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Tensions in Syria’s Sweida city are emblematic of wider national problems [1]

['Democracy In Exile']

Date: 2025-07-29

This article by Anagha Nair was first published on Democracy in Exile on July 22, 2025. This edited version is published on Global Voices as part of a media partnership agreement.

The communities of Sweida in southern Syria have historically maintained a tense yet functional relationship. Despite their long-running cycle of clashes and periods of peace, they have coexisted as neighbors for hundreds of years.

Now, that appears to have changed.

The latest fighting began on July 11, when a group of Sunni-Arab Bedouins — an ethnic and religious majority but ethnic nomadic minority in the country — kidnapped and robbed a Druze vegetable seller. The incident, following months of low-level frustrations between the two groups, sparked a round of tit-for-tat attacks that soon escalated into a full-fledged conflict.

The fighting between Sweida’s Druze — an offshoot of Shi'ite Islam and a Syrian minority comprising about 3 percent of the country’s religious diversity but a majority in Sweida — and the historically nomadic Bedouin tribes of southern Syria quickly spiraled out of control. Both groups are heavily armed and driven by a deep sense of loyalty towards their communities.

As such, Sweida transformed into a killing ground over the past week, burning under the weight of sectarian struggle, external interests and governance failures.

Tensions between the Druze and Syria’s new government have been high since the toppling of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024. With regular negotiations between the community and Damascus’s interim leaders from the now-dissolved Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the groups had maintained a fragile peace.

However, in April 2025, the Druze-majority areas of Jaramana and Ashrafiyet Sehnaya in Damascus experienced heavy clashes between forces affiliated with the interim government and Druze factions following the circulation of a fake audio recording of a Druze official insulting the Prophet Muhammad.

Amid the chaos of the latest conflict, the Syrian government deployed its security forces to Sweida on July 14, following agreements with Druze leaders. The goal was to establish a security presence to regain peace.

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However, not long after the deployment, Hikmat al-Hijri — one of three Druze spiritual leaders in Syria — reversed his stance, calling for international protection and rejecting the ceasefire with Damascus and the Bedouin tribes.

Following the entry of the Syrian government’s forces, well-documented evidence points to many of them joining the Bedouin clans. Videos that went viral on social media show multiple violations against Druze civilians and surrendered fighters, ranging from shaving their moustaches — seen as a symbol of honor for the community — to gruesome mass killings.

Revenge killings

Amir,* an English teacher from Sweida, is a member of the Druze community who was caught in the crossfire. He spoke to Democracy in Exile from his home on July 16 between the sounds of shelling and bullets. Amir sent his family to a safer location but stayed home to host and protect women from his community.

“The [interim government] had agreed to enter here peacefully … suddenly we woke up yesterday to the noise of shelling and bombing … the news started to come,” he explained, listing “raping, stealing and killings on the roads” as some of the many violations in the governorate.

On July 15, the Israeli government said it directed its military to “immediately attack the regime forces and the weaponry that entered the Sweida area,” following through on their demand that southern Syria remain demilitarized. Later, they launched an airstrike on the ministry of defense in the center of Damascus, alongside numerous other government positions, in a clear signal to the interim authorities.

Following a hastily established truce with the Druze on July 16 and the withdrawal of governmental troops following those Israeli attacks, state media announced an eruption of “revenge killings” against Bedouin communities, including civilians, by Druze militias.

Ahmad,* a Bedouin man from Al Mazraa, explains how he fled his village with 15 families, including his 85-year-old mother, fearing persecution by the Druze.

“Armed factions led by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri’s Military Council besieged the clans in their villages, cut the supply of bread and medicine and didn’t let us go to hospitals because we are Sunni Muslims,” he said from a temporary accommodation in the Damascus suburbs.

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Soon, Bedouin tribes from around the country, including the northern governorate of Aleppo, mobilized to join the fighting. Interim President Ahmed al-Shara’a hailed the move as “heroic,” while asking them to comply with the ceasefire and adhere to state orders.

