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More for Moscow than for America [1]
['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.']
Date: 2025-09-12
“More for Moscow than for America”: Trump-era actions (Jan 2025–Aug 2025) that advantaged U.S. adversaries—and why they matter
American national security is more than tanks and treaties. It’s a fabric of alliances, rules, institutions, and credibility, stitched over decades. In the first eight months of 2025, that fabric was pulled in ways that—taken together—tilt the strategic balance toward Russia (and, secondarily, China and Iran). The effect has been to shrink U.S. influence, weaken deterrence in Europe, and throttle the soft-power tools that help keep wars from starting.
“Unprecedented” isn’t a word historians toss around lightly. The closest modern parallel is Richard Nixon’s 1968 interference—via Anna Chennault—with Vietnam peace talks, an episode Lyndon Johnson privately described on tape as “This is treason.” Those conversations and the State Department’s FRUS volume are matters of record. But that was a single, furtive gambit clustered around one negotiation. What sets 2025 apart is breadth and simultaneity: multiple pillars of U.S. power (aid, multilateral leadership, climate and science diplomacy, alliance credibility, and real-time war support) were all dialed down at once. Miller CenterCloudFrontOffice of the Historian+1
1) Abolishing USAID (and the cascading aid freeze that preceded it)
On March 28, 2025, the administration formally notified Congress of its intent to abolish USAID as an independent agency—folding residual functions into the State Department by July and discontinuing the rest. The move capped a day-one program to “reevaluate and realign” U.S. foreign aid that had already put obligations and disbursements on ice. State’s implementation guidance and a global stop-work order followed within the week. The Kaiser Family Foundation’s running timeline documents the sequence and its immediate program shock. The White HouseStateKFF
Why it matters: USAID is not charity; it’s an instrument of statecraft. Its health, food-security, governance, and stabilization programs are how the U.S. blunts the very vacuums the Kremlin exploits (security services, disinformation, opportunistic energy deals). Killing or mothballing those channels mid-stream hands space to Moscow and Beijing at a discount. Devex
Concrete effects: stop-work orders froze ongoing grants and contracts; unobligated awards were canceled; and global-health delivery—often routed through USAID missions—stalled pending “review” that kept being extended. DevexVenable
2) Canceling ~$4.9–$5.0 billion in already-approved foreign aid (“pocket rescission”)
On August 29, the White House invoked a “pocket rescission,” timing a 45-day hold to run out the fiscal clock and effectively cancel ~$4.9 billion appropriated by Congress for international programs—among them U.N. dues and peacekeeping lines. Reuters and the Washington Post detail both the tactic and the immediate bipartisan blowback over separation-of-powers. Axios adds that the government’s own watchdog had warned pocket rescissions undermine Congress’s purse power. ReutersThe Washington PostAxios
Why it matters: beyond the near-term cash effect, this erodes U.S. leverage in the multilateral system—the very committees and councils where Russia chips at rules and narratives. If U.S. funding becomes uncertain at the stroke of a pen, Washington’s votes and voice matter less the next time sanctions, monitors, or missions are on the table.
Programs hit: reporting and budget tables point to Contributions to International Organizations and International Peacekeeping Activities as major targets, alongside democracy and development accounts historically managed by USAID. Reuters
3) The day-one, 90-day freeze on (nearly) all foreign assistance
Within hours of inauguration, an executive order halted new obligations and disbursements across development assistance while a 90-day review proceeded; State’s follow-on guidance explicitly told bureaus and posts to issue stop-work orders on existing awards. Devex reported the global cable; State and neutral legal advisories captured the scope. The White HouseDevexNAFSA
Why it matters: even a “temporary” freeze blows holes in immunization campaigns, governance transitions, and humanitarian pipelines. Pauses become cancellations; contractors lay off staff; credibility vanishes. That is precisely where Kremlin-aligned security actors and influence networks step in cheaply.
4) Blocking Ukraine’s long-range strikes inside Russia
By late August, the Pentagon’s approvals process was quietly blocking Ukraine’s use of U.S.-provided ATACMS for deep strikes inside Russia—a reversal from late-2024 permissions. WSJ broke the story; Reuters and others corroborated, noting approvals had to run to the Secretary of Defense. The Wall Street Journal+1Reuters
Why it matters: Ukraine’s best levers to raise costs for Moscow are logistics hubs, air bases, and command nodes beyond the border. Tying those strikes to U.S. political calendars and gatekeepers tilts operational tempo toward Russia and hands the Kremlin bargaining leverage.
5) Pausing weapons deliveries to Ukraine—twice (March, then July)
In early March, the administration paused military aid while pressing Kyiv toward talks; in early July, it again halted or slowed shipments—Patriot interceptors, 155 mm shells, GMLRS, and more—before partially resuming them amid backlash. Reuters, PBS, and The Guardian tracked the reversals and their battlefield timing. Reuters+2Reuters+2PBS
Why it matters: week-long gaps during heavy bombardment aren’t just optics; they’re windows the Russian military exploits. A “start–stop” pipeline also tells allies and Kyiv that U.S. support is contingent—and tells Moscow to wait out Washington.
