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Ukraine Invasion Day 578: operations will continue through the winter [1]
['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.']
Date: 2023-09-23
Ukrainian forces and their armored vehicles punched through Russia’s main defensive line on the war’s southern front and are operating on the other side, a local commander said Saturday. Ukrainian forces’ “ability to bring armored vehicles to and through the most formidable Russian defenses” and “operate these vehicles near prepared Russian defensive positions” were “important signs of progress in the Ukrainian counteroffensive,” Ukraine's military forces have broken through Russian lines near Verbove and are moving to retake Tokmak, 12 miles beyond the current frontline.
Ukrainian military officials stated that the Ukrainian counteroffensive would continue in the winter. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi told CNN that he expected a major Ukrainian breakthrough after Ukrainian forces reach Tokmak (a major Russian stronghold in western Zaporizhia) and that it is important that Ukrainian forces not lose the initiative they currently hold.[9] Tarnavskyi also stated that Ukrainian operations will continue through the winter as Ukrainian forces are mostly advancing on foot without vehicles and that inclement weather will thus not have a major negative effect on the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[10] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov echoed a similar assessment about continued Ukrainian winter operations in an interview with The War Zone published on September 22.[11] ISW has previously assessed that, while seasonal weather can slow ground movements and challenge logistics, it will not impose a definite end to Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[12] The culmination of the Ukrainian counteroffensive will likely depend rather on the Russian and Ukrainian balance of forces as well as on Western aid to Ukraine. www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/...
x BLACK SEA BULLSEYE: Friday's missile strike on the HQ of Russia's Black Sea fleet was timed to coincide with a meeting of flag and general officers. The commanding general of RU forces in Zaporizhzhia, Colonel-General Olexandr Romanchuk, and his Chief of Staff, Lt General Oleg… pic.twitter.com/oOocMwi3yL — Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) September 24, 2023
Key Takeaways: ISW is now prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have broken through Russian field fortifications west of Verbove in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Ukrainian forces have not overcome all prepared Russian defensive positions near Verbove.
Ukrainian forces are deepening their penetration in Zaporizhia Oblast and are assaulting Novoprokopivka – a frontline village 1.5 km immediately south of Robotyne.
Ukrainian military officials stated that the Ukrainian counteroffensive would continue in the winter.
The Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast has likely destroyed the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet).
A senior Ukrainian official explicitly confirmed that Ukraine’s objective in Bakhmut is to fix Russian forces. Ukraine’s fixing of Russian forces in Bakhmut may be alleviating pressure on the Kupyansk frontline.
Ukraine’s simultaneous counteroffensives in Bakhmut and southern Ukraine are impeding Russia’s long-term force generation efforts as Russia redeploys its new reserves to defend against Ukrainian advances.
A Ukrainian intelligence chief stated that the September 22 Ukrainian strike on the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Command headquarters in Sevastopol injured senior Russian commanders.
Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 22 to 23.
Zaporizhia Oblast occupation governor Yevgeny Balitsky appointed former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and ultranationalist figure Dmitry Rogozin as a Russian Federation Council senator representing occupied Zaporizhia Oblast
A Russian insider source argued that the Russian military should reintroduce military officers for political affairs (zampolits) to address the Russian military’s problems with political and ideological commitment– a problem that Russian military thinkers identified in September 2018.
Disjointed Wagner Group contingents reportedly returning to fight in Ukraine are likely to have a marginal impact on Russian combat capabilities without bringing the full suite of effectiveness Wagner had had as a unitary organization under financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s and founder Dmitry Utkin’s leadership.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances on September 23.
Russian authorities are reportedly embezzling funds from military facilities near the border of Ukraine.
Russian government programs continue to forcibly deport children in occupied Ukraine to Russia. www.understandingwar.org/...
x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - SEP 23
■ Clear downward trend of 🇷🇺 artillery strikes
■ Troop losses slightly below average
■ Double-digit artillery, vehicle, APV & tank losses
■ Oryx: -2 🇷🇺 9 🇺🇦 duplicates & corrections
See dashboard for further analysis
📈
https://t.co/8JE28gYsYl pic.twitter.com/Msk0UzqqQ9 — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦 (@ragnarbjartur) September 23, 2023
Six Neptune anti-ship missiles were launched from Odesa region
x Russian warship, go F yourself!
A Russian occupier boat sunk after it was attacked by a Ukrainian drone.
Good riddance! pic.twitter.com/Vky38IWfMj — Republicans against Trump (@RpsAgainstTrump) September 23, 2023
x My great-grandfather was a very rich man. He owned a lot of land and, most importantly, a windmill, which was crucial for flour production.
