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Ukraine Invasion Day 384: are Wagner forces expended to derail Prigozhin’s political aspirations [1]
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Date: 2023-03-13
Disinformation continues and the battle for Bakhmut seems no closer to conclusion, which serves Ukraine’s purpose in draining Russian combat power. Like some US capitalists disinforming blame on “woke” banks and directing attention to diversity as a cause while fomenting an intentional asset fire sale by right-wing libertarians, Wagner will immolate itself with brutal warfighting to advance its political goals in the Kremlin. Wagner forces are the very example of chaotic security risks with poorly trained former prisoners among their forward ranks. You can have a human ‘capital call’ where liquidity resembles adaptability.
Russian milbloggers continue to speculate about a prospective Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine, suggesting increasing concern in the Russian information space about Ukrainian combat capabilities as Russian forces pin themselves on offensive operations in Bakhmut. The milbloggers largely agreed that Ukrainian forces would prioritize an offensive in the south against Berdyansk-Melitopol in Zaporizhia Oblast or Mariupol-Volnovakha in Donetsk Oblast, but some claimed that Ukrainian forces have enough combat power to conduct a second counteroffensive either in another area of southern Ukraine or along the Kupyansk-Svatove line in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast.[16] A Wagner-affiliated milblogger agreed with ISW’s prior assessments on the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut, claiming that Ukrainian forces are grinding Russian forces’ best available infantry around Bakhmut to reduce Russian forces’ capability to stop any Ukrainian advances .[17] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces would be able to drive south and face minimal Russian resistance in southern Ukraine, unlike other areas of the front line. Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces would target southern Ukraine because a “destroyed Crimea” holds strategic importance while a “destroyed Donbas” does not.[18] Russian State Duma Deputy Dmitry Kuznetsov claimed that Ukrainian forces would target the Kerch Strait Bridge in Crimea in a months-long interdiction campaign like the Antonivskyi Bridge in Kherson Oblast and called on Russian forces to quickly develop anti-drone warfare to defend the critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Crimea to mainland Russia.[19]
The city of Bakhmut has been the main focus of Russia’s assault, but Moscow is also targeting other areas of eastern Ukraine.
After several weeks, the training of Ukrainian soldiers in the use of Leopard 2 battle tanks in Munster in Germany is nearing completion. The soldiers are now able to use the modern main battle tanks, 18 of which Germany is sending to Ukraine in the coming days. pic.twitter.com/qymXHzNbuk
The first anniversary of the Russia-Ukraine conflict is an apt occasion to reflect on the changing nature of 21st-century warfare. The war in Europe demonstrates that while the fundamental nature of war does not change, warfare as a dynamic interaction between opponents is always evolving. That is so because “war” in its essential state remains irrational and unrestrained, and although the laws of combat are immutable, belligerents locked in conflict are continually seeking new ways to defeat and destroy the adversary. Even if one side does not succeed in overwhelming the other, it must, for the sake of its own survival, think of ways to bog the opponent down in a war of attrition.
[...]
There are also strategic lessons to learn from the conflict. The first is that regardless of the geopolitical and operational imperatives, war should never be started in haste. President Putin’s assumptions about Russian power and anti-Western zeal drove him to launch a seemingly impulsive invasion of Ukraine. The Russian President’s fears were undoubtedly fueled by NATO’s expansionist policies, but there was never a sense that the war effort had been thoroughly deliberated.
[...]
The importance of adaptability in modern warfare is another vital lesson. While belligerents strive to act quickly and decisively, uncertainty is a constant feature of military operations. A belligerent must adapt to changing conditions such as new technologies, novel tactics, and new ways of using older war assets to outthink and outflank the enemy.
[...]
The third strategic lesson is that in today’s world, a “short war” is a comforting myth. The Ukraine war is an instructive example of how any war effort that begins with one side assuming the other’s impending collapse is doomed to falter. Russian overconfidence was a major contributor to the Russian military’s failure to meet its war objectives.
