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Ukraine Invasion Day 332: not about to attack Moscow [1]
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Date: 2023-01-20
The Kremlin continues to falsely claim that Ukraine poses existential threat to Russia. Russia's Representative to the UN responded to Ukrainian proposals for a peace summit on Jan. 13 with false claims framing Ukraine as an aggressor that was “about to attack Moscow.”
A Russian strike on an apartment complex in the central Ukrainian city was one of the deadliest for civilians away from the front line since the war began. The attack prompted
Efforts to have stepped up in recent weeks as the war enters a critical phase. So far missing from the new military aid infusion pledged by Western nations are American and German-made tanks that Ukraine’s leaders say
The lack of agreement was certain to disappoint many in Ukraine, including President Zelensky, who had appealed directly to the officials before the talks began. “Hundreds of thank-yous are not hundreds of tanks,” he said in a video address. “All of us can use thousands of words in discussions, but I cannot use words instead of guns.”
Mr. Scholz’s real concern, they suspect, is that he does not believe the world is ready to see German tanks near the borders of Russia, a reminder of the Nazi invasion in World War II. One senior American official said this week that if Mr. Scholz and the German public are worried about that, in these circumstances “they are the only ones who are.”
The British Challengers and German Leopards are more flexible and easier to run. But in public, Mr. Austin and others avoided criticizing Mr. Scholz, who in their view has managed the biggest reversal of German foreign policy — starting with the suspension of two pipelines bringing gas from Russia — quite skillfully.
American officials were clearly frustrated after their negotiations with the German government this week. Germany had begun by saying that it would send Leopard tanks, and authorize others to, if the United States sent its M-1 Abrams tank as well. The United States declined, saying the tank is such a gas guzzler — it employs a jet engine — and requires such a supply line to keep running that it would not be useful in Ukraine’s environment. (The officials dodged questions about why a tank so difficult to operate on European battlefields is in the American arsenal.)
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued offensive operations near Svatove on January 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Novoselivkse (15km northwest of Svatove).[35] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near neighboring Kuzemivka (15km northwest of Svatove) and that Russian forces are in a dangerous position as they have no other settlements to fall back to in the immediate area.[36] Former Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Minister Vitaly Kiselev published footage on January 20 of Russian forces using thermobaric artillery systems against a Ukrainian position near Novoselivske.[37] The use of a military district-level asset indicates that Russian forces may be prioritizing the frontline north of Svatove. A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 6th Tank Regiment of the 90th Tank Division of the Central Military District have been operating in the Svatove area since late October 2022.[38]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on January 20. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut itself, within 32km north of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamiankse, Krasnopolivka, Soledar, and Krasna Hora; and within 16km southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske and Dyliivka.[43] Geolocated footage published on January 19 indicates that Russian forces have likely captured the eastern part of Sil (15km north of Bakhmut).[44] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group fighters conducted an assault near Blahodatne (12km north of Bakhmut) and continued attempts to advance in the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[45] German outlet Der Spiegel reported that the German Intelligence Service has intelligence that indicates that Ukrainian forces are losing a three-digit number of soldiers every day in the Bakhmut area.[46] Fighting in the Bakhmut area continues to be highly attritional for Russian forces as well. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Territorial Defense claimed that Russian forces captured Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) on January 20, following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s claim that Wagner Group fighters captured the settlement on January 19.[47] The Russian MoD referred to Wagner Group fighters once again as "volunteers of assault detachments" likely to downplay the Wagner Group’s role in tactical advances while also shielding itself from previous criticism that it does not acknowledge the Wagner Group’s involvement in such claimed advances.[48]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast are still likely preparing for a defensive operation in the long term despite recent claims of territorial gains. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces made territorial gains in Zaporizhia Oblast on January 20. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and several Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified elements of the Russian Eastern Military District (EMD) seized Lobokove, 25km southwest of Orikhiv.[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that unspecified elements of the 5th Combined Arms Army of the EMD and the 58th Combined Arms Army of the Southern Military District (SMD) also seized Maly Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, and Novoandriivka southwest of Orikhiv, and Novodanylivka, Mala Tokmachka, and Bilohirya to the southeast of Orikhiv to enable direct ground attacks against the settlement from multiple sides.[57] Prominent Russian nationalist media outlet Tsargrad reported that the claims are unverified.[58] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Stepove (20km southwest of Orikhiv) and Mala Tokmachka (7km southeast of Orikhiv), contrary to the Russian claims.[59] A milblogger reposted January 19 battle footage from the Ukrainian General Staff showing a platoon-sized (30 people) group of Russian forces from the 58th Combined Arms Army conducting a ground attack in Zaporizhia Oblast.[60] The milblogger criticized Russian military command for allowing Russian forces to attempt a ground attack without heavy weapons or armored vehicle support, suggesting that Russian forces currently lack or are unwilling to dedicate the equipment necessary to sustain a prolonged offensive in Zaporizhia Oblast.[61] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces may have conducted the localized attack to locate Ukrainian defensive positions for an upcoming offensive but conceded that Russian forces are only able to conduct limited operations with their current amounts of ammunition and manpower.[62]
www.understandingwar.org/...