6) Taking Ukraine’s NATO membership “off the table”
Across February and August, the President publicly said he didn’t believe Russia would “allow” Ukraine into NATO and later described NATO membership (and even reclaiming Crimea) as “impossible” for Kyiv. Reuters and Euronews documented the statements. Whether or not one thinks accession is prudent, advertising Moscow’s veto as decisive hands the Kremlin a victory—in principle and propaganda. Reuterseuronews
7) Casting doubt on Article 5 and collective defense
In March, the President said the U.S. was “not going to defend” allies who didn’t meet elevated spending thresholds; en route to the June summit, he again raised questions about unconditionality before offering warmer words at the meeting itself. CBS and the Washington Post captured the wavering line. Deterrence thrives on clarity; explain on TV how the umbrella might not open, and you invite probing. CBS NewsThe Washington Post
8) Restarting U.S. withdrawal from the World Health Organization
On day one, an executive order re-launched U.S. withdrawal from WHO and instructed U.S. negotiators to cease work on the pandemic accord and IHR amendments pending. KFF’s tracker and the order itself lay out the step and its implications. WHO is the clearinghouse for outbreak alerts and norms; vacating it hands agenda-setting to others, notably China. The White HouseKFF
9) A second U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
The administration also re-triggered exit from the Paris Agreement. A Congressional Research Service report explains process and consequences; legal alerts summarize the practicalities (withdrawal finalizes on notice, but the diplomatic damage arrives immediately). Exiting Paris fractures transatlantic climate coordination that often undergirds export controls and sanctions—areas where Russia benefits from delay. Congress.govWhite & Case LLP
10) Pulling U.S. scientists out of the IPCC process
In February, the U.S. told federal scientists not to participate in a key IPCC meeting planning the next assessment report; Reuters and Scientific American reported the withdrawal, and Columbia’s Sabin Center parsed the knock-on effects for science diplomacy. Fewer U.S. authors and delegates means less influence over the evidence syntheses parliaments and markets use to set rules—again ceding space to rivals. ReutersScientific AmericanSabin Center for Climate Change Law
Why the ten matter together
Each action has its own rationale—“efficiency,” “burden-sharing,” “America First.” In combination, though, they dampen exactly the tools the U.S. uses to compete in the gray zone between war and peace. Aid freezes and USAID’s abolition undercut stabilization where Russian mercenaries and disinformation thrive. WHO/Paris/IPCC withdrawals vacate tables where coalitions are assembled and standards set—rooms where China and Russia prefer the U.S. absent. Doubts about Article 5, curbs on Ukrainian long-range strikes, and start–stop munitions signal to Moscow that time and pressure will be rewarded. None of this guarantees Russian gains; it just makes American recovery costlier.
What Have We Gained and What Have We Lost
If one tallies 2025’s “gains” in the narrowest budgetary sense, the math fits on an index card. The late-August pocket rescission aims to cancel roughly $4.9–$5.0 billion in foreign aid before FY2025 ends—cash outlay reductions if, and only if, courts and Congress don’t reverse them. ReutersThe Washington Post
Withholding assessed payments while WHO withdrawal runs its course would defer hundreds of millions for the current dues cycle (public documents place the U.S. WHO assessment for 2024–25 near $260 million), though arrears could still come due. World Health Organizationchinadailyhk Downsizing the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) might trim a fraction of its $950 million FY2025 request—tempered by litigation that forced disbursements to RFE/RL and by one-time shutdown costs that would post in FY2026. USAGMRadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty And abolishing USAID yields, at most, operating-expense savings if functions aren’t simply re-housed at State; appropriations summaries peg USAID OE around $1.2 billion. House Committee on Appropriations
Even a maximalist reading—rescission held, WHO checks withheld, partial USAGM/USAID overhead cuts realized—lands in the low single-digit billions. Against a Federal budget measured in trillions and an international-affairs topline near $58–59 billion, the fiscal impact rounds to well under one-tenth of one percent of outlays. In other words: fiscally tiny, strategically loud. The White House
What did we lose to buy those savings? We traded away capability, credibility, and cohesion—three things that don’t show up on a ledger until the bill arrives as a crisis.
