While I haven't read Blackmore, I suspect I would enjoy it,
although I'd have to get over my Dawkins bias first tongue
emoticon
This review from 1999 on Amazon of the book gives me hope that I
might enjoy it. The reviewer ties together Blackmore view of
memetics and Lakoff's "Philosophy in the Flesh".
Now I haven't read Philosophy in the Flesh either, but I've read
enough from Lakoff to know that I'm a huge fan of the embodied
cognition concept.
To highlight (save reading the below), the line, "I think
perhaps both of these books may be converging on some similar
problems from different perspectives."
helps confirm what I've been suspecting: that memetics is more
or less compatible with Lakoff, just seeing things from
different starting points.
"This book is a little too ambitious. Although Blackmore does
not succeed in making the case for a science of memetics, she
does a fantastic job trying to. With things like "Campbell's
rule" and copying of instructions vs. copying of the product,
she makes some good conceptual headway. She provides some good
behaviorist insight on true imitation as a potential basis for
memetic theory. The speculative field of memetics has yet to
pull all the threads together, though Blackmore does a very good
job setting the stage. I think the field as a whole could use a
lot more immersion in cognitive science beyond the interesting
forays of Daniel Dennett("Darwin's Dangerous Idea" highly
recommended). I think the cognitive roles of language while not
overlooked, could use more attention. In this vein I recommend
to those interested to read "Philosophy in the Flesh" by George
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, after you finish "The Meme Machine."
The Meme Machine reads very well. It doesn't leave me seeing how
memetics will get from here (speculative) to there (real
science), but it leaves me thinking that there must be a way.
Blackmore backs up her own ideas with some good scientific
background, but doesn't lay any real empirical foundations for a
science of memetics. I think until we have a better idea of the
neurological organization underpinning our conceptual thinking
that foundation will not appear. For some possible headway on
that, again I suggest you read "Philosophy in the Flesh" after
you read "The Meme Machine." I think perhaps both of these books
may be converging on some similar problems from different
perspectives.
I think Blackmore sets some goals that are entirely too
ambitious, and fails to achieve them. Instead of laying a
foundation, she merely piques our interest. Don't let that stop
you from enjoying "The Meme Machine." It is very interesting.
Read this book. You will be glad that you did."
