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Ukraine Invasion Day 488: mutiny result remains vague [1]

['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.']

Date: 2023-06-25

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the short-lived revolt against the Kremlin exposed “real cracks” in Putin’s authority.

x Russian state media went from:

-pretending Wagner didn't exist before the war

-praising them and giving them a disproportionate amount of attention for the past 9 months

-accusing them of treason

-a new to be determined phase https://t.co/NtpzYR98Y7 — Rob Lee (@RALee85) June 25, 2023

Russian sources speculated on the specifics of the deal mediated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to end the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 armed rebellion, including the possible involvement of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s chief of staff. Russian opposition outlet Meduza, citing unnamed internal Kremlin sources, reported that Prigozhin initially tried to get in touch with the Russian Presidential Administration midday June 24 as Wagner fighters moved north from Rostov-on-Don towards Moscow, but that Putin refused to speak with Prigozhin. [1] Meduza noted that, once Prigozhin observed the lack of widespread military support for Wagner’s actions and changed his mind on Wagner’s prospects, the Kremlin turned to negotiations involving Lukashenko, Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Office Anton Vaino, and Russian Ambassador to Belarus Boris Gryzlov. Vaino and Gryzlov’s possible involvement was not reported on June 24. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also questioned whether the deal will hold Wagner or Prigozhin accountable in any way for the deaths of at least 13 Russian airman on June 24. [2] Prigozhin’s whereabouts cannot be verified beyond his departure from Rostov-on-Don late on June 24. Russian outlet RTVI claimed that Prigozhin’s press service told RTVI that Prigozhin “sends his regards” and will answer all questions “when he is on normal communication,” and a prominent Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel shared an AI-generated image of Prigozhin holding a finger to his lips and stating “plans love silence,” a copy of the phrase commonly used in Ukraine about operational security. [3] As ISW noted on June 24, the specifics of the deal are still unclear in the open source beyond speculation and rumor. The fallout of Wagner’s armed rebellion has not yet concluded, and it remains to be seen how the deal will be implemented, if all involved parties will comply fully, how the Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) intend to do with Wagner personnel - and if Wagner fighters will cooperate, regardless of Prigozhin’s wishes. www.understandingwar.org/...

x Prigozhin’s press office told @RTVi on Sunday afternoon that the warlord “says hi to everyone and will answer questions when he has good [cell phone] reception”.@NastyaStognei @LaurenFedor and @JudithREvans on the fallout from the failed couphttps://t.co/UEwwzqORKU — max seddon (@maxseddon) June 25, 2023

In the course of a few hours, Prigozhin met with Alekseev and the deputy defense minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov at the Southern Military District’s headquarters in Rostov-on-Don. Prigozhin told them he would head toward Moscow and was going after Chief of the General Staff [Valery Gerasimov] and [Defense Ministry Sergey] Shoigu. Neither Shoigu, nor Gerasimov have commented on Prigozhin’s rebellion. It’s also unclear where exactly they were while the events were unfolding. Another one of Meduza’s source close to the Russian leadership doubts that there would be personnel changes in the defense ministry anytime soon, stating that “Putin almost never bends under pressure.” Meduza’s sources added that the rebellion weakens Putin’s position: “He was unable to get down to Prigozhin’s level, but he was nowhere to be found after yesterday’s national address. He’s the first in command, and takes control when necessary. He shouldn’t make Lukashenko the public face and allow Russia’s security officials [siloviki] to lead negotiations.” While Prigozhin was leading his army toward Moscow, Putin was, according to his spokesman Peskov, dealing with documents in the Kremlin. Putin’s plane, equipped to control the army, also reportedly departed Moscow on the afternoon of June 24, disappearing from radar near the city of Tver, reported iStories, referencing flight data pulled from Flightradar. One of Meduza’s sources believes that Putin will now try to consolidate power, and that the number of attempts by Russia’s elites to “restructure the hierarchy” will only increase. meduza.io/...

x I agree Mike it does not make sense but I put nothing past Putin. Maybe a way to see who sided with coup, put Lukashenko under Wagner control in Belarus? Also how widely were Prigozhin’s comments spread in Russia under media controls? — Jon B. Wolfsthal 🟦🇨🇿 (@JBWolfsthal) June 25, 2023

x "The side effect of apathy was on display yesterday," @anneapplebaum writes. "For if no one cares about anything, that means they don’t care about their supreme leader, his ideology, or his war." https://t.co/OlDn1aYqNY — The Atlantic (@TheAtlantic) June 25, 2023

x This description by @anneapplebaum is of Putin's Russia, but it's happening here as the GOP goes culture war crazy. Flooding the zone with shit. Nonstop attacks on the news media, teachers, experts. Half meant conspiracy theories. The effect is to make paying attention pointless. pic.twitter.com/ulfBtPwkJi — Jay Rosen (@jayrosen_nyu) June 25, 2023

