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Ukraine Invasion Day 350: Russia's unrealistic timeframe lacks sufficient combat power [1]
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Date: 2023-02-07
Russian nationalist information space is continuing to express worry over Russia’s inability to sustain a rapid and multi-pronged decisive offensive operation on a deadline. Christopher Caldwell writes that "Russia started the war between Russia and Ukraine" but writes his entire op-ed as if he's blithely unaware of that fact. Maybe there will be Caldwell Units of a timespan for the war’s duration.
The Russian nationalist information space is continuing to express worry over Russia’s inability to sustain a rapid and multi-pronged decisive offensive operation on a deadline. One prominent milblogger warned that Russian forces should not fall into the trap of attempting to start numerous offensive operations like they did in spring 2022 but instead focus on gradual advances that would generate high casualties among Ukrainian forces. The milblogger added that Russian military command should prioritize tiring Ukrainian forces and disrupting their logistics rather than conducting a frontal assault. Another milblogger stated that Russia still needs to create a breakthrough force and reject its current tactic of launching small, localized offensives that waste Russian combat on “capturing fields.”[6] ISW previously assessed that Russian efforts to conduct spoiling attacks and to fix Ukrainian forces further undermine the sustainability of a major offensive. www.understandingwar.org/... Key Takeaways Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu is likely attempting to posture the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as an effective and involved leadership apparatus as the Russian military prepares for a renewed major offensive in Ukraine.
Russian military command may be rushing to launch a large-scale offensive operation to conquer Donetsk Oblast in an unrealistic timeframe and likely without sufficient combat power.
The Russian nationalist information space is continuing to express worry over Russia’s inability to sustain a rapid and multi-pronged decisive offensive operation on a deadline.
Russian state energy company Gazprom may be creating its own private security force, likely in an effort to normalize state-affiliated paramilitary groups and undermine non-state private military companies (PMCs).
The Kremlin may be implementing some demands previously voiced by Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin to build rapport with other nationalist figures who advocated for similar policies.
The Russian State Duma further formalized the institution of social benefit schemes in occupied territories of Ukraine in order to further consolidate administrative control of occupied areas.
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Svatove and Kreminna.
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut.
Russian forces did not make confirmed territorial gains on the southern axis.
Russian officials appear to be investing in railway infrastructure to increase the efficiency of military logistics.
The Russian MoD is reportedly proposing a bill to allow all military personnel, including conscripts, to voluntarily participate in Russian peacekeeping missions. www.understandingwar.org/…
KYIV, Ukraine — As Russia makes slow, bloody gains in a renewed push to capture more of eastern Ukraine, it is pouring ever more conscripts and military supplies into the battle, Ukrainian officials say. Still it remains far from clear that Moscow can mobilize enough forces to sustain a prolonged offensive. The Ukrainian military said on Tuesday that Russian forces were attacking in five different directions along the crescent-shaped front line in the east, relying on masses of troops to try to overrun Ukrainian positions. The tactic has allowed Russia to make incremental gains in recent weeks and, according to U.S. officials, to slowly tighten a noose around the key Ukrainian-held city of Bakhmut. But the strategy has come at a cost of hundreds of dead and wounded soldiers each day. “The major threat is the quantity,” Serhiy Haidai, the Ukrainian governor of the eastern region of Luhansk, told Ukrainian television on Tuesday. “It is a huge monster that is at war with us, and it owns immense resources — not endless, but still. There are too many of them.” www.nytimes.com/...
