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The Immorality of Patriotism [1]
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Date: 2025-06-02
When I was growing up in the 1950s and 1960s, all public school students in my state of Colorado were required to start each school day by reciting the Pledge of Allegiance. No one was exempt. But now that I think about it, I don’t believe there was anyone, certainly no student, who questioned whether it was right or good or appropriate to recite the pledge. Most of us going through public schools at the time didn’t really give it a second thought; we stood up, placed our right hand over our left breast (close enough), and said it in unison, then went about out school day.
Now, Colorado state law allows students to decline to participate in the still-mandatory recitation of the pledge. Evidently, scruples about verbal expressions of loyalty and commitment to a flag that stands for one’s country of residence have risen to the level where reciters can take a pass and continue reclined at their desks with right hand twiddling a #2 pencil out of boredom. Or maybe as a statement of indifference, or a demonstration of resistance to the authoritarianism of teachers and school administrators, or a conviction that expressions of unqualified loyalty are misplaced if given to anyone or anything other than that which is absolute and unalterable (which, of course as we all know, is not applicable to a country).
I understand the idea of requiring naïve and uninformed students to recite the pledge. The curators and disseminators of human knowledge and skill naturally want their charges to learn about and become grateful and appreciative for the country in which they live with the benefits bestowed by the rights enumerated in law. This country wants and needs citizens who value the freedom they enjoy here and desire to live in communities where those rights and privileges are shared and protected. This country wants and needs people who have been, are, and will be loyal participants in our social, economic, and political life. This is, after all, the land of the free and the home of the brave.
But it is at this point that there enters in an uncomfortable bit of confusion, cacophony, and conflict, for we are talking about what many take to be the essence of patriotism: Loyalty to, participation in, and support for one’s country and the governmental, social, economic, political, and religious systems that give it reality. This dissonance over patriotism comes from the undercurrent of morality that bears it up: it is good and right to be loyal to one’s country, over all others, and to seek its preservation and progress; it is bad and wrong to limit, qualify or reject such allegiance. This is the rudimentary moral premise of that attitude we label patriotism as internalized by all those years of reciting the Pledge of Allegiance.
Let’s ponder, for a moment, the meanings—for they are plural—of patriotism, and let’s consider the morality—or moralities—that undergird the sense of allegiance that is externalized in the utterances and enactments of patriotism.
According to the etymologists at the Oxford English Dictionary, the word “patriot” has its origins in the late Middle Ages and goes back to the Greek word patriotes (πατριώτης), which means “fellow citizen” or “compatriot.” It is derived from patris (πατρίς), meaning “fatherland” or “country,” and ultimately from pater (πατήρ), meaning “father.” The idea behind the term is one of loyalty or devotion to one's homeland, viewed almost as a familial bond.
The word entered English in the late 16th century via French, where patriote had developed a similar meaning. Initially, “patriot” in English referred simply to someone who loves and is loyal to their homeland, but over time, especially during the 17th and 18th centuries, it began to take on more political connotations. By the time of the American Revolution, “patriot” became associated specifically with those who supported independence and self-governance over against the monarchical rule of the colonizing power.
Given the fact that an individual is a citizen of a country alongside other individuals who are citizens, this baseline meaning of “patriot” signifies that all individual citizens are patriots. But this merely begs the question: What does being a patriot mean, and how does one enact one’s patriotism?
We may be helped here by giving some attention to what political scientist Stephen Nathanson said about patriot and patriotism in the first major analytical inquiry into the subject in his 1993 book, Patriotism, Morality and Peace. For Nathanson, patriotism indicates both a set of attitudes and an ideal or principle. We can specify the patriotic attitudes as a special love for one’s country, a sense of personal identification with it, a special concern for the well-being of the country, and a willingness to sacrifice to promote the country’s good (34-35). The point here is that, as a set of distinct attitudes, patriotism has one’s country as the attitudinal object. These same four attitudes can be found in an individual’s regard for a spouse or partner, a friend or coworker, as well as an entire racial, ethnic, social or religious group, in which cases there are distinct objects toward which the attitudes are directed. When that object is one’s country, then we call it patriotism.
