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Ukraine Invasion Day 378: eastern Bakhmut captured [1]
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Date: 2023-03-07
Fighting continues and it may be the case that the NYTimes is doing disinformation that protects other national interests in its latest revelations about the Nord Stream sabotage. Otherwise fighting continues in Bakhmut, as “Russian commanders have repeatedly stretched their forces too thin across multiple axes of advance throughout the invasion of Ukraine”.
The war in Ukraine upended the normal course of life in Ukraine and beyond. Ukrainian efforts on the battlefield and in the country’s hinterlands have defied Russian and many others’ expectations of a quick subjugation. The same vitality may be creating inflated expectations of Ukraine liberating all its territories in the short term. However, one can be certain that the Russian aggression against Ukraine subjected millions of Ukrainians to violence and hardship. Thousands of civilians are believed to have been killed or injured, though exact figures are hard to come by while swathes of Ukraine are still under Russian occupation. Tight informational controls in those areas do not allow for a clear understanding of the treatment of civilians. However, the discovery of mass graves in northern Ukraine and the Kharkiv region indicates that torture, rape, and summary executions may have also occurred in areas currently beyond the reach of independent media and international forensic experts. Likewise, the experience of people allegedly abducted or disappeared in occupied southern and southeastern Ukraine – many of them former and current local administrators and cases of targeting of Russian-appointed officials by suspected Ukrainian partisans active in occupied areas – is telling and warrants further exploration. Revelations of atrocities are not the sole side effect of liberation. Contamination of formerly occupied areas with mines and explosives poses and will continue to pose a serious risk to civilians returning to their homes and livelihoods, especially in rural areas. It will require one of the greatest demining efforts in human history and is likely to kill and maim civilians in the coming years, even if the war ended immediately. The direct impact of the war on civilians extends far beyond those killed or injured. One year into the war, Ukraine’s economy has contracted by about a third and requires continuous external support.19 Over five million Ukrainians are internally displaced.20 About eight million people have been forced to seek refuge outside the country, of whom close to three million have found themselves in Russia,21 many having been ‘evacuated’ by the Russian forces against their will, including thousands of children. Those remaining in Ukraine face ongoing interruptions to basic utilities amid cold weather as Russia continues striking civilian infrastructure. They are also living under constant threat of being caught up in cross-border strikes, as in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions, and shelling in much of eastern and southern Ukraine. Finally, Russia’s ongoing occupation of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant and recurring threats to deploy nuclear weapons pose a continuous risk to life and the environment – not only in Ukraine, but also in the region at large. acleddata.com/…
Bakhmut: Ukraine’s top generals want to bolster the defenses of the embattled city, signaling that they would pursue a strategy of bleeding the Russian army in a battle of attrition rather than retreat. Ukraine’s top generals want to bolster the defenses of the embattled city, signaling that they wouldrather than retreat.
Action in the Skies: Against the odds, are using aging vehicles to fight a better equipped adversary. Against the odds, Ukraine’s helicopter brigades are using aging vehicles to fight a better equipped adversary.
Arming the World: As traditional weapons suppliers like the United States face wartime production shortages, — but not Ukraine itself, to try to avoid provoking Russia. As traditional weapons suppliers like the United States face wartime production shortages, Ukraine’s allies arming South Korea has stepped in to fill the gap by — but not Ukraine itself, to try to avoid provoking Russia. Key Takeaways Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 7 that Russian forces will have an “open road” to capture key cities in Donbas. ISW continues to assess, however, that Russian forces lack the capability to exploit the tactical capture of Bakhmut to generate operational effects, and will likely rapidly culminate following the capture of Bakhmut.
Russian forces likely lack the mechanized forces necessary to advance beyond Bakhmut, and the tactical “assault detachments” used in assaults against Bakhmut are likely unable to conduct maneuver warfare.
Russian forces have likely captured the eastern part of Bakhmut east of the Bakhmutka River following a controlled Ukrainian withdrawal from eastern Bakhmut as of March 7.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu reiterated boilerplate rhetoric seeking to deter further Western military aid to Ukraine.
Shoigu additionally outlined long-term and likely aspirational efforts to restore and expand the Russian officer corps.
Russia exchanged 130 Ukrainian prisoners-of-war (POWs) for 90 Russian POWs on March 7.
