NRA Continues To Defend NICS Improvement Amendments Act: Last week, when
the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed H.R. 2640, "The
NICS Improvement Amendments Act," by a voice vote, some gun owners were
confused as to the exact scope and effect of this proactive reform bill.
Let's look at the facts...
http://www.nraila.org/Legislation/Federal/Read.aspx?id=3128
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NRA-ILA Alerts: Alerts for the various states are posted on the NRA-ILA
website.
http://www.nraila.org/Legislation/State/
---
From John Farnam:
18 June 07
More sterile guns and "gunmen"!
In looking through a recent issue of a popular American gun magazine, I
noted an article on the subject of planes-game hunting. A smiling
hunter is pictured with his deceased quarry ( an antelope) and his Ruger
single-shot rifle, presumptively the one used to down the animal,
obviously unloaded, out of his control, and leaning nonchalantly against
the reclining beast.
It must the new, accepted norm for "hunters" to pose for photographs
with empty guns! It is as if they were saying, "It's okay! My gun is
unloaded. I'm harmless/helpless/defenseless. We can all relax now."
And, among gun-magazine publishers, it is apparently the new, unwritten
rule that hunters may pose with guns, so long as all are obviously
unloaded, sterile, and not being held in a way where one could possibly
use them for any serious purpose.
I had the unhappy experience of hunting with a British PH in South
Africa several years ago who had this same pernicious habit of unloading
rifles the moment the beast went down and the hunt was supposedly
"over." After shooting a large Oryx with a borrowed 270 bolt gun, this
PH indicated that he could now take the rifle from me. We'll, I
couldn't very well tell him he couldn't have his own rifle back, but I
was dismayed and not a little concerned when he promptly unloaded it,
all the time complementing me on my accuracy.
His congratulatory comments were, as is turns out, premature! After
thirty minutes, the "dead" Oryx got back up, looking at the two of us
and displaying very little discomfort! We had both been guilty of
"relaxing too soon." I drew my G19, which was the only gun I still
had. In an embarrassed panic, my PH tried clumsily to reload the
rifle. Meanwhile, the animal, apparently bored with both of us, ran
away! It was hours before I got another shot at it and finally brought
it down for the final time. My PH never asked me to surrender the rifle
the rest of that day, and it thus stayed loaded and under my direct control.
During WWII, a far wiser General "Vinegar" Joe Stillwell, assigned to
the far east, never allowed himself to be photographed while unarmed.
Every picture we see of him today shows him with M1 Carbine in hand. A
fifteen-round magazine is unfailingly locked in the magazine well, and I
have every confidence there was always a round chambered. Joe Stillwell
obviously didn't feel a need to apologize for always being ready to act,
unlike many in today's generation of hunter/writers.
Like Vinegar Joe, I have made it a habit of not allowing myself to be
photographed on a hunt while holding an obviously empty gun or with my
rifle or shotgun out of my direct control. I believe such photographs
convey an arrogant, overly-casual attitude that simultaneously dishonors
our quarry and does a disservice to our Art.
Nor do I allow myself to be photographed using an autopistol, with slide
locked to the rear, as a pointer, calling attention to bullet holes in a
paper target. It's a pistol, not a pointer, and such an airheaded stunt
does our Art no good service!
Decades from now, I, for one, don't want my descendants to look as
photos of me, as I am unarmed, clueless, inattentive, and arrogantly
assumptive that the fight is over. No, I want all to say of me, if
nothing else, "... now, there's a Warrior!"
"A mousetrap is an example of excellent "conditioning." It's coiled
spring sits expressionless. It has no personal animosity toward mice,
any more than it does toward careless index fingers. So long as neither
touches the cheese, there is no problem! But, when the cheese is
molested, it's reaction is fleet, remorseless, and absolutely invariant."
