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Russia Ukraine: Is all-out Putin defeat a safe aim to end war? [1]
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Date: 2023-01
Six weeks ago, the war in Ukraine was at a stalemate, in which neither side could win but neither side could lose. Substantial Russian gains would be countered by more NATO help for Ukraine, but major Ukrainian advances could lead to Putin threatening extreme escalation.
That combination of violence with stalemate seemed likely to last through the winter, with scores of soldiers and civilians killed every day and destruction meted out to towns and cities across Ukraine. Since early December, though, much has changed, bringing the prospect that the war could alter drastically in a matter of weeks.
Precisely how that might happen is impossible to predict, but there are several elements to factor in.
One is public opinion within Russia. Anti-war feeling has increased since the start of partial mobilisation last autumn, and it stems from more than one base. One is older Russian men with military experience who are deeply critical of the conduct of the war and of what they see as the incompetence of the senior military, even extending that criticism to Putin and those immediately around him.
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Another important base, though, is drawn from a much larger group of Russians who are sick of the strictures brought by the war, a feeling often exacerbated by knowledge of the large number of young Russian soldiers who have been killed or maimed.
There is one caveat here, though: the shift in public opinion does not amount to a clear-cut anti-war movement. This is at least partly due to media control and the ready suppression of dissent, but there is another factor at play.
Many Russians may be dismayed and depressed that the war continues, but this does not mean that they want Russia to lose and be humiliated on the world stage. If Russia was forced out of Ukraine, the fear is that it would be prey to even more NATO expansion, possibly threatening the integrity of the state itself.
That sentiment fits in with Putin’s own claims, expressed early in the war, that Russia had to win in Ukraine to pre-empt a pattern of NATO expansionism that had been ongoing ever since the break-up of the Soviet Union over 30 years ago.
Another factor to take into account is the lack of progress on the battlefield in Ukraine. In light of this, the Russian army has fallen back on maintaining control of parts of Donbas, with an emphasis on trying to occupy the salt-mining town of Soledar as a prelude to the more strategically significant city of Bakhmut. Its occupation would be largely symbolic – as the first significant Russian gain for some months – but despite Kremlin claims, what is left of Soledar is still contested.
Putin has also replaced General Sergei Surovikin as head of the military in Ukraine. He now comes under General Valery Gerasimov, the current chief of general staff. Given that Surovikin was seen as a tough and uncompromising general, his demotion within three months of appointment does look close to desperation.
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[1] Url:
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/russia-ukraine-war-us-nato-weapons-policy-putin-threat/
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