www.orfonline.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast ( Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces have made marginal territorial gains northeast of Kupyansk as of March 13. Geolocated footage posted on March 13 shows that Russian forces advanced south of Hryanykivka (17km northeast of Kupyansk).[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions northeast of Kupyansk near Masyutivka (13km northeast of Kupyansk), Dvorichna (17km northeast of Kupyansk), and Hryanykivka on March 12 and 13.[36]
Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line on March 12 and 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Kreminna, Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), Chervonopopivka (6km northwest of Kreminna), Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna), and the Serebrianska forest area (10km south of Kreminna) on March 12 and 13.[37] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are focusing on operations near Kreminna and Bilohorivka and constantly attack near the Kreminna area.[38] Haidai also stated that Russian forces dedicated new T-90 tanks to offensive operations near Kreminna but ran out after two weeks and are now using T-72s.[39] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces achieved localized successes along the Svatove-Kreminna line on March 12 and 13, including in the Serebrianska forest area.[40] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Terny, (17km west of Kreminna), Nevske, and Makiivka (23km northwest of Kreminna), but made marginal gains near Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna) and the Zhuravka gully (18km west of Kreminna) after repelling a Ukrainian counterattack on March 12.[41] The milblogger claimed on March 13 that Ukrainian forces conducted a counterattack near Karmazynivka (13km southwest of Svatove).[42]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued making advances in and around Bakhmut on March 12 and 13 but have not succeeded in completing a turning movement, envelopment, or encirclement of the city as of March 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops attacked towards Minkivka (15km northwest of Bakhmut) on March 12 and 13, indicating that Russian forces have likely advanced along the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway in order to launch assaults further northwest of Bakhmut.[45] Geolocated footage posted on March 12 indicates that Russian forces have also made advances about 8km northwest of Bakhmut in the area between Dubovo-Vasylivka and Bohdanivka.[46] Geolocated footage posted on March 13 shows that Russian forces have advanced to new positions in southwestern Bakhmut along the T0504 Kostiantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway.[47] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces spokesperson Colonel Cherevaty reported on March 12 that over 39 combat clashes took place within Bakhmut over the past day, and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; north of Bakhmut near Vasyukivka (15km north); northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka (12km northwest) and Hryhorivka (10km northwest); and west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west) and Chasiv Yar (10km west) between March 12 and 13.[48]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian forces continue to conduct raids against areas in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Ukrainian officials posted footage on March 10 showing Ukrainian forces conducting a limited raid in an unspecified area in east bank Kherson Oblast.[61]
Russian forces continued routine fire against areas west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on March 12 and 13.[62] Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated on March 12 that Russian forces have the capacity to replace damaged military equipment positioned on the Kinburn Spit, but noted on March 13 that Ukrainian fire against Russian positions on the spit has reduced the pace of Russian artillery fire.[63] Humenyuk also stated on March 13 that Ukrainian forces are working to push Russian forces 20km away from the Dnipro River bank.[64]
www.understandingwar.org/...
The existence of a 25000 Russian reserve army core at Melitipol was confirmed by the Ukrainian intelligence agencies themselves
From 2014 to 2022, the Azov Regiment was based in the city of Mariupol in southeast Ukraine, and this year the Azov fighters gained global visibility as defenders of the city, which Russia conquered in May after a bloody two-month siege, destroying most of the city in the process.
The Azov Regiment is frequently invoked to conjure what Russian-Israeli historian Vyacheslav Likhachev calls the “myth [of] Ukrainian fascism”, and many Western press sources in 2022 continue to treat the association between “Azov Regiment/Battalion” and “Neo-Nazi” as axiomatic, with some even attempting to draw unsubstantiated links between Azov and white supremacist terrorists in the West.
The “What about Azov Nazis?” canard has become a ubiquitous tu quoque that Russia deploys to problematise Western support for Ukraine, and distract from its own record of atrocities. Literally meaning “you also” in Latin, this logical fallacy is more informally known as “whataboutism”, and has been deployed in Russian propaganda for decades. In cruder terms, one might recall the playground retort, “I know you are, but what am I?”
[...]
There isn’t space to canvas all these in a short piece, but this is the conclusion of Anton Shekhovtsov, Ivan Gomza, Anders Umland, and Vyacheslav Likhachev. For a concise summary, Likhachev’s point-by-point rebuttal of the Azov-Nazi narrative comes highly recommended.
lens.monash.edu/…
New buildings have appeared and many buildings damaged during the bombardment have gone. For example, the Russian military has built a whole new district comprised of a dozen apartment blocks in the western part of Mariupol. It is called Nevsky, after the River Neva, on which President Vladimir Putin's home city of St Petersburg stands. According to Russian state media, St Petersburg is the main sponsor of the reconstruction of Mariupol. "It says on the bus: St Petersburg and Mariupol are twinned cities. There are slogans everywhere telling us that we're part of Russia now," pensioner Maria (not her real name) told me.
"I liked things the way they used to be. Now we live in fear. We have no idea what to expect."
[...]
Russia has imposed its own Russian-language curriculum in occupied areas - complicating efforts to get children back to school.
The fast-paced rebuilding of Mariupol has provoked envy in Donetsk, the regional capital occupied by pro-Russian forces since 2014, which has been neglected by comparison.
The Russia-installed head of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic, Denis Pushilin, has even had to deny rumours that the capital will be moved to Mariupol.
Assimilation
There are other important ways in which Russia is putting its stamp on Mariupol.
For example, local residents are under pressure to obtain Russian passports.
Ivan, the Mariupol city councillor I spoke to (not his real name), said locals often formed "huge queues" trying to get Russian passports.
They were required if you want to find formal employment, especially with government agencies or in the public sector, he explained.
[END]
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