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Ukraine Invasion Day 563: 'predictions on the future trajectory of the war are impossible' [1]
['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.']
Date: 2023-09-08
ATACMS longer-range missiles would be a welcome addition to the Ukrainian arsenal.
x Maybe a partial compensation for Musk's sabotage of Ukraine's Crimea operation: US seems on verge of sending rockets that will quadruple Ukraine's striking distance, putting almost all of Crimea in range.
https://t.co/Gp6btTV4t2 — David Frum (@davidfrum) September 8, 2023
“There are specific square kilometers” liberated from Russians, but the counteroffensive can't progress faster due to the lack of air superiority and long-range weapons, Zelenskyy said today.
Russian forces have reportedly made notable changes to their command and control (C2) in Ukraine to protect command infrastructure and improve information sharing, although Russian force deployments are likely still exacerbating issues with horizontal integration. Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) Deputy Director of Analysis Magarita Konaev and CSET Fellow Owen Daniels stated on September 6 that Russian forces moved headquarters out of range of most Ukrainian strike systems and have placed forward command posts further underground and behind heavily defended positions.[1] It is unclear if Russian forces have employed this more protected command infrastructure throughout Ukraine and to what degree these defensive efforts have impeded Ukraine’s ongoing interdiction campaign.[2] Konaev and Daniels stated that Russian forces have improved communications between command posts and units at the front by laying field cables and using safer radio communications.[3] The Royal United Services Insitute (RUSI) stated on September 4 that Russian forces are also trying to improve signals through the wider use of application-based C2 services that require less training.[4] Konaev and Daniels noted that signals at the battalion level downward are still often unencrypted and that Russian personnel still frequently communicate sensitive information through unsecure channels.[5] Russian forces are additionally reportedly adapting their deployment of electronic warfare (EW) complexes. Konaev and Daniels stated that Russian forces have dispersed their deployment of EW complexes since spring 2022 from a concentration of roughly 10 EW complexes for every 20 kilometers of the frontline to 1 major EW system every 10 kilometers, with additional supporting EW assets deployed as needed.[13] The dispersal of these EW assets suggests that Russian forces have improved the coverage that a single EW complex provides, although Konaev and Daniels noted that the systems still have issues with limited coverage and EW fratricide.[14] RUSI stated that Russian forces are dispersing Pole-21 systems and treating them as disposable EW systems in order to provide wide-area protection from Ukrainian drone strikes.[15] Russian sources particularly credited superior Russian EW capabilities for aiding Russian forces’ successful defense against the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine in June.[16] Konaev and Daniels added that these EW systems continue to present challenges for Ukrainian drones transmitting targeting information and securing Ukrainian signals.[17] www.understandingwar.org/...
Key Takeaways: Russian forces have reportedly made notable changes to their command and control (C2) in Ukraine to protect command infrastructure and improve information sharing, although Russian force deployments are likely still exacerbating issues with horizontal integration.
Artillery constraints in Ukraine are reportedly prompting the Russian military to accelerate longstanding efforts to implement a fires doctrine prioritizing accuracy over volume.
Russian forces are additionally reportedly adapting their deployment of electronic warfare (EW) complexes.
Ukrainian forces reportedly continued to advance south of Bakhmut and south of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed gains on September 8.
Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed-131/136 drone strikes targeting Odesa Oblast on the night of September 7–8.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov publicly rejected an incredibly favorable offer from the UN Secretariat that met many of Russia’s stated demands to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative on September 6, indicating that the Kremlin is either delaying its return to the grain deal in an attempt to extract maximum concessions from the West or has no intention whatsoever of returning to the grain deal.
The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) directly responded to recent indications that the Armenian government may be questioning its decades-long security relationship with Russia.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line but did not make any confirmed advances on September 8.
The New York Times (NYT) — citing Western, African, and Russian sources — reported that Russian intelligence structures are competing for control of the Wagner Group’s assets and operations in Africa.
Russian occupation officials continue to hold illegal regional elections in occupied Ukraine. Russian occupation officials in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts announced the start of in-person voting in occupied territories on September 8. www.understandingwar.org/...
x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - SEP 8
■ Combat engagements stay high
■ Increased troop losses, record equipment losses for 2023
■ Tank loss record for 2023 also matched
■ Oryx: +39 🇷🇺, +12 🇺🇦 (net change) - total & 30-day ratios up
■ KIU: +32 officers
📈
https://t.co/ikSZlBHx0E pic.twitter.com/82FYCEhJMg — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦
[email protected] (@ragnarbjartur) September 8, 2023
x British Air Force began patrolling the Black Sea waters
They are protecting ships carrying Ukrainian grain from possible attacks by Russia. pic.twitter.com/rRwmAd6sTG — NEXTA (@nexta_tv) September 8, 2023
x ⚡ABC News: US will likely send ATACMS to Ukraine in upcoming aid package.
