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Ukraine Invasion Day 325: six more weeks of copium and beavers? [1]
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Date: 2023-01-13
High-ranking Ukrainian officials continue to forecast an intensification of Ukrainian and Russian operations in the spring of 2023 and that a Russian offensive from Belarus remains unlikely.
The announcement sparked a significant backlash within the Russian information space due to the Russian MoD’s failure to acknowledge the Wagner Group's participation in the capture of Soledar. The Russian MoD issued a follow-up announcement six hours later recognizing Wagner volunteers and assault detachments as participants in the Battle for Soledar and noting that the Russian MoD received numerous inquiries regarding its original commemoration of select Russian forces.[4] The Russian MoD attempted to justify their snub of Wagner by claiming that a Russian “heterogeneous grouping of troops” executed a “joint plan” in the Soledar direction and attributed the assault against residential areas to Wagner forces. Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin vaguely responded to the Russian MoD’s omission of Wagner, stating that he cannot comment on the situation and noting that journalists’ questions about the matter expose their concern over commemorating Wagner’s “heroic capture of Soledar.”[5]
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on January 13 that Russian forces seized Soledar, Donetsk Oblast, on the evening of January 12. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces can now form a “cauldron” around Bakhmut and threaten Ukrainian supply lines running southwest of Soledar that support Ukrainian troops in the city.[1] The Russian MoD notably praised assault and army aviation, missile and artillery troops, and Russian airborne forces for seizing Soledar, without acknowledging Wagner Group’s participation in the fighting for the city. Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov maintained that the situation around Soledar is difficult and noted that it is unclear if Russian forces control the settlement at this time. At the same time, other Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued to fight in Soledar during the night of January 12-13.[2] Ukrainian forces may still occupy some positions on the northwestern borders of Soledar but are unlikely to control significant territory within the settlement itself. ISW assessed on January 12 that Russian forces had likely captured Soledar on January 11, but such a victory is unlikely to presage an imminent Russian encirclement of Bakhmut.[3]
Chancellor Scholz's excuses for not sending MBTs have fallen apart. Months of time & lives have been lost. It's time to put this debate to rest & #FreeTheLeopards pic.twitter.com/ZWsyaNRApv
That list doesn’t show the true picture. There are only 2,000 Leopard tanks in Europe. And over 1,000 of them are from countries that barely help Ukraine. Ukraine isn’t getting Abrams, and France won’t give many of their tanks if any at all. And UK only has 227 Challenger 2 tanks pic.twitter.com/fkqY3Y4jzs
Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly ordered Russian occupation authorities to deport Ukrainian children to Russia using medical schemes at a meeting with members of the Russian Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights (HRC) on December 7. The Kremlin published a list of official orders on January 12 that Putin gave to HRC members on December 7. The document includes an order for Russian occupation officials to take unspecified measures to “meet healthcare system needs” in occupied Ukraine.[33] Zaporizhia Oblast Occupation Deputy Vladimir Rogov stated on January 12 that Putin personally ordered occupation authorities to administer preventative medical examinations to children in occupied Ukraine and that over 110,000 Ukrainian students have undergone medical examinations in occupied Zaporizhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts.[34] Rogov stated that over 450 Russian “specialists” from Crimea and Adygea are conducting these examinations and are discovering thousands of children with undiagnosed medical conditions and sending them – possibly to Russia – for “treatment.”[35] Putin previously thanked Russians for their efforts to send children from occupied Ukrainian territory on “holidays” in Russia in his annual New Year’s speech.[36] ISW has previously reported instances of Russian officials using the guise of “holidays” and vacation schemes to justify the transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea.[37] ISW maintains that the forced deportation of Ukrainian children represents a possible violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
VOLYN REGION, Ukraine, Jan 12 (Reuters) - Burst river banks, thick mud and waterlogged fields could be seen for miles around northwest Ukraine's border with Belarus on Thursday, making the prospect of a Russian assault from across the border unlikely for now despite recent warnings from Kyiv.
