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Ukraine Invasion Day 329: what does a 'lasting' Russian victory look like [1]
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Date: 2023-01-17
"Visual Capitalist @VisualCapThe tank, an armored all-terrain fighting vehicle, revolutionized the way we fight when introduced during WWI Since then, despite some commentators predicting the end of the tank era, they remain a cornerstone of 21st century armies." Russia is in effect losing 2-4x the tank losses that Ukraine is losing."
The invaders are conducting offensive operations in Bakhmut and Avdiyivka districts in Donetsk region and "suffering significant losses in manpower." The only lasting Russian victory would erase Ukraine and relegate any remaining nation to the pseudo-autonomy of a vassal state.
A victory in Soledar would be more symbolic than strategic, military analysts say. Russia has been deprived of wins in recent months, so any kind of success could help maintain support for Putin’s war. But Soledar itself likely will not play a major role in retaking Bakhmut or the greater region of Donbas, which has been one of Putin’s primary targets. Another success for Putin in recent months is the lack of battlefield losses. Russian defenses appear to have held in the east and south. Again, analysts expected that battlefield lines would not move much during the winter. But that was not always guaranteed; Ukraine, for one, promised to continue its offensive push even in the winter months. That hasn’t happened, allowing Russia to hold territory. [...] But with proper preparation and some luck, the worst has not come to pass. European nations stocked up on gas from alternative sources, like the U.S., Nigeria and Qatar. And the winter proved to be relatively warm, allowing Europeans to avoid some of the higher fuel prices, as my colleague Somini Sengupta wrote. Subsequently, Western unity around Ukraine has held. If anything, it has strengthened. Western powers are promising Ukraine tanks and other armored vehicles, discarding fears that providing these weapons would be seen as too provocative by Russia. “The debate is not about whether to do less but how to do more for Ukraine,” Julian Barnes said. Rescue workers are still digging through the ruins of the apartment building in Dnipro, Ukraine, after the deadly missile attack there on Saturday.
Russians and Ukrainians are learning to live together in Bali, Indonesia.
The families of detainees in Russian-occupied territories are hoping for a further Ukrainian counteroffensive. www.nytimes.com/...
The risk – not a prediction – is that if Ukraine commits its reserves to a spring offensive and takes heavy casualties it could become vulnerable later in the year. Maximising the gains achievable in the spring and limiting the cost in Ukrainian lives for an offensive is key to mitigating this risk. For this task, Nato-designed armoured vehicles such as the Bradleys and Marders already promised alongside potential future deliveries of Leopard 2 main battle tanks, would be ideal. Fielded in sufficient numbers, these vehicles would protect the Ukrainian troops from artillery while they advance and help to knock out Russian armour and bunkers. The provision of Nato armour to support manoeuvres would also help resolve the supply limitations Ukraine’s partners are finding in the provision of artillery ammunition. Without armour, the Ukrainian armed forces are likely to be more reliant on artillery and therefore fire more ammunition to advance. Armour offers Ukrainian troops the prospect of making greater gains firing fewer shells. Despite these sound operational reasons for providing Ukraine with armour, the provision of Nato-designed main battle tanks presents some major challenges. The Leopard 2, weighing about 69 tonnes, and Challenger 2, weighing 72 tonnes, are more than 20 tonnes heavier than the Soviet-designed main battle tanks currently operated by Ukraine. There is little Ukrainian infrastructure along which such heavy vehicles can travel, while their engineering and recovery vehicles are optimised to support Soviet designs. Putting aside the training needed to maintain and fight with Nato-designed tanks, they would also need to be provided alongside combat engineering and mobility support vehicles if they were to be employable at any scale. It is this requirement for enablers that poses hard choices on Nato members wanting to offer Ukraine their vehicles. After the cold war, frontline tank fleets declined significantly, while the cutbacks in bridging, breaching and transport and recovery vehicles have been even more severe. Most countries operate the bare minimum of these vehicles to meet their Nato commitments and even in these small fleets vehicle unavailability due to low maintenance is a problem because of underinvestment during the “war on terror”. www.theguardian.com/...
Key Takeaways Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced on January 17 that he will implement Russian President Vladimir Putin's directive to conduct large-scale military reforms between 2023-2026 to expand Russia's conventional armed forces, likely in preparation for a protracted war in Ukraine and also to set conditions to build a significantly stronger Russian military quickly.
Putin may announce a second mobilization wave in the coming days, possibly as soon as January 18.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is trying to improve professionalism within the Russian armed forces and likely test and improve the effectiveness of its chains of command down to the small unit level.
Several prominent voices in the pro-war information space seized on these guidelines to support further criticisms of the Russian MoD, suggesting that the MoD will likely face stiff resistance.
Serbian President Alexander Vucic called on the Wagner Group to cease recruitment in Serbia.
Russian forces continued to conduct limited counterattacks near Kreminna as Ukrainian officials continued to suggest that Russian forces may be preparing for a decisive effort in Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continued offensive actions across the Donetsk Oblast front line.
The Russian information space is struggling to portray tactical Russian gains around Soledar as operationally significant.
Russian forces in Kherson Oblast continue to struggle to maintain their logistics efforts in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast due to Ukrainian strikes.
A Russian occupation official claimed that Putin will make an "important statement" pertaining to the war in Ukraine on January 18.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be attempting to establish the Wagner Group as a legal entity in Russia. www.understandingwar.org/...
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