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Between a Rock and a Hard Place: How Kazakhstan, Nepal, and Germany Have Responded to Authoritarian Influence [1]
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Date: 2024-07
This blog was written by three early-career researchers selected for Freedom House’s 2023–24 Junior Fellowship Program. Each year, this highly selective program offers recent college graduates an opportunity to join the Freedom in the World research team, where they conduct qualitative research and data analysis, and, following the report’s launch, participate in briefings with audiences including other nationally known research organizations and US congressional staff.
Deepening repression in the world’s most authoritarian countries has been a driving force behind the 18 consecutive years of decline in global freedom documented by Freedom in the World. Increasingly, autocrats are extending their influence beyond their borders as well. Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine has entered a third year, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to intimidate the people of Taiwan. These two authoritarian nations have also sought to silence dissidents abroad using tactics of transnational repression, reaching beyond their borders to threaten, abduct, or even assassinate opponents.
The influence of authoritarian regimes like Russia and China can take more subtle forms as well, ranging from economic coercion to disinformation campaigns to attempts to co-opt domestic political groups. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global program of development and investment initiatives, has sparked controversy as a vehicle for Beijing to project its power and gain leverage, and as a potential debt trap for borrower nations.
The impact of such authoritarian influence varies: while some countries are able to resist, others are more vulnerable or more willing to cooperate. The cases of three countries across the spectrum of global freedom—Kazakhstan (Not Free), Nepal (Partly Free), and Germany (Free)—illustrate these differences.
Kazakhstan, a resource-rich Central Asian state that borders both Russia and China, has its own long history of authoritarianism. Its natural resource wealth has allowed Kazakhstan’s regime to maneuver between Russia and China for economic gain while continuing to repress rights and freedoms at home—including by adopting tactics from Russian president Vladimir Putin’s playbook. Nepal’s government has sought more economic independence from India by entering into investment deals with China as well as a $500 million compact with the United States’ Millennium Challenge Corporation, but has struggled to protect its vulnerable Tibetan population from Beijing’s reach. Germany, meanwhile, has resisted Russian disinformation campaigns aimed at dulling public support for Ukraine even as some political parties express more sympathetic opinions toward the Kremlin.
Fewer authoritarian alliances, but still no democratic path for Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan’s relationships with Moscow and Beijing have evolved in recent years, a result of the geopolitical fallout from the Kremlin’s aggression against Ukraine and Beijing’s growing economic influence. Throughout, the Kazakh regime has imposed tight controls on its population: the country has been rated Not Free in Freedom in the World since 1994.
Russia and Kazakhstan maintained strong ties for decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But current president Qasym-Jomart Toqaev did not side with the Kremlin following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, refusing to recognize the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk or Russian-backed referendums in those regions that aimed to legitimize its control. Kazakh authorities in 2022 also canceled the annual May 9 Victory Parade and banned Russian military propaganda symbols.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, during a bilateral face-to-face meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia. (Photo Credit: Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin Pool/Alamy Live News)
At the same time, Kazakhstan continued to trade with Russia.Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, it has increased its imports from the European Union (EU), drawing widespread criticism that the country was acting as a back door for dual-use goods such as electronics and mobile phones to continue to enter Russia. Authorities in Kazakhstan have also proven willing to aid Russia’s campaign of transnational repression. In 2023, at least five Russian antiwar activists and defectors living in Kazakhstan were detained. Ultimately, Astana offered some asylum, while others remain in legal limbo.
While the Kremlin was focused on its campaign in Ukraine, Kazakhstan deepened its economic relationship with China. Kazakhstan has been a key player in Beijing’s BRI—which was first announced in Astana in 2013—and the PRC replaced Russia as Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner in 2023, accounting for 21.3 percent of its foreign trade in the first nine months of the year, according to Kazakhstan’s National Statistics Bureau. During Toqaev’s October 2023 visit to Beijing, the two countries signed 30 commercial agreements worth over $16 billion covering the transfer of technology and new infrastructure investments.
This relationship is complicated by a history of domestic Kazakh resistance to China’s economic influence. In 2016, rare protests erupted throughout the country against a new law that would allow foreigners to lease land for 25 years. Demonstrators chanted overtly anti-Chinese slogans, expressing fear that Chinese investors would take over their land. In 2019, anti-Chinese sentiment also drove Kazakh protests against the expansion of Chinese factories.
