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When Russian theory gets crossed with ground level reality in the trench lines. [1]

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Date: 2023-08-16

This article is in part a response to Vuld Edone’s article. Their article should be read first (and in my opinion recommended).

I’ve mostly stayed out of commenting on the “in front of prepared lines” because, well, I don’t know what these positions Russia is defending from are like at the ground level. I do think people overemphasize the magic of putting a fortification dot on a map. They are useful when portraying general trends, but the reality on the ground is not a binary. A lack of a dot doesn’t mean a lack of trenches, mines, and other obstacles. It means whoever puts a dot on the map either missed it or chose not to depending upon whatever criteria.

As it doesn’t take much to dig a foxhole, I’ve basically assumed the Russians defending “in front of the line” have a minimum of a foxhole, and frequently we see more complex trenches. The difference between a foxhole and a trench is simply the time and effort it takes to connect two foxholes. We KNOW they have minefields.

As for the Russian tendency to attack and regarding its effectiveness: Historically, a well timed counter attack can be extremely effective because the enemy is exhausted and relatively disorganized immediately after taking a position. Squads are mixed up, NCOs and officers are figuring out who was killed or wounded, and the good NCOs are proactively setting up a new defensive line expecting the counter attack. But if it comes before they are set up, the original attackers can be caught unprepared and defeated or pushed back. The Germans are famous for the opportunistic counter attack often being led by an NCO who in the German system had the authority to do so.

So counter attacking a newly lost position to take it back is a generally accepted good tactic. However, there is also a reason the Germans were both odd and smart in placing the responsibility in their NCOs. Not all counter attacks are the same. If the lost position was just barely taken and is undermanned, a counter attack by FRESH troops can likely take the position back. If the lost position was annihilated by tank and artillery fire and the attacking troops basically just walked in, then a counter attack would be into relatively fresh enemy troops who have fighting vehicles backing them up. If the force available to counter attack is tired, understaffed, or otherwise compromised, it would be a really dumb idea.

The difference between the two counter attacks can rarely be assessed using a map. An officer who is not on the scene could only make a wise decision to attack or not depending upon the reports they receive back from their subordinates. Poor communication or observations from a subordinate could result in a poor decision. An officer (or NCO) near the lost position who has on the ground knowledge of what just happened, would be much more informed about the condition of their own troops and the likely condition of the enemy troops. As such, the on the ground knowledge will give the officer (or NCO) the best chance at making the correct decision. Further, this information is timely. The longer it takes to counter attack, the more time the enemy has to prepare for it. So an officer deciding from far away for whom it takes time to collect and process the different reports coming in will always be behind the curve. In the 2 hours it took to collect the info, the enemy has had 2 hours to prepare for the counter attack in any number of different ways. Being close to the action is important here.

And this is where we need to remember Russian doctrine. Not necessarily the no retreat part, we’ve seen the Russians retreat. What we need to remember is the top-down decision making the Russian military enforces. NCOs and low level Russian officers do not have the authority to make the counter attack decision. Instead, they will be told from above whether to launch a counter attack or not. It may come from standing orders to always counter attack, or it may be freshly delivered orders from an officer much higher on the chain of command who doesn’t really know the situation on the ground. (Particularly if the information coming up the chain is made more rosy).

We’ve talked about the importance of Ukrainians using more western style command structure with empowered NCOs. Well, this is a decent chunk of what that is about. We frequently see Ukrainians making wise counter attack decisions because they trust their NCOs and junior officers to make those decisions. They trust those NCOs, train them for this, and then the person most informed about the situation (the NCO actually there) is also the person frequently making the decision.

In contrast we gawk at the absurdities of the Russian counter attacks because we frequently see the ones that have the worst results. We don’t often see or comment on the times when the Russians stumble into the correct decision.

And so we end up with “Russians counter attacking in front of their lines”. Well, some of what they are doing IS stupid, but it comes from the problems inherent in an overly rigid hierarchy which demands strict adherence to orders with no room for on-the-spot deviation from orders. We can safely assume the Russians are defending from dug in positions to start with. The suicidal counter attacks are more likely due to poor command and control.

So in the end, I don’t think a whole lot should be made about “defending in front of their lines.” The Russians (as Vuld Edone points out in their article) are defending lines. The part to remark on is the Russian command and control being poor which when combined with distorted reports from the front leads to bad decisions.

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[1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/8/16/2187624/-When-Russian-theory-gets-crossed-with-ground-level-reality-in-the-trench-lines

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