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How to Win a War When Russia has Infinite Time-Outs [1]
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Date: 2025-09-10
Ukraine is a stalemate. However, that term does not mean exactly what we think it means. Even while the front line is not moving much, there is a lot happening.
There are several ways to win a war. One is if your opponent loses the will to fight, such as the Afghans after the U.S. withdrawal. Another is if one side lacks the power to resist, such as Kuwait when Iraq invaded in 1990. Some say that “all wars end in negotiations,” but that is not really true. William the Conqueror never negotiated the end of the war with King Harold Godwinson – he just killed him and occupied England. In World War II, the Allies negotiated the “unconditional surrender” of both Germany and Japan. The Confederate government never surrendered, even if one of their generals did. Jefferson Davis was captured in women's clothing while trying to run away.
Negotiations, however, do end most wars, and that is what Ukraine’s allies have been pushing for since the war began. It is important to note, however, that negotiation is all about compromise, and in this case, the sides are deciding which war aims to forsake. If each side achieves half their war aims, is it a victory? For whom? Because, by negotiating, we are giving away what the other side means to take (or defend) by force. But, in exchange, maybe we can be better off, either by avoiding future total defeat or by merely avoiding the devastation of months or years of further war.
Under pressure from their allies, the Ukrainians have already agreed to a ceasefire. The idea is that whenever Russia wants to agree also, the front lines will be frozen in their current location, all fighting will cease, and the two sides will work out what to do next. The two sides are far apart. Ukraine might be willing to temporarily cede control of captured territories but does not want to agree to a formal renunciation of their claims. The Russians, on the other hand, want the Ukrainians to give up all captured territory plus a lot of territory that Russia does not control. This includes critical parts of the Ukrainian defensive lines. The Russians also want the Ukrainians to disarm their military, replace their government and constitution with one the Russians approve, and agree to not have any alliances with other countries that could help them in the future.
The problem here is not just that giving into any of the Russian demands would likely be catastrophic for Ukraine. The problem is that Russia can, in effect, call for a ceasefire whenever they want. The Russian front line is crumbling? Immediate ceasefire! The Ukrainian front line is crumbling? No ceasefire today! Any time the war turns against them, the Russians can ask for a timeout for a few days or weeks, strengthen their defenses, and start the war right back up.
People think a stalemate is perpetual failure, but it isn’t true. Stalemates last until they don’t. To break a stalemate, one side first needs to achieve local superiority along a portion of the front line sufficient to break through. This penetration can occur through luck, new technology, superior strategy, or a deception plan. Most likely, however, particularly when both armies are dug in across a wide front, any penetration is going to be at least partially the result of attrition warfare. Attrition warfare comes down to two things. First, how fast is each side “generating combat power” by building/fixing vehicles, supplying fuel/ammo/supplies to the front lines, training new Soldiers, and so on? Secondly, how much “attrition” is each side suffering in lost or destroyed equipment, supplies, and Soldiers? What is important, instead of just bragging about a"body count," is the comparison in combat power between the two armies over time.
In the best-known modern stalemate, both Germany and the French/British generated combat power at a similar rate as they lost it during World War I from around 1914 until the United States joined the Allies and Germany could no longer replace losses. Over the course of months, the combat power shifted decisively in favor of the Allies, although the “stalemate” continued. The Meuse-Argonne offensive that started in September 1918 shattered that illusion, as the Germans no longer had the combat power to resist Allied advances. They surrendered just before the war turned into a rout.
A “stalemate” could also persist if both sides lose combat power at a similar rate. An example might be Sparta and Athens in the Peloponnesian War that had tiny armies and navies by the end of the war compared to what they had at the beginning. What is ultimately important is not the rate of loss but rather the growing imbalance over time. Once the disparity is great enough, the chance of a penetration of the front lines becomes much more likely.