Corruption has been a key enabler of the Putin regime; illicit networks entrench regime interests and prevent individuals outside the regime from gaining influence within the system. To weaken these barriers, Washington must properly enforce sanctions on the Kremlin’s cronies in the business world, combat money laundering, make financial and real estate markets in the United States and Europe more transparent, and support investigative journalists in their bid to uncover such corruption. The United States can also bolster Russian civil society, an important force in forging a more liberal and democratic country, beginning with supporting the work of the many actors in Russian civil society—including journalists and members of the opposition—who have fled the country since the start of the war in February 2022. Backing them now would help lay the groundwork for a better relationship between the United States and a post-Putin Russia. Ultimately, however, Washington and its allies can do little to directly shape Russia’s political trajectory. A better Russia can be produced only by a clear and stark Ukrainian victory, which is the most viable catalyst for a popular challenge to Putin. Such a resounding defeat is also required to enable Russians to shed their imperialist ambitions and to teach the country’s future elites a valuable lesson about the limits of military power. Support for Ukraine—in the form of sustained military assistance and efforts to anchor the country in the West through membership in the European Union and NATO—will pave the way for improved relations with a new Russia. Getting there will be hard. But the more decisive Russia’s defeat in Ukraine, the more likely it is that Russia will experience profound political change, one hopes for the better. www.foreignaffairs.com/… (2021) Russia after Putin: How to rebuild the state The new government’s first action should be to release all political prisoners and to establish all elementary freedoms of speech, media, assembly, organization, and religion.

It should dissolve the Federal Security Service (FSB), the principal security agency of Russia, and dismiss all its employees and form a new judicial system, courts, as well as the general prosecutor’s office.

Russia should abandon its presidential system and hold early founding elections at all levels soon after a democratic breakthrough. www.atlanticcouncil.org/...

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, which Kyrylo Bunanov, head of Ukraine's Military Intelligence, says Russia has mined 4 of 6 of its power units. x Prigozhin capturing Voronezh-45 nuclear storage facility in Russia may be part of the key to the lock that can help explain his decision to suddenly and bizarrely 'end' the coup which was succeeding spectacularly. I've been trying to figure how Prigozhin can guarantee his own… https://t.co/0n34YAu5Mn pic.twitter.com/H6APVMhfkI — Igor Sushko (@igorsushko) June 25, 2023 Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov warned on June 23 that Russia has finished preparations for an attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). [36] Budanov stated that Russian forces have mined the ZNPP’s cooling pond and have moved vehicles loaded with explosives to four of the six ZNPP power units. [37] As ISW previously assessed, intentional Russian sabotage of the ZNPP resulting in a radiological catastrophe would potentially be more detrimental to Russian forces on the southern bank of the Kakhovka Reservoir than to Ukrainian forces on the opposite bank. [38] Russia has frequently invoked threatening rhetoric surrounding the ZNPP in order to dissuade potential Ukrainian counterattacks into occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and Russian forces may be disseminating information about mining of the cooling pond and power units to discourage Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. However, Russia demonstrated a willingness to put its own troops in harm's way after the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP), so ISW cannot rule out the potential that Russian forces may be setting conditions to sabotage the ZNPP. www.understandingwar.org/...

Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations in Ukraine does not appear to have been substantially impacted by Wagner’s June 23-24 armed rebellion. Russian and Ukrainian sources both reported that fighting continued as usual along the entire frontline, with Russian forces conducting a relatively higher number of ground attacks near Bakhmut than over the past few days. [34] Some Russian sources used the armed rebellion as a rhetorical device to preemptively exculpate Russian forces from any Ukrainian gains made on June 24 and 25. [35] Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and his mercenaries pulled out of the Russian city of Rostov-on-Don and the region of Voronezh after a deal was mediated by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko to end their short-lived armed mutiny.

armed mutiny. Under the agreement, the Wagner soldiers who took part in the rebellion will not be prosecuted and Prigozhin will go into exile in Belarus.

Wagner soldiers who took part in the rebellion will not be prosecuted and Prigozhin will go into exile in Belarus. Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke by phone on Sunday morning, according to Belarus’s Belta news agency. The two men spoke at least twice on Saturday.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his defence minister said they held a series of calls with key allies including the United States to discuss Putin’s “weakness” and Ukraine’s next counteroffensive steps.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the short-lived revolt against the Kremlin exposed “real cracks” in Putin’s authority.

French President Emmanuel Macron said the revolt revealed “divisions” within the Russian leadership and exposed the “fragility of its military and auxiliary forces”.

In China’s first official remarks on the rebellion, the foreign ministry said Beijing supported Russia in “protecting national stability”, adding that the issue was Russia’s “internal affair”. www.aljazeera.com/... Key Takeaways Russian sources speculated on the specifics of the deal mediated by Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to end the Wagner Group’s June 23-24 armed rebellion, including the possible involvement of Putin’s chief of staff.

The implications of the Lukashenko-Prigozhin deal for the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also remain ambiguous.

Wagner forces continued to withdraw from positions in Rostov and on the road to Moscow to their bases on June 25, and the Kremlin’s intended structure for leveraging Wagner fighters remains unclear.

Further details emerged on the composition of the Wagner units approaching Moscow on June 24, indicating Prigozhin would likely have struggled in an active conflict in Moscow without additional support.