Russian independent polling organization The Levada Center released poll results that 51 percent of Russians feel negatively toward Russians who left the country due to mobilization, indicating at minimum negative feelings towards those that escaped mobilization, if not overt support for the war.
The New York Times (NYT) stated on March 7 that low-confidence and unverified intelligence reviewed by US officials may suggest that a pro-Ukrainian group carried out an attack on the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022, but made clear this is a very low confidence assessment.
US Air Force General James Hecker confirmed on March 6 that the US has provided Ukraine with Joint Direct Attack Munition Extended Range (JDAM-ER) kits.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces attempt to conduct operations across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
Russian federal authorities continue to place the onus of solving mobilization issues onto Russian regional authorities who then absolve themselves of ongoing Russian command issues.
Russian occupation authorities continue to import employees from various Russian law enforcement agencies to staff vacancies in occupation administrations.
x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - MAR 7
66:28 🇷🇺/🇺🇦 added by Oryx's @Rebel44CZ (+ corrections to totals)
VISUALLY CONFIRMED:
3.13x losses to date ➡
2.73x since 🇺🇦 counteroffensive (Aug 29) ⬇
3.77x 30-day average ⬇
📈
https://t.co/KpM6nnRQQ0 pic.twitter.com/87MvxzWtkn — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦
[email protected] (@ragnarbjartur) March 7, 2023
ISW continues to assess, however, that Russian forces lack the capability to exploit the tactical capture of Bakhmut to generate operational effects, and will likely rapidly culminate following the capture of Bakhmut. As ISW has previously assessed, Russian forces would have to choose between two diverging lines of advance after capturing Bakhmut. Russian forces could attempt to push west along the T0504 highway towards Kostiatynivka (about 20km from Bakhmut) or could push northwest along the E40 highway towards the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk area in northwestern Donetsk Oblast (about 40km northwest of Bakhmut).[2] These two potential axes of advance are not mutually supporting, and degraded Russian forces would likely have to prioritize the pursuit of just one to have any chance of success - though Russian commanders have repeatedly stretched their forces too thin across multiple axes of advance throughout the invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian forces have also heavily fortified both of these routes, which are supplied by numerous ground lines of communication (GLOCs) running deep into the Ukrainian rear, and any Russian attempt to advance down these roads would likely be highly costly.[3] www.understandingwar.org/... Russian forces additionally likely lack the mechanized forces necessary to advance beyond Bakhmut, and the tactical “assault detachments” used in assaults against Bakhmut are likely unable to conduct maneuver warfare. Recent Russian advances within urban areas of Bakhmut demonstrate that Russian forces can secure limited tactical gains with infantry-led frontal assaults.[4] Russian forces likely lack the mechanized forces necessary to exploit the roads (which are likely highly fortified) west of Bakhmut. As ISW has recently reported, Russian forces are increasingly relying on “assault detachments,” a battalion-size element optimized for frontal assaults on fortified areas, rather than for maneuver warfare.[5] These detachments are artillery-heavy, use simplified tactics, relegate tanks to a fire support role in rear areas, and would almost certainly struggle to effectively conduct operations beyond urban areas. A prominent Russian milblogger echoed this observation on March 7, noting that assault detachments are simply too small to “punch a wide and deep gap” in Ukrainian defensive formations and follow with tank and mechanized battalions, and called for the formation of “breakthrough brigades,” a change likely far beyond the current capabilities of Russian forces in the area.[6] The continuing devolution of Russian force structure towards small assault detachments using simplified tactics, combined with mounting losses among the most effective Russian troops, will likely greatly limit the ability of Russian forces to properly exploit any paths of advance opened by the capture of Bakhmut Russian forces remain unlikely to secure more than a tactical victory following 10 months of assaults. www.understandingwar.org/... x x YouTube Video Ukraine has demanded the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigate grisly footage circulating on social media allegedly showing Russian forces killing a Ukrainian prisoner of war with a series of blasts from assault weapons. The amateur video apparently depicts a detained soldier standing in a shallow trench, wearing camouflage, and smoking a cigarette. The man said “Slava Ukraini!” – or Glory to Ukraine – before multiple shots are heard. www.aljazeera.com/... www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces have likely captured the eastern part of Bakhmut, east of the Bakhmutka River, following a controlled Ukrainian withdrawal from eastern Bakhmut as of March 7. Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around the city on March 7. Geolocated footage posted on March 6 and 7 shows Russian positions in eastern Bakhmut within 200m of the Bakhmutka River and Russian forces comfortably operating in areas in eastern Bakhmut where they previously had not been observed, supporting previous Russian claims that Russian forces captured the eastern part of Bakhmut and that Ukrainian troops have withdrawn to central and western Bakhmut.