After a penetration, the winning army then has to “exploit” the gap by rapidly pushing through combat power. In the modern era, that can only be accomplished by armored vehicles like tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs like Bradleys, BMPs, Marders, etc.) because nothing else has the speed or survivability to get through the gap fast enough. Infantry typically do not advance in contact with the enemy at more than about 1 kilometer per hour. At that speed, it is trivial for the defenders to just truck in more troops to drop in front of the attackers. Light-skinned vehicles are also too vulnerable to fight on their own and must advance at the speed of dismounted infantry. Tanks and IFV, on the other hand, can rapidly advance at around 20 kilometers per hour. Some say “the tank is dead.” If that is true, then it is impossible to break a stalemate, leaving future wars to drag on interminably. Instead, the Ukrainians (or Russians) will need a massive mechanized force in reserve that can take advantage of any penetration and force an end to the war. Of course, any exploitation will eventually “culminate” when there is no longer enough reserve combat power available to continue advancing while defending the logistics that supply the exploitation force. However, by then, the geometry of the whole war has changed, and it becomes a race, first to prepare for the inevitable counterattack and then prepare for the next offensive. However, if there is already an imbalance in combat power, the advantages will compound to the stronger side, likely leading to a swift end in the war.
So, what now? The stalemate will continue until it doesn’t. The Russians are currently unwilling to negotiate an end to the war and Ukraine’s allies cannot apply enough pressure to force it. Eventually, there will be a large enough imbalance in combat power that one side will be able to exploit this advantage. This could happen several ways. The least likely is that either side finds a way to rapidly increase combat power. The Chinese could directly involve themselves in the war or the North Koreans could send a massive Army to aid Russia, but it looks like a lot of cost for little reward for both. Similarly, the European and American powers could provide Ukraine with billions of dollars in new weapons, but the Europeans are incapable, the Americans unwilling, and the Ukrainians likely lack the manpower to take advantage of it if they did.
More than likely, the end of the war will come because one side has run out of the ability to generate enough new combat power. The Ukrainians are dependent on donated weapons, ammunition, and parts that arrive unpredictably, and they need foreign money to pay the costs of their war. Also, virtually their entire population is either mobilized or working in critical industries without the ability to recruit massive numbers of more soldiers. The Russians, meanwhile, lack the manufacturing capability to make critical weapons like artillery tubes from hardened steel and have now run out of their massive stockpile of cold war tanks and artillery that were in storage. Military morale is low, leading to difficulty coordinating major operations. They are facing an economic collapse without funds to pay for their military as the civilian economy contracts. And, they have a manpower crisis of their own. Unlike the Ukrainians, they have more people available, but Putin does not want to draft massive numbers from the Moscow and Saint Petersburg regions due to the risk of instability. The Russian military has no unity of command and Vladimir Putin rewards leaders who constantly attack while penalizing those that want to use more strategy.
Can Ukraine win? Absolutely. On the war’s current trajectory, without a ceasefire or negotiated peace, I would assess them as having a 50% chance of holding out longer than the Russians. However, it is impossible to say when the war might end, whether a month from now or three years from now. However, if Ukraine’s allies keep insisting that a ceasefire or peace agreement can be had whenever Putin chooses, the odds become 0%. Russia can just pause the war in a temporary ceasefire while they bring in more Soldiers, landmines, and digging equipment, and then restart the war as they see fit. Or, if they ever assess the war as unwinnable, then they can declare a ceasefire and then drag out a peace negotiation longer than Ukraine's allies' patience until they get what they want. Letting the Russians have the initiative in negotiations is just as costly as giving them the initiative in maneuver warfare. Ukraine's well-meaning friends are sabotaging their chances for success. The goal should not be "peace in our time" at any cost - until Ukraine can win or Russia is willing to negotiate much closer to what Ukraine wants, the war must continue, and it is counterproductive to offer ceasefires until that changes.
One strategy going forward is to significantly increase the support to Ukraine while tightening a trade embargo on Russia and putting massive economic and diplomatic pressure on the countries supporting Russia until the war shifts in Ukraine's favor and they can recapture some or all of their lost territory. Or, follow the same initial strategy, wait until Ukraine is at a position of relative strength and put massive pressure on the Russians to try to force them to negotiate a non-disastrous end to the war at the time of our choosing. The European plan now, staying Ukraine's allies until we inevitably pull the rug out from under them isn't likely to have good results. Trump's plan, to unpredictably change our stance week to week, is even worse.
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