Gonzalez Allies Trumpet Conservative Views: The Washington Post, one of
the most liberal papers in the US, seems to argue that Alberto Gonzalez
is sufficiently conservative to warrant President Bush's appointment to
the Supreme Court. Not mentioned is his avowed support for federal bans
on cosmetically impaired firearms, ostensibly because such weapons pose
a threat to his police-officer brother.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9275315/
---
New Orleans Gun Confiscation Is Foolish And Illegal: Attorney David
Kopel once again looks at the role of legally armed citizens in
maintaining order in parts of New Orleans and Algiers and the illegality
of the seizure of their firearms.
http://www.reason.com/hod/dk091005.shtml
---
The Torah And Self-Defense: I have shared this link before but the list
has gained many members since then and the document is well worth
reading. David Kopel traces our Judaeo-Christian concepts of
self-defense (and capital punishment) from the first five books of the
Old Testament through the beginnings of Christianity.
http://www.davidkopel.org/2A/LawRev/The-Torah-and-Self-defense.pdf
---
Interesting Revenge: A Pennsylvania man has lost his battle with
neighbors to operate a skeet range on his farmland. While they may have
had a legal basis to suppress the noise from shooting, they will have no
legal means to oppose the odor from his new pig farm.
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05254/568101.stm
---
From Force Science Research Center:
"FRAUGHT WITH PERILS"...BUT WHAT'S BETTER?
EXPERTS SPEAK OUT ON NEW SUICIDE-BOMBER GUIDELINES FROM THE IACP...and the
FSRC welcomes YOUR thoughts!
Part 2 of a 2-part Series
Counter-terrorism expert Robert Bunker, PhD, won't take questions about the
provocative recommendations he wrote for 2 recent publications from the
International Assn. of Chiefs of Police about would-be suicide/homicide
bombers and how police officers can best preemptively kill them.
Through an assistant, he declined to address inquiries from Force Science
News, so we were unable to discuss with him the operational challenges and
seemingly no-win dilemmas posed by some of his guidelines.
As described in detail in Part 1 of this series, Bunker's core advice,
delivered across 2 IACP Training Keys, encourages officers to shoot to kill
suspected bomb carriers with rounds to the head. According to Bunker, this
deadly force would be justifiable under "Federal laws and rulings" if you
have a reasonable belief that a suspect is simply capable of detonating a
bomb, without needing to wait for him or her to actually make a move or
take "other action potentially sufficient to carry out the bombing." The
reports include a "Suicide Bomber Profile" to help officers identify likely
offenders.
The full IACP reports can be accessed online.
For IACP Training Key #581 - Suicide Bombers, Part One visit:
http://www.theiacp.org/pubinfo/IACP581SuicideBombersPart1.pdf
For IACP Training Key #582 - Suicide Bombers, Part Two, visit:
http://www.theiacp.org/pubinfo/IACP582SuicideBombersPart2.pdf
The tactical and decision-making guidelines, along with other elements of
Bunker's presentation, have profound implications for law officers,
supervisors, trainers and administrators and for the communities they
serve, according to police use-of-force experts consulted by Force Science
News.
While commending the IACP for engaging a tough, complex topic before
American law enforcement has yet had to deal with it face-to-face, the
experts express concern that some of the recommendations set impossible
skill standards for most street personnel, that they raise thornier legal
questions and training dichotomies than the reports suggest, and that they
call for operational policies and practices that may well strain the always
dicey police-society relationship in dramatic new ways.
As one expert told us, "The drastic actions recommended would change the
police mind-set about potentially lethal confrontations and may have
unforeseen and unintended consequences."
WE WANT TO KNOW WHAT YOU THINK
The Force Science Research Center at Minnesota State University-Mankato
wants to hear your reactions to the issues raised by the IACP documents and
the experts' opinions.
-- As an LE professional, do you feel these guidelines will be adopted by
your agency?
-- Will they be followed on the street?
-- Will your community accept them...as well as the errors of judgment they
may lead to?
-- What might be better, if anything? Or are these simply the stark reality
that law enforcers and civilians alike need to confront before the first
suicide bomber explodes a payload here?
*** SEND THE FORCE SCIENCE RESEARCH CENTER YOUR THOUGHTS at:
[email protected]
Meanwhile, here are reactions to Bunker's guidelines and recommendations
from prominent use-of-force authorities.
