(C) Daily Kos
This story was originally published by Daily Kos and is unaltered.
. . . . . . . . . .
Ukraine Invasion Day 317: are ceasefires opportune or opportunistic [1]
['This Content Is Not Subject To Review Daily Kos Staff Prior To Publication.', 'Backgroundurl Avatar_Large', 'Nickname', 'Joined', 'Created_At', 'Story Count', 'N_Stories', 'Comment Count', 'N_Comments', 'Popular Tags']
Date: 2023-01-05
Putin orders 36-Hour CeaseFire as Kremlin says it will pause firing on the front line for Russian Orthodox Christmas
Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence states that Ukraine is planning a major offensive for spring. The fiercest fighting is anticipated in March 2023.
https://t.co/naXCyAC2y6
"Those systems have been stressed for the Russians from the onset and weather conditions will only make that harder. The only advantage the Russians have in this conflict is mass".
Collins said that Ukraine can also absorb the stress of fighting in low or sub-zero temperatures much better than the Russians, who have logistics, morale and leadership difficulties instead.
Former US Army colonel Liam Collins told Euronews that Ukraine needs to stage an attack before snow melts in spring, making unpaved roads harder to use.
A new offensive would also be "crucial to maintain the support of the international community and demonstrate that their huge financial and military effort for Ukraine is bringing results".
"They've got to maintain the momentum that they’ve built up: First in September with the capture of the Kharkiv region, and then in November with the liberation of Kherson ," he told Euronews.
"Ukraine is marshalling and holding back troops and ammunition for a new major attack on Russian positions", said Peter Dickinson, Ukraine analyst at the Atlantic Council .
As Russian strikes against Ukraine continue relentlessly and peace hopes seem to fade , a growing number of experts say the war may soon reach a crucial turning point.
About putin and his “cease fire”. Imagine a rapist broke into your house. He rapes, kills. Then he got tired. And he asks for “cease fire”. What will you answer?
The ceasefire announcement positions Putin as the guarantor of Christian values and beliefs. Putin and other Russian officials have frequently framed the war in Ukraine as a religious war against “Satanic” and “fanatical” elements of Ukrainian society that seek to undermine traditional religious values and morality.[9] Putin’s proposed ceasefire supports false Russian information operations that Russia is fighting a holy war against an immoral Ukrainian society and its secular Western overseers. In actuality, Russian forces have suppressed religious freedom in occupied Ukrainian territory since 2014.[10]
Putin’s framing of the ceasefire on religious grounds additionally reinforces another two-fold Russian information operation that frames Ukraine as suppressing religious groups and positions Putin as the true protector of the Christian faith. As ISW has previously observed, the Kremlin has weaponized discussions of Eastern Orthodox Christianity to accuse Kyiv of oppressing religious liberties in Ukraine.[6] Russian sources have recently picked up on raids carried out by the Ukrainian State Security Service (SBU) against Russian Orthodox churches and clergy members and Ukrainian sanctions against Kremlin-linked elements of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).[7] These measures are not efforts to suppress religious liberties in Ukraine but rather are aimed at explicitly pro-Kremlin elements of the Russian Orthodox Church that have materially, politically, and spiritually supported Russian aggression against Ukraine.[8] The invocation of a ceasefire on distinctly religious grounds in line with Russian Orthodox Christian tradition is a subcomponent of this information operation. Suddenly announcing a ceasefire with Ukraine that should have been negotiated well in advance in observance of Russian Orthodox Christmas will allow Russia to frame Ukraine as infringing on the right of believers to celebrate the holiday as hostilities will likely continue into January 6 and 7. This information operation can support the baseless Kremlin narrative that Ukraine was persecuting Orthodox Christians and Russian speakers, a narrative that Putin has repeatedly advanced as justification for his illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Putin could have been seeking to secure a 36-hour pause for Russian troops to afford them the ability to rest, recoup, and reorient to relaunch offensive operations in critical sectors of the front. Such a pause would disproportionately benefit Russian troops and begin to deprive Ukraine of the initiative . Putin cannot reasonably expect Ukraine to meet the terms of this suddenly declared ceasefire and may have called for the ceasefire to frame Ukraine as unaccommodating and unwilling to take the necessary steps towards negotiations. This is an intentional information tactic that Russia has previously employed, as ISW has reported.