x Multi-layer fortification system was built on the high grounds near #Soledar. Every repelled attack gives Ukrainian engineers more time to build these. The defenders have now clear view on Soledar and the valley in between.#UkraineRussiaWar pic.twitter.com/TpGXiBHpUO — MilitaryLand.net (@Militarylandnet) January 13, 2023
As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches the one-year mark, European publics and politicians alike are asking how long the war will last and what scenarios could play out throughout the rest of 2023. Naturally, making such predictions is always more of an art than a science. But, as things stands, here is how things look for the course of the conflict. Since April 2022, Russia has waged a war of attrition. Instead of quickly conquering Ukraine from multiple directions as it had intended, Moscow is banking on a slow, grinding war in the country’s east to erode Kyiv’s resources at a rate greater than its own. It hopes that Ukraine will eventually give up voluntarily, or that its organised military resistance will collapse. Russian decision-makers are relying on their information warfare and the throttling back of energy deliveries to Europe to chip away at international assistance to Ukraine. From the Kremlin’s point of view, this strategy could prove successful; the Russians are likely to continue with it. [...] Ukraine will be hard pressed to defend against new Russian attacks in the first half of 2023. It is unlikely to be able to mount a large-scale counter-offensive, as its armed forces lack the means to undertake head-on assaults against Russian forces (particularly armoured personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and tanks). They are instead making do with indirect fire, such as artillery and rockets, to weaken the Russian lines and then attack them with light forces. But if supplies of heavy ground combat vehicles (tanks and infantry fighting vehicles) from the West pick up steam, a Ukrainian counter-offensive may well be on the cards for the second half of the year. The biggest constraint on the Ukrainian side is the availability, as losses increase, of materiel, such as of combat vehicles. Spare parts and ammunition for many Soviet-era systems are becoming scarce and their availability rests on the willingness of non-Western countries to sell what stocks they have. As the war drags on, these sources will dry up and it is particularly hard to predict their availability. The Ramstein meeting on 20 January broke allies’ taboo of delivering heavy ground combat capabilities. But the numbers of Western-made systems that Ukraine’s supporters have promised to send are still low. They will only have an impact on the war if deliveries increase and accumulate over the rest of the year. Tanks and armoured personnel carriers are also subject to a higher rate of attrition compared to artillery and air-defence systems. ecfr.eu/...
x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - FEB 7
15:2 🇷🇺/🇺🇦 added by Oryx's @Rebel44CZ - only a partial update (he will be working on the backlog this week)
VISUALLY CONFIRMED:
3.10x losses to date ⬆
2.64x counteroffensive ⬆
1.93x 30-day average ⬆
📈
https://t.co/Rh19ugheaK pic.twitter.com/gWSkzOF4EU — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦
[email protected] (@ragnarbjartur) February 7, 2023 Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast) Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Svatove and Kreminna on February 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack near Novoselivske, 13km northwest of Svatove.[15] Kremlin-sponsored news outlet RIA Novosti published footage reportedly of Russian forces repelling a Ukrainian ground attack in Novoselivske on an unspecified but likely recent date.[16] Geolocated footage posted on February 6 shows that Russian T-90 tanks firing at Ukrainian forces in Novoselivske.[17] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Kreminna and Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[18] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced several kilometers near Bilohorivka, from which the milblogger claimed Ukrainian forces had previously withdrawn.[19] Ukrainian forces still maintain a presence in Bilohorivka, as ISW has recently reported.[20] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Russian military command may be rushing to launch a large-scale offensive operation to conquer Donetsk Oblast in an unrealistic timeframe and likely without sufficient combat power. The UK MoD assessed on February 7 that Russia has highly likely been attempting to launch a major offensive operation to reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative borders since early January 2023 but had only been able to gain several hundred meters of territory per week.[3] The UK MoD attributed such a slow pace to Russian munitions shortages and a lack of maneuver units that are necessary for a successful and rapid offensive. The UK MoD noted that Russia is unlikely to build up the combat power necessary to substantially affect the outcome of the war while Russian military command continues to demand for unrealistic and sweeping advances. ISW similarly assessed on January 28 that Russian leadership may be once again planning a decisive offensive based on erroneous assumptions about Russian military capabilities and likely lacks the combat power necessary to sustain more than one major offensive operation.