The Russian ultranationalist information space fractured on June 25 between those who want to move past the rebellion and those demanding solutions to the internal security flaws that the rebellion exposed.

The ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club held a pre-scheduled event in Moscow on June 25 and espoused longstanding criticisms against Putin and the Russian military leadership, suggesting that the Kremlin will not immediately begin cracking down on antagonistic ultranationalist groups in the aftermath of Prigozhin’s rebellion.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front.

Russian forces’ ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations in Ukraine does not appear to have been substantially impacted by Wagner’s June 23-24 armed rebellion.

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov warned on June 23 that Russia has finished preparations for an attack on the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

A Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group attempted to cross the international border into Sumy Oblast.

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks near Svatove, Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.

Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk and western Zaporizhia oblasts.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivskyi Bridge in Kherson Oblast.

Ukrainian officials continue to report that Russia relies on sanctions evasion schemes to acquire foreign components for weapons production.

Russian occupation authorities continue to weaponize policy regarding children to consolidate social and administrative control of occupied areas. www.understandingwar.org/...

x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - JUN 25

59:16 🇷🇺/🇺🇦 added by @Rebel44CZ 🇨🇿 (59:14 after removal of duplicates and/or corrections)

VISUALLY CONFIRMED:

2.9x losses to date ➡

2.4x since 🇺🇦 2022 counteroffensive (Aug 29) ➡

1.0x 30-day average ⬇

📈 https://t.co/3xiYiYDbdG pic.twitter.com/8TAGIAstOl — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦 [email protected] (@ragnarbjartur) June 25, 2023

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) The Ukrainian General Staff reported that a Russian sabotage and reconnaissance group unsuccessfully tried to cross the international border into Sumy Oblast near Rodionivka on June 25. [39] Russian forces continued limited ground attacks northwest of Svatove amid claims of continued Ukrainian offensives along the Kreminna-Svatove line on June 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Berestove, Kharkiv Oblast (20km northwest of Svatove). [40] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled four Ukrainian attacks near Karmazynivka (12km southwest of Svatove), Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna), and Dibrova (6km southwest of Kreminna). [41] Russian sources speculated that Ukrainian forces struck Luhansk City with Storm Shadow cruise missiles on June 25. [42] Geolocated footage published on June 25 shows a column of smoke in the vicinity of Luhansk City. [43] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) official Rodion Miroshnik claimed that Russian air defenses operated in the area. [44] ISW has not observed visual confirmation that Ukrainian forces struck Luhansk City on June 25. www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on June 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported a relatively higher number of Russian offensive operations near Bakhmut than over the past few days and stated that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked northeast of Bakhmut near Rozdolikvka (14km northeast) and Vesele (16km northeast); northwest of Bakhmut near Hryhorivka (10km northwest) and Minkivka (12km northwest); and southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivkske (3km southwest). [45] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces took advantage of distraction caused by Wagner Group’s armed June 23-24 rebellion and launched several counterattacks in the Bakhmut area, including southwest of Bakhmut near Kurdiumivka (12km southwest) and Klishchiivka (6km southwest); northwest of Bakhmut near Yahidne (3km northwest); and northeast of Bakhmut on the Vasyukivka-Rozdolivka line. [46] The Russian MoD claimed that units of the Southern Group of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks northwest and southwest of Bakhmut. [47] Ukraine’s 3rd Separate Assault Brigade reported that it defeated elements of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) in the Bakhmut area and destroyed a Russian bridgehead in an unspecified area on the western bank of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal, which runs southwest of Bakhmut between Mayorsk and Kurdiumivka. [48] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) A Russian source claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Vuhledar area on June 25. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks near the outskirts of Vuhledar (30km due east of Velyka Novosilka). [51] Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on June 25. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to seize lost positions near Novodarivka (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka). [52] Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 25. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack near Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv) and Novopokrovka (15km southeast of Orikhiv). [54] Russian sources claimed that neither side controls Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv), although ISW has not observed footage suggesting that Ukrainian forces have lost control of the settlement since they captured it on June 19. [55] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions near the Antonivskyi Bridge in Kherson Oblast. ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims, and it is unclear if floodwaters have receded enough for Ukrainian or Russian forces to establish positions near this area. www.understandingwar.org/... x On June 25th, Russian terrorists attacked Ukraine with six S-300 missiles against Zaporizhzhya region, 33 airstrikes, and more than 45 rockets from rocket salvo systems.

Civilians were injured and buildings were damaged.

–Armed Forces of Ukraine report, 06:00, 26 June 2023 — Michael MacKay (@mhmck) June 26, 2023

x Footage of yesterday's battalion vs battalion combat of the 🇺🇦1st Mech Battalion (3 Assault Br) vs 🇷🇺3rd Battalion (57th Guards).

As a result of the assault, the bridgehead on the western bank of the Siversky Donets - Donbas canal was completely cleared.

During the operation,… pic.twitter.com/reUuGTZj58 — Dmitri (@wartranslated) June 25, 2023

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[1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/6/25/2177498/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-488-mutiny-result-remains-vague

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