According to U.S. officials, Washington will likely send long-range Army Tactical Missile Systems to Ukraine in an upcoming package, ABC News reported on Sept. 8.
https://t.co/cXkRbo0vMA — The Kyiv Independent (@KyivIndependent) September 9, 2023
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on September 8 but did not make confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk) and Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove).[42] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Ilya Yevlash stated that Russian forces are continuing to concentrate efforts on the Novoyehorivka area and are using convict recruits and unspecified private military companies (PMCs) to conduct assaults in the area.[43] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on September 7 that the operational situation in the Kupyansk and Lyman directions is intensifying.[44] ... A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces continued to advance near Synkivka and Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) on September 7, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[46] www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 8 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations and achieved unspecified partial success south of Bakhmut.[56] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Southern Grouping of Forces repelled 12 Ukrainian attacks near Bakhmut, Vesele (20km northeast of Bakhmut), Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), and Andriivka (9km southwest of Bakhmut).[60] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in limited skirmishes in western Donetsk Oblast on September 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks south of Prechystivka (35km southwest of Donetsk City).[69] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) repelled a platoon-sized Ukrainian force northeast of Mykilske (27km southwest of Donetsk City).[70] www.understandingwar.org/...
x A Ukrainian drone struck the "Kremniy EL" microelectronics plant in Bryansk, Russia tonight.
It’s one of Russia’s largest microelectronics plants and 97% of its sales are for the army. pic.twitter.com/t2NLxOYGiK — Visegrád 24 (@visegrad24) September 7, 2023
x The first ten Leopard 1 tanks promised by Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands have arrived in Ukraine
These are the first tanks from the batch of 100 Leopard 1 tanks promised in February 2023. Previously, Ukraine received 71 Leopard 2 tanks.
https://t.co/jND3HwfuPI pic.twitter.com/tXPgxxY6U8 — Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) September 8, 2023
Russian Tactical-Nuclear Bombs and Missiles have begun to arrive at Storage and Deployment Sites in Belarus. x Yesterday, 12 pieces of equipment for the Iskander-M missile system arrived in Belarus — @belzhd_live.
The Community of Railway Workers of Belarus @belzhd_live managed to find out the route and composition of the train, which brought Iskander-M missile systems from Russia to… pic.twitter.com/HvDnguSUNX — Belarusian Hajun project (@Hajun_BY) August 31, 2023 x "After serving as a key base for Russian troops, aircraft, and missiles to attack Northern Ukraine in 2022, Belarusian authorities have now added a new destabilization risk to their panoply of threats." @MGolubeva_LV
https://t.co/0CqDBjLehW — CEPA (@cepa) September 7, 2023
x UN conducts secret negotiations with Russia on lifting many substantial sanctions in exchange for the "grain deal," BILD reports.
The editorial staff obtained a confidential letter from UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei… pic.twitter.com/kn37vAEBA0 — Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) September 8, 2023
x Did everyone miss the Ronan Farrow Expose last month? I feel like I’m taking crazy pills. He told us Musk spoke to Putin and then sabotaged Ukrainian comms.
https://t.co/icFVjWOJoc — Mueller, She Wrote (@MuellerSheWrote) September 8, 2023 An American citizen and US government contractor acknowledges that he personally sabotaged a military operation of a US ally.
