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Shall we expect a combined arms offensive from Ukraine now? [1]
['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.']
Date: 2023-07-19
I quite disagree with the tone and message of the latest post by Kos on the Ukrainian military situation. It feels really very one-sided, without looking at the other side of the equation.
For me, it reads like “We thought/expected that Ukraine would apply (ideal) combined arms warfare led by (ideal) Western-style officers, implemented by (ideal) Western-style soldiers allegedly riding (shiny new) Western equipment. And now they don’t”.
Oh well, did anyone really believe in it? How could that be possible?
How much time does it take to train an officer? Normally, you select your best junior officers and send them to an academy for at least a year. But who will be stopping the Russian offensive when the best Ukrainian officers are away studying and training in combined arms warfare?
Also, the best junior officers tend to die while fighting. We all cheer when we hear a Russian colonel or general being taken out — but the best Ukrainian officers die as well, and there are not many of them.
Those officers who survived the first year of this war — and are currently available for frontline command— are the people who used to sit deep in the rear (and they were sitting there for a reason).
There are also younger soldiers (or, more precisely, “newer” — the mobilized civilians are not so young) who can be promoted to officers. But to be able to command large military formations, they still have to be taught, educated, and trained. And they can’t, because —you guessed it — they are doing the fighting now.
Further, how would those officers be trained in combined arms without knowing what arms they have to combine?
As of February 2022, all arms that Ukraine had was a very limited reserve of former Soviet weapons, inmost cases of older models and smaller quantities than Russia. That was more or less enough for a limited-time,limited-scale combined arms defense — and Ukraine was more or less prepared for that kind of combined arms warfare - and did well with that. Exceeding the expectations of many Western combined arms specialists.
(Yes, it was a shame for us to have been so unprepared for the big war, but that’s a question for another discussion).
There was not any clear commitment, nor a schedule, nor an expectation of what — and whether, and when,and how much — the West will deliver to Ukraine. So, what combined arms offensive training are we talking about here?
The Western air defense only started arriving in late autumn last year in any relevant amounts. The tanks have become available for studying and training in spring this year. When do you have the time to learn how to combine them?
(And not all of that equipment was so shiny — a large portion of Western-supplied equipment is 30 or 50-year old technology and sometimes manufactured quite a long time ago).
Estimated military balance dynamics as of May 2023
The same applies to the servicemen. Ukraine used to have a fairly well-trained and more or less combat-familiar force in February 2022. These were the people who took the first Russian blow — and were dying and wounded and captured in thousands during the first months of the war.
They are no more. I would guess that 80% of the current Ukrainian army are the people who did not know how to shoot just 18 months ago. Ukraine is still building a system of efficient mobilization and preparation of men for the military service. And it is doing this during the war. All training bases, barracks, and any significant concentration of troops or equipment are (or have been until very recently) under constant threat of a Russian missile strike.
Of course, a four-week infantry training course somewhere in the UK is better than nothing. But let us be clear here — does someone believe a four-week prep course of former civilians produces a soldier — or a unit — capable of making a combined arms offensive?
Also, is combat arms warfare a real thing at all?
What was the last time a Western army — any army at all — undertook a successful “proper combined arms operation” against an equally armed opponent?
I am not a military expert, but all that I have seen here on the DailyKos blogs was a computer animation of a combined arms breach of enemy defense carried out after reaching an aerial superiority .
Yes, probably Ukraine can breach the Russian defensive line in one place by spending all HIMARSes and Storm Shadows in a matter of three days at one place of Russian defense — and then what? What to do with the Russian reserves which would rush to the point of breach? What about the Russian aviation and explosive drones that would hunt Ukrainian advance forces lacking air defense and radio jamming defense? What about the other parts of the 2,450-kilometre-long front, where Russia can start a new offensive?
I am not here to piss off the friends of Ukraine around the world. As I write these words this night in my apartment in Kyiv, I am still fully aware that Ukraine survived to this day due to the military and financial support of the democratic world.
But if you are friends, please keep your expectations realistic. All I am calling for is a realistic, down to earth approach, and some understanding.
Ukraine is learning to fight a large war – one of the largest in the last 50 years - while fighting. And by making mistakes. Mistakes that leave many Ukrainian families mourning every day.
Ukraine is learning how to make an offensive against an enemy who is simply still outnumbering the Ukrainian army.
Against an enemy who had been making war and militarization one of the main pillars of its domestic and international policy and practice for the last 20 years. They had their toddlers riding in toy tanks at children military parades! And they had the notion of killing Ukrainians normalized in their public conscience.
An enemy who is strong in radio-electronic warfare (affecting front-line communication, use of drones and any guided ammunition).
And in air defense.
Against an enemy who had seriously infiltrated the Ukrainian military and political system and is still meddling in the Ukrainian media and public opinion field, taking advantage of the Ukrainian democratic governance system that values freedoms and liberties.
Against an enemy that has all of its military industry and overall economy largely intact, while Ukraine had most of its military and industrial capacities physically destroyed in the first weeks of the war.
Against an enemy who is capable of blowing up a huge river dam and intentionally creating an enormous flood endangering tens of thousands of human lives in order to thwart the Ukrainian offensive across the river and reduce the length of the front line.
In an ideal world, on 24 February 2022, Ukraine could possibly ask Russia for a pause of 18 months,while Ukraine would wait for 3 months for the West to debate on whether to help Ukraine or not and then another 6 months on whether the West can spare any armored equipment or advanced air defense systems for Ukraine.
Then the best, carefully selected Ukrainian officers could travel to Europe for another 6-12 months to study combat arms warfare, while hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian civilians were getting proper military training and instruction and learning to use the now available Western air defense and tanks and planes and other modern equipment, which was supplied in quantities that matched the Russian quantities on the front.
And all that time Russia would quietly wait at the border, doing nothing.
Yes, I would love to see and live that scenario.
But we are living in the real world now. And in the real world, the current counter-offensive is the best thing that we have. And yes, it boils down to the fact of who has more of everything — more artillery, more MRLSs, more armored vehicles, more de-mining equipment, more Storm Shadows (to replace non-existed aviation), more mobile air defense systems to support the advancing units, more counter-battery equipment,more drones for surveillance and loitering, and more well-trained soldiers to use all of that.
This is war as it is. Aside from some foreign volunteers acting in their private capacity, nobody is willing to come and show Ukrainians how to fight this war in a proper, combined arms way. And we are fighting as well as we can. Doing what we can, where we are, with what we have.
Believe me — if we could, we would have done better. We are the most interested people on earth to end this war, as soon as possible.
Thank you for your patience and for hanging on with us in these difficult times.
P.S. As I call for patience, you may wish to read my earlier diary: Ukraine Counteroffensive Anxiety: Take a Step Back, Reflect, Engage, Connect.
P.P.S. I have been told in the comments that I misunderstood Kos’ post that was aiming at quelling the expectations of many people on the West and explaining the reasons for the apparently slow progress of the Ukraine’s offensive and that our messages are going essentially in the same direction.
My pain, and my point, however, goes a bit deeper: I disagree that Ukrainian actions shall be described or considered with any reference to the “golden standard” of a “combined arms operation” or a similar concept born or embedded in the current doctrine and/or recent practice of the US army, and I insist that Ukraine’s performance can — and has — only be measured against the real circumstances which we have on the ground and the real military capabilities that Ukraine possesses now.
With all that said, I continue to be a devoted and grateful reader of Daily Kos’ coverage of the war.
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[1] Url:
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/7/19/2182242/-Shall-we-expect-a-combined-arms-offensive-from-Ukraine-now
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