THOMAS AVENI--nationally known firearms instructor, frequent expert witness
in police liability litigation, member of FSRC's National Advisory Board
and researcher, trainer and consultant for the Police Policy Studies
Council:
"If we accept the premise that Middle East-style suicide bombings are about
to debut here and that the way we currently police our streets is likely to
be exploited by our enemies," then some drastic changes undoubtedly are
warranted. But the recommendations are "fraught with complexities and
perils that may be unforeseen and cannot be understated," Aveni fears."
"When we start instructing police to profile people for head shots, we're
in a whole new world"--one that will require "altering the police mind-set"
to encompass "adversaries who are soldiers in a war, as opposed to simply
criminals. This is a major departure from the present police culture."
Heavily burdened trainers "will have to interpret vast gray areas embedded
in these guidelines, and then determine how to negotiate the conflict
between traditional deadly force policies and practice" and what the
suicide-bomber realities are said to call for.
For example, Bunker points out that traditionally trained center-mass shots
may actually detonate a bomber's explosives or may merely inflict nonfatal
wounds, allowing the bombing mission to proceed. A head shot is the only
reliable placement for instant de-animation.
Aveni agrees. "But I've trained thousands of cops, and I don't think most
have the skill to deliver a head shot" from a distance, especially with a
handgun, which may be the only weapon immediately available in an
unexpected encounter.
"The human skull is a fortified pillbox, mounted on a swivel, the neck,"
Aveni says. "The head can move up and down and side-to-side freely and
quickly when a threat is perceived." (Indeed, according to Executive
Director Dr. Bill Lewinski, the Force Science Research Center has
documented that an unrestrained subject can move his head sideways 6 to 10
inches in as little as 1/10th of a second-"faster than a rifle bullet can
travel 200 yards and faster than any officer could possibly react.")
"Consequently," Aveni says, "with a handgun, the most reliable means of
effecting the recommended nasal-cavity shots, ear-canal shots or brain-stem
shots is with the subject literally pinned down and immobilized by the
officer. So much for 'stand-off distances!'"
When a suspect is driving a vehicle, with a potentially far higher-capacity
payload than an individual could pack personally, the Training Keys
recommend that officers keep a "minimum safety distance [of] 660 feet in
all directions." (No 'stand-off distance' is recommended for bombers on
foot.)
"This is roughly twice the distance that police precision
riflemen--snipers--generally train for, and they are usually equipped with
12-16X scopes on precision .308 rifles," Aveni explains. "In other words,
only a mere handful of specially trained, exceptionally high-skilled police
could even hope to successfully engage a threat at that range."
In order to detect the various situational, physical and behavioral cues
Bunker itemizes in his Suicide Bomber Profile, "an officer would have to be
in close proximity to a suspect," Aveni points out, "adding to the tactical
dilemma."
Moreover, the profile Bunker describes may lead to serious repercussions if
an officer relies on it for deciding to use deadly force.
"The Training Keys suggest that a threat doesn't need to be imminent to
warrant deadly force, only that its use be objectively reasonable," Aveni
explains. "But if 'objective reasonableness' is predicated primarily on the
rather broad, imprecise 'profile,' there's a substantial probability that
someone other than a suicide bomber will be shot here as has already
happened in London.
"And if mistakes in judgment are made, given the Keys' 'shoot-to-kill'
recommendation, they aren't likely to be mitigated with sophisticated
medical care."
Trainers, Aveni believes, "are going to be faced with a precarious
dichotomy-needing to teach traditional use-of-force decision making versus
a really radical departure for suspects fitting a suicide-bomber profile.
This is uncharted territory. In an actual shooting, will things that seemed
'reasonable' in the moment be considered reasonable later?"
Essentially, he asserts, the IACP publications seem to be saying "if you
reasonably believe there's a threat, assassinate the guy. This will be a
very, very difficult decision for a beat cop."
Already law enforcement is coping with controversial and divisive
"mistake-of-fact" shootings in criminal encounters. "Such shootings could
rise substantially if these new protocols are implemented," Aveni predicts,
"and a disproportionate number of unarmed ethnic minorities are likely to
be the casualties. We already know how volatile this can be.
"Police discretionary powers have been eroding in recent years. Yet there's
a tremendous amount of discretionary latitude--not to mention enormous
performance expectation--inherent in [Bunker's recommendations]. It's
unreasonable to expect agencies to have the wherewithal to try to train all
their officers to the level this dramatic policy shift would require.