x A number of Telegram channels claimed this occurred a week ago, but Sladkov is a more credible source. Teplinsky appears to have been successful as the VDV commander, and he is popular among Russian channels, so this doesn't appear to be a performance-related change. 2/ — Rob Lee (@RALee85) January 20, 2023
x The VDV obviously has many leaders will a lot of combat experience in this war, and none of them were chosen. If this is true, it is an indication that the recent C2 changes are not necessarily driven by military needs, but by internal dynamics. 4/ — Rob Lee (@RALee85) January 20, 2023
x From the beginning of the Russian invasion, arguments over provision of different weapons & technologies to #Ukraine have been waged in Europe and the US. Perhaps the most long-standing, and important, is provision of American or European tanks. 1/22 🧵🇺🇦 pic.twitter.com/94A0htsCug — Mick Ryan, AM (@WarintheFuture) January 19, 2023
2/ My aim in this thread is not to argue whether they should be provided. I think it is obvious they should. If Russia can deploy T90s or even its new T-14s (according to British Intelligence), why are we denying similar capabilities to #Ukraine? My aim in this thread is not to argue whether they should be provided. I think it is obvious they should. If Russia can deploy T90s or even its new T-14s (according to British Intelligence), why are we denying similar capabilities to
3/ The objective here is to explore the considerations for the introduction of western tanks into the Ukrainian armed forces. The need is well established. Tanks are a valuable part of the modern combined arms team. Tanks save lives!
4/ The first consideration is availability. The Ukrainians need tanks now, so waiting to set up production lines to build new tanks for 2023 is not viable. Which tanks are available now?
5/ A part of availability is quantity. The Ukrainians are likely to need hundreds of new tanks (300-500) for the offensives to come. A dozen won’t cut it. This requirement alone restricts the types of tanks that might be provided. Tanks, no tanks: Scholz holds key to Leopards for Ukraine, but waits for Biden
6/ A second consideration is how western tanks will fit into the current Ukrainian military. These are doctrinal and organization issues. However, given Ukraine has long operated a large tank fleet, this is a minor concern. They know how to do this & can do so better than most.
7/ A third consideration is strategic sustainability. What are the depot maintenance capabilities in Ukraine? Depot level maintenance of tanks and their power packs – as well as the electronic subsystems – will be a key part of introducing western tanks.
8/ Ukraine has already been fulfilling these functions for its current large fleet of tanks. A new system isn’t required, but some modifications might be needed. But given the demonstrated capacity of Ukraine to adapt in this war, it is very possible. Ukraine has already been fulfilling these functions for its current large fleet of tanks. A new system isn’t required, but some modifications might be needed. But given the demonstrated capacity of Ukraine to adapt in this war, it is very possible.
9/ A fourth consideration is training. New systems always require evolved training systems whether it is the introduction of different technologies and techniques, new simulators, and training aids (engines, driver training, guns, subsystems, ammo, ranges, etc). A fourth consideration is training. New systems always require evolved training systems whether it is the introduction of different technologies and techniques, new simulators, and training aids (engines, driver training, guns, subsystems, ammo, ranges, etc).
10/ Once again, as an existing tank operator, many of these systems already exist in Ukraine. But they will require modification. And potentially, training supplementation in other countries will be needed to speed up absorption of the tanks into Ukraine's army and its schools.
11/ A fifth consideration is battlefield combat support for the tanks. By this I mean the engineering and command vehicles that are integral to heavy armour operations. While Ukraine has some capacity here, bridging, ploughs and other vehicles might also be needed. A fifth consideration is battlefield combat support for the tanks. By this I mean the engineering and command vehicles that are integral to heavy armour operations. While Ukraine has some capacity here, bridging, ploughs and other vehicles might also be needed.