Even so, cooperation between the two countries has grown in other ways as well. In 2023, Astana and Beijing ratified an agreement to exchange migration information about each other’s citizens, including border crossings and visa and asylum applications. Civil society groups fear that this deal could endanger ethnic Kazakhs fleeing repression in Xinjiang by effectively giving Chinese authorities the power to prevent them from leaving, potentially fueling transnational repression.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, even as its relationship with Russia and China has changed over time, Kazakhstan’s domestic regime remains deeply repressive. Mirroring Russia’s crackdown on dissent, Astana has adopted policies that target civil society, including using antiterrorism laws against political opponents, false news laws that threaten freedom of expression, and so-called foreign agent laws that target human rights organizations and defenders. Kazakh authorities have also recently pushed for a ban on so-called LGBT+ propaganda.
Although Kazakhstan’s government has been able to use its economic leverage to maintain a measure of independence from Russia and China, the influence of these authoritarian regimes remains pervasive, from the suppression of domestic dissent to the long arm of transnational repression.
Nepal’s turn toward China leaves Tibetan population vulnerable
In recent years, Nepal has sought to strengthen ties with China as a counterweight to its economic dependence on India. But this change has facilitated the PRC’s transnational repression campaign against the country’s Tibetan diaspora.
Historically, Nepal, a landlocked country in the Himalayas, relied on trade with India for goods and fuel. However, following India’s unofficial blockade of border crossings in 2015—precipitated by a dispute over provisions in Nepal’s new constitution—the country pivoted toward China. In 2017, it signed a memorandum of understanding joining the BRI, although little progress has been made to date in launching projects under the mechanism. In 2016, China agreed to loan $215 million to Nepal for the construction of a new airport, and two years later, Nepal secured access to Chinese ports, another key step in ending India’s dominance. However, the airport deal has been criticized for benefitting Chinese state-run firms and saddling Nepal with debt.
Chinese President Xi Jinping holds a welcoming ceremony for Nepalese President Bidhya Devi Bhandari before their talks in Beijing. (Photo Credit: Zhang Ling/Xinhua/Alamy Live News)
This turn toward China came with a price for Nepal’s vulnerable Tibetan population. Nepal has been a traditional haven for Tibetans fleeing repression by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since the unsuccessful 1959 uprising, though crossings have dropped in recent years due to tighter border security. Despite hosting a Tibetan diaspora, authorities in Kathmandu have always staunchly supported Beijing’s rejection of Tibet’s autonomy—a policy reaffirmed by Nepalese prime minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal in September 2023—and are committed to not allowing political activities critical of the PRC. In Nepal, Tibetans are prevented from attending political events or marking culturally significant days such as Tibetan Independence Day, the March 10 National Uprising Day, or Tibet’s Democracy Day. Tibetan refugees in the country live in legal limbo, without formal recognition as refugees or identity cards. Nepal has signed intelligence-sharing agreements with China, but stopped short of agreeing to the extradition agreement that many Tibetans feared.
In addition to limits on their activities in Nepal, members of the Tibetan diaspora, including human rights advocates and journalists, are targeted by the PRC’s campaign of transnational repression. In 2018, a member of the Tibetan Volunteers Group identified as Adak was detained for over a week by Nepalese authorities for posting a photo on his Facebook page that included a Tibetan flag. The situation worsened in 2019 during a visit to the country by Chinese president Xi Jinping, when Tibetans were monitored, harassed, and detained for simply wearing clothing that had Tibetan slogans or signs, or to preempt suspected protests. Nepal’s government has warned local media not to cover the Tibet issue, and the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu asked that journalists writing about the Dalai Lama be investigated.
Kathmandu’s limits on their legal status and the CCP’s transnational repression have also engendered self-censorship among the Tibetan diaspora in Nepal and weakened bonds with those still inside Tibet. Last month, Chinese police arrested more than 1,000 participants in a peaceful protest in Tibet against the construction of a dam on the upper Yangtze River that would forcefully relocate 2,000 villagers and demolish six historic monasteries. However, no solidarity protests were held among members of the Tibetan diaspora in Nepal. And while thousands of Tibetans took to the streets around the world on March 10 to commemorate the 65th National Uprising Day, Nepal did not witness a single rally.