Ukrainian soldiers near the Belarusian border say that the high number of beaver dams, which locals haven’t cleared because of the war, have helped flood the Volyn swamps- making the area much easier to defend
Ukrainian officials have warned of a new looming Russian assault, with Belarus to the north named as one possible launchpad, as Moscow seeks to revive its faltering invasion.
joint military grouping in Belarus and plan to hold joint aviation drills there from next Monday. Russia and its close ally Belarus have beefed up theirin Belarus and plan to hold joint aviation drills there from next Monday.
Against this backdrop, the borderland's thick forests and treacherous swamps are guarded by the Volyn territorial defence brigade, one of hundreds of Ukrainian units recruited from local people willing to defend their communities.
On the sidelines of training exercises several kilometres south of the Russian border, soldiers and officers from the unit told Reuters how the unusually mild winter had given them a considerable tactical advantage.
www.reuters.com/...
COPIUM: Lying to yourself in order to cope with something. A metaphorical opiate inhaled when faced with loss, failure or defeat, especially in sports, politics and other tribal settings. The effects of copium include, but are not limited to: extreme rationalizations for the defeat, outlandish theories of conspiracy supposedly perpetrated by the opposing side, extreme rage directed at the other side . www.urbandictionary.com/...
There are 3 internal political factions around Putin: the oligarchs with "liberal" tendencies, the classic Siloviki, and the "crazy" far right: Kadyrov, Prygozhyn, etc. The appointment of Gerasimov is a snub to the far right.
Ukrainian officials and some in the West have said that Russia will soon try to launch a new offensive. In its statement on Wednesday announcing General Gerasimov’s appointment, Russia’s defense ministry hinted at a renewed campaign, tying the decision to the “increased scale” of Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.
The statement also cited the need “to organize closer interaction” between various troop formations” and increase “the effectiveness of management of troops.”
Mark Galeotti, who studies Russian security affairs, said on Twitter that the move was “confirmation, if we needed it, that there will be serious offensives coming, and that even Putin recognizes that poor coordination has been an issue.”
The move is “at least the most poisoned of chalices,” Mr. Galeotti said. “It’s now on him, and I suspect Putin has unrealistic expectations again.”
The appointment is also seen as an attempt to keep in check the increasingly vocal Yevgeny Prigozhin, whose Wagner group mercenaries have publicly criticized General Gerasimov.
www.nytimes.com/...
x Have just talked to a soldier whose battalion was withdrawn from near Soledar. He said about the Wagner that "They attack...as if they're more afraid of what is behind them than of us". He also said that the 🇺🇦army will stand, no matter what, and his battalion will return — Iuliia Mendel (@IuliiaMendel) January 13, 2023
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Soledar on January 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 19km north of Soledar near Spirne, Rozdolivka, and Sil, and within 6km southwest of Soledar near Krasna Hora and Pidhorodne.[43] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults near Bilohorivka (12km northeast of Soledar) and Berestove (15km northeast of Soledar).[44] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces captured the railway station in Sil (5km northwest of Soledar) and blocked the settlement from three sides, although ISW cannot independently verify these claims.[45] Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces continue to defend Soledar and Ukrainian drone footage posted on January 13 indicates that Ukrainian forces likely hold positions near the settlement, though ISW cannot confirm the presence of Ukrainian forces within the settlement itself.[46] CNN published a video report on January 13 from a Ukrainian trench roughly three kilometers away from Soledar stating that Ukrainian forces seem to be conducting an organized withdrawal from the settlement.[47] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are still conducting clearing operations in Soledar as of January 13.[48] These reports indicate that Ukrainian forces maintain an organized defense west of Soledar and that Russian forces are likely prioritizing stabilizing their control of Soledar before attempting further advances. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have successfully cut Ukrainian forces in Dvorichchia (4km west of Soledar) off from supply routes from Bakhmut and Siversk.[49] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are conducting assault operations on the outskirts of Paraskoviivka (5km west of Soledar) and Krasna Hora (5km southwest of Soledar).[50] Geolocated footage published on January 12 and 13 shows Ukrainian forces operating in Krasna Hora despite Russian milblogger claims that Russian forces captured the settlement.[51]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued defensive preparations along the southern axis on January 13.[65] Odesa Military Administration Spokesperson Serhiy Bratchuk posted on January 13 a photo of a segment of Russian fortifications in western Crimea, reportedly situated between Zaozerne and Molochne.[66] Ukrainian Operational Command South Spokesperson Natalya Humenyuk stated on January 13 that poor weather conditions around the Kinburn Spit have complicated both Ukrainian reconnaissance efforts and Russian transit efforts.[67] Russian forces continued routine strikes on the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River on January 13.[68]
www.understandingwar.org/...
