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Ukraine Invasion Day 492: will Wagner PMC no longer participate in hostilities on UKR territory [1]
['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.']
Date: 2023-06-29
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two other sectors of the front and reportedly made gains on June 29.
Prigozhin's mercenaries will no longer take part in the war against Ukraine This was announced by the head of the Main Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Defense, Kyrylo Budanov."We have received a discredit to the Russian leadership. Once again the myth of the steadfastness of the Russian regime has been destroyed. Losses were inflicted on the military and space forces of the Russian Federation. And also - the Wagner PMC will no longer participate in hostilities on the territory of Ukraine. And this is the most effective unit of the Russian Federation, which was able to achieve success at any cost," said Budanov. x Prigozhin's mercenaries will no longer take part in the war against Ukraine
This was announced by the head of the Main Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Defense, Kyrylo Budanov.
"We have received a discredit to the Russian leadership. Once again the myth of the… pic.twitter.com/zRw5TFi2iH — NEXTA (@nexta_tv) June 29, 2023
How to end Russia’s war on Ukraine As Ukraine continues to fight to liberate its occupied territories and eject Russian invaders, its Western backers debate the likely endgame for the war and its aftermath. The international response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, while impressive in many ways, remains inadequate to the task and dangerously wobbly. Russia’s wider threat to the rules-based international order is also insufficiently acknowledged. Many proposals have been put forward for how the conflict could, or should, be brought to a close. Some, though well-intentioned, involve concessions that would effectively appease Russia, betray Ukraine and endanger Europe. Persistent calls for a ceasefire or ‘negotiated settlement’ to end the fighting without tackling its underlying cause – Russia’s ambition to eliminate Ukraine as we know it – will do no more than reward the aggressor while punishing the victim. This multi-author report takes nine commonly espoused ideas for quick fixes or objections to bolstering assistance to Ukraine, and weighs them against both current reality and their long-term consequences. The unanimous conclusion of the authors is that the only outcome to the war that can safeguard the future security of Europe is a convincing Ukrainian victory – hence, Western military support to Kyiv should be redoubled before it is too late. www.chathamhouse.org/... Summary of principles for Western policy on the war Ukraine must not be pressured, directly or indirectly, into a negotiated pause to the fighting. Instead, Kyiv must be allowed to fight the war to a conclusion before a peace is negotiated. Anything short of this grants Russia success and will encourage future Rus sian invasions.
before a peace is negotiated. Anything short of this grants Russia success and will encourage future Rus Ukraine’s Western backers must recognize that territorial concessions by Ukraine – including over Crimea – are not a workable solution . Granting Russia its wishes will confirm for Moscow that the path of conflict is the right one.
Granting Russia its wishes will confirm for Moscow that the path of conflict is Ukraine must be provided with genuine security guarantees to provide for its future safety. ‘Neutrality’, Ukraine’s status before 2014, provides no such guarantee. This war proves that real safety against Russia lies only within NATO, and with Ukraine’s completed transformation from former Soviet republic to full and free partner within the transatlantic community. Ukrainian membership of NATO and the EU should be a priority.
to provide for its future safety. ‘Neutrality’, Ukraine’s status before 2014, provides no such guarantee. This war proves that real safety against Russia lies only within NATO, and with Ukraine’s completed transformation from former Soviet republic to full and free partner within the transatlantic community. Ukrainian membership of NATO and the EU should Ukraine’s Western backers must overcome their fear of inflicting a clear and decisive defeat on Russia . The dangers of this defeat are far outweighed by those of Russian success or an ambiguous end t o the conflict.
The dangers of this defeat are far outweighed by those of Russian success or an ambiguous end t The potential for political instability within Russia should not be a deterrent to pressing home Ukraine’s advantage . Indeed, the attempted Wagner Group mutiny of 24 June 2023 showed that domestic tumult can offer a tactical edge to Ukraine. The war has shaken the Russian regime, as the rebellion showed, although state fragmentation is unlikely even in the event of Russia’s defeat.
Indeed, the attempted Wagner Group mutiny of 24 June 2023 showed that domestic tumult can offer a tactical edge to Ukraine. The war has shaken the Russian regime, as the rebellion showed, although state fragmentation is unlikely even in the event of Russia’s defeat. The financing of support for Ukraine must be recognized as an investment in Euro-Atlantic security, and one which is yielding enormous returns in neutralizing the most acute threat to that security. Western governments should make it clearer to their electorates what this investment buys , and if necessary adopt public communications strategies challenging narratives around the fiscal costs of supporting Ukraine. For example, governments should make clear that headline figures on the value of weapons and other equipment supplied to Ukraine mostly do not represent new costs, but materiel already purchas ed and on hand.