"It might be more prudent to train only your brightest and most capable
officers and assign them to patrol your likeliest terrorist targets. But of
course the Catch-22 to that approach is the high probability that untrained
officers will be the ones who first encounter a guy with a bomb belt."
WILLIAM EVERETT--prominent use-of-force trainer, an executive
risk-and-litigation manager for an entity insuring hundreds of government
agencies, and a member of FSRC's National Advisory Board:
Bunker's recommendations constitute "new and radical concepts for the
police, the courts, the public and the people on juries judging police
actions. The guidelines look like a war plan trying to be fitted into a
civil jurisprudence system. They ask people to say, 'We know that the
police are now involved as gun-carrying soldiers in a war on terrorism and
these are the rules for the war...but we're still thinking of them as our
friendly police department.'
"Is the change necessary? Yes. Can we get there easily and without angst?
No.
"[Bunker's] propositions are not irrational but they're so radically
different, it's hard to know how we'll react legally or societally if they
are adopted."
As an attorney and force trainer, Everett zeros in on Bunker's "premise
that under federal law cops are authorized to shoot to kill when they have
reasonable basis to believe a person is carrying a bomb" and the
implication that characteristics listed in the Suicide Bomber Profile could
be a foundation for that reasonable belief.
Everett points out that his state--probably like others--requires a higher
standard (probable cause) to believe a suspect will cause death or great
bodily harm to others before the use of deadly force is justified. "States
are free to create more restrictive rules than the Federal standard," he
warns. "If you're thinking of adopting [Bunker's] guidelines as an
administrator, I'd make sure that your prosecutor knows about it and that
it is compatible with the laws of your jurisdiction."
Making a deadly force decision on the basis of the bomber profile in lieu
of an identified threatening action seems to him a slippery slope. "Doing
so, you take a position that here's what a terrorist with a bomb may very
well look like and because a suicide bomber is so dangerous to so many
people, you don't need the same degree of certainty you need for other
deadly force transactions.
"If you shoot someone who exhibits 5 or 7 characteristics of a terrorist
with a bomb, let's say, the success of your decision is going to be
determined when you strip away his shirt and find a bomb--or you just find
chest hair."
A different standard for reacting to potential suicide bombers may be
realistic, Everett concedes, given the risk of letting a suspect go with a
bomb that could kill a hundred people. "But look at the [mistaken
assessment] incident in London and see how a wrong call can rock a nation
and bring into question how the police ought to be doing business. People
today don't have a lot of tolerance for mistaken application of force that
results in human death.
"I think society and the court system are going to expect a fair amount of
documented training of officers regarding the characteristics of terrorists
if cops are going to make split-second, life-and-death decisions based on
those characteristics. More guidance and training needs to be developed not
only in recognizing but in interpreting these characteristics to better
distinguish those who exhibit some of the characteristics and are a threat
versus those who have them but aren't a danger."
He points out the irony that currently we can't apply a reasonable
terrorist profile at our airports to determine who gets searched, yet
Bunker proposes a profile that would guide officers in making
life-and-death decisions.
Everett predicts that departments that "view themselves as likely to deal
with terrorist bombers in the future are probably going to be putting
resources into making [Bunker's recommendations] operational through
training. Departments that need to be on this cutting edge will tool
themselves up to get there and discharge the job very responsibly. Agencies
that don't perceive themselves at risk are going to consider all this
largely irrelevant. I don't see it spreading across the country like Asp
batons and Tasers.
"For the guidelines to be successfully operational, though, individual
officers are going to have to feel morally satisfied--not just legally
satisfied--that they have correctly identified a threat before they shoot
to kill. Until they've been trained to a high level of confidence to sort
out threats from nonthreats, there's bound to be a high degree of
hesitation."
Everett praises the IACP's reports for provoking discussion of where we
should see the police in fighting terrorists domestically. "There are
shortcomings and there are no-wins" in Bunker's recommendations, he says.
"But they should stir the passing, the imagination and the creativity to
ask and answer, 'How do we do better than this?'"
JEFF CHUDWIN--Chief of Olympia Fields (IL) P.D., president of the Illinois
Tactical Officers Assn., a former prosecutor and a widely respected
firearms and use-of-force instructor:
Philosophically, Chudwin does not see the IACP reports as much more than
"simply a re-statement of everything we've known" about suicide/homicide
bomber response.