[24] Geolocated footage posted on March 6 additionally shows Russian advances in southwestern Bakhmut.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continue efforts to storm Bakhmut and that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Fedorivka (15km northeast) and Bilohorivka (20km northeast); northwest of Bakhmut near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest), Yahidne (1km northwest) and Zalizianske (10km northwest); west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west) and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (7km southwest).[26] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to withdraw westward from Bakhmut.[27] One milblogger noted that Ukrainian troops are conducting counterattacks southwest of Bakhmut near the T0504 Kostiantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway to maintain access to the road.[28] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that the Wagner Group killed 11,000 Ukrainian soldiers in Bakhmut over the course of February, and other Russian sources also amplified claims of high Ukrainian losses.[29] www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast ( Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Hryanykivka (54km northwest of Svatove), Nevske (17km north of Kreminna), Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[17] Geolocated footage published on March 7 depicting Russian forces storming and capturing Ukrainian positions northwest of Kreminna indicates limited Russian advances.[18] Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are unable to capture Stelmakhivka (15km west of Svatove) and Nevske.[19] A video posted on March 7 claimed to show personnel from the 375th Motorized Rifle Battalion of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps operating in Luhansk Oblast.[20] Geolocated footage published on March 7 shows Ukrainian artillery striking five Russian tanks near Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna), indicating the further degradation of Russian mechanized forces in the area.[21] Haidai stated that Russian forces have increased the number of attack waves in the Kreminna and Bilohorivka directions.[22] Footage published on March 7 claims to show elements of the 4th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the LNR 2nd Army Corps firing rockets at Ukrainian positions near Kreminna.[23] www.understandingwar.org/...
x "Contrary to the conventional wisdom, scholarship suggests that Ukrainian citizens may paradoxically benefit from us supporting them less," @MaxAbrahms writes:
https://t.co/kPuUFDsIGy — The Atlantic (@TheAtlantic) March 8, 2023
x Watching Putin apologists and tankies suggest that Sy Hersh and the New York Times are both right on Nord Stream 2 is like watching Edward Scissorhands masturbate. — Michael Weiss (@michaeldweiss) March 7, 2023
The New York Times (NYT) reported on March 7 that low-confidence and unverified intelligence reviewed by US officials may suggest that a pro-Ukrainian group carried out an attack on the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022. US officials reported that they know very little about the “perpetrators or their affiliations,” but that they may be “opponents” of Russian President Vladimir Putin.[12] The NYT article emphasizes that US officials refused to disclose the nature of the intelligence and have not settled on an explanation of the Nord Stream attacks, and this leak remains low-confidence. www.understandingwar.org/… U.S. officials said that they had no evidence President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine or his top lieutenants were involved in the operation, or that the perpetrators were acting at the direction of any Ukrainian government officials. The brazen attack on the natural gas pipelines, which link Russia to Western Europe, fueled public speculation about who was to blame, from Moscow to Kyiv and London to Washington, and it has remained one of the most consequential unsolved mysteries of Russia’s year-old war in Ukraine. Ukraine and its allies have been seen by some officials as having the most logical potential motive to attack the pipelines. They have opposed the project for years, calling it a national security threat because it would allow Russia to sell gas more easily to Europe. [...] Ukrainian government and military intelligence officials say they had no role in the attack and do not know who carried it out. After this article was published, Mykhailo Podolyak, a senior adviser to Mr. Zelensky, posted on Twitter that Ukraine “has nothing to do with the Baltic Sea mishap.” He added that he had no information about pro-Ukrainian “sabotage groups.” U.S. officials said there was much they did not know about the perpetrators and their affiliations. The review of newly collected intelligence suggests they were opponents of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, but does not specify the members of the group, or who directed or paid for the operation. U.S. officials declined to disclose the nature of the intelligence, how it was obtained or any details of the strength of the evidence it contains. They have said that there are no firm conclusions about it, leaving open the possibility that the operation might have been conducted off the books by a proxy force with connections to the Ukrainian government or its security services. www.nytimes.com/...
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