compatible with the "thing-in-itself," the latter being Kant's term
for things as they exist apart from their existence as images in the
mind of an observer. In a footnote to this passage, Schopenhauer
provides the following passage from the 'Outlines of Pyrrhonism' (Bk.
I, ch. 13) of Sextus Empiricus to demonstrate the original distinction
between phenomenon and noumenon according to ancient philosophers:
νοο�μενα �αινομ�νοι� �ν�ε�ίθη �ναξαγ��α� ('Anaxagora
s opposed what is
thought to what appears.')
See also
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* Always already
* Anatta
* Condition of possibility
* Haecceity
* Hypokeimenon
* Ineffability
* Observation
* Qualia
* Schopenhauer's criticism of the Kantian philosophy
* Transcendental idealism
* Unobservable
External links
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* [
https://archive.org/details/surdofmetaphysic00caru 'The surd of
metaphysics; an inquiry into the question: Are there
things-in-themselves?' (1903)] by Paul Carus, 1852-1919
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Original Article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noumenon
