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Ukraine Invasion Day 340: offensive operations continue with overestimated capabilities [1]
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Date: 2023-01-28
The war continues its destructive path even as the post-war economy is being planned.
The python named Kupiansk rescued by a soldier from under a Russian tank during the liberation of Kupiansk city, may be Petrusha the Python, who used to live before the Russian invasion in the local hotel complex Camelot - its employee recognized it
https://t.co/CDvmbTkf5i pic.twitter.com/tGHhTlH0tN
The Russian military leadership may once again be planning an offensive operation based on erroneous assumptions about the Russian military’s capabilities, however. Russia's military failures in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts have demonstrated time and again that Russian military leadership overestimates the Russian military‘s own capabilities. The degraded Eastern Military District naval infantry elements that are currently attacking Vuhledar will likely culminate even if they succeed in capturing the settlement.[12] The Ukrainian loss of Vuhledar, if it occurs, would not likely portend an immediate Russian breakthrough on multiple lines of advance in Donetsk or in the theater in general, therefore. Ukraine‘s spring rain season (which normally occurs around April) will degrade the terrain’s suitability for maneuver warfare. If Russian forces attempt simultaneous mechanized offensives in the next two months they would likely disrupt Ukrainian efforts to conduct a counteroffensive in the short term, but such a Russian offensive would likely prematurely culminate during the spring rain season (if not before) before achieving operationally significant effects. Russian forces’ culmination would then generate favorable conditions for Ukrainian forces to exploit in their own late spring or summer 2023 counteroffensive. Ukraine would additionally be seeing growing benefits from the incorporation of Western tank deliveries that have only just been pledged offensives on multiple axes this winter and spring is thus very questionable.
Russian forces likely lack the combat power necessary to sustain more than one major offensive operation while fixing Ukrainian forces in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts. There is no open-source evidence to suggest that Russian forces have regenerated sufficient combat power from their losses in the early phases of the war to enable Russian forces to conduct simultaneous large-scale mechanized offensives in the next several months. The Russian military has not demonstrated the capability to conduct simultaneous combined arms offensive operations since early 2022. Russia’s most recent gains around Bakhmut relied on months of human wave attacks to secure territorial gains around Bakhmut by brute force at tremendous human costs. Russia’s earlier capture of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in summer 2022 also did not utilize combined arms but instead relied on large-scale rolling artillery barrages to methodically destroy Ukrainian positions. Russian forces are experiencing growing artillery ammunition shortages that would prevent them from repeating these tactics.[10] It is unlikely, moreover, that the conventional Russian military will be willing to take the kinds of horrific losses the human wave tactic has inflicted on Wagner’s convicts.
x Germany and the US have agreed to send tanks to Ukraine, with Berlin supplying the Leopard 2 and Washington the M1 Abrams. But will the tanks change the course of the conflict?
We asked a Ukrainian officer in the front-line city of Bakhmut to explain ⤵️ pic.twitter.com/qZjBMO1Zv4 — Al Jazeera English (@AJEnglish) January 28, 2023
Russian forces are attempting to prevent Ukraine from regaining the initiative possibly ahead of a planned decisive Russian offensive in Donbas. Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov stated on December 22 that Russian forces are focusing most of their efforts on seizing Donetsk Oblast, which likely entails Russian forces capturing key positions in western Luhansk Oblast and northeastern Donetsk Oblast to reach the oblasts’ administrative borders.[7] Russian forces have resumed ground attacks in the Vuhledar area (which they unsuccessfully attempted to reach in late October 2022) and are conducting small-scale assaults in Zaporizhia Oblast and around Donetsk City. Russian forces are conducting a large-scale offensive operation on the Bakhmut frontline as their current main effort and a defensive operation, for now, on the Svatove-Kreminna line.[8]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian forces reportedly continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 28. Geolocated footage published on January 28 indicates that Russian forces have made marginal advances near Hryanykivka, Kharkiv Oblast (53km northwest of Svatove) and likely hold positions near Novovodyane, Luhansk Oblast (24km northwest of Kreminna).[22] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults near Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna) in the direction of Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna) and Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[23] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 28 that Ukrainian forces conducted reconnaissance-in-force operations along the Nevske-Terny line on January 26 and 27.[24] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[25]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on January 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut itself, within 18km north of east of Bakhmut near Rozdolivka and Krasna Hora, 6km west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske, and within 20km south of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Druzhba.[31] Geolocated footage published on January 26 indicates that Russian forces have likely advanced to the northwestern outskirts of Sil (14km north of Bakhmut).[32] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters pushed Ukrainian forces back from positions north of Sil and that Russian forces conducted assaults in the direction of Paraskoviivka (9km north of Bakhmut) and Verkhnokamianske (32km northeast of Bakhmut).[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces captured a stronghold west of the Bakhmutka River near Paraskoviivka and Krasna Hora (7km north of Bakhmut).[34] Geolocated footage published on January 28 indicates that Russian forces made marginal advances in the northeastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[35] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters continued assaults in the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[36] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian assault squads pushed Ukrainian forces from positions near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) back to Ivanivske and advanced to Bila Hora (15km southwest of Bakhmut) from the Siversky Donets-Donbas canal.[37] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia claimed that the 132nd Brigade of the 1st Army Corps continued successful offensive operations in the direction of Toretsk (23km southwest of Bakhmut) and recaptured lost positions from Ukrainian forces.[38]
www.understandingwar.org/...
