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Ukraine’s endgame [1]
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Date: 2023-05-06
What will it take for Ukraine to end this war?
Better yet, what will it take to make Russia believe that it has lost? Rather than listen to the echoes in my head, I thought it might be more productive to listen to Dr. J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., Professor of Military History at the US Army War College.
Bartholomees has a simple formula: R = M x W
R represents the power of resistance, M is the total means available, and W is the strength of Will. Victory is achieved as R approaches zero; that is, as the power of resistance drops to an ineffective level. An opponent can push R toward zero by reducing either M or W (or both).
In other words, Ukraine can end the war either by grinding the Russian military – equipment and personnel – to nothing, or it can terminate their Will to resist. Option 1 is not possible, so we won’t spend more time on it. Let’s instead explore what Option 2, drive W toward zero, might look like. Of course, it’s clear that in the real world there will be some kind of a blend. The question is how could Ukraine minimize Russia’s W?
Driving Russia’s W => 0
People keep pointing to WW II as representative of how many losses Russia can sustain and still maintain their W. An alternative model could be WW I, where the Russian army collapsed and just dissolved backwards, even as the government fell into chaos.
Why WWI? It has similarities to today:
The Allies shipped massive supplies to the Soviets during WWII; not much during WWI. In this war we are choking off supplies to Putin.
The corruption in the Putin regime is much greater than during communist times. You didn’t want to get caught stealin’ from Stalin. Today, the kleptocracy has stolen much of the support that was supposed to modernize the Russian military.
Sergei Khrushchev [Nikita’s son] suggested it is impossible to get any justice in a polluted system, where bribes cost Russia an estimated 3 percent of the country’s GDP each year. In a Helsinki Commission Report, economist Clifford Gaddy, an expert on Russia, claims, “[Putin’s] vision of the country’s entire economy is ‘Russia, Inc.,’ where he personally works as the executive director” and the owners of nominally private firms are “mere divisional managers, operational managers of the big, real corporation.” The Russian military is an extension of the kleptocracy.
The bottom line is that the Russia of today is a lot like the Russia of the early 20th century, backward, centralized, and falling further behind. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to hope that the Russian resistance could be driven to collapse emotionally before it is physically destroyed.
Comparison of Ukrainian W vs. Russian W
Ukrainian Will to resist is high. Steven Pifer, a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine and an affiliate at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, said, “Ukrainians see this war as existential.”
What about Russian W? Marlene Laruelle and Ivan Grek write in the New York Times: Morale is reportedly low and complaints common. And yet a significant number of Russian men are still keen to fight — more, in fact, than at the war’s outset. Russian soldiers are fighting. So, at this point Russian W is adequate. What could Ukraine do to degrade Russia’s W? We’ll look at two ideas:
Russian soldiers wait for orders.
There is no room for initiative. Russia doesn’t have functioning non-commissioned officers. If they receive no orders, they do nothing.
“Russian military is a quintessential reflection of the state that created it: Autocratic, security-obsessed, and teeming with hypercentralized decision-making, dysfunctional relations between civilian and military authorities, inefficiency, corruption, and brutality.”
Russia will not learn to become an adaptive, quick reacting force. The Putin regime is not structured that way. In fact, it is structured NOT to be that way. Delegating power and initiative to all levels is contrary to an authoritarian regime because one of the ways the regime stays in power is by controlling communication from the center. Allowing cross-talk and decisions between lower levels is dangerous to the regime. In other words, if the Putin regime becomes a quick-reacting force, it won’t be the Putin regime any more.
The main weapon that Ukraine has acquired from NATO is not tanks, not artillery, not anti-aircraft missiles, not Infantry Fighting Vehicles. It is, rather, the ability to learn and take initiative. While Russian officers are lying to their superiors and telling them what they want to hear, Ukrainian soldiers are learning and adapting instantaneously to changes on the battlefield.
This difference between the Ukrainian and Russian organizational structure illustrates how Ukraine can destroy Russia’s Will to resist: Simply cut off Russian units from their commanders. It will be like pulling the plug on a vacuum cleaner. They will stop and wait for orders.
The God of war.
Former Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin is reputed to have called artillery the “god of war.”
“Russians use artillery (howitzer, tube rockets, tactical battlefield, and cruise missile) as a combat and not a combat support arm, with other arms working to support its artillery and not the other way around.”
“There is an intangible dimension to the Russian feeling for their guns. According to legend, following the catastrophic loss at Narva in 1700 to the Swedish Empire, Peter the Great ordered every church in the country to give some of its bells to make new cannons to replace the artillery, which had all been lost to the Swedes. Ever since, Russian cannons have been considered holy…”
This exaggerated faith in artillery provides another vector for Ukraine to destroy Russia’s W with little risk to itself. Russia knows that “Given the probable weakness in Russian manufacturing, every artillery piece or big gun that wears out or is destroyed is one the Russians cannot replace.” But how could Ukraine remove Russia’s artillery as an effective force? It will not happen with artillery counter-fire. Russia has too many cannons and rockets.
Ukraine’s plan
Here’s my fearless prediction of Ukraine’s plan to destroy Russia’s W: Ukraine will take advantage of its strengths and Russia’s weaknesses, its flexible, initiative-driven, quick-reacting force and superior logistics vs. Russia’s ossified command & control structure and incoherent logistics.
Russia has invested in a massive “defense in depth” system of trenches and so-called quick-reacting rear echelons. It has concocted complex plans and done some training of their soldiers who will face the Ukrainians. The Russian cannon fodder will soon learn from that great philosopher “Iron” Mike Tyson, “Everybody’s got a plan until they get punched in the mouth.”
Ukraine will concentrate massive force along a limited front and punch a hole through Russian lines. No matter how over-matched the Ukrainians are in personnel and artillery, they will overpower Russia at the point of attack, simply because Ukraine knows where it will attack. Ukraine will arc behind Russian lines and cut off logistics and communications. Russian logistics will be cut by physical interdiction. Communications will be cut by physical interruptions to land-lines, radio jamming, and attacks on regional HQs.
Of course, a Ukrainian force arcing behind enemy lines will also be vulnerable to logistical and communications problems. However, the communications problems for the Ukrainians will be mitigated by the initiative-driven command and control structure of the Ukrainian military. Local commanders will react to changes in the plan based on their own initiative and training. Russian commanders will wait for orders…
Ukraine will be challenged by the need to funnel massive supplies of food, fuel, and ammo across long distances. But they did it in Luhansk and Kherson in 2022. Russian troops will die on the vine.
Ukraine will sic mobile firepower, such as IFVs, on Russia’s massed artillery. It will be devastating to the artillery physically and to Russia’s W emotionally.
You heard it here first. The Russians have brought a knife to a gunfight. Ukraine’s biggest problem during the counter-offensive will be dealing with all the Russian POWs.
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