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Ukraine Invasion Day 374: Russians advance on Bakhmut [1]

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Date: 2023-03-03

Over a period of several weeks early this year, regular #Russian troops replaced many of the mercenaries fighting around #Bakhmut, “retain[ing] the initiative for Russian operations around the city,” ISW explained. https://t.co/QSzFG9aH1p

x For any other serious army this would have been utterly embarrassing but for the Russian air defense it was just an ordinary weekday.



Congratulations to BYPOL. #Belarus #Russia pic.twitter.com/YCdHilPWrB — (((Tendar))) (@Tendar) March 2, 2023

In a sense, Russia’s war in Ukraine is itself haunted by Stalin’s ghost. Ukraine’s insistence on condemning the Soviet-era legacy and its demands to recognize Stalin’s terror-famine, the Holodomor, as a genocide have been among the dividing lines in Ukrainian-Russian conflict. While the Holodomor was partly a result of Stalin’s push for the collectivization of agriculture, it also coincided with his effort to break the backbone of Ukrainian nationalism, which he saw as threatening Soviet unity. Meanwhile, the Russian military’s methods in this war are horrifyingly reminiscent of Stalin’s willingness to use millions of soldiers as cannon fodder during the war with Germany. But where Stalin was ultimately victorious, Putin appears to be headed for defeat—and it seems increasingly likely that his rule will end in a real-life farce as dark as the hyperbolic satirical version of the death of Stalin. www.thebulwark.com/...

Key Takeaways Ukrainian forces appear to be setting conditions for a controlled fighting withdrawal from parts of Bakhmut.

Russian officials continued to release limited information about the March 2 incursion in Bryansk Oblast but failed to provide clarity about what actually transpired.

Russian President Vladimir Putin did not address the reported situation in Bryansk Oblast in an emergency meeting with the Russian Security Council according to the meeting’s readout.

Russian authorities continued efforts to portray Russia as the only safe operator of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), likely to constrain the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) presence at the ZNPP and compel the de facto recognition of Russian ownership of the ZNPP.

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.

Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Donetsk Oblast front line as Ukrainian forces appeared to prepare for a controlled withdrawal from at least parts of Bakhmut.

The Kremlin continues efforts to increase government oversight of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).

Russian occupation authorities continue to prepare occupied territories for the September 10 Russian regional elections. www.understandingwar.org/...

This week marks one year since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine kicked off a war that has offered up a wide range of lessons on the conduct of large-scale combat operations in the twenty-first century. In those twelve months, the war has touched all corners of Ukraine and yet its most defining features have been fights for control of cities. But while urban areas may be the war’s most important environment, at least to this point, no two urban battles have been the same. The battles in Kyiv, Mariupol, and Kherson, and the ongoing battle in Bakhmut have taken very different forms. This fact offers a valuable opportunity: by searching for elements common to each of these battles, despite the different contexts in which they occurred, we can illuminate fundamental lessons on urban warfare. Four particular lessons stand out. Most of them are not new. Rather, they have been on display in previous wars, but too often ignored or forgotten. This is a mistake we should not make again. The US military must learn from the current war in Ukraine to avoid paying the penalty, in blood and treasure, when it finds itself in its own urban battles in the future. 1. In war, cities are important—even the ones with no military value. 2. The foundational task of urban warfare is not clearing. 3. In cities, armies must be able to defend and attack—and switch between the two rapidly. 4. An army that cannot execute combined arms maneuver will suffer. mwi.usma.edu/...

x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - MAR 3



No additions from Oryx's @Rebel44CZ today (only minor corrections)



VISUALLY CONFIRMED:

3.13x losses to date ➡

2.72x since 🇺🇦 counteroffensive (Aug 29) ➡

3.60x 30-day average ⬆



📈 https://t.co/DklSSkr2Lg pic.twitter.com/ICvuFtmJMo — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦 [email protected] (@ragnarbjartur) March 3, 2023

x Russian army suffered heavy losses during its failed assault on Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, eastern Ukraine



