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What did Lukashenka gain from the Wagner crisis? [1]
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Date: 2023-07
The Wagner group’s abortive ‘march on Moscow’ last month gave Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenka a unique opportunity to strengthen his position in relation to the Kremlin and improve his image.
But if Belarus is really to become a new base for Russian mercenaries, as the Belarusian defence ministry said on 11 July, it could destroy the dictatorship’s monopoly on violence. It could also create colossal risks for Belarus as a whole.
Since the dictatorship in Belarus survived the dramatic 2020 protests – largely thanks to the Kremlin’s support – Lukashenka has repeatedly told his supporters that their future is now inextricably linked with the fate of Vladimir Putin. He believes Russia’s collapse would lead to “[his government] not being there tomorrow”, which suggests he saw the Wagner uprising as a direct threat to his own rule.
On 24 June, the morning after Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin began his rebellion, Lukashenka gave the order to bring the Belarusian army to full combat readiness. “This turmoil would immediately spread to Belarus,” Lukashenka later explained.
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In parallel, it appears that the Belarusian leader offered Putin his services as an intermediary in negotiations with Prigozhin, although the Russian president seemed to have little faith in their success. “Listen, Sasha [Lukashenka’s nickname], it’s useless,” Lukashenka said Putin told him at the time. “[Prigozhin] doesn’t even pick up the phone, he doesn’t want to talk to anyone”.
As the armoured vehicles of Prigozhin’s mutinous mercenaries rolled towards Moscow on 24 June, putting Russia on edge, the Belarusian authorities were in no hurry to communicate about the unfolding events. The only official statement appeared in the afternoon that day and was issued on behalf of the Security Council of Belarus.
The message was very neutral; the council did not publicly support Putin and did not condemn the actions of the rebels, but stressed that internal confrontation was inadmissible and called for “the voice of reason” to prevail. Apparently, Lukashenka had little interest in who was right or wrong, but was keen for Russia to remain strong enough to guarantee the safety of his regime in Belarus.
It would have been difficult to find a better intermediary. Negotiations between the Kremlin and Prigozhin lasted nearly a whole day. On the evening of 24 June, it was announced that agreement had been reached to stop the rebels’ movement against Moscow, as well as “further steps towards de-escalation”.
A PR triumph
Speaking on 27 June to a military audience, Lukashenka portrayed himself as Russia’s saviour, someone who had prevented unrest and civil war. According to this version of events, he first convinced Putin not to kill Prigozhin, and then convinced the head of the Wagner Group to stop his march on Moscow.
Indeed, if you take Lukashenka at his word, he became Russia’s de facto head of state during the mutiny, giving direct orders to Alexander Bortnikov, head of the country’s Federal Security Service (FSB), threatening to dispatch a brigade of the Belarusian Armed Forces to Moscow to deal with Prigozhin, and then giving the rebels personal security guarantees. “Trouble was thus averted,” he concluded.
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[1] Url:
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/belarus-lukashenka-deal-wagner-putin-prigozhin/
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