/John
21 June 07
Sage advice from criminal defense attorneys with whom I work:
When I am asked by lawyers to provide them with expert consultation in
shooting cases, I always make it a point to ask several, general
questions about strategies for gun owners/carriers. This advice I, in
turn, pass on to my students:
The most dangerous and damaging single thing one can do in the wake of a
lethal confrontation, the one act that fatally damages most claims of
legitimate self-defense? Answering questions asked by police
investigators, at the scene, without first insisting on having your
attorney present.
Even seemingly innocent-sounding statements like, "I didn't mean
to....", "It was an accident.....", "This is terrible....", and "I
can't believe I did that...." are, in fact, monstrously incriminating.
Attorneys tell me that the strongest part of the prosecutor's case is
almost always directly founded upon indiscreet statements made, at the
scene, by the accused, to police.
On the other hand, saying nothing to police carries risks also. When
those on one side of the incident talk freely to the police, and those
on the other side say nothing, talkers automatically go into the
"victim" column on the investigator's notebook, while the silent go into
the "perpetrator" column. Those assigned distinctions tend to be
permanent and will color the investigation from that point forward.
The best compromise is to have your well-rehearsed tape loops ready to
go. Tape loops need to be emphatic and unmistakable, but neither rude
nor insulting: "Officers, I want to cooperate, but I want my attorney
here first" , "I'll be happy to answer all your questions just as soon
as my attorney is here."
At that point, police are obligated to stop questioning you. However,
they may say something to you like, "You can go the 'lawyer-route' is
you want, but it won't do you any good.", "You better start answering
questions now, while you still have the chance.", "All we want to do is
just clear this up.", "You'll feel much better after you talk with us."
or, "We only have a few questions, strictly routine..."
What they are trying to do is persuade you to definitively rescind your
demand that you have a lawyer to represent you during questioning. Once
you say,"Okay, I'll talk with you," they will assume, correctly, that
you've changed your mind and no longer want a lawyer. Don't do it!
Continue to remind investigators that you still want a lawyer and
continue to politely decline to answer questions.
So, when first confronting arriving police officers, (1) assume a
non-threatening posture, with both palms turned outward and clearly
visible. Make sure no guns or other weapons are visible. (2) Get into
the "victim" column" right away with, "Officers, thank God you're
here!" Then (3) identify yourself by saying, "I'm the one who called."
VCAs don't call the police very often!
When asked what happened, say: "That man tried to murder us," pointing
in the direction of the perpetrator. Then comes (4) "I'll be happy to
answer all your questions just as soon as my attorney is here."
Beyond that, shut your mouth. Don't sign anything and don't "consent"
to anything. If arrested, submit peacefully and without comment. When
asked if you understand your rights, say "No." When asked what you
don't understand, say, "I don't understand any of it."
Tape loops need to be practiced every time we go to the range. None of
the foregoing may seem important, until the unthinkable happens. Then,
I promise you, the nightmare will begin, made all that much worse when
you don't know your lines!
/John
23 June 07
Why do we adamantly refuse to learn? This, from an LEO friend in the SE:
"I attended a one-day conference on LE Crisis Negotiation last week.
The session focused on active shooters. One hundred local LEOs
attended, along with military MPs and others. We were on a college campus.
Most attendees were dressed in BDUs or 'duty-casual' (511 pants, golf
shirt w/department logo). Many were in full uniform. Others wore
logo-emblazoned blazers.
Precious few attendees were armed! I was just about the only one. Most
displayed a shiny badge clipped next to an empty holster. Even those
in uniform showed up with empty holsters.
Nearly all left their guns in their cars before entering the campus.
They apparently look upon their personal weapons as inconsequential
accouterments, to be discarded at a whim when in a 'safe' environment,
and this in the very wake of the VA Tech shootings!
Unbelievable! Will we ever learn?"
Comment: So long as this civilization looks upon
helplessness/defenselessness as "virtues," we will continue to see this
kind of institutionalized stupidity, this lemming-like allegiance to
enforced impotence, even among LEOs. And, few even question it!