Like many others, Ahmad blames the violence primarily on al-Hijri and the Sweida Military Council, perceived to be under the former’s command. Researcher Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, however, frames this as a dangerous misconception, explaining that Druze factions that previously disagreed with al-Hijri ultimately fought against the opposing forces as the threat to their broader community became apparent.

He also stresses that the violence propagated by some Druze extremist groups against Bedouins was being falsely associated with al-Hijri and his “separatist” ideals, ignoring the nuance in al-Hijri’s stance and fracturing the prospect for national unity. Most, if not all, Druze factions ultimately ended up fighting the interim authority security forces and Bedouin militias.

Catastrophic events

Joseph Daher, an academic specializing in the political economy of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, explained in an interview with Democracy in Exile that the conflict in Sweida must be observed within the larger framework of Assad's fall, highlighting that it symbolized the government’s intention “not to allow any kind of actors challenging the central power — Damascus and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.”

“[The government] used confrontation between Druze and Bedouins to say, ‘We're coming to Sweida to create order,’ while they were fighting on the side of the Bedouins— not stopping the fighting,” he added.

He went on to explain how national and international actors have instrumentalized existing sectarian divides, potentially creating a shift in sentiment among the Druze. The community was already grappling with a fraught relationship with the new, Islamist-led government. In March 2025, Syria witnessed the mass killing of Alawite civilians in the coastal area of Latakia, revealed in an investigation to have Damascus’s direct involvement.

“Among the vast majority, Druze, whether in Syria or Lebanon, reject Israel, but [these recent events] could push some sections, still very much a minority, to seek or accept forms of collaboration with the devil to be able to survive,” Daher noted.

Amir, for instance, emphasized that his priority was the safety of his community, using nearly an identical expression.

“We don’t support any military actions against Syria, but what are we supposed to do? If you were here [as] a civilian, unarmed and someone [was] coming to kill you, I think you’d take help from the devil,” he argued.

At the time, Amir explained the dire humanitarian condition he was facing, where his community was running out of food. As the day continued, the situation worsened as Sweida was besieged following the Bedouin advance. Its main hospital was running out of supplies.

On July 19, the government secured a fragile ceasefire deal. The dust slowly began to settle. Bedouin troops withdrew, and the siege was partially lifted. The first humanitarian aid convoys entered the ravaged city since the start of the fighting.

Yet, the question remains: What does this latest episode of violence entail for Syria, which only recently began recovering from its long civil war?

Daher describes the events as “catastrophic” on all levels.

“Ahmed al-Shara’a, in some ways, came out weaker in this episode,” he says. “If he's politically weaker, he’s going to be less willing to accept any kind of dissent within the country.”

The Bedouin-Druze clashes, and the government’s involvement in them, could jeopardize ongoing negotiations with the Kurd-led Syrian Democratic Forces [SDF], who control most of northeastern Syria under autonomous rule. Since the fall of the regime, al-Shara’a has engaged in negotiations with the SDF for integration into the Syrian state — talks that the recent fighting will almost certainly impact.

Daher outlines a path for preventing further catastrophes, including prior tragedies in Syria’s northwest and south.

“Rather than seeking to consolidate your power … You know you’re weak and cannot control everything. No one is asking you to [control everything] — share power,” he says, addressing the government.

He adds that, now more than ever, the role of civil society, including political parties, trade unions, and professional associations, is crucial. These groups must build a “counter society” in support of state-building.

“Even in liberal democracies, if you don't have a strong civil society and strong social movements, the government usually will go forward with its policies,” he explains.

“This is not particular to Syria, but even in Syria, it's more difficult because we had 14 years of war and 50 years of dictatorship.”

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[1] Url: https://globalvoices.org/2025/07/29/tensions-in-syrias-sweida-city-are-emblematic-of-wider-national-problems/

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