[4] Ceasefires also take time to organize and implement. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov notably said on December 14 that Russia has no plans for a ceasefire for Russian Orthodox Christmas, so Putin’s sudden January 5 announcement was surprising.[5] The date of Russian Orthodox Christmas in 2023, after all, has been known for centuries. Had Putin been serious about a religiously motivated ceasefire he had ample time to prepare for it. The announcement of a ceasefire within 24 hours of when it is meant to enter into force suggests that it was announced with the intention of framing Ukrainian forces who continue to fight throughout the timeframe of the ceasefire as unwilling to work towards peace and wanting to fight at all costs.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement that Russian forces will conduct a 36-hour ceasefire between January 6 and January 7 in observance of Russian Orthodox Christmas is likely an information operation intended to damage Ukraine’s reputation. Putin instructed Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to initiate a ceasefire from 1200 January 6 to 2400 January 7 along the “entire line of contact between parties in Ukraine” and called on Ukraine to accept the ceasefire to allow “a large number of citizens of citizens professing Orthodoxy” to attend services on the day of Russian Orthodox Christmas.[1] Putin’s announcement was ostensibly in response to an appeal by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow (head of the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church) for a temporary ceasefire in observance of Christmas Eve and the Day of the Nativity of Christ.[2] Ukrainian and Western officials, including US President Joe Biden, immediately highlighted the hypocrisy of the ceasefire announcement and emphasized that Russian forces continued striking Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure on December 25—when many Orthodox Ukrainians celebrate Christmas—and New Year’s.[3]
Biden on Putin’s announced ceasefire: “It’s interesting that he was ready to bomb hospitals, nurseries and churches on December 25th and the New Year. I think he's trying to find some oxygen” pic.twitter.com/3EgL4dXenR
Out of its force of nearly 50,000 mercenaries, Wagner has sustained more than 4,100 deaths and 10,000 wounded, including over 1,000 killed between late November and early December near Bakhmut. KYIV, Ukraine — Ukraine has claimed a string of successful artillery attacks on Russian barracks in the first days of the year, asserting that it hit newly drafted men and other soldiers where they were sleeping or congregating, killing or wounding hundreds. The Russian military has confirmed one of the three waves of claimed strikes, though it gave a much lower death toll than the Ukrainians estimate. Even the lower toll of 89 soldiers killed in that attack, however, represents a startling setback for the Russian military. Social media posts, reports from local residents and Russians who blog about military affairs offered partial confirmation of the other strikes claimed by Ukraine, but not corroboration of the casualty counts. Military analysts say the Ukrainians’ use of long-range artillery, including American-provided HIMARS precision rockets, to target barracks marks a shift for the artillery forces, which for months had concentrated on matériel like ammunition depots.
The Ukrainian military’s focus on the Russian infantry is among the first changes seen in its tactics with its American-provided weaponry, in response to Russia’s mobilization of hundreds of thousands of soldiers over the fall. The haphazard movement of additional soldiers into the war zone, many of them poorly trained and led, has presented new targets behind the front lines for howitzers that can fire more than 20 miles and HIMARS rockets with a range of up to about 50 miles, analysts say. www.nytimes.com/...