12/ A 6th consideration is battlefield logistic support. Fuel trucks (tanks need lots), low loaders, recovery vehicles like the Hercules will probably all need to be part of any tank fleet provided to Ukraine. And, ammunition of several types will be needed in large quantities. A 6th consideration is battlefield logistic support. Fuel trucks (tanks need lots), low loaders, recovery vehicles like the Hercules will probably all need to be part of any tank fleet provided to Ukraine. And, ammunition of several types will be needed in large quantities.
13/ Once again, as an existing user of tanks, #Ukraine understands these requirements and the battlefield systems and organisations needed to ensure tanks are supported and maintained on the battlefield. It is about modification, not establishing new organisations for Ukraine. Once again, as an existing user of tanks,understands these requirements and the battlefield systems and organisations needed to ensure tanks are supported and maintained on the battlefield. It is about modification, not establishing new organisations for Ukraine.
14/ A 7th consideration is a digital battle command support system. Tanks play a vital role as a protected hub for digital information management and command on the battlefield. It is a force multiplier on the modern battlefield.
15/ So this will be an important consideration for which tanks go to Ukraine. And, we will need to ensure that this digital system can be linked to other parts of the combined arms team.
16/ While there will be other challenges, the provision of a tank fleet will involve all of these considerations. They each interact – ticking them off individually is almost never possible.
17/ But, the Ukrainians have demonstrated throughout this war that they are very capable of integrating very complex hardware and weapons quickly. They are an adaptive, learning institution with a strong imperative for constant improvement.
18/ We need to stop looking for excuses like ‘this is a complex system’. I don’t recall these arguments when M1 tanks went to Iraq, or Egypt.
19/ And as someone who commanded a brigade with M1 tanks, if the Australian Army with its very light logistic footprint (and lack of tank strategic sustainment for the first decade in service) can do it, the Ukrainians definitely can!
20/ Final point – as I have written almost since the start of the war, at some point we need to start providing common fleets to Ukraine. The provision of tanks is the opportunity to provide Ukraine with a single type to simplify maintenance, training, ammunition, digital comms.
21/ Given need for commonality, and the considerations in this thread, there are only 2 solutions: the M1 tank and the Leo 2. Both are huge fleets, which could be made available. Providing them is not escalatory. It just takes political courage. End. washingtonpost.com/world/2023/01/… Given need for commonality, and the considerations in this thread, there are only 2 solutions: the M1 tank and the Leo 2. Both are huge fleets, which could be made available. Providing them is not escalatory. It just takes political courage. End.
22/ Thank you to the following whose links and images were used in this thread: @washingtonpost @DefenceHQ @DefenceU @Militarylandnet @POLITICOEurope @defence_insider Thank you to the following whose links and images were used in this thread:
• • •
x Dmitry Medvedev, the deputy head of Russia’s Security Council and key ally of President Vladimir Putin, has warned that defeat for Russia in Ukraine could lead to nuclear conflict
https://t.co/4GswNNhIaY — CNN International (@cnni) January 20, 2023
x After photos showed a Pantsir-S air defense system on the roof of the Russian Defense Ministry and other buildings in Moscow, the Kremlin declined to comment.
https://t.co/OuOXH7DsUz — The Washington Post (@washingtonpost) January 21, 2023
A report in the Russian media claims that the first production examples of the country’s Poseidon nuclear-powered, nuclear-tipped, ultra-long-endurance torpedoes have been built. These will initially be provided to the Russian Navy’s shadowy Project 09852 Belgorod, the world’s longest submarine — but, at this stage, it’s unclear if the torpedoes actually have their nuclear warheads fitted.
According to Russia’s state-run TASS news agency, “the first batch of Poseidon ammunition has been manufactured” for the Belgorod and will be delivered “soon.” Citing “a source close to the Russian military and defense industry,” the same report says that trials have already been completed of various components related to the Poseidon torpedo, including its nuclear powerplant. Previous examples of Poseidon were produced for developmental and test use, including the one seen in the video below, published by the Russian Ministry of Defense, but the latest announcement suggests that series production of the torpedoes, or at the very least a larger pre-production batch, has commenced. www.thedrive.com/...
"The war in #UKraine is not just a another conventional conflict in Europe, but a fight for universal values of sovereignty, decolonization, #democracy."
~ Michael McFaul
x Progressive, Anti-Imperialist, Democrats of the World, Unite!
https://t.co/QLYcCVDDJZ — Michael McFaul (@McFaul) January 20, 2023
x Planning for every contingency, yes. Using worst-case scenarios as an excuse for inaction in the face of evil, never. Ukraine must win, and the sooner the better for the world. Our post-Putin plan to cure Russia of the imperial virus:
https://t.co/gm60UQwEz2 — Garry Kasparov (@Kasparov63) January 20, 2023
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