When the Communists fought for power, he convinced people to accept this new politics, so that Ukraine would be part of the USSR and not… pic.twitter.com/Cy4xaJufQI — Iuliia Mendel (@IuliiaMendel) September 23, 2023 x A guy who...
- was once appointed as a successor in the presidential office by an agreement of oligarchic elites
- never had any political career before taking power
- never participated in any real competitive elections
- has spent a quarter century in power and intends to… — Illia Ponomarenko 🇺🇦 (@IAPonomarenko) September 23, 2023
x The commander of Ukraine's southern counteroffensive says Ukrainian forces broke through near Zaporizhzhia's Verbove in the direction of Tokmak, a strategic hub for Russia.
https://t.co/ukRgNXxiJM — Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) September 23, 2023
ISW is now prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have broken through Russian field fortifications west of Verbove in western Zaporizhia Oblast. These fortifications are not the final defensive line in Russia’s defense in depth in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but rather a specific series of the best-prepared field fortifications arrayed as part of a near-contiguous belt of an anti-vehicle ditch, dragon's teeth, and fighting positions about 1.7 - 3.5 km west of Verbove.[1] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi stated in an interview with CNN published on September 23 that Ukrainian forces achieved a “breakthrough” on the left flank near Verbove and that Ukrainian forces continue advancing.[2] Combat footage posted on September 22 shows a destroyed Ukrainian Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) and BMP-2 operating slightly beyond Russia’s fighting positions trench line near Verbove, indicating continued Ukrainian progress in deploying more heavy equipment beyond Russia’s triune belt of the anti-vehicle ditch, dragon’s teeth, and fighting positions.[3] Commercially available satellite imagery indicates that Ukrainian forces have brought heavy equipment closer to Verbove over the past 96 hours in a manner consistent with Tarnavskyi’s statement.[4] The Wall Street Journal reported on September 21 that Ukrainian forces achieved a “limited breakthrough” west of Verbove citing an unnamed Ukrainian Air Assault Forces officer.[5] www.understandingwar.org/... Ukrainian forces have not overcome all of the prepared Russian defensive positions near Verbove. Ukrainian forces’ rate of advance near their breakthrough remains unclear. Russian forces likely still control segments of the long trench line of Russian fighting positions between Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Verbove, especially near the tactical high ground to the south. Russian forces have reportedly established prepared fighting positions in almost every tree line that Ukrainian infantry are slowly and systematically fighting through. Russian forces have more field fortifications beyond Verbove; there are more anti-vehicle trenches and fighting positions north of Ocheretuvate (26km southeast of Orikhiv), for example. It is unclear the extent to which those positions are manned, however. ISW continues to assess that the Russian military does not have sufficient forces deployed to this sector of the front to completely man its defenses in depth and that Ukrainian forces should be able to operate through Russian field fortifications more rapidly if they are not properly manned.[6] Ukrainian forces are deepening their penetration in Zaporizhia Oblast and are assaulting Novoprokopivka – a frontline village 1.5 km immediately south of Robotyne. Geolocated combat footage posted on September 23 shows elements of the Russian 70th Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) ambushing and killing two Ukrainian infantrymen in Novoprokopivka’s northeastern outskirts, indicating that Ukrainian forces have likely cleared Russian positions between Robotyne and Novoprokopivka.[7] Multiple Russian sources reported that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack against northern Novoprokopivka on September 22.[8] This is the first confirmed Ukrainian ground attack in the immediate vicinity of Novoprokopivka. www.understandingwar.org/...
