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Ukraine Ground War Update: Kursk - A Timeline of the Russian Response [1]

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Date: 2025-03-08

I apologize for the length of this. It gets into the weeds quite a bit. For those not interested in some of the nuts and bolts, there are bits you can skip.

Also, I wrote about 2/3 of this early in the week, so the recent situation change highlighted by Quaoar’s diary last night only starts to appear in the last part.

On 10 Feb, I published a diary that illustrated the apparent deterioration of Russia’s offensive capability as shown in a chart of the amount of territory Russia had been able to capture per week for the past year. That chart shows a precipitous drop in Russian advances from some time in the mid-to-end of Dec until the time of that diary. Here is the same chart updated to the present (current week prorated through Sunday).

As you can see, the lower rate of Russian advance continues, but not at the extreme low level at the week of that diary. The current continued Russia limited success is in two places: the pocket SW of Korakhove, as predicted in the diary, and an area near Velika Novosilka, where Ukraine has not yet been able to solidify its defensive line following the loss of the town itself.

Next, that diary lays out possible reasons for the slowing of Russian advances. However, to my shame, I missed one possible important reason: A shift in focus from advancing in Donbas to addressing finally the Kursk incursion .

For a couple of months at the beginning, I watched the Russian troop deployments around the Kursk incursion and noted here in comments that Russia did not seem serious about reducing the incursion. The Russian units in the area were not numerous and, in many cases, were second rate at best, e.g. a unit of “Infantry” pulled from air force personnel and several Territorial Defense Regiments (Terr). And there was NO ARTILLERY as I noted on several occasions.

I got bored with looking at that a couple of times a week as it never seemed to change and I stopped. I got lazy. Well, I shouldn’t have. Last week, I looked again and noticed that there were a LOT more red squares (Russian units) up there and that three of them had big black dots in the middle of them (artillery).

This first map was the situation on 1 Sep 2024.

This second map is the situation on 4 Mar 2025.

A bit different, huh? So, I went back and looked to see what had arrived when. That resulted in this chart.

If you’re really a glutton for punishment, right click here for a larger version. I know it’s not a great chart. It’s intended to show the methodology and to let anyone who wants to dig further do so. That’s all. What we have here is not only an increase in the number of units, but also an increase in their quality and capability. Here is the basic (imperfect) chronology, as near as I can tell. It tells a story. The Beginning: At the beginning of August, Ukraine began its operation in Kursk. Initially, Russia responded with units it had in the immediate vicinity. This included Terr. Regiments (Regt), forming/ refitting/ training units, and a limited number of others that had been responsible for this section of the border. Within a couple of days, they had moved additional units in from the nearby Kharkiv axis, which was already stalled at this point. The 47th Tank Division (Div) HQ was the nearest higher command and was given responsibility for containing the Ukrainian advance until more forces could arrive.

Establish Control and Start the Buildup:

In Sep, the Russian response was still at a low level, but things were starting to happen. The 106th Airborne Div HQ arrived with some of its subordinate regiments (3-4 Airborne/Air Assault Regts). Most of this force relocated from the area of Rozdolivka, a small backwater about 20 kms north of Bakhmut. They had captured some territory there over the previous year, but nothing of importance. Other units arrived in this month, also, notably the 83rd Airborne Brigade (Bde) from the Kharkiv axis. Add in four other regiments (Regt) from Kharkiv, Krynky, Robotyne, and a newly formed Regt. It was a pretty big bulk of troops, but there was still a lot of work to be done before things were ready.

Still no artillery units and no units from the major combat axes (Pokrovsk, Charsiv Yar, etc.). In Oct, not much more arrived, just one weird “independent” Regt from deep inside Russia. Also, the 47th Div HQ finished its part in this operation leaving the 106th Div HQ in charge.

Start to Bring Pressure and pull out over-matched units:

During this time and in the next couple of months, Russia used these new forces to secure the area to the northwest (Snagost, Veseloe, Korenovo, etc.) of the “core” Kursk incursion and to start to shrink the incursion down to that core. Also, from the SE, Russia attacked through the woods toward the heart of the Ukrainian effort: Sudzha. The attack toward Sudzha made progress, but ultimately failed. However, these two efforts lay the groundwork for the current situation/threat.

In Nov, more arrived, notably Regts subordinate to the 76th Air Assault Div. Total, it was one Regt and three battalions (Bn). One of those Bns was the first Bn of what would later become the entire 177th Marine Bde.

The other change in Oct and Nov was Russia started pulling out of the area almost all of the non-topline units that had borne the brunt of the first weeks of fighting. This included the “Frigate” Bde (navy people pulled into an “Infantry” unit), and four Territorial Regts. So, during this time, Russia is not only increasing quantity, but quality as well.