The ideal or principle in play here, according to Nathanson, is the notion that “patriotic attitudes are valuable and that we should take steps to encourage and promote patriotic attitudes in people” (34). Note the use of the words “valuable” and “should” in this quote. The former word signifies that patriotic attitudes have value, or worth, or desirability—in short, a good to be sought, achieved and retained; the latter word signifies that an obligation is laid upon us, or a duty to cultivate and nurture these attitudes in others. What Nathanson articulates with these observations is that being a patriot, enacting patriotism, and encouraging others to do so are all a matter of morality, one in which particular attitudes and behaviors are expressive of virtue and goodness.
Unfortunately, the attitudinal and practical relationship between patriotism and morality is rather complex. On the one hand, patriotism as love for one’s own country may be viewed as a moral virtue; on the other hand, impartiality and justice are also held up to be ethical principles that are rational and applicable to all persons in all countries. This conundrum complicates and encumbers the notion of patriotism because it is difficult to love and serve one’s country without partiality and to seek its well-being by imposing injustice on others.
In the Lindley Lecture delivered in 1984 at the University of Kansas, moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre addresses this conundrum. He begins by distinguishing two types of moral frameworks: those that prioritize universal, impartial standards and those that are particularistic, focusing on the values of a specific community. According to MacIntyre, patriotism is the loyalty and commitment one has to their nation, not merely because of its abstract principles or ideals, but because it is their own nation. It involves a sense of belonging, identity, and responsibility toward the community that shapes one’s moral and ethical perspective. Thus patriotism implies a kind of partiality—it requires individuals to give preference to the interests and values of their own country over those of others, even when these interests may conflict with universal principles of justice or the common good.
The central question posed by MacIntyre is this: Can this form of particularistic loyalty be considered a virtue within a moral framework that values impartiality and universal justice? For those committed to a liberal, Enlightenment view of morality, the answer would likely be “no,” arguing that virtue requires adherence to universal ethical principles that treat all individuals as equals, regardless of nationality. In contrast, patriotism seems to demand a form of moral partiality, favoring one’s own nation over others in a way that could lead to conflict, exclusion, or even injustice.
However, it is at this point that MacIntyre challenges the assumption that moral virtue must be based solely on impartial, universal principles. He contends that particularistic commitments, like patriotism, can indeed be virtuous within a different moral framework—one that recognizes the importance of community, tradition, and social context in shaping moral values. In his view, individuals are not isolated moral agents who make ethical decisions in a vacuum. Rather, they are persons who are deeply embedded in social and cultural communities that provide the context for their moral development. Thus, patriotism can be seen as a form of loyalty to the community that has shaped one’s moral identity and values.
Though MacIntyre does not offer a definitive answer as to whether patriotism is a virtue, he does highlight the tension between the universalism of liberal moral theory (e.g., do unto others as you would have them do unto you), and the particularism of community-based ethics (e.g., partiality toward one’s in-group which one loves and seeks to preserve and protect). Instead of an answer on the patriotism-as-virtue question in general, MacIntyre invites us to explore the ways in which moral identity is shaped by the communities to which individuals belong. At best, he simply opens up the possibility that patriotism might be regarded as a virtue, but only within a moral framework that values loyalty, community, and tradition alongside justice and impartiality.
So far as patriotism is concerned, it comes down to the question of what constitutes the “community” that forms the context in which our moral sense is formed and developed. Is that community homogeneous or heterogeneous, socially differentiated or socially stratified, internationalist or nationalist, civic-oriented or racioethnic-oriented, open-minded or closed-minded? Does this community draw a tight and narrow circumference around itself, or offer a broad and permeable gateway to entrance and participation? In the final analysis, what is the nature of the “community” and “country” which is the object of those attitudes and ideals we refer to with the word patriotism?
Posing the question in this way, guided by observations of such thinkers as Nathanson and MacIntyre, we can suggest that whatever patriotism may be, it seems quite likely to fall along a continuum spanning from true patriotism to false patriotism, authentic patriotism to counterfeit patriotism, principled patriotism to perverse patriotism, moral patriotism to immoral patriotism. And, it appears that, in this country at this time, we have an abundance of false, counterfeit, perverse and immoral patriotism.
It occurs to me that patriotism can become immoral when it leads to harmful behaviors or becomes the justification for unethical actions. For example, patriotism is immoral when it demands uncritical loyalty to one’s country. A patriotism that refuses to acknowledge the faults or wrongdoings of a nation, or criticize and hold the government accountable, can foster injustice, prevent necessary social or political reform, and lead individuals to support immoral actions or policies like oppression, human rights violations, or unjust wars. And speaking of wars, during times of such conflict, an immoral patriotism can make citizens feel pressured to support their country’s actions unquestioningly, even if those actions violate ethical standards or international laws. In such cases, patriotism becomes a force that stifles moral reflection and encourages complicity in wrongdoing.