x ⚡️ WAR IN #UKRAINE - JAN 5
Increased troop as well as equipment losses
TODAY'S REPORT:
810 troop losses ⬆
7-day troop average: 737 ⬆
34 equipment* losses ⬆
7-day equipment* average: 34 ⬆
* Land-based only
📈
https://t.co/Yp6uLWqZUs pic.twitter.com/n4oJSKWLwR — Ragnar Gudmundsson 🇮🇸🇺🇦
[email protected] (@ragnarbjartur) January 5, 2023
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian forces continued limited counterattacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on January 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Stelmakhivka (16km northwest of Svatove).[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that battles in the past week between Ukrainian and Russian forces northwest of Svatove have been positional in nature and that control of terrain has not changed.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault near Ploshchanka (17km northwest of Kreminna).[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District have been conducting an offensive or a very active defense along the Ploshchanka-Makiivka line (22km northwest of Kreminna) for the past few weeks.[28] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to push Ukrainian forces back from positions near the R-66 (Svatove-Kreminna) highway and that fighting is the fiercest near Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna).[29] The Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian artillery units can currently interdict all Russian movements on the highway and that Russian forces intend to resume movements along the highway after pushing Ukrainian forces further back.[30] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on January 5 that Russian forces transferred mobilized servicemembers and Wagner Group personnel to the Kreminna area out of fear that the tactical situation in the area was worsening.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also conducted an assault towards Bilohorivka, Luhansk Oblast (12km south of Kreminna).[32]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces continued to operate sabotage and reconnaissance groups on the Dnipro River and reinforce positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on January 5. Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on January 4 that Russian forces are training mobilized personnel in the Henichesk area and transferring more manpower to the area.[47] The Head of the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavrisk Direction Defense Forces, Yevhen Yerin, stated on January 5 that Russian forces are primarily conducting defensive actions in Kherson Oblast, and only use small sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the Dnipro River and delta islands to probe Ukrainian defenses.[48] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces maintain positions on Velyki Potemkin Island southwest of Kherson City in the Dnipro River delta and that Ukrainian forces previously only briefly landed on the island on January 2.[49] One milblogger claimed that the islands remain contested and that it does not make sense for Russian forces to maintain positions on the islands as they cannot launch an effective amphibious operation without controlling a bridgehead to Kherson City.[50]
www.understandingwar.org/...
x Early this morning Ukrainian HIMARS hit the town of Havrylivka Druha in the Kherson region.There were app 1000 Russian soldiers stationed there. Expect another Makiivka #Ukraine #Russia #Putin #Putinswar #Ukrainewar #UkraineFrontLines pic.twitter.com/4zTuJIximb — raging545 (@raging545) January 5, 2023
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a successful counterattack as Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on January 4 and 5. The Ukrainian State Border Guards Service reported on January 4 that Ukrainian soldiers conducted a tactical counterattack in Bakhmut and advanced 300 meters in an unspecified area, forcing Russian troops to withdraw from certain unspecified positions.[37] Russian sources refuted this report and claimed that Russian troops have advanced northeast and south of Bakhmut and made gains within Bakhmut itself.[38] The Ukrainian General Staff stated on January 5 that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Bilohorivka (22km northeast), Soledar (10km northeast), Krasna Hora (5km north), Vyimka (25km northeast), and Pidhorodne (5km northeast); and south of Bakhmut near Kurdyumivka (12km southwest), Mayorsk (20km south), and Pivnichne (20km southwest).[39] Geolocated footage posted between January 4 and 5 indicates that Russian troops have made marginal advances south of Bakhmut near Opytne (3km south of Bakhmut) and Kurdiumivka.[40] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group forces expanded their control over certain urban areas on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[41] Former commander of militants in Donbas in 2014 and prominent milblogger Igor Girkin noted that this sector of the front is a “mutual meatgrinder of attrition” for Ukrainian and Russian troops.[42]
www.understandingwar.org/...
