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Ukraine Invasion Day 382: expansionist militarism & necessary containment [1]
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Date: 2023-03-11
As the social and economic repercussions mount – in the form of higher energy and food prices – so too do the voices calling for an increased focus on stopping the war. 47% of Germans feel comfortable about supplying weapons to Ukraine, but 53% believe that not enough effort has been made to bring an end to the fighting. But the risks of the strategic vision that prioritises European stability via dialogue with Russia are also considerable. Breaking the unity with Washington would mean Europe distancing itself from the country that remains the main guarantor of its security, while buttressing Russia and China’s revisionist discourse at a time when the gap is widening between the West and the rest of the world. According to a survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations, while 71% of Americans and 66% of Europeans see Russia as an adversary or rival, 80% of Indians, 79% of Chinese and 69% of Turks consider Russia a necessary partner or ally. The gap between those in Europe who prioritise Russia’s total defeat and those who insist on stopping the war in Ukraine is already evident in public opinion. While total defeat for Russia is the most popular option in Poland (41%), stopping the war leads in Italy (52%) and Germany (49%). Notwithstanding these divisions, the shock of war has meant that Europe’s political discourse has tended towards the necessary containment of Russia and stances like Poland’s dominate. The situation on the ground in Ukraine and the growing strategic divergence in Europe has led anti-militarist voices to argue that weapons deliveries to Ukraine should be stopped, ignoring the fact that this would mean victory for Putin. In a war of aggression it is impossible for the attacked to give up their rights to self-defence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The re-emerged “stop the war” movement fails to recognise that the Kremlin’s expansionist militarism is the main threat to the security of many Europeans today. www.cidob.org/… At this remote tank range, it is possible to believe history is in the making. NATO is delivering on its promise, laying the foundations of a fully modernized NATO-compatible Ukrainian army. edition.cnn.com/... In short, the conditions are far from ripe for diplomacy. One day this will change, but that day appears to be far off. The good news (if there is any) is that the war may well become less intense as both sides face the difficulty of sustaining the magnitude of losses they have suffered this past year. They simply lack the manpower, equipment, and economic resources to do so. It also seems unlikely that Russia will opt to escalate. Attacking NATO makes no sense when it is patently clear Russia cannot even defeat Ukraine. Nuclear weapons seem to have little or no military value, and both China and India have made clear their opposition to their use. More important, Russia’s use of nuclear weapons of any type would almost certainly bring US and NATO troops directly into the war. The bad news, though, is that the war will not end anytime soon. The map of Ukraine a year from now will most likely resemble nothing so much as the map as it appears today. The year ahead promises to be dismal, not decisive – more reminiscent of World War I than of World War II. jheconomics.com/...
Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances within Bakhmut on March 11. Ukrainian and Russian sources continue to report heavy fighting in the city, but Wagner Group fighters are likely becoming increasingly pinned in urban areas, such as the AZOM industrial complex, and are therefore finding it difficult to make significant advances.[1] ISW will continue to monitor and report on the situation in Bakhmut as it unfolds. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova confirmed that there is infighting in the Kremlin inner circle, that the Kremlin has ceded centralized control over the Russian information space, and that Russian President Vladimir Putin apparently cannot readily fix it. Kremlin journalists, academics, and Novorossiya supporters held a forum on the “practical and technological aspects of information and cognitive warfare in modern realities” in Moscow on March 11.[2] During a panel discussion Zakharova stated that the Kremlin cannot replicate the Stalinist approach of establishing a modern equivalent to the Soviet Information Bureau to centrally control Russia’s internal information space due to fighting among unspecified Kremlin “elites.”[3] Key Takeaways Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances within Bakhmut on March 11.
Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova confirmed that there is infighting in the Kremlin inner circle, that the Kremlin has ceded centralized control over the Russian information space, and implicitly that Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot fix it.
Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin said that he would transform the Wagner Group into a hardline ideological elite parallel military organization after the Battle of Bakhmut.
Ukrainian sources report that Ukrainian forces advanced toward Svatove.
Russian forces continue to establish fortifications in Zaporizhia Oblast.
Russian mobilized soldiers continue to publicize complaints that commanders treat them poorly and used them as expendable manpower to patch holes in existent formations.