x In Donetsk region, in the Avdiyivka direction, the rashists shelled Berdychi, Avdiyivka, Vesele, Vodyane, Nevel's'ke, Krasnohorivka, Mar'yinka and Novomykhaylivka.
In the Novopavlivs'k direction the invaders shelled Bohoyavlenka, Vuhledar and Zolota Nyva.
2/2 pic.twitter.com/gsa1XZ2hh3 — Michael MacKay (@mhmck) January 28, 2023
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian sources did not report any Russian ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast for the second consecutive day on January 28. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov, who began the Russian information operation of a Russian offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast, has not commented on Russian ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast since January 26.[49] Russian sources reported only routine artillery fire without mentioning any ground assaults on January 28.[50] One Russian milblogger claimed on January 27 that poor weather during the day prevents Russian forces from firing artillery and that Russian forces are unable to advance at night due to a complicated network of fortifications on the front lines.[51] The current lack of reporting and evidence of Russian advances continues to support ISW’s assessment that Russian forces only conducted limited offensive operations in Zaporizhia Oblast.[52]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Missile attack on Zaporizhzhia
x Russian occupation regime brings in 800 Russian police officers to Zaporizhzhia Oblast | Ukrainska Pravda
https://t.co/zmlLHIqUKA #Ukraine #UkraineRussiaWar #UkraineUnderAttack #UkraineWarNews — Sue Stone (standing with 🇺🇦) (@knittingknots) January 28, 2023
Russian forces continued to strike routine areas in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts on January 28.[53] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck the Zaporizhstal plant in Zaporizhzhia City with an Iskander missile overnight on January 27-28.[54] www.understandingwar.org/...
x 🔥 A SUV covered with Putin's swastikas burned down in #Moscow
What an amazing coincidence. pic.twitter.com/pMebPx22XT — NEXTA (@nexta_tv) January 28, 2023
x FLASHBACK: This story by @MarcusReports is still as relevant as when it was written a year ago: Can Ukraine Really Use Donated Fighter Jets? That Depends |
https://t.co/dmMgF2iihs — Defense One (@DefenseOne) January 28, 2023
Perhaps the most eye-popping of today’s pledges to ship weapons to the Ukrainian military was the European Union’s announcement that it would soon send fighter jets. Would Ukrainian pilots really be able to jump in a donated jet and fly into combat?
Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle says sure, if it’s a type they already know how to fly.
“It really would not be a big step, going from a Ukrainian MiG-29 to a Polish MiG-29,” said Carlisle, a retired general who oversaw U.S. Air Force fighter jets as head of Air Combat Command.
The EU official who made Sunday’s announcement said he understands that the Ukrainian Air Force has no time to get up to speed on unfamiliar aircraft.
“They need the kind of fighters…that the Ukrainian force is able to operate,” EU policy chief Josep Borrell said. “We know what kind of planes, and some member states have these kinds of planes.” Borrell did not say what kinds those were.
But according to the Flight International 2022 World Air Forces database, the Ukrainian air force flies Soviet-made MiG-29s and three types of Sukhoi jets. Three NATO nations, Poland, Slovakia, and Bulgaria, also fly the MiG-29, a twin-engine fighter jet developed in the 1970s. Bulgaria also flies the Su-25, a close-air support jet also flown by Ukraine.
Since Ukraine already flies the MiG-29, its Air Force pilots could immediately fly MiG-29s flown by other countries without any major training, Carlisle said. Pilots typically must go through a training course before climbing into the cockpit of a new type of jet.
“It's not like driving a Chevy and then driving a Dodge,” Carlisle said. It takes a bit to transition airplanes between makers, as well as within makers, if it's a different type of airplane.”
www.defenseone.com/...
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