/John
(Because I was carrying revolvers, whose ammunition would not fit into
the pistols on which we were working, I was allowed to remain armed in
the three pistol armorer courses I took at last month's IALEFI
conference. I nearly bit through my tongue when one of the instructors
made a remark that he was sure that all of us would agree that it was
very unlikely that anyone would attack us through the back door of the
room. Let's see, I'm a terrorist and some of the top law-enforcement
trainers in the US are going to be sitting in rooms in large groups
here...I recall an incident in Torrance CA, over a decade ago, where an
armed robber attempted to take down a conference of officials from a
nearby city, including two unarmed police officers. As I recall, one
officer was shot fatally and the robber died of a crushed neck.)
---
From Force Science Research Center:
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I. NEW STUDY: WE'RE GETTING BETTER PREPARED TO WIN ON THE STREET AND IN
COURT
Part 1 of a 2-part series
--A high percentage of officers leave law enforcement after they're
involved in a shooting.
--Suspects who try to kill officers are usually drunk, drugged, or deranged.
--When multiple cops are in an armed confrontation, they'll likely
experience "contagion fire" and blast off a wild fusillade of rounds.
--In matters of deadly force, when you're sued, you're screwed.
Right?
Maybe not. Based on a new study of lethal force, it may be time to dump
these and other venerable "truths" about police encounters into the
dustbin of myth.
What is true, according to the latest findings by Dr. Darrell Ross,
long-time police trainer, researcher, and expert witness, is
hearteningly positive: modern training is paying off for officers in
high-stress situations, and the life-or-death decisions they're forced
to make "in nanoseconds" are being overwhelmingly supported in the
judicial process.
In short, says Ross, his study reveals "a resounding common trend: We're
getting better prepared for the realities of the street, and we're
winning there and in court."
Because of the select nature of Ross' research sample, "it cannot
necessarily be generalized to all police shootings," observes Dr. Bill
Lewinski, executive director of the Force Science Research Center at
Minnesota State University-Mankato. "But his excellent and important
work brings to light fascinating discoveries about some force encounters
that should encourage and motivate trainers, as well as stimulate additional
research."
Ross, who heads the Dept. of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration
at Western Illinois University, presented his research into suspect
behavior, "contextual cues," and officer performance, during a 4-hr.
session at this year's annual conference of the International Law
Enforcement Educators and Trainers Assn. (ILEETA). He recently
supplemented his remarks in lengthy interviews with Force Science News.
We begin our series of reports on his important findings with his
sometimes-surprising discoveries about officer/subject factors in deadly
clashes and the aftermaths that swirl in the wake of controversial cases.
Ross analyzed roughly "10 years' worth of case material" from 86 lethal
force incidents. These confrontations involved 121 officers from 94
municipal, county, state, and campus LE agencies, large and small, from
across the U.S., although predominantly (45%) from the Central states.
All told, these officers fired 340 shots. Ninety-seven per cent of the
suspects were killed, but all officers survived, although about 4 in 10
suffered injuries requiring treatment.
"All were high-profile incidents in which I was an expert witness for
officers and their agencies in lawsuits, usually Section 1983 [federal
civil rights] actions," Ross explains. Wrongful and excessive force was
universally alleged. Because of his expert status, Ross had extensive
access to reports, investigative files, crime scene evidence, detailed
personal interviews, depositions, sworn testimony, training records, and
other revealing documentation. He personally visited 65% of the shooting
locations under time and weather conditions that mimicked the event to
accurately perceive the atmosphere.
For the most part, the shootings occurred in 1 of 4 circumstances: the
investigation of a suspicious person or activity (32%), during a
domestic call (20%), during a vehicle stop (18%), or after a vehicle
pursuit (15%).
All officers and all suspects were male. Of officers, 55% were white,
30% black, 15% Asian. Their average age was 34, average time in LE 11
years. Some 80% had at least 2 years of college. Seventy per cent were
working patrol at the time of the shooting, and for 93%, the shooting
analyzed was their first.
