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Struggle for Power in Russia: Ivan the Terrible Edition [1]

['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.']

Date: 2023-07-15

I was an exchange student in St. Petersburg in 1981, and had a roommate from a rural area in the Caucasus region. In the fall, her mother and her sister visited, and commenced a search for winter boots for several sisters. Everyone seemed to want tall, leather boots with heels, but all that was available were short, rubber boots like a wellie. Curious, I joined the search, and was approached by a black market seller who offered boots for twice the official price. I reported the price to my roommate, but thought the person making the offer was pretty shady, and decided to stay away from black market commerce.

There was a criminal tinge to commerce in Russia because most transactions were illegal outside of state run stores. This complicated the transition to a market economy, because many of the people with business skills were also trained criminals. Little did I know just how rough things could get. This week, an investigative report on Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner private military group was published by Proekt Media. It turns out that in 1981, a few months before I arrived in St. Petersburg, 18-year-old Prigozhin and his friends assaulted a woman on the street and stole her boots and her earrings. Presumably he was solving a problem with inventory. He was arrested and put in jail for ten years.

After a business career marked by violence and intimidation, Prigozhin staged an uprising and marched on Moscow, before abruptly agreeing to end his campaign. The most bizarre turn of events took place a few days later when he met with Putin himself, along with 35 of his commanders. Prigozhin walked free - had a large sum of money returned, signed some new contracts, and his Wagner group was promised a new assignment. He and at least part of the Wagner group are now located in Belarus.

Meanwhile, loyal, effective military commanders are either arrested and jailed, or relieved of their positions. Reports are that General Surovikin has been detained, along with 13 other military commanders, presumably on suspicion of supporting the abortive coup. Fifteen other commanders have reportedly lost their positions.

The most recent event was the firing of General Popov of the Russian 58th Army, which has been serving on the Southern front in Ukraine, and has suffered heavy losses. General Popov, in his recorded message to Minister of Defense Gerasimov, echoed some of the same complaints that had been voiced by Prigozhin over the previous several months - men were put on the front with inadequate support and equipment - that they were dying from betrayal of the higher ups. Popov has not so far questioned the premise of the war in Ukraine, but has harsh criticism for the conduct of the war.

So why does a hardened criminal get off scot free, except for some of his heavy military equipment which was confiscated, and the real people are not only ignored, but punished? It appears that Vladimir Putin is re-creating the role of an early Muscovite Tsar. It’s as if Tsar Ivan the Terrible himself was receiving a band of loyal irregulars, to receive new pledges of loyalty. But how did Ivan the Terrible reward the loyal general who defended Moscow from more than one attack? In about 1573 Mikhai Vorotynsky was tortured personally by Tsar Ivan, and died later from severe burns.

It’s important to Putin that he have his own private groups who are loyal only to him. This is the role of Wagner, and of other shadowy organizations in Russia. Anyone who might be a rival, because they have an independent power base, such as the admiration of many soldiers, is suspect. This explains Surovikin and Popov. The problem is that organizations such as the Wagner group are destabilizing to regular governmental structures.

Obviously, there is turmoil within the Russian armed forces. How does this lead to a change in the power structure in Russia, if one posits that a change is necessary? Mihail Kasyanov, a former prime minister of Russia (2000-2004), says that we will see more and more people in the power structure engage in an “Italian strike,” where they do as little as humanly possible, and often avoid doing anything at all. Orders that require coordination of several departments are never carried out because the necessary signatures are lacking, and so on.

Russia will continue to function less and less effectively over the course of the next several months, and Putin’s authority will be greatly diminished. People will still fear the FSB, since certain armed forces will still be functioning, but the various branches may start fighting with one another more openly.

We have already seen cases of wilful disobedience of the spirit of the law, such as when a court in Voronezh refused to convict a person hauled in for holding up a sign that said “No to War,” because there is not war, only a special military operation, so that the sign was not an insult to the Russian military.

There are reports of opposition voices from different regions of Russia. In Tula Oblast, a milkmaid by the name of Elena Agafonovala had started asking questions at local government meetings, and in private meetings with officials. She has been branded a “foreign agent,” and is subject to restrictions under a repressive law. In a recent interview, she says she would like to see a plan to get ourselves (Russians) out of this situation, and that banding together with people in other regions is necessary. She lists her title as “milkmaid and foreign agent,” in a moment of humor.

How does any of this help Ukraine win the war? And/or how does Russia get back on a path that would lead to a modern state, which functions effectively to protect the interests of its population? The frustrating answer is that this is a process, and it will take a while to play itself out. Ukraine knows very well that they can hurry the demise of Putin’s regime along by winning on the battlefield and they are doing the best they can. Surely disorganization in the Russian military will show up more and more as a factor on the battlefield. Sadly, it takes a while for an ineffective system to collapse.

This is my opinion, but Russia can become a modern state - some of the building blocks were laid down in the period after 1991. Indeed, the high levels of education among the population were developed during the previous, Soviet period. Starting in the early 90s a normal business culture developed which provided career paths outside of the state system. A good percentage of Russians no longer rely on the state for their employment - they participate in a normal, private economy, and economic interests favor better relationships with the outside world, and more effective governance internally. Muscovy is not a completely hopeless medieval state, as much as they act like one at the moment.

My information comes from a variety of sources over the past week, but I am particularly indebted to Mikhail Fishman, who does a Friday program called Itogi nedeli on TV Rain. If you are inclined to support Russian independent media, TV Rain is a good place to start.

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[1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/7/15/2181435/-Struggle-for-Power-in-Russia-Ivan-the-Terrible-Edition

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