, and if necessary adopt public communications strategies challenging narratives around the fiscal costs of supporting Ukraine. For example, governments should make clear that headline figures on the value of weapons and other equipment supplied to Ukraine mostly do not represent new costs, but materiel already purchas NATO must urgently increase production of munitions and weapons systems , with the aim of matching rates of consumption in Ukraine. This is not only to sustain the Ukrainian armed forces in the current conflict, but also to replenish and augment stockpiles across NATO in readiness for an extended period of military tension, and the possibility of high-intensity warfare. NATO should facilitate international defence procurement collaboration and – in consultation with the EU – remove systemic obstacles such as protectionism impeding multinational defence orders.
, with the aim of matching rates of consumption in Ukraine. This is not only to sustain the Ukrainian armed forces in the current conflict, but also to replenish and augment stockpiles across NATO in readiness for an extended period of military tension, and the possibility of high-intensity warfare. NATO should facilitate international defence procurement collaboration and – in consultation with the EU – remove systemic obstacles such as protectionism impeding multinational The vital requirement for justice for Russia’s war crimes and atrocities must not be disregarded for the sake of a settlement with Moscow . Only accountability will prompt change in Russia. Most pressingly, Ukraine needs ongoing assistance with its vast caseload of war-related proceedings, as well as with the establishment of a special tribunal for Russia’s crime of aggression. Ultimately, support to win the war is necessary to allow a prospect of justice b eing delivered.
Only accountability will prompt change in Russia. Most pressingly, Ukraine needs ongoing assistance with its vast caseload of war-related proceedings, as well as with the establishment of a special tribunal for Russia’s crime of aggression. Ultimately, support to win the war is necessary to allow a prospect of justice b Economic and financial sanctions must be constantly refined and honed to ensure they remain effective . Policy in this area should be informed by an understanding that Russia is involved in a huge effort to get around sanctions. Sanctions remain important in imposing a cost on Russia. They will have an increasing role in constraining the ability of the Russian military-industrial complex to rebuild offensive military capability ero ded in Ukraine.
Policy in this area should be informed by an understanding that Russia is involved in a huge effort to get around sanctions. Sanctions remain important in imposing a cost on Russia. They will have an increasing role in constraining the ability of the Russian military-industrial complex to rebuild offensive military capability ero The frozen assets of the Russian state and private individuals must be repurposed to finance reconstruction of Ukraine’s society, infrastructure and economy . Western government funding and private sector investment will not be enough on their own to meet Ukraine’s needs. Asset seizures or some variation on them, quite apart from being the moral choice and a source of substantial additional finance, are also necessary to show Russia and the Russians that crime doesn’t pay. In fact, they should be an essential part of the de-Putinization process that Russia must undergo if it is to join the civilized communi ty of nations.
Western government funding and private sector investment will not be enough on their own to meet Ukraine’s needs. Asset seizures or some variation on them, quite apart from being the moral choice and a source of substantial additional finance, are also necessary to show Russia and the Russians that crime doesn’t pay. In fact, they should be an essential part of the de-Putinization process that Russia must undergo if it is to join the civilized communi Finally, it is essential that Western countries – and partners further afield – recognize and accept that the outcome of Russia’s war on Ukraine is a key determinant of their own future safety and security. Any genuine, durable plan for peace can only be implemented after hostilities have ended in Ukraine’s favour. And it must enshrine the principle of respect for the country’s sovereign independence and pre-2014 territorial borders. Any other outcome will set a precedent that encourages aggressors worldwide and degrades the rules-based international order. Ongoing, long-term deterrence of Russia after this war is an essential condition for pr eserving peace. www.chathamhouse.org/...
Key Takeaways The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces seized the “strategic initiative” in the Bakhmut direction and are currently conducting a broad offensive in the area.
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two other sectors of the front and reportedly made gains on June 29.
The Kremlin may intend to assume formal control over the Wagner Group following its armed rebellion and turn it into a state-owned enterprise, although it is not clear if the Kremlin has committed itself to such a course of action.
Recent satellite imagery may have detected active construction of a speculated new Wagner Group base in Asipovichy, Belarus.
Kremlin-affiliated businessmen may be acquiring Prigozhin’s domestic media empire, likely as part of ongoing effort to destroy his reputation in Russia.
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov refused to address Army General Sergei Surovikin’s whereabouts on June 29, prompting more speculations in the Russian information space.
Western observers continue to speculate about the whereabouts of Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov following Wagner’s rebellion, although his lack of public appearance is not necessarily indicative of his current official standing within the Russian military leadership
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks south of Kreminna.
Ukrainian forces intensified counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area and reportedly made advances.