x A Ukrainian T-72 charges a Russian trench, firing into it at point blank range with its main gun. pic.twitter.com/adkfPfMBMK — OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) January 5, 2023
x Russian troops continue to arrive in Belarus
According to the Belarusian Defense Ministry "personnel, weapons, military and special equipment" of the Russian Armed Forces continue to arrive in the country. The number of arriving servicemen or weapons is not specified. pic.twitter.com/avVGLRLgFU — NEXTA (@nexta_tv) January 5, 2023
x Amazing video. Beginning of Russian war. #Kyiv under siege. Ordinary Ukrainians take up arms to defend their freedom pic.twitter.com/CmtYbUqV9f — Sergiy Koshman (@Koshman) January 4, 2023
x Russian Soldiers Use Dead 'Rotting' Bodies As Shield, Like 'In A Movie': Ukraine Intel Chief
https://t.co/Zym9NFPvPc — 🇺🇸TrumpRussiaTies Mapping Project🇺🇸🇺🇦 (@TrumpRussiaTies) January 5, 2023
x M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles Will Be Sent By U.S. To Ukraine
https://t.co/gNULvYlHyq — The War Zone (@thewarzonewire) January 5, 2023
x The announcements in the past day of infantry fighting vehicles being sent to #Ukraine represent an increase in capability for Ukraine’s soldiers, and a change in mindset in the Western leaders. What does this mean for 2023? 1/25 🧵🇺🇦
https://t.co/INFVBESQyC — Mick Ryan, AM (@WarintheFuture) January 5, 2023
2/ And we should not forget, the French are also contributing to this enhanced armoured fighting vehicle fleet for #Ukraine. And we should not forget, the French are also contributing to this enhanced armoured fighting vehicle fleet for
3/ These decisions will have several impacts on fighting - as well as strategy and preparing for fighting - in 2023.
4/ First, these vehicles will provide a clear qualitative increase in capability for . These are leading edge infantry fighting vehicles, designed to fight in a mechanised combined arms team, against Soviet and Russian forces. First, these vehicles will provide a clear qualitative increase in capability for #Ukraine . These are leading edge infantry fighting vehicles, designed to fight in a mechanised combined arms team, against Soviet and Russian forces.
5/ This qualitative edge will be important in the battles to come. Ukraine, despite its momentum, demonstrated ability to win and superior morale, will need every edge possible in the tough offensives to eject Russia from its defensive positions.
6/ Not only are these well armoured and armed vehicles, they have very good optics and digital communications - essential for the effective integration of combined arms teams.
7/ A second implication of these vehicles is that #Ukraine will need to continue its transition to standard #NATO logistics processes. Armoured vehicles are supported in echelons from company, battalion and above. So new processes, and new logistic supply chains, will be needed. A second implication of these vehicles is thatwill need to continue its transition to standardlogistics processes. Armoured vehicles are supported in echelons from company, battalion and above. So new processes, and new logistic supply chains, will be needed.
8/ Perhaps a thread from logistics expert @TrentTelenko would be in order to cover this topic on support echelons for western armoured vehicles. Perhaps a thread from logistics expertwould be in order to cover this topic on support echelons for western armoured vehicles.
9/ A third implication is that the old Soviet-era fleet of armoured vehicles in Ukraine’s military continues to degrade in serviceability - and they have less ammunition. This means Western vehicles are probably here to stay as a long term solution to Ukraine’s land force needs.
10/ But this may also mean that Russia is having similar problems - albeit at a different scale - with availability of vehicles and ammo. This will bear watching, and will be an exploitable weakness for #Ukraine. But this may also mean that Russia is having similar problems - albeit at a different scale - with availability of vehicles and ammo. This will bear watching, and will be an exploitable weakness for
11/ A fourth issue is that additional training will be needed to not just operate and sustain the vehicles, but also ensure they are used as infantry fighting vehicles and not just infantry ‘carriage’ vehicles. There is an important difference.
12/ That said, the Ukrainians throughout this war have demonstrated the capacity to very quickly absorb new weapons and equipment, and then use them in novel or clever ways. Think , Gepards and Javelin. We should expect the same with the Bradley’s and Marders. That said, the Ukrainians throughout this war have demonstrated the capacity to very quickly absorb new weapons and equipment, and then use them in novel or clever ways. Think #HIMARS , Gepards and Javelin. We should expect the same with the Bradley’s and Marders.
13/ A fifth issue is that a single shipment probably won’t suffice. As good as they are, there will be battle losses of these vehicles. More will be needed for Ukraine’s offensives to come. The eventual need will be hundreds of each.
14/ A sixth issue is that this may drive the provision of other armoured vehicles for fast moving and hard hitting mechanised forces. For example, more self-propelled artillery is probably needed for the brigades that will employ the Bradley’s & Marders. Norway has donated M109 to Ukraine 15/ Additionally, more low-loaders, protected logistics vehicles and protected, mobile C2 vehicles will also be required.