Capability. Eliminating USAID as an independent engine of global health, food security, democracy support, and disaster response removes a tool the United States has used for six decades to stabilize places where the Kremlin thrives on disorder. The dissolution push followed a day-one freeze and global stop-work that halted thousands of awards. Even sympathizers concede the change severs established delivery channels mid-mission. The price of “savings” here is slower immunizations, weaker election support, and narrower humanitarian pipelines—the very seams where Russia and China step in with cheaper, harder power. The White HouseDevex
Credibility. The pocket rescission didn’t just zero out lines on a spreadsheet; it told allies, UN partners, and implementers that appropriated funds can be yanked by executive maneuver. That erodes confidence in American commitments and shrinks U.S. leverage at the UN—especially when the same package targets U.N. dues and peacekeeping. The immediate dollar “gain” is offset by a reputational debit: fewer votes marshaled for mandates that constrain Moscow, and more space for rival narratives in rooms we vacate. The Washington Post
Cohesion. Restrictions on Ukraine’s deep-strike options inside Russia, paired with two pauses in weapons deliveries during heavy Russian bombardment, created operational gaps and political doubts—first in Kyiv, then across Europe. Delays and caveats don’t “save” money; they shift costs to the battlefield and to future reassurance. What they do buy—at a steep strategic price—is the impression that Washington’s support is contingent and time-limited, an impression the Kremlin can bank. Reuters+1
Other touted “gains” are largely illusory. Leaving WHO and re-withdrawing from Paris carry no immediate, automatic budget dividend: Paris has no dues, and WHO financing is part assessed, part voluntary; either way, the cost of forfeiting agenda-setting power in health and climate (where allies build standards that shape trade and tech) can arrive as billions during the next pandemic or supply-chain shock. The White HouseCongress.gov
A harsher way to put it—the way some allies already whisper it—is that the United States bartered away instruments of its own security for a modest, perhaps temporary, budget talking point. The pocketed billions may balance a press release; they don’t balance the ledger of national power. That’s where the faint odor of betrayal creeps in—not the theatrical kind, but the quiet kind that trades near-term optics for long-term strength and asks soldiers, diplomats, and aid workers to do more with less while rivals press their advantage.
Country-by-country and program impacts (where we already see them)
Ukraine’s battlefield and deterrence environment. The deep-strike restrictions limited ATACMS employment into Russia; the July pause deprived Ukraine of Patriot interceptors, 155 mm ammunition, and GMLRS when air raids surged—before partial resumption. Moscow benefited from operational breathing room and the propaganda value of wobbling U.S. support. The Wall Street JournalReuters
Global health and humanitarian pipelines. USAID’s dismantling and the aid freeze/cancellations triggered a wave of terminated and paused awards across HIV/TB/malaria, MCH, and emergency response portfolios; implementers began drawing down staff and shuttering activities that anchor stability in the Sahel, the Horn, and Southeast Asia. That’s where Russia barters security and disinformation for influence. Devex
Multilateral leverage and information space. The pocket rescission targeted UN dues and peacekeeping, reducing U.S. voting weight and leverage at precisely the forums where Russia contests narratives. In parallel, USAGM layoffs accelerated—532 RIF notices on Aug 30—shrinking U.S. broadcasting into Russia’s near-abroad and China. Courts have already forced some funds to RFE/RL, underscoring how chaotic the “savings” case is. AP NewsPoliticoRadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty
Allied confidence. Public musings downgrading Article 5 and pre-emptively foreclosing Ukraine’s NATO path made European leaders hedge—even as the administration sought praise for higher allied defense spending. You can’t warn Moscow not to test the shield while explaining how, and for whom, it might not work. CBS NewsThe Washington Post
Brief portraits of the second ten items
Beyond the top tier, ten additional moves extend the pattern. DOJ disbanded the Foreign Influence Task Force and ended Task Force KleptoCapture, easing pressure on Russian influence networks and oligarch assets. DHS/CISA sidelined mis/disinformation teams, weakening defenses in an election year. The White House floated easing Russia sanctions in the context of talks; it threatened troop reductions in Europe and explored closing dozens of embassies/consulates, shrinking the diplomatic footprint where Russia and China are active. Tariffs of 25%, then 50%, on India—framed around Russian oil purchases—risk splintering a pivotal partnership. An EO paused FCPA enforcement for 180 days (later partially reset), dulling a key anti-kleptocracy tool. And USAGM’s mass layoffs (VOA, RFE/RL, RFA) dimmed a U.S. megaphone in Russia’s near-abroad and China. In each case, the direction of travel was the same: less U.S. presence and pressure in the arenas where authoritarian rivals compete hardest. Mayer BrownDefaultNextgov/FCWCyberScoopThe Washington PostThe Wall Street JournalThe GuardianReutersNew York PostAP News
Sources (selection)
⁃ USAID abolition; aid freeze & implementation: EO and State guidance; Devex; KFF timeline. The White HouseStateDevexKFF
⁃ Pocket rescission (~$4.9–$5.0 B): Reuters; Washington Post; Axios explainer. ReutersThe Washington PostAxios
⁃ Ukraine deep-strike restrictions / shipment pauses: WSJ; Reuters; PBS; Guardian. The Wall Street JournalReuters+2Reuters+2PBS
⁃ NATO/Article 5 & Ukraine membership comments: CBS; Washington Post; Reuters; Euronews. CBS NewsThe Washington PostReuterseuronews
⁃ WHO withdrawal: White House EO; KFF overview. The White HouseKFF
⁃ Paris withdrawal: CRS; law-firm alert. Congress.govWhite & Case LLP
⁃ IPCC pull-back: Reuters; Scientific American; Columbia Climate Law. ReutersScientific AmericanSabin Center for Climate Change Law
⁃ USAGM budget/layoffs: USAGM FY2025 CBJ; RFE/RL court order; AP/Post/Politico layoff coverage. USAGMRadioFreeEurope/RadioLibertyAP NewsThe Washington PostPolitico
⁃ Budget context: FY2025 Budget (State/USAID ~ $58.8 B); USAID OE; WHO dues doc. The White HouseHouse Committee on AppropriationsWorld Health Organization
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