(C) Alec Muffett's DropSafe blog.
Author Name: Alec Muffett
This story was originally published on allecmuffett.com. [1]
License: CC-BY-SA 3.0.[2]


I asked ChatGPT about the availability of VPN software in every instance of Linux, and about how the State might try to prevent its use, plus how much it costs to “roll your own” VPN

2025-07-31 09:49:43+00:00

Discussion attached below; I agree with its conclusions 100%

Hat-tip to Alan Cox for reminding me that every version of the Linux kernel has had VPN capability baked into it for nearly 30 years. The capability is so ubiquitous that it’s easily forgotten about, and anyone can learn to use it.

Please explain for me, concisely, in language suitable for someone moderately academically inclined but being inclusive of people who have not worked in STEM-type fields, what the Linux Kernel is, and what VPN software exists within it, and whether its use can be regulated successfully by a local government in any way that would constitute significant state oversight. Please make sure to consider the impact of VPN software upon attempts to restrain open and free, unidentified, even perhaps anonymous use of the internet, and compare that against opportunities for state control. What would the state have to do in order to achieve its goals?

The Linux Kernel, VPN Software, and State Control: A Concise Overview

What is the Linux Kernel?

The Linux kernel is the core part of the Linux operating system. Think of it as the central program that manages communication between a computer’s hardware (like memory, CPU, or storage) and the software applications running on it. It handles low-level tasks like process scheduling, file access, and networking. Importantly, the kernel is open-source, meaning its code is publicly available and can be modified or redistributed freely.

What VPN Software Exists Within It?

The Linux kernel includes native support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) protocols—tools used to create secure, encrypted tunnels over the internet that can hide a user’s identity and location. These include:

IPsec : A suite of protocols built into the kernel (via the XFRM framework) for encrypted communication at the IP layer.

: A suite of protocols built into the kernel (via the framework) for encrypted communication at the IP layer. WireGuard : A newer, simpler VPN protocol added to the Linux kernel in 2020, praised for its speed, modern cryptography, and efficiency.

: A newer, simpler VPN protocol added to the Linux kernel in 2020, praised for its speed, modern cryptography, and efficiency. OpenVPN , though not in-kernel, uses kernel features like TUN/TAP interfaces to function.

, though not in-kernel, uses kernel features like TUN/TAP interfaces to function. L2TP, PPTP, and others are often supported through kernel modules or user-space tools using kernel interfaces.

This kernel-level integration makes VPN functionality faster and more tightly coupled with the operating system, which facilitates widespread, decentralized use.

Can Local Governments Regulate VPN Use Effectively?

The short answer: not without significant challenges—both technical and political.

Obstacles to Regulation:

Encryption and Obfuscation:

VPN traffic is encrypted and can be obfuscated to resemble regular internet traffic, making it hard to detect or block reliably.

Decentralization:

Because VPN software can be freely distributed (especially open-source software like WireGuard), it can be repackaged, renamed, and redistributed by users to evade detection or blocking.

Integration with the Kernel:

Because certain VPN capabilities are baked into the Linux kernel, preventing their use often means restricting the use of Linux itself—which is infeasible for many personal, commercial, and industrial systems.

What Would the State Need to Do to Achieve Control?

To effectively regulate or suppress VPN use, a state would have to implement a multi-pronged strategy, likely involving:

Network-Level Controls:

Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to identify and block encrypted traffic.

to identify and block encrypted traffic. Active probing to detect VPN servers.

to detect VPN servers. Blocking known VPN endpoints, though this is a cat-and-mouse game.

Legal and Infrastructural Measures:

Criminalization of unauthorized VPN usage or possession.

Mandating backdoors or registration of VPN providers.

Requiring ISPs to monitor and report suspected VPN use.

Device-Level Control:

Requiring vendors to ship devices with restricted kernels or with kernel modules removed (e.g., no WireGuard/IPsec).

Mandating signed software, limiting user control over system software—effectively neutering general-purpose computing.

Surveillance and Coercion:

Social engineering, informant networks, or psychological deterrents (e.g., punishments for dissent).

Incorporation of AI-based traffic analysis to adaptively detect circumvention attempts.

Tension Between VPNs and State Control

For Users : VPNs enable anonymity , freedom of information , circumvention of censorship , and protection from surveillance . They support civil liberties in oppressive regimes and protect privacy even in liberal democracies.

: VPNs enable , , , and . They support civil liberties in oppressive regimes and protect privacy even in liberal democracies. For States: VPNs complicate censorship, obstruct surveillance, and undermine efforts at social control. To regain control, the state must often infringe upon general-purpose computing, free expression, and civil liberties.

This creates a fundamental structural tension: either the state tolerates a certain level of anonymous digital activity, or it must transition toward digital authoritarianism.

Conclusion

The Linux kernel includes robust VPN support, which—by virtue of being open-source, widely used, and technically embedded—is difficult to regulate effectively without broad, invasive measures. States seeking significant oversight must either substantially re-architect internet infrastructure and computing freedom, or accept the persistence of decentralized, anonymizing tools. There is no easy middle ground.