When it fosters exclusion or hostility toward those who are perceived as “outsiders” or “foreigners,” patriotism can become immoral. A form of patriotism that defines loyalty to the country in terms of national or ethnic purity can easily slip into xenophobia, racism, or nativism. This type of patriotism draws sharp lines between those who “belong” and those who do not, often based on ethnicity, race, religion, or immigration status. Moreover, when patriotism turns into a justification for discriminating against minority groups, immigrants, or foreigners, it undermines basic principles of equality and human dignity. This form of patriotism becomes manifest in policies or attitudes that exclude certain groups from full participation in national life or justify violence against those who are seen as threats to national identity.
An immoral patriotism can lead to moral partiality—treating the interests of one’s own country as inherently superior to the interests of others. This can result in double standards where the same actions are judged differently depending on who commits them: a patriotic individual might condemn human rights abuses or aggressive policies when committed by other countries but excuse or justify them when done by their own nation. This selective application of moral principles undermines the idea of universal justice. When patriotism blinds individuals to the wrongs committed by their own country or encourages a sense of moral superiority, it can perpetuate injustice on an international scale. In extreme cases, this form of patriotism can justify acts of imperialism, exploitation, or military aggression under the guise of national interest.
Militarism–the belief that military power and war are necessary or desirable expressions of national loyalty–is a sign of an immoral patriotism. When patriotism is equated with supporting military interventions or viewing the use of force as a legitimate tool for advancing national interests, it can lead to the justification of violence and aggression. In this sense, patriotism can be used to rally public support for unjust wars or violent conflicts, often under the banner of defending the nation. When national pride is linked to the glorification of military strength or the willingness to engage in war, patriotism can serve as a vehicle for promoting violence rather than peace and cooperation.
When the ideology of patriotism is used to suppress dissent or silence criticism, it is a sure indication that it is immoral. In some cases, patriotism is wielded as a political tool to marginalize or demonize those who question government policies or speak out against injustices within the country. Those who engage in protests or criticize the nation's actions may be labeled as unpatriotic or disloyal, leading to social or political repression. This form of patriotism undermines democratic values, such as freedom of speech and the right to dissent. It creates a climate in which citizens feel pressured to conform to dominant narratives of national pride, even when those narratives are built on injustice or inequality. Suppression of dissent under the guise of patriotism erodes the moral fabric of a society by stifling the voices of those who seek to advocate for justice and reform.
Patriotism becomes immoral when it gives rise to national exceptionalism—the belief that one’s country is inherently better, more virtuous, or morally superior to all others. This mindset often leads to a justification of unethical actions on the basis that they serve the “greater good” of the nation. National exceptionalism can also lead to a lack of empathy or concern for people in other countries, fostering indifference to global suffering or injustice. When patriotism fosters a sense of moral superiority or entitlement, it can justify policies that harm other nations, such as economic exploitation, environmental degradation, or refusal to engage in international cooperation on issues like climate change or human rights.
In sum, while often seen as a virtue, patriotism can become immoral when it promotes blind loyalty, fosters exclusion, or leads to moral double standards. When patriotism is used to justify violence, militarism, suppression of dissent, or national exceptionalism, it becomes a force that undermines freedom, justice, equality, and the common good. In order for patriotism to remain morally defensible, it must be tempered by critical reflection, a commitment to universal ethical principles, and a willingness to acknowledge and address the faults and injustices within one’s own country.
In short, it is possible for one’s country to be the object of the attitudes of love and affection, loyalty and allegiance, concern for its well-being and advancement, and willingness to sacrifice to promote its health and preservation. But it ceases to be a moral patriotism when these attitudes are manifest in ways that impede, disparage, abuse, tyrannize, and repudiate any of one’s fellow citizens—compatriots—and their right, under our Constitution and laws, to seek well-being and thrive as full participants in–receivers of and contributors to–our civil society.
The principles and enactments of freedom, equality, and justice demand that our patriotism be moral, or there simply is no freedom, equality, and justice to which we may direct our patriotism. The Pledge of Allegiance means nothing if it is not a symbolic act that both authorizes and reflects our moral patriotic attitudes and behaviors.
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