x Earlier this week, I published a thread that was the first of two parts examining how #Ukraine and Russia might think about – and plan – the inevitable offensives to come in 2023. The #Gerasimov appointment pushed this second part back a couple of days! 1/25 🧵 pic.twitter.com/F5qF8VycwE — Mick Ryan, AM (@WarintheFuture) January 13, 2023
2/ In Part 1, I proposed seven considerations for those planning these offensives: purpose; design; timing; location; resources; adaptation; & politics. I then examined the first 4 in detail. Today, I explore the final 3 considerations.
(Part 1👇)
3/ Resources. Offensive operations are hugely expensive in recon assets (to find, fix and kill the enemy), artillery, armour and mobility support (engineers), logistics and air support. Multitudes of each, combined in Brigades, Divisions or Corps, will be needed.
4/ Follow on forces are also needed. Whether they are military police for traffic control, civil police and emergency services or reconstruction personnel, once territory and towns is liberated, Ukrainian government authority needs to be re-established.
5/ For Russia, part of assembling resources for 2023 has been their recent mobilisation efforts. While chaotic at times, they appear to have achieved some efficiencies, which has resulted in large numbers of mobilised troops being sent to the front. 6/ How these troops will be used is already becoming clear. In the withdrawal from Kherson, mobilised troops were often used as disposal rear guards as more valuable and elite formations withdrew across the Dnipro.
7/ And in the Battle of , mobilised troops are used in human waves, essentially as ‘bullet catchers’ so other units behind them might be able to exploit any gains they make. We will probably see more of this in the campaigns to come. And in the Battle of #Bakhmut , mobilised troops are used in human waves, essentially as ‘bullet catchers’ so other units behind them might be able to exploit any gains they make. We will probably see more of this in the campaigns to come.
8/ Ukraine too is recruiting troops as replacements as well as continuing to build new formations for 2023. These troops however appear to be getting a higher standard of training, including in NATO countries, and better equipment. This will be important in the battles of 2023. Ukraine too is recruiting troops as replacements as well as continuing to build new formations for 2023. These troops however appear to be getting a higher standard of training, including in NATO countries, and better equipment. This will be important in the battles of 2023.
9/ Strategic support will also be necessary for both sides. Ukrainian industry, and western aid donors, will be required to provide weapons, ammunition and other support for the current defensive campaign, as well as building up huge stocks for any offensive.
10/ The provision of newer IFVs and western tanks – as well as their support vehicles like recovery vehicles, engineer vehicles, fuel trucks and low loaders – will be critical aspects of this support, as will be the fuel and ammunition for them.
11/ If Ukraine is conducting break-in battles as part of its offensives, this armoured capability will be vital. But so will the provision of intelligence on Russia’s intentions, troop movements and logistic support. washingtonpost.com/world/2023/01/… If Ukraine is conducting break-in battles as part of its offensives, this armoured capability will be vital. But so will the provision of intelligence on Russia’s intentions, troop movements and logistic support.
12/ As part of this support, western industry also needs to increase production of munitions.
13/ For the Russians, they are starting to run short on the munitions and weapons that were stockpiled over decades during the Cold War. Russia will have to increase the output of its defence industry and seek foreign sources of supply. Russia is running short of long-range missiles, say Western officials
14/ Adaptive Campaigning. Probing for opportunity is necessary even after planning is complete and an offensive has been launched. The Ukrainians – especially at the tactical level – have been superior to the Russians at recognising and exploiting battlefield opportunities.
