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Ukraine Invasion Day 410: rather than 'Democratic Peace', "War is persistent, but not prevalent." [1]
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Date: 2023-04-08
Several Russian commentators are emphasizing Russian preparations for an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive, suggesting that the overall focus of the Russian information space is shifting away from discussing Russian offensive capabilities and towards assessing Ukraine’s potential to regain significant ground.
A breakthrough for Russia appears increasingly unlikely. Regardless of the outcome in the fierce battle of Bakhmut , Moscow’s inability to gain substantial ground in the Donbas shows how little its offensive has achieved and how much its military has struggled to efficiently capture urban areas throughout the war.
Compare that with what Moscow had hoped to achieve from its winter offensive by now: to seize the entire Donbas region — which contains dozens more settlements, some of them much larger than Bakhmut. To do that, Russia would have to recreate and win battles at the scale of Bakhmut again and again.
Ukrainians have been marking the first anniversary of a missile strike on Kramatorsk railway station in eastern Ukraine, which killed at least 58 people , including several children. The attack took place on 8 April 2022, when the station was packed with women, children and elderly people waiting to be evacuated.
Russia’s campaign to break down Ukraine’s unified energy system within the past winter period has “highly likely failed”, the UK’s Ministry of Defence said in its latest intelligence update . Large-scale long-range attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure have become rare since early March, it said.
More than 30 children have returned to Ukraine and reunited with their families after they were taken illegally to Russia, according to the Ukrainian organisation Save Ukraine. “Сhildren abducted by Russians from the Kherson and Kharkiv regions have been reunited with their families after several months of separation,” it said.
Ukrainian and Russian sources discussed the decreased rate of Russian offensive operations along the entire frontline on April 8, supporting ISW’s assessment that the overall Russian offensive is approaching culmination. [1] Council of Reservists of the Ukrainian Ground Forces Head Ivan Tymochko reported on April 8 that Russian forces are fighting along the entire frontline, but that Russian offensive potential continues to decline and that current Russian attacks are focused on distracting and dispersing Ukrainian troops in anticipation of counteroffensive operations. [2] Tymochko stated that Russian forces are not making serious advances anywhere on the frontline, noting that the pace of attacks in and around Bakhmut has slightly decreased in some areas and stagnated entirely in others. [3] Tymochko also assessed that the Russian offensive on Avdiivka has “choked” and reported that Russian forces still do not control Marinka despite having reduced the city to rubble. [4] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the pace of Russian offensive operations along the entire Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline has decreased over the past day and emphasized that Russian forces are struggling to advance anywhere in Ukraine. [5] Several Russian commentators are emphasizing Russian preparations for an anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive, suggesting that the overall focus of the Russian information space is shifting away from discussing Russian offensive capabilities and towards assessing Ukraine’s potential to regain significant ground. [6]
The dynamics of battlefield artillery usage in Ukraine reflect the fact that Russian forces are using artillery to offset their degraded offensive capabilities. Former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Security Minister and current Vostok Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky reported that the Russian command has decided to stop the daily issue of ammunition to areas of the front where there are no active offensive operations almost entirely. [7] Khodakovsky noted that the artillery shortage on the frontline results in part from preparations for a Ukrainian counteroffensive. [8] Khodakovsky’s statement indicates that the Russian command must prioritize artillery ammunition supplies rigorously due to shortages. High demand for shells indicates that Russian forces are still heavily relying on artillery to offset key shortcomings in combat capability, including poor Russian targeting skills, insufficient ground assault capabilities, and inadequate availability of airpower in Ukraine. Russian forces use heavy artillery barrages to flatten settlements before seizing them with ground attacks, offsetting the need to conduct effective infantry attacks or to conduct an airstrike using scarce precision munitions and putting airframes and pilots at risk of Ukrainian air defenses. Continuing Russian shortages in artillery ammunition will undermine the Russian military’s ability to continue offsetting its other weaknesses and limitations. The Washington Post reported on April 8 that by contrast, Ukrainian forces are using one-third as many shells as Russian forces and that Ukrainian forces are conserving shells by carefully prioritizing targets. [9] Ukrainian forces are more accurate in their targeting, but also likely benefit from being on the defensive in most areas--offensive operations normally generate increased artillery requirements.
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces have continued to make gains in Bakhmut as of April 8. Geolocated footage published on April 7 indicates that Russian forces likely advanced close to the T0504 highway in southwestern Bakhmut. [41] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern and central Bakhmut. [42] A Russian source claimed on the night of April 7 that Wagner forces had entirely captured Bakhmut and that Ukrainian forces were retreating to Chasiv Yar, but later retracted the claim on April 8 and stated that Ukrainian forces only retreated from the central part of Bakhmut to the western parts of the city. [43] ISW has not seen visual confirmation of Russian claims that Wagner forces control all of central Bakhmut, and the relatively decreased rate of Wagner’s advance in the center of the city indicates that Ukrainian forces are still actively defending their positions in that part of the city. Other Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner fighters are attempting to advance from the south and east towards Bakhmut city center to pressure Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the area. [44]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continue to fortify Russian border regions. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continue to construct fortifications in areas of Kursk Oblast that border Ukraine and maintain a presence in border areas of Kursk and Belgorod oblasts. [36] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces may be constructing fortifications in Russian oblasts bordering Ukraine to support the information operation to frame the war as an existential threat to Russia, as well to disperse Ukrainian forces by pinning them to border areas away from the frontline. [37]
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on April 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Kreminna itself, Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna), the Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna), and Verkhnokamianske (18km south of Kreminna). [38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Terny (17km northwest of Kreminna) and Nevske (20km northwest of Kreminna). [39] Another Russian milblogger claimed that a newly-formed artillery battalion of the 2nd Luhansk People‘s Republic (LNR) Army Corps comprised of volunteers operate on the Kreminna-Bilohorivka line. [40]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian special forces, intelligence, and naval sources revealed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to stage an amphibious landing on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River on October 19, 2022, to liberate the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). [58] Ukrainian officials told The Times that about 600 Ukrainian servicemen on 30 armored boats attempted to land near the ZNPP, but that only one Ukrainian group was able to reach occupied territory due to the Russian artillery fire and Russian use of tanks to repel Ukrainian advances. The group retreated back to the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River after three hours of close combat on the outskirts of Enerhodar. Ukrainian sources stated that Ukrainian special forces anticipated that Russians would engage in infantry combat out of concern for the safety of the ZNPP and revealed that Russian forces set up dense defensive lines and mined the territory nearby. ISW reported on October 19 that Russian sources accused Ukrainians of attempting land near the ZNPP but failed to assess that a landing had taken place at that time. [59] Ukrainian state nuclear energy company Energoatom reported on April 8 that Russian forces are installing additional fences around the ZNPP and are restricting the movement of vehicles on the territory of the plant.
www.understandingwar.org/...
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