16/ And most important of all - protected mobility support vehicles will be needed for the Sappers to quickly breach or bridge obstacles and sustain the momentum of the advances we expect these vehicles to be used in. Terriers and M9 ACE are good examples of these vehicles. And most important of all - protected mobility support vehicles will be needed for the Sappers to quickly breach or bridge obstacles and sustain the momentum of the advances we expect these vehicles to be used in. Terriers and M9 ACE are good examples of these vehicles.
17/ A seventh implication is that this may be a step closer to the West providing tanks. While Ukraine has many Soviet era tanks - it’s own and captured - these are wearing out, are short of ammo, and less capable than tanks like the M1 or Leopard.
18/ The best candidate is the M1. The US has thousands in storage that can be upgraded. Poland has just purchased hundreds, so eventually, a common strategic logistics support approach would be possible. Leopards would probably suffice as well. Abrams-maker GDLS announces $1.1 billion tank deal for Poland The best candidate is the M1. The US has thousands in storage that can be upgraded. Poland has just purchased hundreds, so eventually, a common strategic logistics support approach would be possible. Leopards would probably suffice as well.
19/ The M1 is hard to sustain, but having commanded a mechanised brigade containing M1s, this is sometimes over emphasised. Our brigade had a different logistic support construct from the US Army, and the tanks worked fine. Stop using this as an excuse!
20/ And providing M1s or Leopards does not ‘escalate’ the conflict. This is an empty argument against providing support to a fellow democracy that has been invaded by a nation with leading edge tanks and long range bombers!
21/ Finally, the provision of these armoured vehicles is a statement of faith in #Ukraine from Europe & America. Nations in Europe, and the US, now appear to believe that Ukraine can win this war. This may result in a range of other support efforts in the coming weeks and months. Finally, the provision of these armoured vehicles is a statement of faith infrom Europe & America. Nations in Europe, and the US, now appear to believe that Ukraine can win this war. This may result in a range of other support efforts in the coming weeks and months.
22/ This is also a signal to Putin. He will need to rethink his strategic calculus for this war. Assuming Europe will lose patience, the West has confounded Putin by not only staying the course with Ukraine but continuously providing more and better equipment and munitions.
23/ Perhaps Putin should use his Orthodox Christmas ceasefire to think about how Russia can withdraw from Ukraine (including Crimea) in 2023. Russia-Ukraine War: Putin Orders Brief Unilateral Cease-Fire; Ukraine Calls It ‘Hypocrisy’
24/ Overall, the provision of the IFVs by America and Germany will have many impacts but is a very positive development. It will increase the fighting power of Ukrainian soldiers - and provide a boost in confidence and morale for #Ukraine. End
25/ Thank you to the following for the images and links used in this thread: @washingtonpost military-today.com @nytimes @Osinttechnical @IAPonomarenko @defense_news @brycewilsonAU Thank you to the following for the images and links used in this thread:
• • •
Euromaidan Press @EuromaidanPress Russia terrorizes Ukraine with 9M727 Iskander cruise missiles launched from 9K720 Iskander short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) system, aka by some as "hospital killer." 9M727 Iskander contains 20 Western components. 15 of them are US-made. Read more ⤵️: euromaidanpress.com/2022/12/31/how…
x There has been a consistent uptick in the last few days, both in what is being supplied to Ukraine militarily and how Ukraine’s victory is the goal. Think we can say there is growing consensus in NATO countries that Ukraine can win this war outright
https://t.co/Vb8i7RrZDh — Phillips P. OBrien (@PhillipsPOBrien) January 5, 2023
You might say we are in phase 4 of military assessment of this war.
Phase 1: Russian shock and awe! Kyiv falls in a week.
Phase 2: My God, Ukraine might hold out.
Phase 3: Can Ukraine actually push Russia back?
Phase 4. Ukraine has a really effective military, it can win.