Ukraine's Armed Forces destroyed/damaged at least 137 Russian infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), tanks & other military vehicles near Vuhledar, according to @oryxspioenkop pic.twitter.com/FUfDFUW9aZ — Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) March 3, 2023

www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut as Ukrainian forces appeared to prepare for a controlled withdrawal from at least parts of the city on March 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled attacks on Bakhmut itself; north of Bakhmut near Vasyukivka (13km north); and northwest of Bakhmut near Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest), Orikhovo-Vasylivka (10km northwest), Hryhorivka (10km northwest), and Bohdanivka (8km northwest).[25] Geolocated footage posted on March 3 shows Ukrainian forces destroying a bridge across the Bakhmutivka River in northeastern Bakhmut and another bridge across the Khromove-Bakhmut route west of Bakhmut, suggesting that Ukrainian troops may be preparing to conduct a controlled withdrawal from parts of Bakhmut.[26] Russian and Ukrainian sources amplified a video posted by a Ukrainian soldier who says that his unit received the order to immediately withdraw from Bakhmut and move into a new combat zone.[27] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner forces have almost entirely encircled Bakhmut and that Ukrainian troops can only feasibly withdraw along one remaining road (likely in reference to the Khromove-Bakhmut route).[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that clashes are ongoing in northern Bakhmut near the AZOM industrial plant and within urban areas of southern and eastern Bakhmut.[29] One Russian source claimed that Wagner forces broke through Ukrainian defenses in Ivanivske (5km west of Bakhmut along the T0504 Kostiantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut road) and are threatening the western outskirts of Bakhmut from the Ivanivske area.[30] There is no corroboration of this claim. www.understandingwar.org/... Ukrainian forces appear to be setting conditions for a controlled fighting withdrawal from parts of Bakhmut. Russian forces have been fighting to take Bakhmut, a city with a pre-war population of roughly 70,000 people, since roughly May 2022 and have suffered devastating casualties in the process. Geolocated footage posted on March 3 confirms that Ukrainian troops have destroyed two critical bridges in the Bakhmut area—one across the Bakhmutivka River in northeastern Bakhmut and one along the Khromove-Bakhmut route just west of Bakhmut.[1] The preemptive destruction of bridges is likely an indicator that Ukrainian troops may seek to inhibit Russian movement in eastern Bakhmut and limit potential westward Russian egress routes out of Bakhmut. Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Rodnyanskyi previously stated on February 28 that Ukrainian forces could choose to pull back from positions in Bakhmut as needed.[2] Rodnyanskyi also noted that Ukraine has fortified the area west of Bakhmut such that even if Ukrainian troops begin to withdraw, Russian forces would not necessarily be able to rapidly take the entire city.[3] If the Ukrainian military command deems it necessary to withdraw from Bakhmut it will likely conduct a limited and controlled withdrawal from particularly difficult sectors of eastern Bakhmut judging from Ukrainian statements and reported Ukrainian actions. ISW will continue to monitor the situation and offer updated assessments of the implications of possible Russian courses of action if and when Ukrainian forces begin to pull back. www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast ( Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast) Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 3. Western media reported that Ukrainian officials have ordered the mandatory evacuation of vulnerable civilians from Kupyansk due to Russian shelling of the area.[19] A Russian source claimed that Russian troops have advanced in the Synkivka area (8km north of Kupyansk) and amplified claims made by Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) officer Andrey Marochko that civilians are leaving Kupyansk en masse in advance of Russian offensive operations near the city.[20] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian equipment column near Svatove on the night of March 2 to March 3, causing Russian forces to suffer substantial equipment losses in the area.[21] Haidai also noted that Russian forces in the Kreminna area are increasingly resorting to using heavy equipment such as BMPT Terminators because they have been unsuccessful in conducting effective small-group attacks.[22] A Russian milblogger posted footage reportedly of elements of the 76th and 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Divisions in the Kreminna area and claimed that BARS-13 (Combat Reserve) elements are also active on this sector of the front.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[24] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes) Russian forces continued to conduct routine fire west of Hulyaipole and in Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts on March 3.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces in the Zaporizhia and Kherson directions attempted to improve their tawww.understandingwar.org/...ctical positions in order to resume future potential offensive operations.[37] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... RU fortifications and trenches Crowd erupts in laughter at Russia's top diplomat after he claimed the Ukraine war 'was launched against us'

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[1] Url: https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/3/3/2156073/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-374-Russians-advance-on-Bakhmut

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