15/ As a 2022 RUSI report notes, the Russians “are culturally vulnerable to deception because they lack the ability to rapidly fuse information, are culturally averse to providing those who are executing orders with the context to exercise judgement.” Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022
16/ The Ukrainians therefore have a greater capacity to deceive the Russians about main and supporting efforts, exploit opportunities where they appear, and to re-orient offensives (or conduct immediate subsequent operations) where possible.
17/ In every offensive both sides start by fighting ‘with’ information. As the battle develops, both sides fight ‘for’ information. With this they will seek heretofore unidentified opportunities to adapt to exploit weaknesses in their enemy’s plan, morale or scheme of maneuver. In every offensive both sides start by fighting ‘with’ information. As the battle develops, both sides fight ‘for’ information. With this they will seek heretofore unidentified opportunities to adapt to exploit weaknesses in their enemy’s plan, morale or scheme of maneuver.
18/ Politics. A final consideration, for both sides for their offensives in 2023 will be politics. As Clausewitz tells us: “War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.”
19/ Every offensive in 2023 will be connected to the political situation. The recent installation of Gerasimov, while largely about Moscow politics, is also about Putin being impatient for battlefield victories. This will influence the timing and kind of Russian offensives.
20/ It is certainly an influence in the Ukrainian offensives to come. Possessing a healthy interplay of civil and military leaders (what @EliotACohen calls the unequal dialog) military endeavours have political objectives (liberation of Ukrainian territory). It is certainly an influence in the Ukrainian offensives to come. Possessing a healthy interplay of civil and military leaders (whatcalls the unequal dialog) military endeavours have political objectives (liberation of Ukrainian territory).
21/ Politics also influences exploitation limits. In offensive operations ‘limit of exploitation’ is a line beyond which military commanders may not exploit the success of earlier stages of an attack.” In a major campaign, this won’t just be a military consideration.
22/ The Ukrainian President will be seeking a balance of reclaiming Ukrainian territory while retaining Western support. While the limits of Ukrainian military offensives may be governed by political and not just military issues, Zelensky has been clear on liberating all Ukraine.
23/ There have been many speculative articles on when offensives might occur in #Ukraine. My aim here is not to discuss exact timing or locations, but to discuss how campaign planners might think about the fight ahead.
24/ So, we are at a point where we await potential Ukrainian & Russian offensives in 2023. Over the winter both sides will have been preparing & shaping the environment for these offensives. There are many more battles to come before Ukraine liberates all its territory. End. So, we are at a point where we await potential Ukrainian & Russian offensives in 2023. Over the winter both sides will have been preparing & shaping the environment for these offensives. There are many more battles to come before Ukraine liberates all its territory. End.
25/ Thank you to the following whose images and links were used in this thread: @DefenceU @IAPonomarenko @washingtonpost @APNews @KyivIndependent @POLITICOEurope @TDF_UA @Reuters @Militarylandnet @nytimes @MassDara Thank you to the following whose images and links were used in this thread:
• • •
x The project to develop an unmanned aerial vehicle with a range of more than 1,000 kilometers and a payload of up to 75 kilograms “has reached such a stage that, unfortunately, we cannot talk about it,” Ukroboronprom spokesperson Nataliia Sad, said. — The Kyiv Independent (@KyivIndependent) January 13, 2023
x In #Moscow, #Russia, an S-400 air defence system has been reportedly deployed - based on these photos, close to residential areas: pic.twitter.com/Wiql1l88tq — Alex Kokcharov (@AlexKokcharov) January 13, 2023
x Exclusive: Russian oil shipped to Asia in Chinese supertankers amid ship shortage
https://t.co/Be88Ja1P5t pic.twitter.com/3FNy4hH6gs — Reuters Energy and Commodities (@ReutersCommods) January 13, 2023
x Sweeping European sanctions on Russian oil are prompting the country to transport more crude on its own tankers
https://t.co/xJILKGENCu — Bloomberg Energy (@BloombergNRG) January 13, 2023
[END]
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