Russian occupation officials use children’s healthcare to generate dependency on the Russian healthcare system. www.understandingwar.org/...
x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - MAR 11
7-day average of Troops, Tanks & APVs increases between days
TODAY'S REPORTED LOSSES:
x4 daily changes over 7-day average
x3 7-day average increases
+ 7-day average of land-based equipment up as well
📈
https://t.co/XxGPBaf2yP pic.twitter.com/anGSeAFAmb — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦
[email protected] (@ragnarbjartur) March 11, 2023
x I wrote a lot about Russia's invasion of Ukraine in the run-up to the tragic anniversary of the beginning of that war. You can find most of those pieces here:
https://t.co/0hMa4b0qC0 — Michael McFaul (@McFaul) March 11, 2023
www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut but did not make any confirmed advances within the city on March 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Paraskoviivka (3km northeast); northwest of Bakhmut near Zalizianske (10km northwest), Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest), and Bohdanivka (6km northwest); and west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west).[16] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty noted on March 11 that fighting in Bakhmut was more intense this week than in the previous week and that there were 23 combat clashes in Bakhmut over the past day alone.[17] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group forces crossed the Bakhmutka River in eastern Bakhmut and are moving towards the city center.[18] Geolocated footage of Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin shows that he was about 1.5 kilometers away from Bakhmut’s administrative center.[19] Several Russian milbloggers notably claimed that Ukrainian forces are preparing for a counteroffensive in Bakhmut.[20] www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast ( Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk on March 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Hryanykivka (18km northeast of Kupyansk) and Masyutivka (15km northeast of Kupyansk).[9] Geolocated footage published on March 11 indicates that Russian forces likely control Pershotravneve (22km east of Kupyansk).[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are maintaining a significant military presence in areas along the Russian border with Kharkiv Oblast to fix Ukrainian forces in the Kupyansk direction to prevent Ukrainian forces from transferring personnel to other areas in Ukraine.[11] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces advanced towards Svatove. A Ukrainian media source reported on March 11 that Ukrainian forces entered Kuzemivka (14km northwest of Svatove) on an unspecified date and now hold positions 11km away from Svatove.[12] www.understandingwar.org/… Four hypothetical offensive plans
x The rashists shelled Dvorichna, Hryankivka, Masyutivka, Pishchane and Kyslivka in Kharkiv region and Novoselivs'ke, Nevs'ke, Kuz'myne, Dibrova and Bilohorivka in Luhansk region.
Source: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine operational info at 18:00 on 11 March 2023
2/2 pic.twitter.com/hrQPbdfZkU — Michael MacKay (@mhmck) March 11, 2023
www.understandingwar.org/... Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces continue to establish fortifications in Zaporizhia Oblast. Satellite imagery published on March 9 shows that Russian forces have significantly expanded fortifications north of Chystopillia, Zaporizhia Oblast between December 2022 and March 9, 2023.[25] Russian forces are likely expanding fortifications in this area to defend the N30 and T0408 highways into Tokmak, a major Russian rear area logistics node that is within 15km of Melitopol along the T0401 highway. Russian forces likely seek to secure major ground lines of communication (GLOCs) into Melitopol in the event of a potential future Ukrainian counteroffensive. Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian logistics and force concentration areas in southern Ukraine. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported on March 10 that Ukrainian forces struck three Russian ammunition warehouses, air defenses, and four manpower and equipment concentration areas on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on March 9 and 10.[26] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command also reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions on the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast.[27] Ukrainian sources implied on March 11 that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions near Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast, but Russian sources denied that Ukrainian forces conducted strikes in the area.[28] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/...