[4] ISW also observed the Kremlin signaling preparations for an early 2023 offensive in December but assessed that the time and space relationship may hinder Russian rapid and large-scale advance aspirations as Ukraine heads into a muddy spring season unsuitable for maneuver warfare.[5] www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas) Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on February 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhokamyanske (30km northeast) and Vesele (17km northeast); north of Bakhmut near Zaliznyanske (6km north), Krasna Hora (4km north), and Paraskoviivka (5km north); and west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske (5km west).[23] Geolocated footage published on February 6 confirms Russian tactical advances north of Bakhmut near Blahodatne (7km north of Bakhmut) and Krasna Hora.[24] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group forces are continuing efforts to take Krasna Hora and Paraskoviivka but that Ukrainian troops still hold these two settlements.[25] One milblogger claimed that Wagner has cleared up to 50 percent of Krasna Hora.[26] Several Russian sources also claimed that Wagner Group forces reached the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway but did not offer specifics on where this may have occurred.[27] Russian milbloggers continue to report that Ukrainian troops maintain control of Ivanivske, a critical settlement along the T0504.[28] Regardless of whether Wagner has reached the T0504, they are already close enough to the highway to substantially threaten Ukrainian supply capabilities along the route. The fact that the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut continues despite tangible threats to the T0504 suggests that its interdiction will not be the operationally significant victory that Russian sources have presented it as. www.understandingwar.org/... www.understandingwar.org/... x BURN RATE: Newsweek reports that RU has lost more than 25 main battle tanks in the last 48 hours. Several were destroyed during a farcical Russian attack on the city of Vuhledar.
https://t.co/HbBUQX6IGh pic.twitter.com/H6w81Bm586 — Chuck Pfarrer | Indications & Warnings | (@ChuckPfarrer) February 7, 2023 x U.S. approves sale up to $10 bln sale of HIMARS rocket launchers, ammunition to Poland
https://t.co/wWLyXFnKqe pic.twitter.com/d46xD9C8WI — Reuters (@Reuters) February 7, 2023 x Andrei Kostin, CEO of Russia’s No. 2 bank VTB blamed sanctions for the lender’s entire 2022 losses, a rare acknowledgment that Western efforts to punish Moscow over the Ukraine conflict have crippled parts of Russia’s financial sector. | @Reuters
https://t.co/6x67JtjYQd — Inquirer (@inquirerdotnet) February 7, 2023
x When it comes to Vladimir Putin and his war crimes in Ukraine, American patriots are aligned with Ukraine. Tankies are in the tank for Putin and they dominate the MAGA GOP and the right's media machine. Top Tankie? @TuckerCarlson #TankieTucker pic.twitter.com/hGB8bmXKCb — Resolute Square (@ResoluteSquare) February 3, 2023
“Beyond a certain point, the United States is no longer ‘helping’ or ‘advising’ or ‘supplying’ the Ukrainians,” writes the journalist Christopher Caldwell. “It is replacing Ukraine as Russia’s main battlefield adversary." x The NYT op-ed finally admits that "Ukraine is losing the war" and asks "with whom is Russia at war — Ukraine or the United States?" The question is whether the media propaganda bubble starts to burst.
https://t.co/qIyvjRLjHK — Ivan Katchanovski (@I_Katchanovski) February 7, 2023 Speaking last week at the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory over Germany at the battle of Stalingrad, President Vladimir Putin of Russia described the present war as a similar effort. Russians say the war is about preventing the installation of an enemy military stronghold on the Black Sea, strong enough to close off what has for centuries been Russia’s main access to the outside world. Without Ukraine, Russia can be turned into a vassal state. That NATO intends to bring about the subjugation, breakup or even extinction of Russia may be true or false — but it will not sound implausible to a Russian. Many Americans cannot resist describing Mr. Putin as a “barbarian” and his invasion of Ukraine as a “war of aggression.” For their part Russians say this is a war in which Russia is fighting for its survival and against the United States in an unfair global order in which the United States enjoys unearned privileges. We should not forget that, whatever values each side may bring to it, this war is not at heart a clash of values. It is a classic interstate war over territory and power, occurring at a border between empires. In this confrontation Mr. Putin and his Russia have fewer good options for backing down than American policymakers seem to realize, and more incentives to follow the United States all the way up the ladder of escalation. www.nytimes.com/...