Answering in the same style: regards “blocking known vpn endpoints” – this presumably means restricting citizen access to unapproved VPNs? But would it not be possible for citizens to rent a cloud server in another country and set up their own VPN endpoint? How cheaply could that be achieved, and how might the state prevent that?

Correct—“blocking known VPN endpoints” refers to a form of network-level censorship in which a government or its designated telecom operators blacklist IP addresses or network ranges known to host commercial or public VPN servers. This tactic is common in regimes seeking to limit access to tools for bypassing state censorship (e.g., China’s Great Firewall).

However, as you point out, individual users can—and do—circumvent such measures by establishing private VPN servers, especially via cloud hosting platforms located outside of the censoring jurisdiction.

Can Citizens Rent Foreign Cloud Servers to Create Personal VPNs?

Yes, and it is technically trivial and economically accessible.

Steps (Typical):

Rent a VPS (Virtual Private Server):

Providers: DigitalOcean, Linode, Hetzner, Vultr, AWS Lightsail, Oracle Cloud Free Tier, etc.

Typical cost: \$5–\$10 USD/month; sometimes free tiers (e.g., Oracle, Amazon, Google).

Location: user chooses a jurisdiction outside the censoring state (e.g., Germany, Netherlands, U.S.).

Install VPN Software:

One-click install scripts for WireGuard , OpenVPN , or Shadowsocks .

, , or . Configurable in minutes even by moderately technical users.

Connect via Encrypted Tunnel:

The user connects from within the censoring state to their VPS using a VPN client, bypassing state censorship by tunneling through an encrypted channel.

Thus, for less than the price of a meal per month, citizens can effectively establish personal, unlisted VPNs.

How Might the State Prevent This?

There are four principal modes by which a state might attempt to prevent this kind of circumvention. Each has trade-offs between effectiveness, cost, and collateral damage:

1. IP and Protocol Fingerprinting via Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)

How it works : Even if the VPN server’s IP is not on a blacklist, DPI systems attempt to identify the traffic patterns and cryptographic handshake signatures associated with VPN protocols.

: Even if the VPN server’s IP is not on a blacklist, DPI systems attempt to identify the traffic patterns and cryptographic handshake signatures associated with VPN protocols. Limitations :

: Obfuscation tools (e.g., obfs4, meek, WireGuard-over-UDP disguises) can mask VPN traffic.

DPI has false positives, potentially misclassifying legitimate encrypted traffic.

Evasive protocols are under constant development.

2. Active Probing and Endpoint Discovery

How it works : Censorship systems simulate user connections to suspect IPs to see if they respond like VPN servers.

: Censorship systems simulate user connections to suspect IPs to see if they respond like VPN servers. Countermeasures: Tools like obfsproxy or port knocking hide VPN behavior unless the correct handshake is used.

3. Cloud Provider Pressure and Cooperation

How it works : The state pressures or incentivizes foreign cloud providers to restrict or monitor the use of their infrastructure for unauthorized VPNs.

: The state pressures or incentivizes foreign cloud providers to restrict or monitor the use of their infrastructure for unauthorized VPNs. Feasibility :

: Only effective if the state has extraterritorial influence (e.g., through trade leverage, legal agreements).

(e.g., through trade leverage, legal agreements). Practically infeasible against decentralized or privacy-respecting providers, and likely to cause political blowback.

4. Legal and Financial Penalties

Approach :

: Criminalizing the use of unauthorized VPNs.

Penalizing financial transactions related to foreign hosting.

Monitoring cloud account creation via national ID verification or domestic payment rails.

Implication: This raises the cost of circumvention by increasing personal risk, rather than eliminating technical pathways.

Strategic Implication: The Arms Race Dynamic

What emerges is a classic asymmetrical arms race:

Users adopt increasingly subtle and private methods to access open internet (custom VPNs, stealth tunnels, Tor bridges).

adopt increasingly subtle and private methods to access open internet (custom VPNs, stealth tunnels, Tor bridges). States escalate their use of surveillance, AI-based traffic analysis, and coercive laws.

Each technical advance in obfuscation demands a corresponding advance in detection—often at great computational and economic cost to the censoring regime.

Conclusion

Yes, citizens can cheaply and efficiently circumvent endpoint blocking by creating personal VPNs on foreign cloud servers. Preventing this would require the state to escalate both its technical sophistication (e.g., DPI, protocol fingerprinting) and its legal-infrastructural control (e.g., cloud access restrictions, digital ID linkage). But doing so risks undermining broader economic and technological openness, and often results in collateral repression of legitimate encrypted services.

Ultimately, this dynamic reveals a deep systemic tension: to comprehensively prevent circumvention, a state must begin to dismantle general-purpose computing and open internet connectivity. Short of that, the use of VPNs—especially bespoke, user-managed ones—remains persistently difficult to suppress without unacceptable costs.
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[1] URL: https://alecmuffett.com/article/113969
[2] URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/

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