(C) Alec Muffett's DropSafe blog.
Author Name: Alec Muffett
This story was originally published on allecmuffett.com. [1]
License: CC-BY-SA 3.0.[2]
How to talk about PRISM and not get entirely blown-off, if you’re an activist
2017-02-14 11:17:19.272000+00:00
[…deletia…] I agree with his assessment — it looks like wiretap for a selector across live accounts (scope unknown).
I concur, but with a potential twist which is unclear. For those who aren’t aware, the way that Section 702 “PRISM” interception surveillance works is well-described in the Wikipedia article:
According to this report, PRISM is only used to collect internet communications, not telephone conversations. These internet communications are not collected in bulk, but in a targeted way: only communications that are to or from specific selectors, like e-mail addresses, can be gathered. Under PRISM, there’s no collection based upon keywords or names.[39] The actual collection process is done by the Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) of the FBI, which on behalf of the NSA sends the selectors to the US internet service providers, which were previously served with a Section 702 Directive. Under this directive, the provider is legally obliged to hand over (to DITU) all communications to or from the selectors provided by the government.[39] DITU then sends these communications to NSA, where they are stored in various databases, depending on their type. Data, both content and metadata, that already have been collected under the PRISM program, may be searched for both US and non-US person identifiers. These kinds of queries became known as “back-door searches” and are conducted by NSA, FBI and CIA.[40] Each of these agencies has slightly different protocols and safeguards to protect searches with a US person identifier.[39]
…and (to explain the jargon) a selector is a string of characters which identifies an individual, for instance:
an email address like
[email protected]
or a phone number
or a Twitter handle
or a Facebook username
or a lot of other things such as those you will find described in Snowden-related articles about XKeyscore.
The FBI then— as described above, though obviously sometimes for themselves, and sometimes on behalf of the NSA — serve these selectors to the various platforms, who are legally obliged to take action upon them and return to the FBI all blobs of data which pertain to these selectors in some [defined] way.
(Sidebar)
The reason that so many platforms can say, hand on heart:
We don’t enable bulk surveillance
There is no back door
We don’t give Government agents direct access to our servers
…is that strictly they are all telling the 100% accurate, honest-to-god truth.
Instead of “direct” access— and again, read the above wikipedia article carefully — the Government forces platforms to query their own databases for selectors that the Government provide, using a threat which I would imagine goes somewhat along the lines of:
“Under section 702 you must give us everything you’ve got that pertains to
[email protected] and if we think you are holding out on us, we will set our lawyers on you / have you roasted in the press for harbouring child molesters / find some way to screw you for taxes.”
…so when anyone from the activist community is attacking a platform for “letting the government search [the] databases”, be aware that by phrasing the accusation in this way they are giving both the platform and the government a free escape route. They can truthfully deny the complaint and sidestep the attack, all because grammar.
So fix your grammar before you attempt such cleverness.
(End Sidebar)
[…email continues on detailed topic; End extract.]
[END]
[1] URL:
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[2] URL:
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