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Ukraine Invasion Day 375: Bakhmut encirclement continues [1]
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Date: 2023-03-04
“The purpose of a turning movement is to force the enemy to abandon prepared defensive positions and is different from the aim of an encirclement, which is to trap and destroy enemy forces. The Russians may have intended to encircle Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut, but the Ukrainian command has signaled that it will likely withdraw rather than risk an encirclement.”
An armed group claiming to fight for Ukraine said it briefly took control of a border town in the Bryansk region of Russia , prompting President Vladimir V. Putin to cancel a trip and convene his security council over a rare known case of a raid inside his country.
Russia’s offensive to take the city — the country’s longest-running sustained assault in the war — is being decided by a yard-by-yard battle for the roads that are the vital lifelines of supply for Ukrainian fighters.
Amid mounting concerns that China could move to supply weapons to Moscow , President Biden and Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany vowed to keep Western support intact during
In a rare opportunity, the 18th Sikorsky Brigade, the foremost of Ukraine’s four helicopter brigades, gave reporters access to a combat unit for two days recently. Officers and pilots described how the Ukrainian brigades moved their aircraft at the onset of the war to evade Russian strikes, and how they adapted their tactics to fighting a much more powerful and better equipped adversary.
Far from being knocked out in the first days of the invasion, Ukraine’s helicopters and jets have kept flying, remaining an inspiring and useful element of the war effort.
One year into the war, against all the odds, Ukraine’s helicopter brigades are still operational. Every day of the week, multiple times a day, they go into battle against enemy forces, launching rocket attacks along the front lines in support of ground troops and occasionally slipping under Russian air defenses to fly covert missions into enemy territory.
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian sources continue to report that Russian forces are trying to set conditions for offensive operations in southern Ukraine. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 4 that Russian forces are attempting to improve their tactical positions in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts to resume offensive operations in some areas.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff has recently changed its language to include information concerning the situation in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts in the same section, and it is unclear whether these reports refer to offensive preparations in both or just one of the oblasts. ISW has not observed any indicators that Russian forces are preparing for sustained offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast or any offensive activity in Kherson Oblast. Some Ukrainian officials have suggested that Russian forces could attempt to launch a decisive offensive effort towards Zaporizhzhia City, but ISW continues to assess that Russian forces do not have the necessary combat power accumulated in Zaporizhia Oblast to launch a large-scale offensive in this sector of the frontline.[41] Russian forces would be highly unlikely to reach Zaporizhzhia City in the case of such an offensive.
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian forces appear to have secured a sufficient positional advantage to conduct a turning movement against certain parts of Bakhmut but have not yet forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw and will likely not be able to encircle the city soon. Russian forces made one limited confirmed advance near Bakhmut on March 4.[1] As ISW reported on March 3, Ukrainian forces are likely setting conditions for a controlled fighting withdrawal out of particularly difficult sectors of eastern Bakhmut, although it is not clear that Ukrainian commanders have decided to withdraw at this time.[2] Russian sources claim that Wagner Group elements have made gains in northeastern and eastern Bakhmut over the past few days, creating a tactically challenging turning movement in urban areas in northern Bakhmut.[3] Ukrainian officials have recently reiterated that Ukrainian forces still control the situation in Bakhmut but have noted that circumstances are increasingly complicated and that the Wagner Group has committed its most advanced and prepared elements to assault operations in the area.[4]
Russian advances in Bakhmut have been slow and gradual and do not suggest that Russian forces will be able to encircle Bakhmut soon, much less that they will be able to take the city by frontal assaults. The Russians have, rather, managed to push close enough to critical ground lines of communication from the northeast to threaten Ukrainian withdrawal routes in a classical turning movement. The purpose of a turning movement is to force the enemy to abandon prepared defensive positions and is different from the aim of an encirclement, which is to trap and destroy enemy forces. The Russians may have intended to encircle Ukrainian forces in Bakhmut, but the Ukrainian command has signaled that it will likely withdraw rather than risk an encirclement. ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces are far more likely to withdraw than to become encircled and that the Ukrainians might still be able to hold their positions in Bakhmut if they choose to try. Russian forces have been suffering high casualties in these advances, and Ukrainian commanders’ assessments of the likelihood that they can force Russian attacks to culminate near or behind their current positions balanced against the risk of losing access to essential withdrawal routes will likely guide the Ukrainian decision to stay or pull back.