x It seems that the Biden Administration has made the decision to provide Ukraine with MGM-140 ATACMS maneuvering missiles. In this thread, I want to explore the warhead effects of ATACMS, specifically discussing overpressure, fragmentation, and penetration effects. 🧵👇 1/25 — Fabian Hoffmann (@FRHoffmann1) September 23, 2023 My analysis focuses on the ATACMS M57 unitary warhead variant, which appears to be one of the main variants in play for Ukraine. However, many aspects discussed also apply to the M48 variant. Towards the end, I also reference the M39A1 variant. 2/25 I view this thread as largely complementary to the works of others who have done an exceptional job at explaining the overall capability profile of ATACMS. I highly recommend checking out the excellent threads by @ColbyBadhwar and @dillonrpayton on this topic. 3/25 The M57 variant which has an official range of up to 300km and carries the 227kg WDU-18/B unitary warhead. Unclassified data suggests that the M57 variant has an accuracy of 9m CEP, meaning 50% of ATACMS will fall within a 9m radius of their designated target. 4/25 Note that CEP (circular error probable) constitutes a probabilistic method of accuracy evaluation. Real-life results may differ. In addition, ATACMS’ 9m CEP is the unclassified value provided by the DoD. The classified CEP may be lower (resulting in greater accuracy). 5/25 The WDU-18/B warhead consists of 98 kg explosive material and 128.8 hull material, including the fuse. The warhead uses DESTEX high explosive, which has a TNT equivalent of 1.05 and a detonation velocity of approximately 6630 m/s. 6/25 The M57-variant achieves most of its destructive power through diffraction loading where the peak overpressure of a shockwave, generated by the detonation of high explosives, is applied to several sides of the target nearly simultaneously to destroy it. 7/25 The extent of damage caused by a shockwave depends on its peak overpressure. Most reinforced concrete structures crumble at 10 pounds per square inch (psi) overpressure, while many other types of buildings and structures can be destroyed at lower levels. 8/25 The human body can withstand relatively high blast overpressure. For instance, lung damage typically occurs only at around 15 psi. Individuals who die from blasts typically do so because they are trapped inside a collapsing structure, rather than due to the shockwave itself. 9/25 The graph below illustrates the lethal radius of the M57 variant for various types of targets, categorized by their hardness. For 10 psi targets, the M57 ATACMS variant has a lethal radius of 18.1 m, which increases exponentially as the target hardness decreases. 10/25 Considering ATACMS' unclassified accuracy of 9m CEP, it boasts a single-shot kill-probability (SSKP) of 94% for 10 psi targets (not factoring in systemic error). When it comes to softer targets (1-4 psi), ATACMS' SSKP based on unclassified data approaches 100%. 11/25 If we assume that the actual CEP is 7m or 8m instead of 10m, which is a realistic consideration given the general overperformance of US equipment in this war thus far, the SSKP remains consistently above 97%, even for targets at 10 psi. 12/25 In addition to overpressure effects, the detonation of a warhead also leads to fragmentation effects. These effects can significantly expand the lethal radius. This is because the shockwave dissipates more rapidly than the fragments are slowed down by wind resistance. 13/25 Unlike the M30A1/M30A2 GMLRS-variant, whose warhead is loaded with preformed tungsten spheroid fragments, ATACMS’ unitary warhead is not pre-fragmented. The resulting fragmentation effects will therefore be uneven and vary strongly from one detonation to another. 14/25 For the sake of argument, let’s assume the 128.8 kg hull material of the WDU-18/B warhead splinters evenly into 7,500 fragments with an average weight of 17 grams and a cross-sectional area of 3 cm. In this case, the initial fragment velocity amounts to 1640 m/s. 15/25 Assuming that those fragments have a high drag coefficient (due to their non-aerodynamic shape) and considering the normal density of air as 1.2 kg/m^3, the fragments will decelerate to less than 600 m/s at a distance of 80 m, and less than 500 m/s at a distance of 100 m. 16/25 At 600 m/s, fragments that weigh 17 grams transfer a kinetic energy of ~2.9 kJ upon impact; at 500 m/s they transfer ~1.9 kJ. This can cause light to moderate damage against lightly armored vehicles and aircraft, but not enough to cause substantial damage (on average). 17/25 More importantly, as the average number of fragments striking a target decreases proportionally to 1/R^2, the likelihood of being hit by a sufficient number of fragments is relatively small if the detonation produces only a relatively small number of fragments. 18/25 If we assume the target presents 15 square meters of surface area to the warhead (e.g., a 5mx3m truck) and that the detonation produces 7,500 fragments, the target will be hit, on average, by 1.39 fragments at 80 m distance and by 0.9 fragments at 100 m distance. 19/25 This implies that the ATACMS M57 unitary warhead variant, like Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG and Taurus, is primarily designed for point effect purposes and has limited capability for creating area effects. To achieve area effects, the M39A1 variant is required. 20/25 The M39A1 variant is equipped with M74 submunitions that scatter over a wider area. Upon detonation, they create a dense and overlapping fragment cloud, which can cause significant damage to a broader range of targets due to the size, weight and velocities of the fragments. 21/25 As others have pointed out, this would be extremely useful for Ukraine, in particular to threaten and destroy aircraft hangars and airfields. If Ukraine does not receive the M39A1 variant immediately, they will hopefully have access to them in the near future. 22/25 Lastly, a quick note on ATACMS' hard-target penetrability. Penetrability is largely a function of warhead configuration, mass, and velocity. Considering that ATACMS has a very high terminal velocity (~ Mach 3), it can achieve some degree of hard-target penetration. 23/25 ATACMS is outmatched by Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG in terms of hard-target penetration, however, which are optimized to engage hardened and buried targets. ATACMS is more useful to engage softer targets of time-sensitive nature and will likely be used in that fashion. 24/25 In conclusion, it is widely understood that ATACMS alone will not win the war. However, it plays a crucial role in complementing Ukraine's long-range strike arsenal and buys the Western alliance time to search for a more sustainable long-term long-range strike solution. 25/25
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