"In every state, police unquestionably have lawful justification to use
deadly force to prevent the murder of others by an offender. The highest
imperative in law enforcement is to stop murder, and if an officer observes
or has reason to believe that a person is about to commit murder or is in
the process of doing so, the officer is justified in using deadly force to
stop the threat. Every department policy I am aware of allows this.
Otherwise, why would we be armed?
"As a matter of principle, it's better that all suicide bombers die before
they can detonate their explosives. They have to be stopped. The result of
a failed response or a lack of response is likely to be mass murder."
The problems lie with making Bunker's key recommendations operational. "In
practice, it's not so simple on the street," Chudwin admits.
Dealing successfully with any deadly threat, he explains, requires "the
right officer in the right place at the right time with the right
equipment, the right training and the right mind-set." And therein lies the
rub when it comes to suicide bombers.
Like Aveni, he's convinced from experience that "the vast majority of
police officers have neither the training nor capability" to accomplish
proper head shots.
He suggests this as a test for yourself and fellow officers: Using a 6-in.
paper plate to simulate the head, first fire from a stationary position and
then add some movement, shooting from variable distances. Hit the center
4-in. portion. His officers practice this "at distances up to 15 yards and
due to constant drilling have good success," even with handguns (though
results clearly illustrate the superiority of the rifle). "Take an officer
not trained in this and you will see a very different result."
It's well established that the handgun is not the preferred weapon in a
gunfight, especially if head shots are required. Emergency room doctors
have estimated to Chudwin that handgun rounds to the head are "effective"
(i.e., immediately incapacitating) only about half the time, "due to lack
of penetration to the cranial vault. There must be an immediate shutdown of
the central nervous system, and the only means of achieving this with
equipment available to police is through the destruction of the brain."
With cranial-vault penetration, rifle rounds come close to being 100%
effective, and Chudwin believes every patrol officer should have an
accurate center-fire long gun immediately accessible in his or her patrol
car and be capable of "surgically delivering gunfire to the head." Of
course, many do not have this equipment or training, despite the fact that
rifles are available to departments for less than $40 apiece through
federally funded programs. "There are police administrators who have not
equipped and trained their officers to defeat this kind of threat, and the
time to do it is now to be ahead of the curve," he says.
If you are already within close range of the would-be bomber and you have
only a handgun, your best tactical option may be to move into the threat
and make close-range or contact head shots to immediately stop the
offender, Chudwin believes, even though closing distance makes you more
vulnerable to the effects of any explosion.
The most difficult street problem will be identifying who must be stopped
by use of deadly force, Chudwin says. From their traditional training,
officers will want to issue a verbal challenge, engage in dialog or
otherwise probe for more information to reassure themselves of the
suspect's dangerous status, but this can be counter-productive when
distance and time are of the essence. "Just making an approach to a suspect
may trigger the response you are trying to avoid or defeat," he says. Even
with a simple, unequivocal command like "Do not move!," the offender can
take action faster than an officer can react and "in the absence of a
proactive use of force, you lose."
If a mistake in judgment is made and a subject who turns out not to be a
bomber is killed, timing will determine the consequences, Chudwin predicts.
"If those officers in London had shot the unarmed suspect before the bombs
had gone off in the subways, those officers might have ended up charged
with unlawful homicide.
"As our society feels a greater danger, it will demand more from its law
enforcement officers. Most often, we do not control events around us, we
can only control our response to them. As administrators, trainers and
street officers, we have to be process oriented, not ending oriented.
Regardless of our best efforts and intentions, we cannot always achieve a
good ending. If our process has integrity, is lawful and is within policy
and we are true to the process, we can stand by what happens, no matter the
ending.
"Whether the demands of society for increased protection will also allow
for forgiveness when terrible mistakes occur, only time will tell."
He urges his fellow LE executives to train their troops meaningfully for
what he sees as a new reality. The world of the suicide bomber "is not the
world I anticipated being chief of police in, it's not a duty I thought I
would be called for," he says. "But here I am, and I stand ready to respond
and fulfill that duty."
================
(c) 2005: Force Science Research Center, www.forcescience.org. Reprints
allowed by request. For reprint clearance, please e-mail:
[email protected]. FORCE SCIENCE is a registered trademark of The
Force Science Research Center, a non-profit organization based at Minnesota
State University, Mankato.