x Only if they want to hear anti-American drivel and outright nonsense about Putin's aims, which are literally to destroy Ukraine. We need more Reaganism and less appeasement politics which Mr. Caldwell should know by now do not work.
https://t.co/eRw13rWgbX — Jason Pates 🇺🇸🇺🇦 (@JasonPates) February 8, 2023
x Caldwell is stuck in a 20th century mindset. For him, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill carving up Europe at Yalta brought decades of peace to Europe. Based on that, he’s now advocating for the US and Russia to similarly partition Ukraine, also in the name of peace. — Harvey B 🇺🇦 (@HarvyB3) February 7, 2023
x NYT publishes another call for Ukraine to surrender. I explain why Caldwell's argument is wrong, why negotiations cannot work right now, and what is necessary to give peace a chance.
https://t.co/Jp1HhSp2Lg — Branislav Slantchev (@slantchev) February 7, 2023 This morning I woke up to an email from Hein Goemans and a link to an op-ed in The New York Times by Christopher Caldwell. It is yet another call for the US to abandon Ukraine in order to force its surrender to Russia, dressed up as a call for negotiations. I had decided not to write about these sorts of publications, but this one seems like a good foil to explain what it is that’s holding up a negotiated solution, and it’s not what Caldwell describes. Let me briefly unpack Caldwell’s argument. He leads with a bold premise: “The United States’ recent promise to ship advanced M1 Abrams battle tanks to Ukraine was a swift response to a serious problem. The problem is that Ukraine is losing the war.” This is indeed bold because it is not supported by any facts on the ground, and all Caldwell has is a bad historical analogy to offer. Why does Caldwell think Ukraine is losing? It’s “because “because the war has settled into a World War I-style battle of attrition, complete with carefully dug trenches and relatively stable fronts. Such wars tend to be won — as indeed World War I was — by the side with the demographic and industrial resources to hold out longest. Russia has more than three times Ukraine’s population, an intact economy and superior military technology.” There are at least two problems with this. The first is that the war hasn’t “settled” into anything. We saw large swaths of territory change hands, and it was just a couple of months ago that Ukraine forced Russia to abandon Kherson and the right bank of the Dnipro River. The tempo of offensive operations did slow down because of the winter, as everyone who knows anything about war fighting expected to happen, and now the Russians are trying to regain the initiative by opening up a major offensive along almost the entire front line. The Ukrainians are fighting back ferociously, and the Russian limited gains have been exceedingly costly. This is not a stalemate anymore than an analogous operation they conducted last summer in Severodonetsk/Lysychansk was. Recall that there, too, there was relentless Russian pressure on these towns and that the stubborn Ukrainian defense made the Russians pay dearly for their capture. More to the point, it gave Ukraine time to amass the resources to launch the operation that liberated Kharkiv Oblast and started the process of pushing Russia from Kherson. If it were up to Caldwell, last summer would have been declared a “stalemate,” which it obviously was not. By all accounts, the Ukrainians are massing resources for another offensive now too — General Zaluzhnyi openly said so when said he was sorry that they could not do more for the defenders of Bakhmut, who need to buy time for that. Caldwell’s take on the war ignores every military analyst who has explained what is happening in Ukraine in favor of creating a false narrative of a stalled war. The second problem is in the tendentious way the resource comparison is being made. Russia may have three times the population of Ukraine, but it does not have an “intact economy.” And, given Western help, neither does it have “superior military technology” or even slightly dominant resources. Ukraine is supported by the West, which accounts for about three quarters of the world economy. Russia accounts for 2%, and that was before the sanctions hit it. And the sanctions are biting — yes, the Kremlin can turn plowshares into swords, but these swords are not good and while the process increases GDP, it does not feed the Russian population. Putin is tightening the screws on the Russians because the country is already groaning under the impact of Western sanctions, especially now that the oil/gas ones have started to be implemented, and the strain of war. Russia is also losing people at what should be an alarming rate in Ukraine, and the fact that it has a large population (a whole lot of which is too old to be drafted) does not make these losses easier to bear. slantchev.wordpress.com/...
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