Seining through thousands of facts in his resource pool, Ross has netted
a number of factors that he feels are particularly significant in terms
of force dynamics, training, and performance. Some examples:
SUSPECT DEMOGRAPHICS. In contrast to the persistent belief that most
offenders shot by police are chemically or emotionally disturbed, 85% of
the suspects in Ross' study were sober. A minority (25%) were "mentally
impaired." More than 1/3 had no prior criminal history. "Officers need
to be aware," Ross says, "that they can get dangerous resistance from
virtually anyone. People do crazy wild stuff even sober, and without a
hard-core criminal past."
Also, 65% of the suspects shot were white, challenging the media- and
activist-fueled impression that police deadly force involves "just white
officers killing blacks."
VEHICULAR WEAPONS. Forty per cent of the offenders in this study used or
tried to use a motor vehicle as a weapon, and more than 1/4 of the
officers involved were actually struck--figures that Ross considers
surprisingly high. "Is this a new national trend, or something just true
of this sample?" he wonders. He isn't sure. But training in avoiding
vehicular assault, such as the pioneering program launched for the Tempe
(AZ) PD by Sgt. Craig Stapp, an advisor to the Force Science Research
Center, certainly seems prescient to these circumstances.
MULTIPLE-SHOOTER IMPACT. In all but 3 of Ross' cases there was a lone
suspect and he confronted a lone officer 43% of the time. In 27% of the
encounters, multiple officers were present but only 1 fired. Even when
multiple officers discharged their weapon (usually a Glock handgun),
they averaged just 4 rounds apiece. Media-hyped scenarios in which
multiple officers perforate a single suspect with unrestrained volleys
are rare anomalies indeed, Ross points out. Much more commonly, even in
the presence of other officers "each individual tends to display a
disciplined discernment of threat and an understanding of when it is
appropriate for him to use deadly force."
With multiple rounds flying, "you would think that errant shots might
hit innocent bystanders," Ross notes, "but I found no cases of this."
Interestingly, officers shoot better when they're alone. Those facing a
suspect by themselves delivered their rounds with an 80% accuracy rate.
With multiple officers firing, the group accuracy fell to 60%.
PHYSICAL PRELUDE. Few shootings evolved from a static, flat-footed
stance. In most cases, officers were physically active shortly before
shooting, either conducting a foot pursuit (30%), grappling with the
suspect (20%), and/or exerting other movement (40%). Four out of 10 said
they had to shoot while moving, with 3% firing while being dragged by a
vehicle. "All this affects heart rate, breathing, and other
physiological responses, and needs to be accommodated for in training,"
Ross says.
He believes officers in the study benefited from a generally high level
of physical fitness. Ninety per cent reported maintaining some type of
aerobic and strength-conditioning workout at least once a week, with 34%
hitting the gym 3-4 days a week and 15% 5 days a week.
COVER. Only 15% of the officers had the luxury of using cover. The rest
were caught unprotected and even if they tried to move to cover, they
didn't have time to reach it before the shooting was over. Amazingly, 1
out of 4 was not wearing soft body armor.
TIMING. About 75% of the shootings occurred after the involved officer
had been on duty from 4 to 10 hours, from 1/2 to 2/3 into their shift.
About 15% were working overtime. Would this suggest that fatigue may
have been a factor in the decision to shoot? Ross says he detected no
evidence of this in his interviews with the shooters, which typically
lasted 3 hours and extensively probed influences on the officers' frame
of mind. "But be prepared for plaintiffs' attorneys trying to drag this
in as a red herring to bolster a weak case."
FIREARMS TRAINING. Modern training methods were strongly evident in the
shooters' backgrounds. All had trained in shooting from varied positions
and extensively in shooting at night. Seventy-five per cent had
practiced instinct shooting, 85% had experience with Simunitions rounds,
and 3/4 had scenario-based firearms instruction and exposure to
FATS-type systems. Forty per cent had been to a Street Survival Seminar,
55% had trained in reading body language, and roughly 1/3 practiced
mental imagery exercises.