================
---
From John Farnam:
5 Aug 05
At an Urban Rifle Course in PA last weekend we had the usual assortment
of weapons. All worked well, with the exception of my JLD PTR-91
(domestic copy of the HK-91). After digesting various brands of 308
ammunition, it started choking, particularly during high-volume
exercises. The problem was extraction failure. We're replacing the
extractor spring, and I'll be exercising it again shortly. I really
want to like this rifle, but I can't live with reliability problems.
More later.
A student using a Robinson Arms VEPR (7.62X39) did just fine, until he
tried to feed it MagSafe ammunition. Upon feeding, the MagSafe bullet
consistently pushed back into the case so far that the feeding cycle
could not complete. It happened with round after round. When we
replaced the MagSafe ammunition with some cheap, Russian military stuff,
the rifle, once again,worked perfectly. Ammunition intended to be used
in military rifles had better have a robust crimp around the bullet, so
it doesn't set back (or become loose) during the feeding cycle.
Ammunition with only casual bonding of bullet to case is suitable only
for non-serious purposes and should be used only in non-serious rifles.
/John
6 Sept 05
Previous disasters have been handled by the National Guard. However, in
this present disaster active-duty military quickly, and necessarily,
became involved with the city now referred to as "third world." Weapons
actually have ammo this time! Hard perimeters have been established.
Not sure of the "procedure" for involving federal troops in domestic
disaster, and, at this point, no one seems to be asking. We may be
witnessing the formation of a permanent, Federal, Emergency Response Model.
New lessons:
Be prepared with food, water, clothing, cold weather/rain gear,
first-aid supplies, sanitary supplies, cash, credit cards, personal ID,
pistols, rifles, blades, ammunition, and the ability to pack a lot of it
into a car quickly for a hasty departure.
Get away from danger as soon as the full scope of disaster becomes
evident, if you can. If not, stay away from crowds and mobs. Don't
allow yourself to be "herded" somewhere that is unsafe. Don't "wait to
be rescued." Don't wait for anything! Any kind of organized assistance
may be days or weeks away.
Family cars should be all-wheel drive! Being able to safely diverge
from the "prescribed" evacuation route may be a critically important
capability.
Form a network of friends and family in other parts of the country.
Openly discuss a mutual-assistance understanding among yourselves, so
you'll always have guaranteed refuges to which you can flee that are far
removed from the danger area.
When traveling, there is great benefit to carrying pistols and blades
discretely concealed and putting rifles and shotguns into
"normal-looking" packs, bags, and luggage. Stealth applies to
evacuation, too! Under these circumstances, being conspicuous for any
reason is usually not in your best interest.
/John
9 Sept 05
Thompson Carbine
At an Urban Rifle Course this week, a student brought a Auto-Ordinance
Thompson Carbine, manufactured now by Kahr. It was beautiful! Came
with two, thirty-round sticks and one fifty-round drum in a nice case.
It fires from a closed bolt.
Unfortunately, it would not function! Maximum number of rounds we could
get through it without a failure to feed was five. Neither of the
sticks nor the drum would feet reliably. We used several different
brands of ammunition, mostly hardball, and it would not feed any of it.
It was a great disappointment for its owner, who is sending it back.
One again, this is a gun I would like to like, but what I saw was
unsatisfactory!
/John
9 Sept 05
Advice on natural disasters, from a friend in the Philippines:
"A side 'benefit' of living in a country that is in the middle of the
typhoon belt is that we learn to prepare for such scenarios early in
life. In each house, it is normal to have an adequate stock of food,
water, medications, and other critical necessities, such as flashlights,
radios, and batteries. Many choose diesel, all-wheel-drive SUVs, even
for city use. They will ford deep water, and the diesel engine gets you
good distance on a single tank of fuel.
We also don't wait too long to define 'the full extent of the threat.'
We get out of harm's way early, on the assumption that enduring the
inconvenience of a 'false alarm' is better than getting stuck in the
path of a killer storm.
We have little looting here, as looters are afraid they will get shot
when they attempt to steal during a crisis. They are right. They will
get shot! We are known to share what we have during a time of calamity,
but we are also famous for protecting what we cannot share.
We are called 'Third World,' and maybe we are. But, our harsh
experiences have taught us that we cannot expect anyone to 'take care'
of us, and, only when you take care of yourself, can you be effective
in taking care of others."
Lesson: Good advice. If the Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock had the attitude
of many Americans today, they would still be standing there with their
hand out!
/John
--
Stephen P. Wenger
Firearm safety - It's a matter
for education, not legislation.
http://www.spw-duf.info