But still no real artillery.

Bring in the Key Important OTHEr Stuff:

Dec is when things got serious. The 76th Air Assault Div HQ arrived from Robotyne to work alongside the 106th Div. Most of the 76th’s subordinate units were already in Kursk by now, but one more of its Regts arrived as well. The 34th Motorized Rifle Bde (MMB) showed up from Pryyutne (Nothing happening there, either.).

However, the BIG news was the arrival of TWO ARTILLERY REGIMENTS! These, too, did not arrive from the main combat axes in Ukraine. This is also when the Korean army fodder soldiers entered the fray.

Jan saw the arrival of the hammer (an artillery BRIGADE!) and further reinforcement with an Engineering (Engr) Bde (Why didn’t I think of that?), a tank Regt and parts of a Spetsnaz Bde. None came from main combat axes in Ukraine.

Now, they’re ready:

It’s Feb and the stage was set. Some of their better troops (airborne/air assault mostly to the northwest), tanks and IFVs (mostly to the southeast), artillery, engineers, marines (SE), etc. It’s all there. Russia has increased its response slowly at first and, in doing so, pulled its forces from axes where next to nothing was going on so as not to interrupt efforts elsewhere.

And while it was doing this, Russia advanced to capture over 2300 sq kms in just one 90 km long section of the line bringing Pokrovsk into focus while taking Vuhledar, Kurakhove, Chasiv Yar, and Velyka Novosilka just to name four towns important to the defense of the Donestk region.

Kostyantynivka (near Chasiv Yar) is what they will probably threaten next, if they can gather a force, but losing Toretsk (as they appear to be doing) is a major blow to the goal of threatening that town. That town’s really important and deserves a diary of its own, so perhaps more on that later.

Was it worth it for Ukraine?

There is no doubt that Kursk pulled Russian forces from the Kharkiv area, but that attack had already been stalled. Furthermore, much of the Ukrainian force involved in the Kursk operation was pulled from Kharkiv as well, so that’s pretty much a wash. The Kursk operation probably helped Kupyansk as well, which is a good thing. However, the rest of the Russian forces came from Kherson, Luhansk, Robotyne, inside Russia, Rozdolivka, and similar places. In all my searches, I have found mention of one Bn that may have previously been somewhere on the Pokrovsk axis.

Going back to the chart that started this whole diary, an argument could be made that Russia has redirected resources to Kursk in Dec, Jan, and Feb and that this could somewhat explain some of Russia’s apparent slowdown over that period. While this is perhaps an example of post hoc ergo propter hoc, there is likely some validity to this argument . Who knows what ammunition, electronic warfare, drones, glide bombs, etc. are at work where?

Ultimately, it’s all political. The effect there was great for Ukraine in the beginning. However, now it will likely swing the other way.

Historians will debate the utility of this operation for years and when they do so, they will likely have access to much better information. Someday, we’ll know. Until then, this is the best I can do.

As far as my estimate of what will happen in Kursk goes, this is my guess (GUESS). Logistics are threatened from the northwest and the southeast. The southeast attack (See Option C/D from this comment for background) will not succeed because it cannot be supported across the terrain it must cross. HOWEVER, it has already cut two of the three roads into the incursion (tiny ones). The attack from the northwest (See this comment for background) CAN be supported logistically. It must advance only another 3-4,000 meters before the highway comes into easy range of even light machine guns. At that point, it would be over. The other two roads used to be a possible alternative to the highway, but they no longer seem to be.

Ukraine must respond to these two threats. The only response I see is to pull resources (troops, etc.) from further into the north of the incursion to hold the “shoulders.” This, in turn, weakens those northern positions. From what I have seen of the map updates of the past day, this is exactly what Ukraine is doing.

It’s time to go. The risks of losing multiple Bdes is too high. This may also be what Ukraine is doing based on those same map updates. Basically, it’s down to Sudzha and 3-4 km around it and the highway.

Meanwhile, I will probably participate much less here over the coming months for the simple reason that what I started saying about 18 months ago and have repeated many times in various forms seems to be coming true:

Events OUTSIDE OF UKRAINE is what will likely decide this based on IMPRESSIONS of what is happening on the battlefield inside Ukraine.

The political and information realms are not my bailiwick. If something interesting or important pops up, I may chime in and there is always snark. I have kept at this mainly because someone kind here in the community bought me a subscription and I felt I owed it to them. Thank you ( Name redacted ).

But that lawn season is approaching and there is work to be done.

Regards, 22 Trucks

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