"All this reflects really good academy and in-service training,
employing a wave of techniques that have emerged over the last decade,"
Ross says. "As officers and as total personalities, these men were very
squared away, well prepared for their deadly force encounters."
AFTERMATH. Encouragingly, Ross did not find evidence of the profound
personal and professional nosedive that some observers would have us
believe commonly follows in the wake of a shooting. Two years afterward,
90% of the involved officers were still employed in law enforcement.
Indeed, 30% had achieved promotions in rank and responsibility.
Only 25% said they had experienced post-shooting stress, usually
relatively mild transitory events like nightmares, sleep disruption,
temporary substance abuse, obsessively dwelling on the incident, job and
relationship problems, and such. Twenty per cent said they had
experienced some marital problems in the aftermath, but only half of
that group ended up divorcing and most reported that the special stress
of the shooting was only one of many factors contributing to the split.
Eight out of 10 said their departments were supportive, providing access
to critical incident debriefing, counseling, legal assistance, and/or
other indications of "being behind the officer," Ross reports. "The
better the department gave the officers positive support and
encouragement, the better they were able to deal with post-shooting
stress issues."
Having lived through a shooting experience, would the officers hesitate
to pull the trigger if faced with similar circumstances again?
Eighty-eight per cent said No. The 12% who said they might pause,
potentially putting their lives at greater danger, are a "small but
important minority," Ross says, "who represent a training challenge that
should not be overlooked."
LEGAL OUTCOME. Overwhelmingly, officers and departments in the study
fared well in the lawsuits against them. More than half won without even
going to trial, when judges ruled in their favor with summary judgments.
Of the 1/3 who went to trial, all won, thanks in part to officers
"testifying well in court and writing solid reports," Ross says.
Fourteen per cent settled out of court, (not necessarily indicative of
bad cases but more likely of risk-management jitters, Ross speculates).
None was charged criminally.
Even though 35% of the suspects who were shot turned out not to have a
lethal weapon, judges and juries seemed to understand the severe
limitations officers were operating under when making their decisions.
For instance, 65% of the shootings occurred outdoors at night or in
low-light conditions. And while contact with a suspect may have gone on
for several minutes, officers in 95% of the cases had less than 2
seconds (less than 1 second for 70%) to perceive a sudden threat and
react to it. "Legally," Ross points out, "an officer's force decisions
don't have to be perfect, they just have to be objectively reasonable
given the totality of circumstances."
Ross cites several arguments commonly advanced by plaintiffs' expert
witnesses in an effort to discredit the force decisions the officers
made in the cases he reviewed:
--The officer "created the harm or put himself in harm's way" because he
used poor tactics.
--Officers are trained to use lethal force only as a "last resort."
--Officers are trained to use "the least amount of force necessary."
--Officers "must demonstrate a 'rational fear' of an imminent threat to
justify shooting."
--Officers are "directed to use levels of force incrementally over
several seconds;" i.e., to advance gradually, step by step through trial
and error, up the force continuum.
All these assertions are erroneous, Ross insists, and were recognized by
judicial reviewers in his study as not representing modern
constitutional standards.
The strength of Ross' study, he says, is that it highlights "trends and
patterns that officers, trainers, and administrators need to know about.
These are officers who survived on the street and in court because of
their decision-making. Their experiences reflect what's happening in the
field.
"Training should be designed to match reality. If you want your officers
to be as successful as these officers, you have to devote the time and
money in training to model what they were challenged to cope with and
hope you get the same results."
[NEXT: Ross' study explores "contextual cues." With limited time to
assess a situation, what indicators helped officers detect imminent
threatening behavior by suspects and decide when to shoot in self-defense?]
================
(c) 2007: Force Science Research Center, www.forcescience.org. Reprints
allowed by request. For reprint clearance, please e-mail:
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The Force Science Research Center, a non-profit organization based at
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================
--
Stephen P. Wenger
Firearm safety - It's a matter
for education, not legislation.
http://www.spw-duf.info
