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Will The Ukrainians Culminate Soon? [1]
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Date: 2023-09-26
When a military is in a defensive posture, it is often said to be "building combat power." The U.S. military defines combat power as "the total means of destruction and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time." (JP 3-0) Combat power is comprised of leadership, information, and the six "warfighting functions" of intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, sustainment, and command and control. If a military has high "combat power" then that means that all components have to also be high. Lack of one component, such as leadership or sustainment, means that a unit lacks the combat power to destroy or disrupt what the enemy wants to do. So, in other words, when a unit is "building combat power," that means that it is stockpiling ammunition, fuel, and spare parts, fixing vehicles, training Soldiers, planning follow-on operations, and so on. The instant a unit gets rotated into the line, combat power starts to degrade. Usually, it will reach its "culminating point," or "the point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense" (JP 5-0) relatively quickly and then have to build combat power again.
For instance, if Ukraine wants to fire 7,000 artillery rounds per day for the offensive but is only receiving 4,000 rounds per day from all sources (manufacturing, donations, etc.), then they can restrict the rate of fire to only 2,000 rounds per day for a month to build up a stockpile of an extra 60,000 rounds. That would mean that after about 20 days of offensive operations, they would "culminate" in regards to available artillery rounds (20 days = 140,000 rounds used. 60,000 initial rounds + 80,000 additional during the offensive) and slow down to only being able to shoot 4,000 rounds per day after that.
If the Ukrainian Army Brigades have a 90% operational readiness (OR) rate of major equipment at the beginning of the offensive, it would immediately start declining as equipment breaks. After 30 days in the field, they might only have 40% of their equipment still fully mission capable, with another 20% functioning in a degraded mode (can't move faster than 2nd gear, only auxiliary optics functioning, etc.) because the equipment is used much harder and with less opportunity to fix it. If the attack continues, then the OR rate will continue to degrade as more and more vehicles have to be sent back for depot-level maintenance and critical spare parts start becoming short. This can be further exacerbated if the enemy destroys key capabilities, like counter-battery radar or breach vehicles, which will have an outsized effect until those items are replaced.
As units take casualties, whether combat (killed, wounded, or captured) or noncombat (illness, injury, or desertion), they lose the ability to perform their core missions without receiving replacements. To fully integrate the new Soldiers, the unit would need to be pulled off the line and given time to train the new Soldiers and integrate them into the unit. New Soldiers typically only know basic-level tasks, relying on their units to train them more advanced skills. Even veteran Soldiers arriving in a unit, however, need time to adjust to the culture, personalities, and tactics of their new units.
When a combat unit is at 85% combat power, it is said to be degraded. At 70% combat power, it is considered "combat ineffective." A combat ineffective unit can still fight, but it can no longer perform its doctrinal missions. There is not a perfect correlation between this concept and the "culminating point," but the concepts are quite clearly related. Another related concept is "force ratios." A force ratio is how much combat power the one side needs against the other to have greater than even odds of success. To keep having successful operations, the Ukrainians need to achieve high enough force ratios to keep moving forward.
FM 5-0
On the offensive, there are other challenges. If the Ukrainians push a 20km wide and 20km deep salient into the Russian lines, they need to defend 40km more territory than they did at the beginning (20km on each flank), requiring more Soldiers. Being a salient, it is vulnerable to attack from all sides, meaning that it is harder to bring air defense, electronic warfare, rotary wing aviation, or artillery forward to support it without high risk. Additionally, the major supply dumps have to be far enough back from the enemy to stay out of artillery or UAS detection range. Trucks, therefore, go from being able to resupply frontline units three times each day at 70 km to twice a day at 140 km, and once a day from 210 km away. Since there is a finite number of trucks available and a finite number of roads, resupply becomes increasingly challenging the further a unit attacks. To reduce risk to the salient and enable the forward deployment of key assets, the salient needs to be expanded on both flanks, requiring even more attackers.
In short, offensives have a shelf life before they "culminate." If they go for too long, the attacking units lose their advantage in combat power (personnel, equipment, supplies, and so on), and the attack will stall. When this happens, the unit needs to transition to the defense so they can "build combat power" again and resume the offense. Additionally, achieving a breakthough is worthless if it cannot be "exploited" by sending massive numbers of forces through the gaps to cut off and destroy escaping enemy units, seize enemy logistics, and seize and defend territory.
As of right now, almost all of the Ukrainian Brigades have been committed to the counteroffensive. The counteroffensive has been going for about 100 days, although the Ukrainians did not commit most of their force until about a month ago, focusing the initial attacks mostly on "shaping operations" to degrade Russian forces and set conditions for later success. The Ukrainians have been making slow and steady progress and "may" be on the verge of much bigger success. It looks like the Russian forces are nearing their breaking point all across their defensive lines, but will the Ukrainians have enough combat power available to exploit the advantage?
This is NOT a stalemate. If the war continues long enough, Russia will inevitably lose. They've already taken a quarter million or more casualties for a war that doesnt relate to their core interests and are taking huge other costs. Ukraine, on the other hand, is in an existential fight and will not lose the will to fight, no matter how much we support them or not. However, will this counteroffensive make the big breakthrough we hope for? I'm doubtful right now but i dont know. We should increase support so they can sustain this as long as possible and then launch a second counteroffensive without another unreasonable delay. Ukraine must win.
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