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast ( Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces reportedly continued offensive operations near Svatove on March 4. Geolocated footage published on March 4 indicates that Russian forces likely secured gains north of Novovodyane (16km southwest of Svatove).[17] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 3 that Ukrainian forces attempted to attack Russian positions northwest of Svatove near Kupyansk in Vilshana (15km northeast of Kupyansk) and Lyman Pershyi (12km east of Kupyansk).[18]
The reported Ukrainian evacuation of vulnerable citizens from Kupyansk does not suggest that Ukrainian forces believe that Russian forces threaten the city. Western media reported on March 3 that Ukrainian officials ordered the mandatory evacuation of vulnerable civilians from Kupyansk due to Russian shelling.[19] Russian forces are within the 25km range that allows them to shell Kupyansk with 152mm tube artillery, which poses considerable risk to civilians. Russian forces have conducted limited offensive operations northeast of Kupyansk over the past month without making any significant confirmed advances and are unlikely to secure the gains required to threaten the city at their current pace of operations. ISW has assessed that the closest Russian advances are about 13km northeast of Kupyansk, and it is unlikely that Russian forces in this area have the capability to rapidly advance 13km cross-country and assault Kupyansk itself, if they are able to advance that far at all, which they have not yet shown the capacity to do.
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued efforts to encircle Bakhmut on March 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; north of Bakhmut near Vasyukivka (13km north); northwest of Bakhmut near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest), Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest), Bodhanivka (8km northwest), and Hryhorivka (10km northwest); and west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west).[28] Geolocated footage posted on March 4 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions on the east bank of the Berkhivka reservoir, indicating that Russian troops have made advances about 5km northwest of Bakhmut.[29] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that the situation in Bakhmut is difficult but under control and remarked that Russian forces blew up the bridge that connects Bakhmut with Khromove to the west.[30] ISW observed geolocated footage of the Khromove bridge on March 3 that indicated that Ukrainian forces destroyed the bridge to inhibit Russian movement to the west of Bakhmut.[31] It is unclear who destroyed the Khromove bridge, but its destruction will in any case limit the abilities of Russian forces to approach Ukrainian positions in and around Khromove from positions in Bakhmut. Russian sources widely claimed that Ukrainian troops are withdrawing from Bakhmut but that certain Ukrainian elements remain within the city.[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group forces cleared the “Tavr” meat processing plant in northeastern Bakhmut and are advancing towards central Bakhmut along streets in eastern and southwestern Bakhmut.[33] Milbloggers additionally claimed that Wagner troops attacked Ukrainian positions west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and Khromove.[34] A Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger noted that the only remaining bridge out of Bakhmut is a bridge across the T0504 Kostiantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway in Ivanivske.[35]
www.understandingwar.org/...
x The Battle of #Bakhmut has now raged since August 2022. The massive human and material resources expended by Russians on this objective may soon necessitate a Ukrainian withdrawal. 1/25 🧵 pic.twitter.com/KgvuDf0ecf — Mick Ryan, AM (@WarintheFuture) March 4, 2023
#Bakhmut has now raged since August 2022. The massive human and material resources expended by Russians on this objective may soon necessitate a Ukrainian withdrawal. 1/25 🧵 The Battle ofhas now raged since August 2022. The massive human and material resources expended by Russians on this objective may soon necessitate a Ukrainian withdrawal. 1/25 🧵
2/ Back in October last year, I examined how withdrawals are conducted and some of their considerations for the Russians in Kherson. I will apply a similar approach for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in #Bakhmut. washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/… Back in October last year, I examined how withdrawals are conducted and some of their considerations for the Russians in Kherson. I will apply a similar approach for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in
3/ Withdrawals, which are considered a ‘retrograde operation’ in US Army doctrine, are designed to allow a force to disengage from the enemy and redeploy on a new mission or to a new location, while minimising casualties.
4/ This quote from Australian Army doctrine is also useful: “Withdrawal is a task employed regularly during mobile defence or the delay to accomplish the overall aim of resuming offensive action…it should be treated as a routine tactic rather than a harbinger of disaster.”
5/ For , holding onto Bakhmut would have had a political imperative. This battle has been invested with political value by both sides – although only one President ( For #Ukraine , holding onto Bakhmut would have had a political imperative. This battle has been invested with political value by both sides – although only one President ( @ZelenskyyUa ) has had the courage to visit his troops there.
6/ The battle for the town and area around it has also been the source of an open, vicious campaign of smears between the Russian Army and the Wagner Group. Wagner Group chief: Bakhmut isn’t about the $$$
7/ But the battle has also allowed #Ukraine to attrit the Russian forces in the east, forcing them to continue committing resources to the battle for a town with almost no strategic value. This has absorbed Russian units that might have been used elsewhere against the Ukrainians. But the battle has also allowedto attrit the Russian forces in the east, forcing them to continue committing resources to the battle for a town with almost no strategic value. This has absorbed Russian units that might have been used elsewhere against the Ukrainians.