In Thursday’s attack, Russia used six of its limited supply of Kinzhal missiles — a ground-based ballistic missile modified to be fired from a warplane — along with a greater number of other ballistic missiles than in previous strikes, Ukraine’s Air Force said. As a result, more of the missiles hit targets. Ukraine has said that advanced Western air defense systems, including American-made Patriots, could help it intercept ballistic missiles. The United States and Germany have said they are sending Patriot missile systems to Ukraine, and France and Italy pledged last month to supply SAMP/T systems — for “surface-to-air medium-range/land-based,” which have a shorter range than the Patriot — although they did not give a time frame. Although the Russian barrage on Thursday was one of the broadest and deadliest since December, some Western officials believe that it showed how Moscow is grappling with its own shortages of military supplies. Britain’s defense intelligence agency said on Friday that Russia was waiting longer between air attacks as it strains to increase missile production. www.nytimes.com/... x Before I do: there are Ukrainian civilians who suffering and dying from these strikes. I’ve said before, Ukraine needs sustained air defense systems and interceptor missiles and other support, as there is an effort underway to exhaust Ukrainian SAMs over time. pic.twitter.com/68u3aJydRe — Dara Massicot (@MassDara) March 10, 2023 I haven’t made my way through all strikes since 2022, so far just 2023 today. I’ve compiled launch points where known, missile type, and interception rates. Sources for now are UAF and western media. I will catalogue Russian info next. /2 @konrad_muzyka has great information on this, if you are not already subscribing to the UCM I recommend it!) /3 (Speaking of interception rates,has great information on this, if you are not already subscribing to the UCM I recommend it!) The attack this week (81 missiles) was not the largest in 2023 – the largest was one month ago with 105 total. This attack was different in terms of type of systems used, launch locations, variation of launchers and missile trajectories, making it complex to defend against. /4 washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/… It featured 6 Kinzhal hypersonic ALBMs – the largest salvo so far of them in the war and the largest recorded for combat use of this missile. Russia doesn't have large numbers of this system, rumored in the dozens. More on that: /5 Ukrainian officials say they cannot intercept Kinzhal, Kh-22 ASCMs and S-300 (SA-20) air defense missiles repurposed for land attack roles. too fast, trajectory is difficult. They claim Russia has fired 210 Kh-22 since 2022, none of them intercepted. /6 The Kh-22 (AS-4) Soviet-era ASCM was designed to be an aircraft carrier killer. It is not very precise, but it is supersonic. /7 Air Force: Ukraine needs Patriot to down Kh-22 missiles Russia used to hit high-rise in Dnipro From the info that I have, there is no set pattern to the makeup of the strike packages this year. Many are ASCMs or SAMs purposed for land-attack roles. A few reasons for this in no particular order: experimentation to see what works, stockpile issues, launcher readiness. /8 Note, no SS-26/SSC-7 in quite some time, probably as inventory is low. They are using different combinations of balloons, Shaheds, timing waves of missiles, shifting launch locations, and so on, to reduce interception rates. /8 Not depicted in the chart - each strike originates from slightly different locations. They haven’t launched much from Belarus in the last month, according to Ukrainian officials. It's a mix from Belgorod, Caspian+ Black Sea, Rostov, Kursk, and occupied Zaporizhzhia. /9 While the Russians likely know the limitations and strengths of Ukraine’s soviet/Russian origin SAMs, they are likely trying to probe weaknesses in NASAMS or IRIS-T performance. /10 Back in November, NASAMs had a 100% success rate according to SECDEF Austin. /11 NASAMS air defense system have 100% success rate in Ukraine- Pentagon chief As for overall targets – most of these strikes are continuing to target the power grid, an oil refinery, defense industrial targets – what is called “critical infrastructure” in Russian mil strategy. However, missiles are striking residential buildings. /12 Ukraine is repairing their grid. The strikes are lethal, yet they backfire too, as Ukrainians are more resolved against Russia with each wave. Nor do I see how they directly support the Donbas effort/13 That being said, I do worry that this wears down Ukrainian SAM inventory; I don’t know how many interceptors they expend for each Russian missile launched. /14 Is Russia following their CONOPs for PGMs? Yes and no. On one hand there is an adherence to striking critical infrastructure, but on the other hand they not found lasting effects from this approach and haven’t switched to a fundamentally different strategy. /15 If interested, we have a new report on the subject. We discuss aspects of Russian PGM targeting and launch capacity by platform. It was written in 2021 (prewar), but only recently approved for public release. /16 As we noted then (but were unable to discuss here until approved) there was a large gap between their theory and the force, to achieve effects with PGMs, EW, and counterspace capabilities. Led by Clint Reach w/contributions from me and a great team. Russia's Evolution Toward a Unified Strategic Operation Final thought - Russia is facing PGM inventory issues and is experimenting with what it has left. These attacks strain Ukrainian air defenses and this is a problem over time. The attacks come every few weeks. thanks for reading/end. • • •
x Here's the latest news on Russia's invasion of Ukraine
https://t.co/GiBqR4EHAA — Bloomberg (@business) March 11, 2023
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