In Nepal’s case, a close economic relationship with an authoritarian regime has led to diminished rights and protections for an already vulnerable population, and undermined nascent democratic institutions such a free press and civil society.
The Kremlin’s campaign to weaken German support for Ukraine
Germany had maintained a close relationship with Russia in the decades after World War II, primarily through trade and energy deals. But in a shift triggered by the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the German government has reduced its dependence on Russian natural gas, supported sanctions, and affirmed its financial commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Germany is now the world’s second-largest contributor of military aid to Ukraine, after the United States.
In response, Moscow has employed a variety of tactics to try to influence German public opinion, including launching disinformation campaigns and building alliances with politicians. The Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns in Germany, which are conducted through alternative media, troll farms, and sometimes traditional media, target the public’s support for Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees. German-language content from Russia’s state-owned RT remains accessible despite EU sanctions imposed on the outlet at the outset of the war, and it disseminates pro-Russian, anti-Ukrainian, and anti-Western propaganda to German speakers.
Malicious actors have also disrupted the information landscape by creating websites and social media accounts mimicking reputable media sources that promote pro-Russian narratives. Although some networks have been dismantled, experts uncovered an extensive pro-Russia disinformation campaign in January. That campaign utilized thousands of fake social media accounts—including some impersonating prominent German political figures—to accuse the German government of neglecting its citizens by supporting Ukraine financially and by taking in refugees.
The Kremlin has also actively sought alliances with German politicians with the hope of shaping German policy toward Ukraine. Leaked documents published in 2023 by the Washington Post exposed the Kremlin’s plans to form a pro-Russia coalition between members of the far-right populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and the Left party on the far left. Members of the AfD have added legitimacy to the Kremlin’s war effort by attending conferences in Russia, and echoing Kremlin propaganda.
Russia’s malign influence in Germany has not been limited to the information and political space. Moscow’s campaign of transnational repression has targeted Russian and Chechen dissidents with physical violence. In 2019, Selimkhan Khangoshvili, a veteran of the Second Chechen War who became a prominent dissident among the Chechen diaspora community, was assassinated in Berlin. Recently, the Kremlin offered to trade wrongfully detained US journalist Evan Gershkovich for Khangoshvili’s assassin, Vadim Krasikov, a member of Russia’s Federal Security Service. In 2022, Russian journalist Elena Kostyuchenko fell ill in Munich and was later diagnosed with symptoms of poisoning. Kostyuchenko, who reported on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, moved to Germany after warnings from colleagues of threats to her life.
People in Hamburg, Germany gather for a demonstration against the war in Ukraine on the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion. (Photo Credit: Imago / Alamy Stock Photo)
The impact of Russia’s influence efforts in Germany is not yet clear. While the country’s strong democratic institutions provide an important counterweight to the Kremlin’s campaign, studies show that more people have become sympathetic to narratives of Russian propaganda since 2022, particularly among some conservative Russian-speaking communities, residents of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany), and supporters of far-right and far-left parties.
The AfD is currently polling strongly in Brandenburg, Thuringia, and Saxony in the lead-up to state elections this summer, and is poised to make a strong showing in European parliamentary elections set for June. If the AfD succeeds in making electoral inroads, there is a real danger that Russia’s influence campaign will lead to a weakening of support for Ukraine at a crucial time in the war effort.
Is there hope for resisting Chinese and Russian influence?
These cases show that when authoritarians succeed in extending their influence beyond their borders, the people living in these societies invariably suffer the consequences—through repressive laws, extrajudicial attacks, and campaigns that manipulate the information sphere. Global freedom is jeopardized as well, as demonstrated by the weakening of support for Ukraine in Germany.
Building resiliency among ordinary citizens and civil society offers the best hope for countering the influence exerted by Beijing and Moscow. In those countries where the people are able to meaningfully participate in democratic institutions, like Germany and Nepal, strengthening those institutions—whether through fact-checking and media literacy in Germany or improved legal protections for refugees in Nepal—can help insulate those most vulnerable to authoritarian interference. In more repressive environments such as Kazakhstan, steady and flexible support for journalists, human rights defenders, and prodemocracy activists working on the frontlines of the fight for freedom is key to building defenses against domestic and foreign repression alike.
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https://freedomhouse.org/article/between-rock-and-hard-place-how-kazakhstan-nepal-and-germany-have-responded-authoritarian
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