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Direct talks in Abu Dhabi: a new chapter for Armenia-Azerbaijan peace? [1]
['Arzu Geybullayeva']
Date: 2025-07-17
On July 10, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met in Abu Dhabi for what marked the first unmediated bilateral contact between the two leaders, signaling a significant departure from the multi-decade tradition of peace discussions being primarily facilitated by external actors like the European Union, Russia, or the United States.
While the specifics of the discussions were largely kept under wraps, with only broad implications emerging from the respective foreign ministries’ statements, both sides affirmed that “bilateral negotiations represent the most efficient format to address all issues concerning the normalization process.”
The pro-government Azerbaijan Press Agency reported that “serious and substantive discussions were held on key aspects of the peace agenda between Armenia and Azerbaijan — including border delimitation, the opening and development of the Zangezur corridor, the initialing of the peace agreement, and other issues.”
An agreement in principle
The Abu Dhabi meeting follows a significant development from March of this year, when Armenia and Azerbaijan announced they had agreed on the terms of a peace deal for the first time. This came after countless meetings and rounds of negotiations mediated by international stakeholders since the Second Karabakh War in 2020, all centered on reaching a final bilateral agreement and settling any remaining disagreements.
The Nagorno-Karabakh area has been under the control of its ethnic Armenian population as a self-declared state since a war fought in the early 1990s, which ended with a ceasefire and an Armenian military victory in 1994. In the aftermath, a new, internationally unrecognized, de facto Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was established, and seven adjacent regions occupied by the Armenian forces. According to the International Crisis Group, as a result of the conflict more than a million people were forced from their homes: “Azerbaijanis fled Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the adjacent territories, while Armenians left homes in Azerbaijan.”
Tensions lingered over the following decades, culminating in the second Karabakh war in 2020 and an ensuing military operation in September 2023, with the latter paving the way for Azerbaijan to regain full control over Karabakh.
The draft peace agreement reportedly included major concessions from Armenia, such as the removal of European Union monitors from the border and the dropping of lawsuits in international courts. Azerbaijan has consistently criticized the EU monitors since their deployment in October 2022, accusing them of “creating military and intelligence cover for the Armenian side.” The EU mission's expansion in February 2023, following an Azerbaijani offensive in Armenia in September 2022, further strained relations with Baku and Moscow, both of whom questioned its purpose and legitimacy.
Azerbaijan's demands also included Armenia amending its constitution to remove any perceived territorial claims to Azerbaijan, specifically references within its preamble to the 1990 Declaration of Independence. Armenia's constitution does not make direct references to Karabakh; the preamble refers to the Declaration of Independence that “references the 1989 joint decision of the Armenian SSR Supreme Council and the Artsakh National Council on the Reunification of the Armenian SSR and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh.”
Prime Minister Pashinyan has publicly supported adopting a new constitution through a national referendum, with plans for a vote in 2027.
Regional stakeholders and the Zangezur Corridor
Several regional powers have a vested interest in securing a lasting peace deal. Turkey, a close ally of Azerbaijan, has actively engaged in the process. In June 2025, Prime Minister Pashinyan's visit to Istanbul for talks with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was described by Armenia as a “historic” step towards regional peace, with Turkey pledging support for Armenia’s peace efforts with Azerbaijan.
A key point of interest for all stakeholders is the proposed Zangezur Corridor – a vital transport link through Armenia connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan, sandwiched between Armenia, Turkey, and Iran. This corridor holds significant potential for facilitating trade and transit between Europe and Asia, offering new economic opportunities for all parties involved.
Key points of contention have arisen in negotiations over the corridor. First, its name: Armenia rejects the term “Zangezur Corridor,” viewing it as a threat to the sovereignty over Syunik, Armenia's southern territory bordering Nakhchivan. Azerbaijan, in turn, opposes full Armenian control, citing concerns over reliable access, while Armenia refuses to cede control of the 32-kilometer (nearly 20-mile) route to any third party.
The US has proposed a potential solution. In a press briefing on July 11, Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Turkey, said, “So what happens is that America steps in and says, ‘Okay, we’ll take it over. Give us the 32 kilometers of road on a hundred-year lease, and you can all share it.’” According to Middle East Eye's analysis of the these developments, “Barrack's comments mark the first official confirmation that the Trump administration offered to manage the corridor through a private US commercial operator, which would serve as a neutral guarantor.”
In its May 2025 report, the International Crisis Group emphasized that resolving the modalities of such transport links, including questions of sovereignty and inspection, remains central to the peace process.
Russia sidelined?
The talks in Abu Dhabi underscore a significant shift in the regional power balance, as Russia – once considered a primary mediator – appears increasingly sidelined. While Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov diplomatically welcomed the direct dialogue, Moscow's influence continues to wane amid deteriorating diplomatic relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan.
According to political analyst Zaur Shiriyev, “Azerbaijan no longer needs Russian mediation, which can create opportunities for real progress.” Armenia-Russia relations have drastically suffered since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, with Yerevan accusing Moscow and its military alliance, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), of failing to defend it against Azerbaijani attacks in 2021 and 2022.
Azerbaijan's relations with Russia have also soured following a contentious plane crash on December 25, 2024. Baku has accused Russia of mistakenly targeting an Azerbaijan Airlines flight with air defense missiles, a claim strongly disputed by Moscow. This incident, alongside the recent deaths of two Azerbaijani brothers during a Russian police raid in Yekaterinburg, has fueled an unprecedented public spat and deepening resentment, reducing Russia's capacity to act as an undisputed regional arbiter.
Challenges remain
Despite the positive signal the direct talk have sent, significant hurdles remain. Domestically, Pashinyan faces considerable pressure from opposition, church, and oligarchic circles, which some analysts believe are backed by the Kremlin.
Similarly, the detention of Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who controls Armenia’s national power grid and had expressed political ambitions by backing the church – which has been at odds with the prime minister's office for some time – further underscores the internal strife.
According to Richard Giragosian, director of the Regional Studies Center in Yerevan, of the frequent “coup attempts” against the democratically elected government – five since 2018 – “none [have] been very serious.” He told Euronews that these moves are “designed to appeal for Russian support” more than they are “driven by Russian activity” – even as Russia itself is “overwhelmed by everything Ukraine.”
Giragosian also took note of two separate Russian disinformation campaigns. The first involves fabricated reports of Russian military buildup at their base in Gyumri, intended to both alarm the EU monitors and pressure Yerevan as it increasingly aligns with Europe. The second, which Giragosian dismissed as “equally absurd,” involves Russian allegations of a “bio weapons facility in Armenia orchestrated by the Americans” – a claim Moscow has previously used against Ukraine and Georgia. These campaigns, Giragosian argued, paradoxically “point to Russia's weakness,” despite the looming “storm on the horizon” as Russia seeks to regain lost influence.
The path to a comprehensive and lasting peace agreement is intricate. While the unmediated nature of the Abu Dhabi meeting marks a crucial breakthrough, the concretization of the outcome will depend on the ability of both leaders to navigate complex domestic politics, maintain diplomatic momentum, and secure the coordinated support of interested international players beyond Moscow. As the South Caucasus continues to redefine its geopolitical landscape, the world watches to see if this new direct dialogue can finally transform decades of conflict into a sustainable peace.
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[1] Url:
https://globalvoices.org/2025/07/17/direct-talks-in-abu-dhabi-a-new-chapter-for-armenia-azerbaijan-peace/
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