8/ It has blooded the Russians (Army and Wagner) in a way that they have not experienced since WW2. By some reports, their slow, methodical and frankly, unnecessary, campaign for Bakhmut has resulted in over ten thousand Russian casualties. Battle for Bakhmut turns into a ‘meat grinder’ for Russian and Ukrainian armies
9/ But at some point in the coming days, the Ukrainian Armed Forces may decide that they have achieved all they can by remaining in their defensive locations around , and that force preservation for the battles that follow is more important. But at some point in the coming days, the Ukrainian Armed Forces may decide that they have achieved all they can by remaining in their defensive locations around #Bakhmut , and that force preservation for the battles that follow is more important.
10/ Once a decision is made to withdraw, what are the planning considerations?
11/ First, deception is vital. The reality is however that it is hard to conceal from the Russians an intention to withdraw. Some deception might be achieved by increased fire support, decoys, simulating normal activities and communications discipline.
12/ A second consideration is how to sequence the withdrawal. This includes when and how to evacuate logistic stocks, headquarters, recon elements and ground combat forces. It will depend on where and in what strength the enemy is pressing the force that is to withdraw.
13/ For the Ukrainians, it is likely some of this has already been done. But the Ukrainians will need enough forces in place – with their own mobility - to prevent a rout but not so much that they lose a large part of the force.
14/ A third consideration for the Ukrainians will be disrupting the Russians ability to interfere with the withdrawal. We should expect to see increased air defence, jamming & artillery used by the withdrawing Russians, as well as greater air support. A third consideration for the Ukrainians will be disrupting the Russians ability to interfere with the withdrawal. We should expect to see increased air defence, jamming & artillery used by the withdrawing Russians, as well as greater air support.
15/ A 4th consideration will be command & control. This isn’t just about who is in charge. It is about controlling an orderly withdrawal in the planned sequence. MPs are vital for road space control, route discipline, and ensuring units don’t ‘vacate’ defensive positions early.
16/ Achieving control is also about good battle discipline. Tactical leaders at all levels must hold their positions until their assigned withdrawal time. This can be very difficult when there is a strong inclination to move rearwards earlier than a plan directs.
17/ The Ukrainians will want to achieve a ‘clean break’. This is disengagement of the Russians in a way that avoids their ability to follow up & pursue the withdrawing force. A lot of artillery, attacking concentrations of Russian reinforcements & fire support will be required. The Ukrainians will want to achieve a ‘clean break’. This is disengagement of the Russians in a way that avoids their ability to follow up & pursue the withdrawing force. A lot of artillery, attacking concentrations of Russian reinforcements & fire support will be required.
18/ Key to achieving a clean break is an effective rear guard. A rear-guard force can help provide a clean break for the withdrawing force and prevent enemy pursuit. I would expect that for the Ukrainians, the rear guard will consist of armoured and mounted infantry forces. Key to achieving a clean break is an effective rear guard. A rear-guard force can help provide a clean break for the withdrawing force and prevent enemy pursuit. I would expect that for the Ukrainians, the rear guard will consist of armoured and mounted infantry forces.
19/ Ultimately, a successful withdrawal requires excellent planning and coordination. But this is underpinned by good leadership at all levels. But concept for how the withdrawal will be sequenced and executed must be unified and led by a senior commander. Ultimately, a successful withdrawal requires excellent planning and coordination. But this is underpinned by good leadership at all levels. But concept for how the withdrawal will be sequenced and executed must be unified and led by a senior commander.
20/ This senior commander must have excellent tactical acumen, good understanding of the terrain and a good appreciation of the capabilities of the withdrawing force. He must understand that getting it wrong can result in the loss of the entire withdrawing force.
21/ The reality is that if the Russia captures , they are seizing rubble. It is a town with little strategic importance & no infrastructure to support a force. That the Russians have invested so much in its capture speaks volumes about their poor #strategy in this war. The reality is that if the Russia captures #Bakhmut , they are seizing rubble. It is a town with little strategic importance & no infrastructure to support a force. That the Russians have invested so much in its capture speaks volumes about their poorin this war.
22/ For the Ukrainians, they will be withdrawing into defensive zones around #Kramatorsk that they have had eight years to prepare. Eight. Years. And it is on higher, more defensible ground than Bakhmut. For the Ukrainians, they will be withdrawing into defensive zones aroundthat they have had eight years to prepare. Eight. Years. And it is on higher, more defensible ground than Bakhmut.
23/ While Ukraine may lose a town, the Russians have lost much more over the course of the battle. They have wasted military units, soldiers and resources that would have been valuable to them once the Ukrainians launch their offensives later in the Spring.
24/ The irony of this battle is that while Russia is desperate for a victory in the short term, Putin often talks of how patient Russia is and how it will outlast the West. There is little in Russian behaviour at present that supports Putin's view. End. The irony of this battle is that while Russia is desperate for a victory in the short term, Putin often talks of how patient Russia is and how it will outlast the West. There is little in Russian behaviour at present that supports Putin's view. End.
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[1] Url:
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/3/4/2156233/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-375-Bakhmut-encirclement-continues
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