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.
Russian forces in early May constructed a dam on the outskirts of Tokmak in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast ahead of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
A Russian BARS (Russian Combat Reserve) affiliated source claimed that Russian forces are moving military equipment to unspecified areas on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River.
The Crimea-based Atesh partisan group stated that Russian forces are increasing their presence in Armyansk to defend key infrastructure in northern Crimea.
Russian Cossack armed formations are reportedly signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as part of a larger formalization effort to integrate irregular forces into MoD structures. www.understandingwar.org/...
x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - JUN 29
Equipment losses in dollar terms up between days
DEVELOPMENT:
$2.3B in the last 30 days ⬇
$59M reported today ⬆
Artillery & plane make up the bulk of today's reported losses
📈
https://t.co/Xa0fK8yXrR pic.twitter.com/QO8mvbcj2s — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦
[email protected] (@ragnarbjartur) June 29, 2023
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks south of Kreminna on June 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Rozdolivka (32km southwest of Kreminna) and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[31] ...The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that unspecified elements of the Southern Group of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Bilohorivka and that Russian forces stopped a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna).[33] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... x 22/23 23rd Rifle Battalion FPV drone hits Russian tank, which continues east of Torske
Coordinates: 49.040074, 38.009823
Map view:
https://t.co/D3LRULQt96
Source:
https://t.co/rElLKwhEGh — Ukraine Control Map (@UAControlMap) June 29, 2023 Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Ukrainian forces intensified counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area and reportedly made advances on June 29. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Ukrainian forces seized the “strategic initiative” in the Bakhmut direction and are currently conducting a broad offensive in the area.[36] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1,200m in the direction of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and 1,500m in the direction of Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[37] Malyar added that Russian forces in the area are conducting counterattacks but have retreated in some areas after suffering losses.[38] Ukrainian Commander of the 57th Motorized Brigade Denys Yaroslavsky stated that Ukrainian forces are in the process of liberating Klishchiivka and that there is intense fighting in the area.[39] Yaroslavsky also stated that Ukrainian forces pushed Russian forces out of positions on the western outskirts of Bakhmut and that fighting is ongoing near Berkhivka (4km north of Bakhmut).[40] Yaroslavsky added that the liberation of dominant elevated positions in Berkhivka and Klishchiivka will allow Ukrainian forces to operationally encircle Russian forces in Bakhmut.[41]... Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that the Russians transferred an unspecified Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) regiment from the Kreminna area to the Bakhmut direction to reinforce Russian forces in the area.[44] ISW has previously observed elements of the 237th Air Assault Regiment (76th VDV Division) and the 331st Airborne Regiment (98th VDV Division) operating in the Kreminna area, although ISW has not seen any visual confirmation of elements of either formation near Bakhmut recently.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Bakhmut itself and Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), and Bila Hora (15km southwest of Bakhmut).[46] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... x 9/23 SBU drone hits Pole-21 EW system in Olenivka, Donetsk
Coordinates: 47.842857, 37.664117
Map view:
https://t.co/DUndmWrcSe
Source:
https://t.co/DfjtQAGyCy — Ukraine Control Map (@UAControlMap) June 29, 2023 www.understandingwar.org/... x Ukrainian Air Force destroyed the command center of Russa's 288th Separate Rifle Battalion in Novotroitske, occupied Donetsk. Reportedly Ukraine used JDAM-ER guided bombs. pic.twitter.com/pyDhLJLZHB — Igor Sushko (@igorsushko) June 29, 2023 www.understandingwar.org/... x Latest Deep State map update shows Ukraine has liberated about 4 km² of territory north of Robotyne. 👍 pic.twitter.com/TIOyBWPKO7 — Benny 🇺🇸 🇺🇦 (@NafoBenny) June 30, 2023 x ATACMS can help for step 4 of the battle plan. yellow=trench;blue=rail;green=main road; red lines=Russian vehicle tracks in fields. Only one trench on this path, unlike multiple trenches south of Robotyne. pic.twitter.com/sLCqGDFdhQ — DavidRedwineMD (@ByronDa12917801) June 29, 2023 Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblast and made limited gains on June 29. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1,300 meters in the western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia oblast border area and have established new positions in the Rivnopil-Volodyne (10–16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) direction.[49] ... The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Starmaiorske (7km south of Velyka Novosilka), while a milblogger claimed that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked positions from Staromaiorske in the Rivnopil direction.[51] Footage published on June 28 purportedly shows elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) operating near the Vremivka salient.[52] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/...
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[1] Url:
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/6/29/2178411/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-492-will-Wagner-PMC-no-longer-participate-in-hostilities-on-UKR-territory
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