Took a while, but we are getting there
And yes, winning the war outright means liberating all of its legally accepted territories, including Crimea
UK making sure its getting in on the party--hinting they will send actual tanks. Missed this earlier--Germany also committing to send a Patriot battery. Things are really ramping up for Ukraine
All of this on a day when the Russians were trying to gain traction on a 'ceasefire'. Hah. Think we can say that there will be no pressure on Ukraine to sign a deal it doesn’t want.
So many things happening. A few things--basically Ukraine is in the process of almost fully transitioning to NATO standard systems. This means in qualitative advantage will continue to grow. Also means that its future is looking more and more as part of NATO made similar points earlier today.
Nonsense. If this war has revealed anything, it is that Ukraine can determine its own destiny. Its not some protectorate of a declining, decrepit Russia. If it wishes as a democracy to join NATO, I bet it gets in--sooner than you might imagine.
Nice to see German officials saying these things unequivocally and with pride.
One of the possible reasons for growing confidence by western European states. The damage the Ukrainians have inflicted on the Russians will be practically impossible to recover from in the short term. Poorly trained conscripts will not replace these.
• • •
x BEB analysts say total estimated losses from the scheme in 2022 stood at UAH 5.2 billion ($142 million).
https://t.co/QuEmKpEQVj — The New Voice of Ukraine (@NewVoiceUkraine) January 6, 2023
As the war continues, Russian intelligence collection probably represents the greatest ongoing cyber risk to Ukraine. Conceivably, Russian hackers might still have larger impact if they can collect high-value intelligence that Moscow then leverages effectively. For example, the hackers might obtain real-time geolocation data that enable the assassination of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy or the timely and accurate targeting of Ukrainian forces, particularly those with high-value Western weapons systems; conduct hack-and-leak operations revealing sensitive war information to the Ukrainian and Western public, such as Ukraine’s combat losses, internal schisms, or military doubts; or collect valuable information about Kyiv’s perceptions and intentions that can aid Moscow at future talks, among other scenarios. Russian cyber fires pose a less serious threat, though such attacks could multiply if Moscow directs more of its overall cyber capability toward Ukraine (at the cost of other objectives) or better leverages cyber criminals.
Conceivably, Russian hackers might still have larger impact if they can collect high-value intelligence that Moscow then leverages effectively. For example, the hackers might obtain real-time geolocation data that enable the assassination of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy or the timely and accurate targeting of Ukrainian forces, particularly those with high-value Western weapons systems; conduct hack-and-leak operations revealing sensitive war information to the Ukrainian and Western public, such as Ukraine’s combat losses, internal schisms, or military doubts; or collect valuable information about Kyiv’s perceptions and intentions that can aid Moscow at future talks, among other scenarios. Russian cyber fires pose a less serious threat, though such attacks could multiply if Moscow directs more of its overall cyber capability toward Ukraine (at the cost of other objectives) or better leverages cyber criminals. This paper’s tentative insights represent one reasonable interpretation of fragmentary, conflicting, and evolving data. Analysts remain reliant on reports from the Ukrainian government, allied governments, cybersecurity companies, and journalists to understand Russia’s cyber operations, their effects, and the larger war in Ukraine. Yet those sources have only partial knowledge, and parochial concerns inevitably shape what, when, and how information is shared. Some sources, for example, have produced fewer public reports in recent months than before. The resulting “cyber fog of war” continues to shroud even the most closely watched cyber incidents. A wider fog pervades the war as a whole, which has already undergone several distinct phases in just nine months—often developing in ways that surprise Western analysts (and others). Despite this uncertainty, governments around the world will not wait to incorporate perceived lessons learned into ongoing updates of military cyber strategies, budgets, doctrines, and plans. Analysts should offer the best assessments currently possible while acknowledging information gaps and the need to reassess over time.
carnegieendowment.org/...
[END]
---
[1] Url:
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2023/1/5/2145382/-Ukraine-Invasion-Day-317-are-ceasefires-opportune-or-opportunistic
Published and (C) by Daily Kos
Content appears here under this condition or license: Site content may be used for any purpose without permission unless otherwise specified.
via Magical.Fish Gopher News Feeds:
gopher://magical.fish/1/feeds/news/dailykos/