x Our view of ongoing wars is always incomplete. Whether it is because of operational security, lack of media, or the fog and friction of war, much remains hidden from us. This is true for #Ukraine war. This makes predictions on the future trajectory of the war impossible. 1/24 🧵 pic.twitter.com/au893qQdmp — Mick Ryan, AM (@WarintheFuture) September 8, 2023 2/ But, there are certain variables which are more likely than others to have an impact on the course of the war in 2024. At this point, there are four key variables which are likely to shape this war in the coming year. 3/ Variable 1 is the strategic disposition of both sides once the muddy season, (“bezdorizhzhya” in Ukrainian) hits, around November. Ground operations after this will become increasingly difficult. The Ukrainians will want to gain as much ground as they can before this. 4/ For the Ukrainians, they will probably want to have at least established fire control in the south all the way to the coast. They don’t have to occupy this territory, but holding the entire area at risk will make Russian resupply very difficult. 5/ For Russia, they will want to avoid this and make gains in their north-eastern offensive. These have a military impact. But for both sides, their dispositions in November will affect political discussions in Western capitals about support for 2024. 6/ Variable 2 is munitions holdings as well as spare barrels, EW and counter-battery radars remaining. The consumption of munitions in Ukraine is the first to challenge post-Cold War defence industrial and strategic logistic models. 7/ But even with the growing use of precision munitions by both sides, large amounts of ammunition will be required over Winter, as well as to prepare for the inevitable 2024 offensives. 8/ There is only so much that can be drawn from stockpiles, whether it is munitions or equipment. Short term, DPICM is helping Ukraine but the longer solution is expansion of production. 9/ The United States has indicated that it will do so but this is still some time from having an impact. Europe has made announcements about expanding production, but this probably won’t have an impact until 2025. 10/ One external actor that might be important to Russia in 2024 is North Korea. While I would not want to be using their low quality ammunition, the Russian rationale will be ‘better to have low quality ammo than no ammo”. This could impact on the battlefield in 2024. 11/ Variable 3. The next variable is the ability of Ukraine & Russia to mobilise, train and deploy more troops. Ukraine mobilised its forces early and has been constantly training regular and territorial forces for defensive and offensive operations. 12/ But as we have seen in the ongoing Ukrainian offensives, there has been a variety in the quality of brigades. This is not to be critical; it is difficult to train individuals and then work them up through the various levels of collective training needed. 13/ NATO needs to step up collective training for Ukrainian formations over winter and into 2024. It needs to look at doctrine for combined arms combat under modern conditions. Whether it can do this is a key variable that will have an effect on military operations next year. 14/ The Russians, after a ‘partial mobilisation’ in September 2022, and ongoing recruiting of about 20-30,000 per month, may still need another mobilisation late this year to rebuild units destroyed or severely weakened during the summer Ukrainian offensives. 15/ Any influx of tens of thousands of new Russian troops, and the potential mobilisation of more in 2024, presents a challenge for Ukrainian strategy moving into 2024. The ability for either side to most effectively mobilise their population is a key variable in the war. 16/ Variable 4 is the willingness of external supporters to continue providing military assistance to either side. The West has taken a stepped approach to providing sophisticated weapons, providing tanks, fighter aircraft and long-range missiles only after long debate. 18/ As Ukraine’s recent strategic strike campaign has shown, long range strike can affect the war without major Russian escalations. This should permit Western politicians to double down on support to move from a defensive approach to supporting a decisive Ukrainian victory. 19/ An interesting variable is the willingness of China to remain ‘neutral’ in this war. But China still imports record amounts of Russian coal, LNG and oil, providing revenue for Putin’s regime. And it still exports to Russia dual use commodities. 20/ An important component of this is the strategic leadership of Putin and Biden – and their ability to nurture and sustain the will of their people. Putin’s direction that launched this war, He is playing for time, hoping that the west gradually tires of the war in 2024. 21/ Biden’s leadership has been vital in hardening western resolve and coordinating a steady flow of aid to Ukraine. But the 2024 US election season will result in closer scrutiny of aid to Ukraine. Biden may be under greater to explore peaceful resolutions to the war. 22/ The capacity for Biden (and Zelensky) to keep Europe and America unified in its support for the Ukrainian war effort – or to even increase support to ensure a Ukrainian victory - will be a key variable in the year ahead. 23/ Nothing in war is certain. But by exploring different variables, we can ascertain Russian weaknesses that might be exploited. We might also ensure that the right kinds and quantities of support are provided at the right time to Ukraine for 2024 (and beyond). End. 24/ Read a more detailed version of this at Futura Doctrina. Thank you to the following, whose images and work were used in this thread: @TDF_UA @DefenceU @ZelenskyyUa @Militarylandnet @ War_Mapper
https://mickryan.substack.com/p/variables-in-the-ukraine-war-for…
x According to the mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov , the United Russia headquarters in Polohy was blown up when party members were "drawing" the results of pseudo-elections there. pic.twitter.com/5gcmb6qjaN — NOELREPORTS 🇪🇺 🇺🇦 (@NOELreports) September 8, 2023
x Russia is holding "elections" on 8-10th September, including occupied territories of Ukraine.
In Nova Kakhovka, a person wrote "Nova Kakhovka is Ukraine" on their voting ballot. pic.twitter.com/SABQN4P40z — Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en) September 8, 2023
x Estonia plans to be the first in the EU to legalize the confiscation of Russian sanctioned assets, - the country's Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna has said.
The funds are planned to be used "for the purposes of Ukraine's reconstruction".
The Estonian government plans to approve… pic.twitter.com/UqQsrfLXeA — NEXTA (@nexta_tv) September 8, 2023
x This is big: The DOJ just charged 11 Russians — and made a rare public statement explicitly linking them to the FSB — for allegedly being part of a hacker group behind some of the biggest cyberattacks in the world, including against major hospital chains.
https://t.co/vsPxeMrAOw — Caroline Orr Bueno, Ph.D (@RVAwonk) September 9, 2023
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